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Management should be protected during an M&A transaction

How to Reward and Protect the CEO and Management Team in an M&A Transaction

Richard Harroch
Finance Legal
Nov 20, 2026

Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) of private companies are complicated, time-consuming, and stressful. The CEO and management team of the seller are essential to the success of a potential deal: they run the business, build the data room, respond to the buyer’s diligence team, and keep customers and employees steady while the process plays out.

Yet they are often the people with the most to lose if the deal goes badly, or even if it goes well, since the buyer may not need them afterward. That is why it is appropriate for management to be thoughtfully rewarded and protected in an M&A transaction, and why the arrangements need to be planned early and negotiated with care.

This article explores the executive compensation arrangements and legal protections that benefit both the management team and the selling company in an M&A deal, including transaction bonuses, treatment of stock options, rollover equity, severance, retention agreements, new employment agreements, golden parachute tax rules, liability protection, and more.

These observations are based on my having been involved in over 200 M&A deals over the years with the likes of Google, eBay, Boeing, Fox (News Corp.), Qualcomm, NBC, LexisNexis, Dun & Bradstreet, Nokia, Sony, private equity firms, Silicon Valley emerging tech businesses, and other companies.

Key Takeaways on M&A Executive Compensation

  • Start early. Management compensation and protection terms are far easier to negotiate before a letter of intent is signed than after the buyer has exclusivity.
  • Know the market. Management carveouts appear in only a small percentage of private-target deals, but they are common where management would otherwise receive little from the sale.
  • Mind the tax rules. Sections 280G and 409A of the Internal Revenue Code can turn a generous package into an expensive problem if they are not addressed before closing.
  • Get separate counsel. Management should often have its own experienced employment, benefits, and tax counsel, paid for by the company. Management’s interests prior to and after a sale are not the same as the company’s interests, and each is best served by having its own counsel.
  • Protect against the downside. Severance with a narrow definition of “cause,” D&O insurance tail coverage, and indemnification rights matter just as much as headline compensation.
  • Handle conflicts transparently. The board should oversee management arrangements so that shareholders can trust the process.

Complicated Issues Faced by CEOs and Management Teams

CEOs and management teams face a long list of challenges in trying to navigate a successful closing of an M&A deal, including:

  • Creation of pitch decks and confidential information memorandums
  • Creation of an online data room containing complete corporate documents, contracts, intellectual property information, employee information, financials, and much more
  • Preparing for management presentations to, and responding to myriad meeting requests from, potential buyers
  • Responding to all-encompassing due diligence requests from potential buyers, including cybersecurity, data privacy, and increasingly, AI and open source software questions
  • Supporting any quality-of-earnings review and working capital analysis
  • Preparing disclosure schedules for the M&A agreement (which can take up to or more than 15 drafts and 50 pages to get right)
  • Coordinating efforts with investment bankers and legal counsel
  • Preparing and defending financial projections and related assumptions
  • Negotiating the terms of any letter of intent and the definitive M&A agreement with the assistance of legal counsel
  • Managing employee morale and concerns that in working towards the acquisition, they may be, in essence, working themselves out of a job
  • All of the above while simultaneously working their day jobs and ensuring that the business doesn’t suffer from the distractions. Indeed, selling companies need to preserve and grow their businesses during a sale process.

Those are some of the reasons why it’s important that CEOs, management teams, and employees feel they are being appropriately rewarded and protected. Let us explore some ways to do that.

Start With Conflicts of Interest and Timing

Before getting into the specific arrangements, it is important to address a threshold issue: management owes fiduciary duties to the company and its shareholders, so negotiating personal compensation while also representing the company in a sale creates an inherent conflict. Buyers know this, and so do shareholders. Handled well, the conflict is manageable. Handled poorly, it can create friction with the board, distrust among investors, and even legal exposure.

Several practices help:

  • Board oversight. The board of directors, or its independent directors or M&A committee, should review and approve any transaction bonus plan, severance arrangement, or equity acceleration for management.
  • Sequencing. Buyers commonly wait to discuss post-closing roles and compensation until the price and key terms are largely settled, often after the letter of intent, so that management is not seen as trading shareholder value for a personal package. Any earlier discussions should be done with the board’s knowledge and consent.
  • Transparency. Disclose management arrangements to the board and, where required or appropriate, to shareholders in the information statement or consent solicitation that accompanies the deal.
  • Document the rationale. Record why the bonus pool is sized as it is and how it is allocated, so the arrangements can be defended as fair if questioned later.
  • Understand who pays. Transaction bonuses and related payroll taxes are typically treated as transaction expenses that reduce the proceeds going to selling shareholders, and buyers sometimes fund new management incentives by trimming the price. Shareholders ultimately bear these costs, which is why independent board approval matters.

Change in Control Transaction Bonus (Management Carveout)

It is appropriate and reasonable for the CEO and management team to request a “change in control” transaction bonus contingent on the closing of an M&A sale. Sometimes these are referred to as “management carveouts.” Here are the key elements of this type of bonus plan that will need to be decided:

  • Amount of bonus. In my experience, aggregate bonus pools for the CEO, management team, and key employees often fall in the range of roughly 6% to 10% of the gross sale price, varying with the size of the transaction and the value management holds in equity. SRS Acquiom’s M&A Deal Terms Studies, which analyze private-target deals, define a “management carveout” more narrowly as a portion of deal proceeds set aside for management when liquidation preferences would otherwise leave them with little or nothing, and they exclude ordinary transaction bonuses from that definition. In deals where such a carveout was used, the median size has ranged from roughly 7% to 13% of transaction value in recent years (10.0% in 2022, 6.8% in 2023, and 12.7% in 2024), though sample sizes are small and the figures swing from year to year.
  • How common are they? Management carveouts appear in a small minority of private-target deals: about 5% in 2024 and 4.3% in 2025 according to reports on the SRS Acquiom studies. They are more common in smaller deals (about 7.6% of deals valued at $50 million or less) and become less frequent as deal size grows. The takeaway is that a carveout is most likely when investor preferences are large relative to the sale price, while transaction bonuses for management are a much broader practice.
  • When paid. At the closing of the M&A event, usually out of the closing proceeds. Sometimes a portion is held back and paid when escrows or earnouts are released.
  • How split among the employees. This varies but usually takes into account seniority level, compensation level, and time employed by the company. The CEO’s bonus would typically be in the range of 1% to 4% of the sale price, depending on the size of the bonus pool and other factors.
  • Obligations of employees. Employees are typically asked to sign a release form at the time of payment, although the employee can ask for a mutual release. Employees typically must remain employed through closing in order to be eligible to be paid. Releases from employees age 40 or older typically must allow 21 days to consider (45 days in a group program) and 7 days to revoke, so build that into the payment timeline.
  • Stock options and equity. The change in control bonus is typically in addition to any equity value held by the employee, especially if the options are underwater. The lower the value of an executive’s equity, the stronger the case for a larger bonus.
  • Allocation of costs. The purchase agreement should state clearly how the bonuses and the employer-side payroll taxes on them are treated in the purchase price calculation, so there are no surprises at closing.
  • Tax treatment. Transaction bonuses are ordinary compensation income to the recipient, subject to withholding, and must be analyzed under the golden parachute and deferred compensation rules discussed below.

Transaction Bonuses, Management Incentive Plans, and Retention Bonuses: What’s the Difference?

These terms are often used loosely, so it helps to distinguish them. A transaction bonus (or carveout) is paid at or shortly after closing to reward management for getting the deal done. A retention bonus is paid by the buyer only if the employee stays for a defined period after closing. A management incentive plan (MIP) is a forward-looking equity or profits-interest program, most often adopted by a private equity buyer, that rewards management for increasing the value of the business after closing. A well-designed package can include all three: a transaction bonus for past efforts, a retention bonus to bridge the integration period, and an incentive plan to align management with the buyer’s long-term goals.

Treatment of Existing Stock Options and Equity in an M&A Event

Management will be mindful of how their existing stock options or equity incentive arrangements will be treated in an M&A event (assuming they exist and are not underwater). The plan documents and award agreements are the starting point, but the treatment is often negotiable. Key issues include:

  • Accelerated vesting. To the extent any employee stock options or restricted stock units are not fully vested at the closing of the M&A event, management often requests that all or a portion of the unvested awards become vested on an accelerated basis. “Single trigger” acceleration vests upon the closing alone; “double trigger” acceleration vests only if the executive is also terminated without cause or resigns for good reason within a specified period after closing. Buyers strongly prefer double trigger, since single trigger gives executives little reason to stay.
  • Cash-out, assumption, or substitution. The buyer may cash out vested options for the spread between the deal price and the exercise price, assume the options and convert them into options of the buyer, or replace them with a new incentive program. Buyers typically seek cancellation of underwater or unvested options without payment.
  • Cashless exercise. The option holder will want to “cashless exercise” their options, negating the potential requirement that they put up cash to exercise.
  • Interplay of options and change in control bonus amounts. The board should be mindful to treat employees fairly and be thoughtful about how the change in control bonus and stock options interplay. The lower the value of the options, the higher the change in control bonus should be.
  • Escrow and earnout participation. If there is an indemnification escrow or earnout in the M&A agreement, will option holders be required to contribute to the escrow and share in the earnout on the same terms as other holders? Deferred payments on options need to be structured to satisfy IRC Section 409A. There is a compelling argument by the company that optionees should share in any indemnification escrow.
  • Tax character. Cash received for non-qualified options is ordinary income, and incentive stock options may lose their favorable treatment if cashed out or accelerated in certain ways. Executives should model the tax outcome before agreeing to a treatment.
  • Qualified small business stock (QSBS). Founders and early employees holding stock that qualifies under IRC Section 1202 should confirm their status before any sale. For QSBS issued after July 4, 2025, the One Big Beautiful Bill Act introduced a tiered gain exclusion of 50% after three years, 75% after four years, and 100% after five years, raised the per-taxpayer exclusion cap from $10 million to $15 million (indexed for inflation after 2026), and increased the company gross asset limit from $50 million to $75 million. Stock issued on or before that date generally remains subject to the prior rules, including the five-year holding period. The structure of the deal can affect whether a sale qualifies, so involve tax counsel early.

Management Rollover Equity and Reinvestment

When the buyer is a private equity firm or another financial buyer, it will often ask the CEO and key executives to “roll over” a portion of their sale proceeds into equity of the buyer’s acquisition vehicle. This aligns management with the buyer and reduces the cash the buyer must raise.

For management, a rollover can be lucrative if the business grows, but it raises its own issues:

  • Tax deferral. A properly structured rollover can defer tax on the rolled portion until the buyer exits, but the structure must be designed by tax counsel and the rolled value should be priced at the same per-share value as the cash consideration.
  • Terms of the new equity. Executives should understand the preferred return, liquidation preferences, and debt that sit ahead of their equity or profits interests, and how dilution from future financings and option pools will affect them.
  • Vesting and “leaver” provisions. Rolled equity is usually fully vested, but new incentive equity typically vests over time. Review “good leaver” and “bad leaver” provisions that let the company repurchase equity at a discount if the executive departs, and push for a narrow definition of bad leaver.
  • Governance and liquidity. Look at board representation, information rights, tag-along and drag-along rights, restrictions on transfer, and how and when management can realize value.
  • Concentration risk. Rolling a large share of one’s net worth into a leveraged private company is a significant decision that deserves independent financial and legal advice.

Severance Arrangements

Management teams and employees will naturally be concerned with losing their jobs in an M&A event. Either the seller or the buyer can implement severance arrangements that will mitigate those concerns. Analysis should be undertaken of any existing severance policies of the company. The idea here is that the severance arrangements would be in addition to the change in control bonus.

  • Amount of severance for the CEO. If the CEO is fired without cause or quits for good reason, it’s reasonable for the CEO to request severance payments equal to 1-2 years of base pay, pro-rata accrued bonus for the current year, and 1-2 years of target bonus, plus continuing health benefits for that period.
  • Amount of severance for other senior management. For other senior management where the executive is fired without cause or quits for good reason, it’s reasonable to request 6 months to 1 year of base salary, pro-rata accrued bonus for the current year, and 6 months to 1 year of target bonus, plus continuing health benefits for that period.
  • Amount of severance for rank and file employees. This varies across companies but is usually tied to seniority and/or compensation level, target bonus, and length of employment.
  • Protection period. Many executives negotiate enhanced severance that applies if the termination occurs within a set window (often 12 to 24 months) after the closing, which is the period of greatest risk.
  • Lump sum payment. It’s best for the employee to receive a lump sum payment on termination and not a series of payments spread out over time. Note that payment timing must comply with IRC Section 409A.
  • Equity acceleration. Tie severance to acceleration of unvested equity.
  • Important definition of cause. Since severance is usually only paid when someone is terminated without “cause,” it’s extremely important to the employee that the term is narrowly defined. Likewise, a broad “good reason” definition (covering material reductions in title, duties, compensation, reporting line, or a relocation) protects an executive whose role is materially diminished after the acquisition.

For a more in-depth discussion of severance packages, see my articles 15 Frequently Asked Questions About Severance Pay and 20 Key Issues in Negotiating an Employment Severance Package.

Golden Parachute Tax Rules: Sections 280G and 4999

One of the most important and least understood issues for management in an M&A deal is the “golden parachute” tax regime under Sections 280G and 4999 of the Internal Revenue Code. If an executive, significant shareholder, or other “disqualified individual” receives payments contingent on a change in control that equal or exceed three times the individual’s average annual compensation over the prior five years (the “base amount”), the portion above one times the base amount is an “excess parachute payment.” The executive owes a 20% excise tax on that excess, on top of ordinary income tax, and the company loses its tax deduction for it.

Parachute payments can include transaction bonuses, severance, and the value of accelerated equity. Because the threshold operates as a cliff, exceeding it by even a dollar subjects everything above one times the base amount to the excise tax, so a modest reduction in payments can sometimes leave the executive better off.

The good news for private companies is that there is a well-established way to avoid the penalty. A private company can “cleanse” the payments by obtaining approval from the holders of more than 75% of the voting power entitled to vote, excluding shares held by the executives receiving the payments, after adequate disclosure to those shareholders. To make the vote meaningful, the affected executives must first waive their right to the excess payments unless the shareholders approve them. Because the waiver puts real money at risk, executives should have their own counsel review it. Key practical points:

  • Run the analysis early. Have accountants or tax counsel calculate the 280G exposure for each affected executive before the deal is signed, since the numbers affect negotiations over bonuses, severance, and acceleration.
  • Plan the vote. The shareholder vote must be completed before closing, with proper disclosure and waivers in place, so build it into the timeline.
  • Gross-ups, cutbacks, and best-net. Some agreements provide a tax gross-up (the company pays the excise tax), which is now rare and disfavored. A “cutback” reduces payments to just under the threshold. A “best-net” provision pays whichever result leaves the executive with more after tax, which is often the most balanced approach.
  • Reasonable compensation. Payments for services after closing or for a reasonable non-compete can reduce the amount treated as a parachute payment, but they require valuation support.

Because the consequences can be severe and the exemption is time-sensitive, 280G should be on the management team’s checklist from the start of the process.

Section 409A: Deferred Compensation Traps in M&A Deals

Section 409A of the Internal Revenue Code governs nonqualified deferred compensation, and it is easy to trip in an M&A context. If an arrangement violates 409A, the executive can be taxed on the deferred amount as soon as it vests, plus a 20% additional tax and interest, which can dwarf the value of the benefit. The most common deal-related issues include:

  • Severance and bonus timing. Installment severance, “good reason” definitions, and payments conditioned on signing a release must be drafted to fit 409A’s timing rules or an exemption such as the short-term deferral rule or the separation pay exemption.
  • Payments from escrows and earnouts. Amounts payable to option holders and other service providers after closing can be permitted under 409A if they are paid on the same schedule and terms as payments to shareholders and no later than five years after closing. The purchase agreement should be drafted with this in mind.
  • Change in control definitions. A payment triggered by a change in control must use a definition that satisfies 409A, which may be narrower than the definition in the company’s plan.
  • Option pricing. Options granted below fair market value, or without a supportable 409A valuation, can create problems that surface in diligence.

Buyers will ask about 409A compliance in due diligence, so management and the company should audit existing agreements before the process starts and correct any problems while there is still time.

Liability Protection for the Executive

It will usually be appropriate and reasonable for the CEO and management team to have liability protections in place such as D&O insurance, indemnification agreements, corporate charter protections, and corporate bylaw indemnification. These protections matter during the sale process, because claims by shareholders or others sometimes follow a transaction, and they matter after closing, when the executive is no longer in control of the company. Key points:

  • D&O insurance and the “tail” policy. The purchase agreement should require the buyer to maintain, or the seller to purchase at closing, a six-year “tail” or run-off D&O policy covering pre-closing acts. Six years is the customary period, and the cost is usually treated as a transaction expense.
  • Charter and bylaw protections. The corporate charter should limit the liability of directors, and where permitted, officers, to the maximum extent allowed by law. In Delaware, a 2022 amendment to the corporate statute allows companies to exculpate officers as well as directors for breaches of the duty of care in direct claims, though not in claims brought by or on behalf of the corporation. The bylaws can provide indemnification and advancement of legal expenses.
  • Indemnification agreements. A separate agreement with each executive should cover indemnification for claims, advancement of legal expenses as they are incurred, and protection that continues even after the executive leaves the company, subject to legal limits on indemnification. Choice of legal counsel may be an important point for executives in industries where there is a risk of litigation after the executive’s departure from the company.
  • Buyer covenants. The acquisition agreement should require the buyer to honor existing indemnification and exculpation provisions for a period after closing (commonly six years) and to give covered individuals the right to enforce them as third-party beneficiaries.
  • Limiting personal exposure under the deal documents. Management should understand its personal exposure in the acquisition agreement. Representations and warranties are generally made by the company and the selling shareholders, not by management in their capacity as officers, and executives who are not selling shareholders should avoid being parties to indemnification obligations. Representations and warranties insurance, now used in roughly half of private-target deals, can reduce the escrow and the exposure for selling shareholders, and should limit the insurer’s ability to pursue sellers for cases of fraud.

Management Should Have Its Own Legal Counsel

It is appropriate and reasonable for CEOs and members of management to be represented by separate legal counsel, paid for by the company. The company’s deal counsel represents the company and its shareholders, not individual executives, and management’s interests can diverge from those of the company on bonuses, severance, rollover equity, post-closing roles, and other key issues.

There are many legal, liability, tax, and employment issues that experienced employment and benefits counsel can help with. These include how tax consequences can be minimized, how Section 280G golden parachute and Section 409A issues can be handled, how equity and rollover arrangements should be documented, and the drafting of appropriate contractual rights for the management team. The cost of separate counsel is small relative to what is at stake, and buyers generally expect it.

There are law firms that specialize in representing executives, including the AI-native law firm FairPlay Law.

New Employment Agreements With the Buyer

If the buyer wants to retain the CEO and members of the management team, it will usually be best for the parties to enter into new employment agreements or offer letters superseding the old ones, signed at or before signing of the acquisition agreement and effective at closing. Buyers often make the effectiveness of key employment agreements a condition to closing. There are a myriad of important issues in negotiating a favorable employment agreement for a CEO or for high-level executives, and experienced employment counsel can draft a fair, protective agreement for the executive. Here are some of the key issues:

1. Scope of employment. The scope of the employment and responsibilities raise a number of issues:

  • What is the title of the executive’s job, and who will the executive report to?
  • What are the executive’s responsibilities, and can the executive be demoted or the responsibilities substantially modified? A reporting line that moves from CEO of a standalone company to a division head is a common source of later disputes.
  • Is the executive guaranteed a seat on the board of directors while an executive? (Typically, this only applies to the CEO.)
  • Where is the place of employment, and can the executive be relocated unilaterally to another city more than 25 miles away, or only with the executive’s consent? Remote and hybrid work expectations should be addressed in writing.
  • Is the executive allowed to be involved in other activities, such as directorships on other boards or involvement in community activities or non-profits?

2. Compensation. Compensation is the most obvious key issue, but there are multiple layers of negotiating points:

  • Does the base salary increase each year of the contract, and under what circumstances can it be reduced, if ever?
  • Is there a signing bonus?
  • What quarterly or annual bonus is available? Is the bonus guaranteed, dependent on achievement of agreed-upon milestones, or wholly discretionary with the board of directors? Bonuses tied to budgets are common.
  • What benefits will be included (health, disability, dental, 401(k), vision, PTO, life insurance, etc.)?
  • Are any clawback or recoupment policies of the buyer going to apply?

3. Equity and option grants. Equity grants are often an important part of the employment agreement:

  • Should the grant be incentive stock options, non-qualified stock options, stock appreciation rights, restricted stock units, or profits interests?
  • If stock options, what is the exercise price? The executive will want the lowest price possible, which should be supported by a 409A valuation.
  • What is the vesting period? A typical scenario is four-year vesting with a one-year “cliff vest.” Credit for vesting is sometimes given for prior employment served.
  • If the executive is terminated without cause, does some portion of the grant accelerate? Is there acceleration upon a later sale of the buyer?
  • How long does the executive have to exercise options after termination? The typical period is 90 days, but it can be longer, and negotiating an extended window is worthwhile.
  • Are shares subject to repurchase on termination of employment, and at what price? Are they subject to a right of first refusal?

4. Liability protection. Will the company have D&O insurance, bylaw and charter protections, and an indemnification agreement that survives the executive’s departure?

5. Term and termination. The circumstances in which the executive’s employment can be terminated and the resulting consequences raise several issues:

  • How long is the employment term, or is the employment “at will”?
  • How is “cause” defined? It is in the executive’s best interest to have a narrow definition, such as, for example, (i) conviction of a felony or (ii) material breach of the agreement after an opportunity to cure has been given (if curable).
  • Is the executive entitled to severance on termination without cause or resignation for “good reason”? How much, and is it a lump sum or payable over time? Will health benefits or COBRA premiums be covered?
  • Will unvested equity vest immediately on termination without cause or resignation for “good reason”? Will it continue to vest on the original vesting schedule, as if the executive were still employed?
  • If the executive is to receive severance, the executive will typically be required to sign a release, but should negotiate for a mutual release.
  • Will the executive be bound by a non-disparagement provision? If so, the executive should negotiate for it to be mutual and to carve out truthful statements to government agencies and in legal proceedings.

6. Confidentiality and invention assignment. The agreement will likely have confidentiality obligations with appropriate carveouts, and the company will likely require that inventions created within the scope of employment belong to the company. Make sure the carveouts preserve the executive’s right to report potential violations of law to government agencies.

7. Restrictive covenants. See the next section.

8. Dispute resolution. How are disputes resolved? My preferred mechanism from the executive’s standpoint is confidential binding arbitration with the American Arbitration Association as the exclusive method. Some executives, however, prefer to preserve the option of going to court. Also address the city where disputes must be brought and the governing law. Executives should also request that the company pay the costs of the arbitrator or panel of arbitrators.

9. Reimbursement of legal expenses. It is common for the executive to request reimbursement of reasonable legal expenses incurred in negotiating the employment agreement.

10. Private equity buyer issues. If the buyer is a private equity firm instead of a strategic buyer, additional issues regarding rollover equity, incentive plans, governance, and leaver provisions will need to be addressed.

For more analysis of negotiating employment agreements, see my article 14 Key Issues in Negotiating Employment Agreements.

Non-Competes and Other Restrictive Covenants

Buyers may want assurance that the executives and selling shareholders will not compete with the acquired business, and the rules on non-competes have changed significantly in recent years. In April 2024, the Federal Trade Commission issued a rule that would have banned most employment non-competes nationwide, but a federal court in Texas set the rule aside in August 2024, and the FTC later abandoned its appeal, so enforceability remains primarily a matter of state law. States vary widely: California, Minnesota, North Dakota, and Oklahoma largely prohibit employment non-competes, and many other states have recently narrowed them by limiting duration or scope, or by restricting them for lower-paid workers.

Two distinctions matter in an M&A deal. First, non-competes given by selling shareholders in connection with the sale of a business are treated more favorably by courts than employment non-competes, since the buyer is paying for goodwill. Even California permits a non-compete from a person selling their ownership interest in a business. An executive who is both an employee and a seller may therefore be bound by a non-compete in the purchase agreement even where the employment non-compete would be unenforceable. Second, the buyer may ask for a longer period in the purchase agreement (often three to five years) than in the employment agreement.

If the buyer insists on a non-compete, here are steps to mitigate the risk to the executive:

  • The term “competing business” should be narrowly drafted and not vague or ambiguous, perhaps listing only a handful of named actual competitors.
  • The period of the non-compete should be as short as reasonably possible, and for employment-based covenants (as opposed to sale-related covenants) no longer than 6 months to a year.
  • The employment non-compete should not apply if the executive is terminated without cause or quits for good reason.
  • Non-solicitation covenants should be limited to customers and employees the executive actually worked with, should exclude the executive’s relationships that pre-dated employment with the company, and should not bar general job postings.

Retention Agreements

Retention agreements are also sometimes used in M&A deals. Retention agreements are contracts between a buyer and key employees of the seller, providing them with financial inducements to stay with the company after the closing of the M&A deal.

  • Purpose: To ensure a smooth transition and to retain critical knowledge, customer relationships, technical expertise, and skills important to the continuing business.
  • How structured: Typically as a bonus payment made after continued employment for 6 months to two years, either as a set dollar amount or a percentage of salary. Payments are often made in installments or at stated milestones.
  • Which employees receive them: Primarily senior management, key technical personnel, and employees with important client relationships.
  • Benefits to buyers: Minimizes disruptions in operations and protects IP and other important assets of the seller.
  • The terms are key: For the employee, the terms (amount of bonus pay, obligations, time period to obtain the bonus, conditions to receiving the bonus, any non-competes, etc.) are key and are negotiable. Employees should ask that the retention bonus be paid in full if they are terminated without cause or resign for good reason, and that it not be forfeited by a restructuring that eliminates their role.
  • Funding: Sometimes the sellers fund part of a retention pool out of the purchase price, which reduces the cash to shareholders, so the board should weigh the trade-off.
  • Interplay with the employment agreement: If the employee is to receive a separate employment agreement, the retention bonus can be incorporated into it with no need for a separate retention agreement.

Earnouts and Management Incentives

Earnouts, under which part of the purchase price is paid only if the business hits specified financial or operational targets after closing, have been a persistent feature of private deals. According to reports on the SRS Acquiom studies, about one-quarter to one-third of recent private-target deals included an earnout. Management is usually the group that has to deliver the earnout, which creates special issues:

  • Operating control. The agreement should obligate the buyer to operate the business in a way that gives the earnout a fair chance of being achieved, or at least not to take actions intended to avoid it.
  • Employment and the earnout. If the earnout is conditioned on the executive’s continued employment, it may be treated as compensation, taxed as ordinary income and not as sale proceeds. Executives should avoid forfeiting earnout rights if they are terminated without cause or resign for good reason.
  • Acceleration. Consider acceleration of the earnout if the buyer sells the business, materially changes the business, or breaches its covenants.
  • Clear metrics. Define the accounting principles, the treatment of buyer overhead and integration costs, and the dispute-resolution mechanism. Earnout disputes are common, especially with EBITDA based earnouts.

Employee Provisions in the Acquisition Letter of Intent

Buyers and sellers frequently enter into a letter of intent for sale of the business to lay the framework for a deal. It can be very helpful for the management team and employees to build into the letter of intent some of the compensation, incentive arrangements, and protections discussed in this article. Because the seller’s leverage is at its peak before exclusivity is granted, this is the best time to settle the broad terms.

Consider including provisions on the size of the transaction bonus pool, treatment of options and equity, severance protections, a commitment to offer employment to key employees on specified terms, benefit comparability and service credit for a period after closing, and the buyer’s plans for the management team. This can help avoid misunderstandings later in the M&A process and preserve morale.

Protecting Rank-and-File Employees and Preserving Morale

A successful deal depends on more than the executive team. Employees throughout the company are anxious about what the deal means for their jobs, pay, and benefits, and the loss of key engineers, salespeople, or customer service staff during the process can reduce the value of the business. Steps that help:

  • Benefit and pay comparability. Ask the buyer to commit that employees who remain will receive base pay and benefits that are substantially comparable for a period (often 12 months), with credit for service and for accrued paid time off.
  • Severance for non-executives. If the buyer will eliminate positions, negotiate a severance formula, such as a number of weeks per year of service, so that employees know what to expect.
  • WARN Act compliance. The federal WARN Act generally requires 60 days’ notice before plant closings or mass layoffs by employers with 100 or more employees, and several states have stricter “mini-WARN” laws, so the parties should allocate responsibility in the agreement.
  • A stay bonus pool. A modest pool for non-executive employees who are critical to the transition can be a very efficient way to protect value.
  • Communication. Plan when and how employees will be told about the deal. Premature disclosure can cause departures, while silence can breed rumors. A coordinated message from the CEO and the buyer, delivered at signing or announcement, helps.

Bonus in the Event an M&A Deal Falls Through

M&A deals fall apart all the time through no fault of the management team. Given the significant efforts put in by management teams in M&A processes, it may be appropriate for the board to award compensation to key executives even if a deal does not close. Management is typically invested and therefore distracted for months, and the business may have suffered as a result.

Options include a modest “process bonus” paid whether or not a deal closes, a bonus tied to signing a letter of intent or a definitive agreement, and a “tail” provision that pays the bonus if a sale to a party contacted during the process closes within 6 to 12 months after the process ends. Any such arrangement should be approved by the board in advance.

Conclusion on M&A Executive Compensation

It is important for the CEO and the management team to be incentivized, rewarded, and protected in the context of an M&A event. The right package combines a fair transaction bonus, sensible treatment of equity, strong severance and liability protection, and a well-negotiated employment agreement, all structured to avoid the traps of Internal Revenue Code Sections 280G and 409A.

Starting early, involving the board, and using experienced separate counsel will give management the best chance of getting a fair result. It’s the right thing to do for the team, the employees, and the shareholders, and it improves the odds that the deal closes, that the business thrives afterward, and that the executives and employees of the company are treated fairly, both before and after the close.

Related Articles

  • Mergers and Acquisitions: What Management Teams Want to Know From a Prospective M&A Acquirer
  • A Comprehensive Guide to Due Diligence Issues in Mergers & Acquisitions
  • 10 Key Steps to Prepare Your Company for an M&A Sale
  • Letters of Intent in Mergers and Acquisitions
  • 15 Frequently Asked Questions About Severance Pay

This article is for general informational purposes only and does not constitute legal, tax, or financial advice. M&A, employment, and tax laws vary and change, so consult qualified counsel before acting on any of the matters discussed.

Copyright (c) by Richard D. Harroch. All Rights Reserved.

A thank you to Darah M. Okeke, David Perla, and Sanjay Kamlani of FairPlay Law for comments on earlier drafts of this article.

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Profile: Richard Harroch

Richard D. Harroch is a Strategic Advisor to CEOs, management teams, and Boards of Directors. He is an expert on M&A, venture capital, startups, and business contracts. He was the Managing Director and Global Head of M&A at VantagePoint Capital Partners, a large venture capital fund in the San Francisco area. His focus is on internet, AI, legaltech, and software companies, and he was the founder of several internet companies. His articles have appeared online in Forbes, Fortune, MSN, Yahoo, Fox Business, and AllBusiness.com. Richard is the author of several books on startups and entrepreneurship as well as the co-author of Poker for Dummies and a Wall Street Journal-bestselling book on small business. He is the co-author of the 1,500-page book “Mergers and Acquisitions of Privately Held Companies: Analysis, Forms and Agreements,” published by Bloomberg Law. He was also a corporate and M&A partner at the law firm of Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe, with experience in startups, mergers and acquisitions, and venture capital. He has been involved in over 200 M&A transactions and 250 corporate financings. He is an advisor to Stella Legal and a number of legal and tech companies. He can be reached through LinkedIn.

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