The German coal market after 1992.

INTRODUCTION

On January 1, 1993 the Single European Internal Market (SEIM) will come into effect(1). As discussed by the working document "The Internal Market for Energy," presented in 1988 (Commission of the European Communities, ed. 1988), the energy market is a vital part of this integration

The SEIM will have severe consequences for the German hard coal industry, one of the most densely regulated and subsidized sectors of the German economy. In 1991, for example, subsidies reached more than DM 11 billion(2). Meanwhile, the industry faces additional though closely linked difficulties: (i) high production costs will continue to translate into low competitiveness; (ii) strategies to reduce carbon-dioxide emissions will make subsidies to this sector increasingly less justifiable. Thus, German coal is facing an especially bleak future. To evaluate German coal's future after 1992 in detail, it is not sufficient, however, to study only its supply conditions. As a primary energy product, coal can be converted into other forms of energy, i.e. electricity, or used in the production of industrial raw materials. A look at the German coal market after 1992 would therefore be incomplete without taking into account the future perspective of coal-using sectors, especially the electricity generation costs and tariffs induced by coal policy.

Our study is organized as follows: first we give a short outline of the pre-1992 coal problems, and the various supports provided to the German coal industry. In section two, we look at the sector's future development, in particular, at the effects of the integration and the liberalisation concept as implied by the SEIM. In section three, we assess the consequences to German coal of various amounts of government intervention and subsidization. The paper ends with a short summary.

MAIN ASPECTS OF NATIONAL AND EC COAL POLICY

Resources, Reserves, and Production

The EC-member countries hold only a modest amount of the world's coal reserves. The estimated geological reserves total nearly 700 billion tons, which amounts to about 5.5% of presently known world reserves. Of these, 617 billion tons consist of hard coal and about 64 billion tons of lignite. However, only 70 billion tons of hard coal and 39 billion tons of lignite, i.e. somewhat more than a fifth of the geological reserves, can be extracted economically |Brecht et al., eds. (1991), p. 1,000~. At the present rate of extraction, this would suffice to meet world demand for the next 300 and 200 years respectively. Within the EC, the United Kingdom (with 45 billion tons) and Germany (with 24 billion) possess almost all economically extractable deposits of hard coal. Nearly 90% of the lignite reserves (35 billion tons) are located in Germany.

In 1990, hard coal production in eight EC-member countries totalled 169 million tce. The United Kingdom and Germany accounted for 174 million tce while Spain accounted for 10.8 million tce or 6.3% (International Energy Agency (IEA), 1992). Extracted lignite in five member countries amounted to 49 million tce--with 31 million tce, or almost two-thirds of this--derived from Germany.

Since the mid-fifties--with the exception of a short upturn in the wake of the oil price-shocks--German hard coal mining has been characterized by a steady fall in sales from 151 million tce in 1956 to 70 million tce in 1990. Production adjusted to the rapid drop in demand somewhat slowly, so that stocks grew temporarily to more than 29 million tce.

In the course of this adjustment, the number of working pits shrunk from 175 in the mid-fifties to 29 at present. The number of coking plants also fell from 64 to 10, and the number of briquette factories dropped from 25 to 3. The effects on employment were tremendous: the total number of workers in the coal sector decreased by more than three-quarters from 598,000 to 139,000. At the same time, the number of workers under ground was reduced by four-fifths from 378,000 to 76,000. Considerable strains in the mining regions followed, particularly in the Ruhr area. This was addressed with massive financial government assistance, mainly for social and political reasons, which amounted to DM 10.7 billion in 1990. Since 1958, the total assistance is estimated at DM 117.3 billion (see Heilemann, Storchmann 1992). Public assistance did, however, ensure a relatively smooth adjustment process and held off serious social conflicts and long-term unemployment. For details and a breakdown of current adjustments, see Hillebrand et.al. (1991).

Production Costs

Low competitiveness in comparison with other producer countries has been responsible for the production cuts in almost all EC member countries. This low competitiveness reflects higher wages, unfavourable geological conditions in coal-mining, and the growing supply of superior energy products such as oil and natural gas. For instance, coal in Western Europe has to be extracted from great depths. But, in the United States, in South Africa and in Australia coal can partly be mined on surface. Production costs vary accordingly as shown in Table 1, especially for opening up new mining fields. In addition, not only labour costs but also royalties, taxes and regulatory compliance costs factor considerably in the differences seen among production costs.

Table 1. Mineable Reserves and Mine Operating Costs for Coal,
1990
                      Mineable Reserves   Operating Costs
                        Billion tons            $/tce
North-America              195                 16-36
South-America               25                 26-48
Western Europe              23                 71-168
Eastern Europe/CIS         120                 30-60
South Africa                50                 10-19
China                       45                 25
Australia                   45                 29-42
Source: IEA Coal Information 1992, pp. 23-29 and Verein
Deutscher Kohlenimporteure 1992.

Regulation and Financial Support

In the early sixties, when oil started crowding solid fuels out of important markets, the low competitiveness of domestic coal provided a rationale for government subsidies and special contracts to ensure ongoing production. The subsidies were initially a response to negative regional effects, and were also partly justified on the basis of fear of insufficient stability of supply after the first oil crisis. Up to that time there had been a steady substitution of domestic by imported energy.

To protect the domestic coal industry from cheaper imports a rather complicated system of laws and private contracts has been established during the past 20 years. It aims to secure sales in the two most important markets: electricity (about 60% of total coal usage in 1991) and steel (about 35% in 1991). The system operates through various private agreements and serves to compensate higher production costs with government-supported buy obligations. The power generating industries have committed themselves to buying a fixed amount of domestic hard coal during 1981 to 1995. The amount totals 631 mtce if the electricity demand rises by not more than 3% on average in the reference period (1981-1985). That amount rises to 646 mtce if the growth rate exceeds 5%. As the electricity demand actually grew at an average rate of less than 2%, in 1989 the agreement had to be amended. The new quantity to be purchased during 1991-1995, originally set at an annual average of 45 mtce, was reduced to 40.9 mtce under the amended agreement.

These private contracts are backed by the "Verstromungsgesetz" ("Electricity from Coal Act") and tariff quotas on imported solid fuels. The Electricity from Coal Act contains special rules about the governmental subsidies and their links to quantities of coal purchased. The total volume of coal purchases is divided as follows:

* a "basic quantity" ("Grundmenge") of 22 mtce per year, set at the same price as that of heavy heating oil,

* an "additional quantity" ("Zusatzmenge") of around 11 mtce per year, set at the same price as the average price of imported coal. The electricity producers are credited with an across-the-board deduction for freight charges in the area of 6 DM/tce. The ceiling for imported coal compensation payments lies at the level of 1980 subsidies - on average about 116 DM/tce.

* a "new quantity" ("Neumenge") which is, in principle, not subsidized. For this additionally contracted amount of German coal the electricity producers are entitled to import coal, on a one-to-one basis until 1989.

Domestic hard coal subsidies for electricity production amounted to DM 5.6 billion in 1990. 75% of the total was the "oil compensation" paid for the basic quantity and 15% the imported coal compensation paid for the additional quantity (see Table 2).

Table 2. Level and Structure of Electricity-from-Coal
Subsidies, 1990
                                       DM million     %
Oil equalization                        4,227.5       76
Additional quantity                        64.3        1
Third country coal equalization           835.1       15
Electricity transport costs                29.6        1
Low volatile coal                          37.5        1
District equalization                      62.5        1
Electricity-from-coal reserve              46.6        1
Construction of new power stations         57.6        1
Refiting of thermal power stations          1.2        -
Total                                   5,565.0      100
Source: Deutscher Bundestag (ed.), 1990.

This support to the power generating industry is financed by a special fee on electricity consumption imposed by the Electricity from Coal Act ("Ausgleichsabgabe"). To meet obligations, it had to be raised several times, reaching a maximum of 8.5% of the average electricity sales in 1989. Revenue from the so-called "Kohlepfennig" ("Penny-for-coal") did not suffice to cover power station operators' entitlements--in 1989 the "Verstromungsgesetz" had to be amended. The new agreements concerned the rules for subsidizing low-volatile hard and low-grade coal as well as the compensatory tariff. Above this, the one-to-one rule was dissolved and the import of coal above 40.9 mtce is no longer restricted.

Reasons given for this reduction were as follows: (i) the much lower rate of increase in electricity consumption during the years 1981 to 1985; (ii) environmental policy requirements reducing purchases; and (iii) a politically agreed upon reduction in the amount of coal-derived electricity which had originally been set at a total of 3.6 mtce for the five years. The subsidies known as the so-called coal-mining region compensation remained in place but underwent cuts and were no longer drawn from the compensation fund. From now on the Federal Government and the coal-Lander (Northrhine-Westfalia and Saarland) were to pay the largest share (more than 95%), with the coal industry financing the rest. Initially, the provisions of the demand agreements were supported by additional federal regulations. Both the use of heating oil and natural gas in the production of electricity and the construction of new oil and gas power stations with an installed capacity of more than 10 megawatts for the production of electricity required government permission.

The second major buyer of coal is the iron and steel industry. To place the German iron and steel industry on par with foreign competitors using third country coal, its use of domestic coal had to be subsidized too. This aid started soon after the beginning of the first sales crises of German coal. The interventions took the form of delivery and purchase contracts between the coal and steel industry, complemented by guide-lines and obligations of the Federal Government, the mining Lander and the EC Commission (cf. Bundesministerium fur Wirtschaft 1970ff.).

The first of these "Huttenvertrage" ("steel mills contracts") expired at the end of 1988, and was replaced by a follow-up agreement now extending up to the year 2000. The new system essentially retains the previous rulings on the calculation of differences in costs and subsidy requirements, but differs in the following respects:

* for the years 1989 to 1991, a fixed volume of funds (an upper limit) in the area of DM 10.9 billion was planned, of which the larger part (circa DM 7.6 billion) was provided by the Federal Government;

* subsidies for coking coal exports will be gradually removed by 1993--until the completion of the SEIM.

In contrast to the financial subsidies given to the power generating industry, subsidies for the iron and steel industry stem from the Federal Government and the mining Lander. These subsidies totalled DM 3.7 billion in 1990.

EFFECTS OF THE COMMON MARKET

The Position of the EC-Commission

The realization of the SEIM and the thereby expected tightening up of competition is an ambitious project. This holds especially for the energy market--a sector which in all countries traditionally has been an "intervention sector" par excellence. Therefore it is not surprising that the Commission's working document anticipates considerable frictions and barriers which will have to be removed on the way towards the internal market(3). All national regulations have to be examined to see whether they conform with the target of guaranteeing a safe, cost-efficient and resource-saving supply of energy(4) for Europe. If not, these regulations should be modified or revoked.

The likely fundamental consequences of the SEIM in the energy sector started an intense debate in the FRG (and elsewhere) that is still far from settled. The focal point of this discussion--apart from gas and electricity markets--is German hard coal mining, which, due to its high production costs, would not be internationally competitive without massive government support. The EC Commission has therefore emphatically demanded the following: (i) reduction of public subsidies; (ii) presentation of a long-term adjustment concept; and (iii) removal of all barriers to competition.

The EC Commission regards the somewhat pretentiously called "Jahrhundertvertrag" ("Century Pact") between the German coal and electricity industries as illegal. It considers the representation of a number of mining companies by the General Association of the coal industry a horizontal cartel agreement. The representation of a large number of electricity producers and industrial power station operators by two pressure groups, likewise, infringes on the European Economic Community (EEC) Treaty. The strong influence of the Federal Government on the signing of and the adherence to the "Jahrhundertvertrag" hinders, according to the EC Commission, companies that have entered into purchase obligations from freely choosing their (coal) suppliers. Furthermore, the quantities agreed on in this treaty are assumed to have an indirect impact on purchases of nuclear power generated electricity from France by German industries. In April 1989, the EC Commission felt obliged to submit a formal request for information to the coal industry and the electricity industry about this subject, apparently with the intention of prompting all those involved in the signing of the agreements to register the "Jahrhundertvertrag". This would enable the Commission to set up authorization proceedings and in this way make authorization dependent on certain conditions, i.e. the reduction of quantities to be purchased.

With respect to the quantities to be purchased during the so-called "Kohlerunde" ("Coal Round") of November 1991, agreements were made to secure sales of domestic coal after 1995 (see Bundesministerium fur Wirtschaft 1991). These agreements outline the following purchase obligations:

* for the electricity industry: 1991 to 1995: 40.9 mtce p.a.; 1996: 38 mtce; 1997 to 2005: 35 mtce p.a.;

* for the steel industry: 1995 to 1998: 18 mtce p.a.; 1999: 16 mtce; 2000 to 2005: 15 mtce p.a.

Production would thus be reduced from roughly 65 where it stood in 1991 to 50 million tce.

In mid 1992, the EC-Commission has not yet accepted these agreements. On the contrary, in an internal paper it proposed, that pits should receive government support only when their production costs lie below the average production costs in the EC as a whole. Pits with production costs above this average have to explain whether they will reach this level by 1997. Otherwise they should be closed down. Obviously, the realisation of these plans would nullify the agreements made by the "Kohlerunde" and German coal would not survive even until 2002.

At present it seems impossible to predict the outcome of this discussion. Obviously future agreements will influence not only German coal but especially the costs of coal using industries. Since the EC-Commission has already approved the agreements and regulations between German coal and the iron and steel industry until 1997, the main effects will be restricted to the electricity sector, particularly to the costs of power generation (s. Storchmann, Wienert 1992).

The Costs of Electricity Supplies

The protection of the German coal industry affects primarily electricity production costs. Liberalization of fuel usage would therefore result in noticeably lower costs for and prices of electricity generation.

The short-run effects of liberalization are the reduction of fuel costs. To quantify these effects it seems necessary to relate the present regulation (the status quo) with the induced fuel costs. In accordance with the various regulations of the "Jahrhundertvertrag," the oil equalization payment is granted for the "basic quantity" (22.0 million tons), which in 1990 implied that the fuel costs for this quantity of domestic coal were similar to those of imported coal. For the "additional quantity" (11 million tons) government subsidies meet the difference between domestic coal and third country coal, but are limited--as mentioned before--to a maximum of DM 116 per tce. At present the difference amounts to about DM 165 per tce, thus the additional quantity induces actual fuel costs which exceed the fuel costs of imported coal (3.4 pf/kwh) by 1.5 pf/kwh. Quantities used in the range of 33 to 40.9 million tons are not subsidised, thus fuel costs for domestic coal must be charged. In 1990 these were 8.4 pf/kwh, exceeding the fuel costs of imported coal by 5.0 pf/kwh or about 150%. Only when the limit of 40.9 million tons is exceeded, the fuel costs fall to the price level of third country coal. In total, the present regulation induced in 1990 additional fuel costs of about DM 1.786 billion or 0.4 pf/kwh.

As will be explained below, we expect that the price-difference between domestic and imported coal will increase until 2005. Thus, if the present regulation and agreements persist, the additional fuel costs would rise. The agreements of the "Coal Round" foresee the reduction of domestic coal from 40.9 to 35 mtce, which will reduce additional fuel costs to about DM 0.956 billion. The higher import quotas would cause a maximum reduction in fuel costs of 0.4pf/kwh in 1995, reduced to 0.2 pf/kwh by 2005.

TABULAR DATA OMITTED

However, free access to fuel markets would not only affect short-term variable costs, but also the development of capacity and thus long-term production costs. In particular, the production of hard coal electricity would be cheaper than production of nuclear derived electricity not only for the medium load but also for the baseload. At an import price of DM 184 per ton in 2005, the point of identical long-term production costs lies at about 9,000 hours year. To minimise costs as of 1995, the additional capacity of 6,500 megawatt would not be installed in nuclear energy but in coal fired plants. Since these power stations were intended for the production of baseload electricity, the capacity utilization of hard coal power stations would increase by almost 400 hours. This would translate into an approximate increase in the use of hard coal of about 14 million tons. The shift to hard coal power stations, which are less costly than that of nuclear energy power stations, would reduce capital costs over the entire twenty-year depreciation period, amounting to 0.5 pf/kwh in the year 2005.

Altogether, production costs could be reduced by up to 0.7 pf/kwh. This calculation does not take into account the financial effects on electricity end-users caused by modification of the equalization payments, which serve to fund the government subsidies to the coal industry. Ignoring the problems of tax-incidence, a modification of founding however, would mean a marked reduction of electricity prices, especially to industry, since industrial and commercial end-users presently finance half of this payments of about DM 2 billion or 1.3 pf/kwh (see Table 4). Balancing cost- and price-effects the liberalisation will cause a marked reduction of the price of electricity especially in the industrial sector. The price effects in the residential and commercial sector will heavily depend on the future level of coal subsidies which in turn will be determined by the future level of production of German Coal. Of course, an increased use of coal will cause additional environmental problems, but these effects are out of consideration in the present context.

Table 4. Tax Burden(*) of Electricity Consumption in Germany,
1990
                 DM Millions    pfg/kwh       %
Industry           2,062         1.28       36.1
Transport             87         1.48        1.5
Public Users         472         1.75        8.3
Agriculture          137         2.04        2.4
Commercial           940         2.87        1.6
Households         2,009         2.02       35.2
Total              5,707         1.62      100.0
Source: Authors' calculations
*Includes value added tax

THE FUTURE OF COAL PRODUCTION AND SUBSIDIES

The consequences for German coal of the EC Commission's requests to reorganize and reduce German coal subsidies depend on the price differences between domestic and imported coal. In 1990 this difference was about DM 165/tce.

With the price of imported coal more or less given, the future role of German coal within the Community's energy supply and the amount of "security premium" allowed for by the Community will be determined by its competitiveness. This requires the disclosure of production costs of each individual mine and an estimate of their future development, as has been demanded for years (Sachverstandigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung 1983/84, item 324).

The Coal Commission's interim report of 1990 (Kohlekommission 1990, pp. 141ff.) presents appraisals of production costs based on the costs of 29 pits, including depreciation as well as calculatory interest payments. These figures provide, for the first time, reference points for evaluating the industry's competitiveness, at least until 1995. According to these estimations, the average production costs in 1988 were DM 259 per tce--they varied within a range of DM 187 per tce to DM 398 per tce. Only 12 of the 29 pits produced at below average cost--their share of production was estimated at 60 million tons. Only three pits, with an estimated total production of 10 to 12 mtce, were operated at or below DM 225 per tce. Approximately one third of average total costs were labour costs.

By 1995, the coal industry itself envisages a reduction in average real production costs from DM 259 per tce by 7% to approximately DM 241 per tce. The industry hopes to achieve this by raising productivity as well as by reducing costs after overcoming the present phase of low level capacity utilization caused by structural adjustment. The range of real production costs of the various pits will at the same time be considerably narrower than in 1988. It is supposed to vary between DM 191 per tce and DM 276 per tce. In 1995 only two pits will operate at costs below DM 225 per tce (in 1988 prices) and about 10 pits with a production of 50 to 55 million tons will operate at costs below DM 240 per tce. An annual price increase of 2% will drive the production costs of these pits into a range of DM 258 to DM 276 per tce by 1995.

These trends must be compared with third country coal prices. Presently, there is an abundant supply of cheap foreign coal, especially steam coal. The expansion of foreign pits which has already occurred and whose production is largely intended for exports, as well as the upcoming projects, lead us to expect that the real price increase will not exceed $2 per ton until the year 2000. Later price increases on the international coal market are also likely to be lower than those of oil since nominal trends already provide enough incentive for the further expansion of supply (Gru|beta~ 1991). It is therefore presupposed that the prices of imported coal will rise in real terms from circa $58 per ton (1990) to $60 per ton by the year 2000 (see Table 5). The nominal increase from $58 to $60 per ton is almost exclusively the result of the general world inflation rate as measured by the world export price index. Assuming an exchange rate of $/ DM 1.70, this translates into a price of DM 143 per ton.

Table 5. Real and Nominal Price Trends for Imported Hard Coal,
1990-2005
Price of Hard Coal             1990     1995    2000    2005
$/t cif at 1990 prices         58.2     58      60      61.5
in $/t cif, current prices     58.2     68.7    83.9    99.7
in DM/t                        94       117     143     170
Exchange Rate                 1.616     1.7     1.7     1.7
Source: Authors' calculations

Even if prices were to rise due to an increased world demand for coal, it is very unlikely that the present German coal industry as a whole could become competitive. Yet for the ten most efficient pits, the production costs in 1995 of about DM 235 per tce would be higher than those in third countries. The price difference between German and imported coal will therefore not shrink to an extent warranting appreciably reduced subsidies as long as the quantity produced is not significantly reduced. Consequently, the cutback in subsidies demanded by the EC Commission would translate into a drastic cutback of domestic coal production. To reduce the present volume of subsidies in the next ten years by about a quarter to DM 7.5 billion would mean, under these assumptions, that only a production of circa 50 to 55 million tons could be maintained. If the subsidies were further reduced to DM 5 billion by the year 2005, coal production would have to be cut back to 35-40 million tons.

With an annual production of circa 700 tons per employee, an annual reduction of production of 17 to 20 million tons during 1990 to 2000 would lead to the layoff of 24,000 to 31,000 workers, circa 2,000 to 3,000 per year. A further cutback in production of circa 10 to 15 million tons in the period 2000 to 2005 would result in 14,000 to 21,000 additional layoffs, circa 3,000 to 4,000 per year. In comparison, the level of dismissals in the coal sector particularly in the first 15 years of the coal crisis was considerably higher, in some years (1965/66) it was even more than ten times as high. The regional consequences, however, are difficult to foresee. This holds in particular as the use of the saved fiscal means is open and the macroeconomic and sectoral consequences of the lower electricity rates are of minor importance. In addition, now the pits would be closed in a macroeconomic environment characterized by much lower growth (2/3-1/2 that of the Sixties) severely limiting the possibilities of finding alternative employment for displaced workers. Finally, the local importance of the pits seems to be greater today, and alternative jobs may require much more labor mobility than in the Sixties (Heilemann, Storchmann 1992).

CONCLUSION

Hard coal mining in the countries of the European Community and in Germany in particular, has undergone a thirty year decline. This decline is bound to continue, probably to accelerate in the SEIM. Because of its continuing lack of competitiveness, German coal only stands a chance on the open market if the price difference with third country coal is reduced by subsidies. Given Germany's tight fiscal position and the dynamics of these subsidies (per ton), a cutback in the production of hard coal seems inevitable.

Recent policies have taken this, at least partially, into account. The agreements made by the 1991 "Kohlerunde" foresee a reduction in coal production by the turn of the century to 50 million tons. It remains very doubtful, however, whether this really presents a long-run solution. Above all, present discussions to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases could place the agreements which have been made into question. In addition, a tighter fiscal situation in Germany could give policies of quicker adjustment additional impetus. In any case, if West Germany's coal policy of the last 35 years has been characterized by anything, it has certainly been change.

* The authors are indebted to an anonymous referee for helpful comments. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 15th International Conference of the IAEE, Tours, France, May 18-20, 1992.

1. The creation of a Single European Internal Market (SEIM) took concrete shape when in 1985/86 the Commission of the European Communities (EC) presented the White Book "The Completion of the Internal Market" and when the European Council passed the "Single Act" (Commission of the European Communities, ed. 1985, and 1986.).

2. This amount does not contain the Pension Fund Deficit, which amounted to about DM 10 billion in 1990. For a critical evaluation of the "subsidy character" of this fund, cf. Fritzsche 1991.

3. For coal-subsidisation in other European Countries see Gordon 1992.

4. It is interesting to note that this has been an explicit goal of German energy policy of the last 60 years and has served to legitimize most, if not all, regulations of this sector.

REFERENCES

Brecht, C., et. al., eds. (1991), Jahrbuch 1992. Bergbau, Ol und Gas, Elektrizitat, Chemie. Essen.

Bundesministerium fur Wirtschaft, ed. (1970), Richtlinien uber die Gewahrung von Beihilfen fur den Absatz von Kokskohle und Hochofenkoks an die Eisen- und Stahlindustrie der Europaischen Gemeinschaft fur Kohle und Stahl gema|beta~ Entscheidung Nr. 70/1 EGKS der Kommission vom 19. Dezember 1969. "Bundesanzeiger", Koln, vol. 22, no. 133, and 1973, 1977 amendments.

Bundesministerium fur Wirtschaft (1991), Ergebnisse der Kohlerunde, "BMWi-Tagesnachrichten", Nr. 9797, Bonn.

Commission of the European Communities, ed. (1985), The Completion of the Internal Market, White Book by the Commission for the European Council. Luxemburg.

Commission of the European Communities, ed. (1986), The Single European Act. (Supplement 2/86 to the Bulletin of the European Communities.) Luxemburg.

Commission of the European Communities, ed. (1988), The Internal Energy Market. (Working Document n. 238), Brussels

Deutscher Bundestag, ed. (1990), Rechnungslegung uber das Sondervermogen des Bundes "Ausgleichsfonds zur Sicherung des Steinkohleeinsatzes", Bonn.

Fritzsche, B. (1991), Knappschaftsrenten und Subventionen: Viel Larm um Nichts? - Eine Analyse des Subventionsgehalts der Regelungen zur knappschaftlichen Rentenversicherung. "RWI-Mitteilungen", Berlin, vol. 42, pp. 303-324.

Gordon, R.L. (1992), Hard Coal as a Study in Overcoming Nationalism in a United Europe. Paper presented at the 15th International Conference of the International Association for Energy Economics, Tours, France, May 18-20, 1992.

Gru|beta~, H. (1991), Entwicklung und Perspektiven fur Angebot und Nachfrage auf dem Steinkohlenweltmarkt (1990). "Zeitschrift fur Energiewirtschaft". Braunschweig und Wiesbaden, vol. 15, p. 11-24.

Heilemann, U. and Storchmann, K.H. (1992), Entwicklung, Struktur und Wirkungen der Steinkohlesubventionen in Nordrhein-Westfalen. (Untersuchungen des Rheinisch-Westfalischen Instituts fur Wirtschaftsforschung, 6), Essen, forthcoming.

Hillebrand, B., et. al. (1991), Auswirkungen des EG-Binnenmarktes fur Energie auf Verbraucher und Energiewirtschaft in der Bundesrepublik (Untersuchungen des Rheinisch-Westfalischen Instituts fur Wirtschaftsforschung, 1), Essen.

International Energy Agency, ed. (1992), Coal Information 1992, Paris.

Kohle-Kommission (1990), Zwischenbericht der Kohle-Kommission zur Erarbeitung einer Konzeption fur eine nationale Kohlepolitik im Rahmen der zukunftigen europaischen Kohlepolitik. Essen. Mimeo.

Sachverstandigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung (1983), Jahresgutachten 1983/84: Ein Schritt voran. Stuttgart and Mainz.

Storchmann, K.-H. and Wienert, H. (1992), Die Beihilfen fur den Absatz von Kokskohle und Hochofenkoks - Grundlagen, Subventionsvolumen, Finanzierungsrisiken. "RWI-Mitteilungen", Berlin, vol. 43, forthcoming.

Verein Deutscher Kohleimporteure (1992), Jahresbericht 1991, Hamburg.