Still waiting

The Palestinian refugee issue is potentially the most explosive item on the agenda for the Middle East peace process. Whereas once it was the primary object of international attention and UN resolutions, since the Oslo Accords of 1993, the matter has been relegated to a sub-clause in Israeli-Palestinian

THE FATE OF PALESTINIAN REFUGEES IS too big a question to be dealt with solely in Israeli-Palestinian bilateral negotiations. The issue affects not only Israel and the nascent Palestinian state, but also the Palestinian refugees themselves and the various host countries, including Lebanon, Syria and Jordan. Yet, there has been minimal coordination and consultation between the Palestinian leadership and the governments of Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, let alone between the Palestinian Authority (PA), established under Oslo, and the wider Palestinian refugee community.

Technically, it is not the PA but the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) that bears responsibility for reaching a deal with Israel, since it was the latter that signed the Oslo Accords. But the actual officals involved in the process, whether PLO or not, are increasingly distanced from the Palestinian refugees whose future is at stake. If they feel sold out in whatever final status agreement is reached between Israelis and Palestinians, they could disown the deal. Then there will be trouble.

STEP BY STEP

Peace in stages has been the modus vivendi of the Middle East Peace Process, ever since the Camp David Accords of 1978, when Egypt was ostracised from the rest of the Arab world for making the first peace agreement with Israel. After the ensuing hiatus, the 1991 Madrid conference gave new impetus to the vision of a comprehensive settlement of the ArabIsraeli conflict. Then PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat broke ranks and opted for the bilateral Oslo formula. After that, Jordan went for a separate treaty in 1994 and Syria pursued its own track too, with Lebanon waiting in the wings.

With this year's unsuccessful Geneva summit between US President Clinton and Syrian President Hafez al Assad, however, attention has reverted to unfinished business on the Palestinian front, and Israel has unilaterally withdrawn from south Lebanon, without an accompanying agreement.

The piecemeal, step by step approach to peacemaking has the advantage of focusing effort on what is do-able, rather than on what is desirable but possibly over-ambitious. In Israel, the political scene is not conducive to making concessions on several fronts simultaneously.

For the Americans - who have acted as broker throughout most of the negotiations - it makes life easier to concentrate on one set of issues at a time. Their rubric has always been to support what the parties can agree on rather than chasing concepts like justice or fairness.

Meanwhile, for each of the Arab parties, there may be some benefit in having the undivided attention of both Israeli and American negotiators, though some would claim the result is suffocating. Because he opted to go it alone first after Madrid, Arafat has had little sympathy for finding himself in a weak bargaining position thereafter.

Oslo was supposed to deliver a final status agreement by the end of a five year interim period of Palestinian self rule in parts of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Now running well behind schedule, the push is on to reach such an agreement by September. Issues to be decided include: refugees, settlements, sovereignty, borders, Jerusalem, security and water. The prospect, therefore, is that the most difficult matters, notably refugees and Jerusalem, will be fudged, to produce a deal on the others sooner rather than later.

The dangers in this may not be immediately apparent to those most directly involved in the negotiations. They may be so caught up in the process that they lose sight of the larger picture and trade-offs are made that will render the whole package difficult to sustain.

SIZE OF THE PROBLEM

The Palestinian refugee issue dates from the establishment of the state of Israel in 1848. The number of Palestinians who either fled or were driven out across the borders was estimated by the United Nations at 726,000 in 1848. The total was subsequently put at 857,000 in 1850 by the newly established LTN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) which was charged with seeing to their welfare. Israeli estimates are lower, Palestinian ones higher. Of the total, approximately one third went to the West Bank, which came under Jordanian rule; another third to the Gaza Strip, administered by Egypt; and the remainder went to Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and beyond.

In the Arab-Israeli war of 1867, some three hundred thousand Palestinians fled from the West Bank and Gaza to Jordan, Syria, Egypt and elsewhere. Of these, nearly two thirds were first time refugees, designated `displaced persons' and the remainder were 1948 refugees who moved for a second time.

Not all refugees were officially registered by the United Nations and not all ended up in camps in the countries surrounding Israel, or in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Some who were initially housed in camps subsequently left.

Today, surviving refugees and their descendants could number as many as 4.5 million, although estimates vary enormously. The number of UN registered refugees is 3.7 million, and registered displaced persons number 1.25 million, though most of the latter are also registered refugees from 1948.

In any case, the estimated numbers give an indication of the size of the problem that awaits resolution. As is plain from a breakdown of figures provided by UNRWA in 1995, less than half the registered refugees currently live in areas of the West Bank and Gaza that may be expected to be within the borders of the nascent Palestinian state.

DREAMS AND REALITIES

The conditions under which the refugees exist vary from place to place. In the areas under the Palestinian Authority they are now eligible for Palestinian passports, although such passports are only issued with the approval of Israel. In addition, some of the ninety thousand or so Palestinians who have returned to Palestinian areas of the West Bank and Gaza with the establishment of the PA may qualify as refugees. After an initial influx, Israel now allows about two to three thousand to return annually under a scheme of family reunification.

In Jordan, refugees have been naturalised and can carry Jordanian passports. In Syria, refugees have equal rights with Syrian nationals except that they may not vote in national elections. They are free to work and to come and go as they wish. By contrast, in Lebanon, the refugees are subject to employment and residency laws that treat them as non-Lebanese citizens and impose several restrictions on them.

The official and frequently repeated position of both Palestinian refugees themselves and the Arab host governments, including the PA, is that the only acceptable solution to the problem is implementation of UN Resolution 194, of December 1948. From this comes the `right of return; which has become the mantra of refugees and Arab governments.

The General Assembly resolved, `that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live in peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return or for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the governments or authorities responsible.'

In fact, different parties have developed different interpretations. The right of return is understood by many to mean simply the right to return to an area or country, but not to a specific house or street. According to some, compensation may not be automatically due to those who choose not to exercise the right of return, but applies to all those who can claim loss of property or damage.

Interpretations of who is liable to pay compensation also vary, as well as views on who should receive the compensation. Host governments may have a claim here as well as individuals.

Unofficially, there is an expectation that not all, and possibly only a few, refugees would choose to exercise the right of return to what is now the state of Israel, but Arab governments and the refugees want the principal upheld as a basis for resolving the issue. Positions vary on where refugees should be accommodated, were they not to return.

The Lebanese government rejects outright any suggestion of resolving the refugee issue at its own expense by resettling them inside Lebanon, even if they wanted to stay there. Syria has not made its position clear on this possibility. Jordan, meanwhile, is thought to be willing to assimilate its refugees, but will require compensation for the years it has accommodated them and rehabilitation costs. That said, the question of their eventual citizenship and passports will remain open until Palestinian statehood is resolved.

The Israeli government rejects the notion of right of return for those who left what is now Israel, and does not wish to see unlimited return to the Palestinian-controlled areas either. The PA is thought to share the view that it cannot accommodate all Palestinian refugees who may wish to live in a future Palestinian state.

The United States, meanwhile, ceased supporting Resolution 194 after the Oslo Accords, on the grounds that it had been overtaken by these and prospective peace negotiations. Its position, in other words, is to focus on the do-able.

Other donor countries without Washington's proprietorial hold on the details of the peace process are less sanguine. They may logically expect to be asked to provide funds for reconstruction and development in Arab countries, but they presumably do not see themselves as liable for footing the bill for compensation for the original displacement and loss of property Quite how the question of compensation will be resolved is unclear. Meanwhile, on-going provision for the refugees, through UNRWA, has been slowly diminishing in real terms, as the prospect of a peace agreement looms.

AT A PRICE

Various prognoses for a Final Status Agreement by September or shortly thereafter, indicate that the Israelis are prepared to recognise Palestinian statehood, but at a price. Currently the haggling appears to be focused on the size, contiguity and borders of the prospective state.

Reports in the Israeli press indicate that the intention is for Israel to annex those parts of the West Bank that include the biggest and most populous Israeli settlements. It will also wish to retain a presence in the Jordan Valley so that Palestine will not border Jordan.

Prime Minister Ehud Barak is apparently willing to hand over to full PA control Palestinian villages around east Jerusalem. This is presumably meant to give them a token presence in the city as a capital. Whether members of Barak's disparate coalition government can stomach this concession remains to be seen.

Speculation on how much territory in the West Bank will eventually fall to the Palestinians varies from fifty to ninety percent. Barak is also thought to be aiming to link the Palestinian areas to one another, from north to south, and open a second `safe passage' route from Gaza to the West Bank. In any case, the bargaining is focused on territory, borders and statehood. The fear of many refugees in neighbouring countries is that the right of return, even to the nascent Palestinian state, will be traded for these other prizes.

Supposing this happens, it is unlikely that the trade-off will be spelled out in the Final Status Agreement. Much more likely is that the agreement will relegate the refugee issue to further discussion, with international involvement.

If statehood is recognised, the responsibility of the government to continue championing refugee rights where the PLO left off will be moot. Even so, other parties, not least Arab host governments, could take this as an invitation to pass the responsibility for refugees on their soil to Palestine. -The most pressing case is Lebanon.

DANGEROUS LIMBO

The presence of the Palestinians in Lebanon has been blamed for triggering the civil war there in the lg7os. The 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon was in pursuit of Palestinian guerrillas operating from Lebanese territory. When international intervention led to supervised exit of the Palestinian leadership and paramilitaries, the ghastly massacres of Palestinians in the Sabra and Shatilla refugee camps occurred.

To this day, the refugees who remain in Lebanon are perceived as a threat to internal security and to the delicate sectarian balance. The camps are no-go areas for the Lebanese Security forces and the potential exists for both Palestinian in-fighting and for the camps to be used as bases for a new round of guerrilla warfare against Israel. The first test will come now the Israeli troops have withdrawn from south Lebanon.

The refugees in Jordan present a different worry. There, the issue is national identity Jordan supports the establishment of a Palestinian state and apparently anticipates that this will enable decisions to be made about who will qualify for Jordanian citizenship. East Bank nationalists think that Jordanians of Palestinian origin - which means at least fifty percent of the population, depending on how far back you make the distinction - should get Palestinian passports once there is a state, and should only receive Jordanian citizenship if they apply for it and are accepted.

If Palestinian refugees are left in limbo, without clearly defined nationality or status, they will become, as they say, a sitting bomb. If the right of return is traded or shelved, and compensation is incalculable, then the potential for instability in Lebanon and Jordan, if not more widely could be sufficient to undo the hard work that has been put into step by step peacemaking.