Stains of red: the changing face of human rights in Russia and China.

MARCO DURANTI, Staff Writer, Harvard International Review

This past September; as the world was still reeling from Boris Yeltsin's latest cabinet shake-up, President Clinton defended his decision to attend a Moscow summit by stressing the critical need for economic reform in Russia.

Months earlier, as Clinton prepared for a state visit to the People's Republic of China, these organizations were joined by a plethora of groups from across the spectrum in an effort to make human rights issues a prerequisite for an expanded dialogue with the Chinese government. Yet for Clinton, the combined cry of ministers, congressmen, trade protectionists, and unions gave way to the ephemeral voice of the American people--the majority of whom, according to polls at the time, believed that Clinton should not criticize China publicly for its human rights policies. According to these same polls, only a minority supported linking US-China trade policy with Chinese human rights issues if that linkage would hurt US economic interests.

Is this tacit approval of Russia and Chinese human rights abuses justified? Are violations of civil liberties in Russia a thing of the past? Has there been increased freedom of speech and dissent in China? Or is it wrong to claim that Russia, by abandoning communism, and China, by distancing itself from rigid ideology, have also cleansed themselves of their legacies of oppression?

When considering the extent of human rights abuse in Russia and China, the Russian republic initially appears to be a greater supporter of civil liberties than the Chinese authoritarian state. But a comparison of criminal rights, freedom of press, and freedom of religion in the two countries reveals that Russia's record in these areas is actually similar to that of its doggedly socialist counterpart. Russia, indeed, may be regressing towards its Soviet past, while China may be making significant progress towards a more free society.

Historical Influence

The Chinese and Russian constitutions offer conflicting messages about the degree to which these governments support freedom of speech and dissent. For example, Article 41 of China's 1982 Constitution states, "Citizens of the People's Republic of China have the right to criticize and make suggestions to any state organ or functionary." In Article 1, on the other hand, it is ominously written that "sabotage of the socialist system by any organization or individual is prohibited." Likewise, Article 29 of Russia's 1993 Constitution states that "everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought and speech," yet goes on to say rather ambiguous statements such as, "Propaganda or campaigning inciting social, racial, national or religious hatred and strife is impermissible."

Insight as why these contradictions exist, especially in these supposedly "democratic" countries can be found by examining their political cultures. Both China and Russia have well-known traditions of authoritarianism that discourage pluralism and non-violent dissent. Communist governments in China and in Russia before 1991 rejected the Western view that human rights are universal, maintaining that all rights were class-based and reflected the objective economic conditions of each society. What is most important, however, is how the current governments of China and Russia use these past cultural legacies such as these to infringe on freedom of speech and dissent in a modern context.

In China, traditional Confucianism reduces the role of the individual by promoting a hierarchical system of loyalties that emphasizes the idea of a society in harmony with its rulers. This system came under attack around 1898 when the notion of human rights was used to criticize the Manchu Dynasty. Although Communists subsequently employed this rights-based approach as a weapon against the Nationalists, once in power, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) began to speak of state-granted "citizen's rights" that could be restricted or denied as the political situation demanded. The CCP has always viewed social and economic rights as more important than civil and political rights, but now, under international pressure, Chinese scholars defend this position by talking of "human rights with Chinese characteristics." Because social and economic rights are "collective" and civil and political rights are individualist, the argument goes, Chinese culture values the former.

The current leadership also plays on the Chinese people's ingrained fear of chaos by conjuring up a return to the anarchy of the warlords or of the more recent Cultural Revolution. With this fear of chaos comes an associated fear of destitution. Since material goods are important for basic sustenance and no ones knows how long China's current prosperity will last, human rights may seem relatively unimportant for Chinese who suffered dire poverty in the 1960s and 1970s. In this light, campaigners for the release of political prisoners in China are told that the suffering of a few imprisoned individuals should not obscure the general improvement in social-economic freedom and living standards in China.

In Russia, the human rights situation has improved dramatically since the advent of glasnost in the 1980s and the subsequent fall of the communist regime. There is now a fair amount of support for free elections, multiple parties, and expanded civil rights, but a gap exists between acceptance of democratic values in general and willingness to apply them in practice. According to political scientist Michael McFaul, the combination of a weak state and an incompetent judicial system has produced a sense of anarchy, a situation alien and frightening to a population raised on a powerful authoritarian state. Thus, popular cries for traditional law and order threaten to undermine individual liberties and civil rights. Furthermore, many Russians are unwilling to grant rights to groups they see as a threat to the emerging democratic order, precisely because they value democracy. In the current transition, there is little guarantee that threatening groups can be contained because the state's capacity to enforce fair rules of the political game is in doubt.

The Illusion of Freedom

Russia's justice system does little to promote freedom of speech and dissent, and if anything, is worsening; China, however, appears to be making small advances toward a more open society. Although the Russian constitution guarantees the independence of courts, the right to a jury trial, and the right to consult with a defense attorney of one's own choosing within 24 hours of being arrested, most citizens are unaware of these rights. Many policemen make brutal use of a June 1995 presidential decree that lets them detain suspects for 30 days, during which time, unless they have bought their freedom, suspects are routinely beaten for confessions. Trial by jury operates only in nine of Russia's 89 regions. Since 1993, the combined effect of a confused new political system and a weak judiciary with the replacement of Yeltsin's initial reform agenda by a tougher nationalism has allowed the ex-KGB--in the guise of the "Russian Federal Security Service"--to reclaim its former power of suppression.

In China, "counter-revolutionary" statutes have recently been removed and legal reforms have been enacted with provisions covering the right of legal counsel, presumption of innocence, limitations on detention without formal charges, and curbs on the power of public security bureaus to act without supervision. Unfortunately, many have been replaced with other laws, such as sedition statutes, that can be used to stifle dissent.

Similar observations can be made on freedom of press in Russia and China. Independent media emerged in the old Soviet Union in the late 1980s, and for a few years produced critical news coverage ranging from local police scandals to the disastrous war in Chechnya to government waste and corruption. Lately, however, much of the independent media has moved back under the control of the state and of business interests close to it. During the 1996 elections, the national media campaigned unabashedly for Yeltsin and gave scant coverage to Gennadi Zyuganov, his communist opponent. Yelstin rewarded the owners with government positions after the elections, sending the message to other business that owning the press and flaunting one's control over it translates into political clout. Thus, Russia's editors have continued the Soviet tradition of seeking out sponsors and producing newspapers oriented toward satisfying those sponsors. China, on the other hand, us starting to break from more authoritarian positions. The editor-in-chief of Beijing Review stated in a recent interview that "Compared to the past, we are very free in speech" which is true, yet went on to say, "I pay special attention to ensuring that my magazine will not stir up social turmoil."

Russia and China resemble each other in the degree of religious freedom they afford their citizens. As in other areas of human rights, China is making progress while Russia is back-tracking. Although there is an increased openness about religion in China, the government insists on controlling all church activity. Independent religious leaders have been jailed and harassed, and Roman Catholics are barred from contact with the Vatican. A new Russian law on "freedom of conscience and religious associations," passed in September of 1997 against President Yeltsin's objections, creates a barrier against religious expansion by preventing development of "totalitarian" sects, limiting the activities of foreign missionaries, and at the same time, creating conditions supportive of Russia's traditional religions.

The International Community

Whereas political and cultural legacies often foster attempts to limit personal freedoms, pressure from the international community can encourage more open societies. China's recent progress and Russia's regress can partly be explained by each government's response to international pressure. A post-Cold War Russia is in some ways more free to abuse its power because the United States, which once made each violation of the 1975 Helsinki human rights accords an international scandal, has consistently overlooked most of its new ally's civil liberties violations. And, as the recent Moscow summit clearly shows, the United States is willing to continue a hypocritical policy, pressing Yeltsin's government for economic, rather than human rights, reform.

On the other hand, the international community's open condemnation of China's repressive regime throughout the last decade has produced significant results. Efforts by the Chinese authorities to prove that human rights are respected in China show that the language of human rights has, to some extent, been accepted. By 1993, China developed what became known as the "hostage politick," releasing certain well-known political prisoners at crucial moments and before important meetings, including the annual US Most Favored Nation decision, the 2000 Olympics bid, and UN Human Rights Commission meetings. When asked about the Tiananmen Square massacre while visiting the United States in November of 1997, President Jiang Zemin even admitted that his government has sometimes been guilty of "shortcomings and mistakes."

Yet, as in Russia, economic considerations are gaining ground over moral considerations in the international community's dealings with China, leading to a renewal of repressive measures. The separation of human rights accountability from Most Favored Nation trade status and Clinton's decision to de-emphasize human rights in his state visit this summer is further evidence of this worrisome trend.

The United States' discrepancy in attitude regarding human rights abuses in China and Russia demonstrate the difficulty in incorporating such moral considerations into a consistent policy framework. Such inconsistency is a reminder of the unresolved issues still plaguing the post Cold War era. As long as the United States persists to ignore the absence of freedom of speech, press, and religion in Russia and China, it cannot in good conscience call the Cold War a victory. Only when the two nations learn to more deeply respect human rights, will China and Russia truly have been "liberated" from the legacy of their Communist pasts.