Another Vote.

Electoral Reform in Italy

On the morning of April 19, 1999, the early editions of many Italian national newspapers ran headlines declaring the passage of a referendum on electoral reform that was intended to create a more unified and workable government.

The referendum would

have changed Italy's partially proportional-representation system, where representation in parliament is based on each party's percentage of the national vote, to an entirely first-past-the-post system, where seats are granted by district to whichever candidate wins a plurality. The stories based their claims on projections by the Abacus polling organization that 50.8 percent of eligible voters had participated. Over 90 percent of those voting had been in favor of a change in the electoral system that many analysts consider imperative for the future viability of Italian democracy.

When all votes were counted, however, only 49.6 percent of eligible voters had actually participated, a figure 0.4 percent too low to validate the referendum. This minor difference caused the failure of the referendum, not to mention the embarrassment of the newspapers. Though 21 million people had voted for electoral reform and fewer than 3 million had opposed it, proponents of a revised Italian parliamentary election system had suffered yet another defeat.

Concerns over Italy's electoral system date back to the end of World War II, when Italy adopted a new constitution. With memories of Mussolini's fascist dictatorship fresh in their minds, the framers of the constitution intentionally created a political system based on proportional representation, making it almost impossible for one party to dominate. At the time, the United States supported these plans, fearing the strength of the Italian Communist Party and the possibility of Soviet influence.

Since its passage, the Constitution has met its original goal by effectively preventing communists and fascists from seizing power. However, it has also kept any other government from holding power for a substantial period of time. At a rate of slightly over one government a year, Italy has reached 58th government in postwar history.

Italian governments fail so frequently because they are often coalitions of many small parties, all of which must be placated to keep the coalition intact. As a result, even minor conflicts within a government can cause its collapse. In early 1999 the Popular Party, which won seven percent of the national vote, threatened to dissolve former Prime Minister Massimo D'Alema's coalition, though in the end it failed to do so. Then, in December 1999, the tiny Socialist party, which received only two percent of the vote in the last national election, broke away from the coalition, forcing D'Alema to form a new government.

D'Alema's difficulties reflect Italy's continuing political problems. The government replaced in December included eight different parties with diverging priorities and demands. Keeping each of these parties satisfied was necessary to maintain the coalition's power, and this need to make constant, minor compromises restricted the government's ability to craft effective policies. The second D'Alema government was hardly better. Reforms of the constitution's electoral system have been proposed in the hope that Italy's chronic political instability can be moderated.

The first of these reforms was a referendum passed in 1993 that abandoned Italy's system of entirely proportional representation in favor of one that allocated 25 percent of the 660 seats in parliament proportionally and the rest in a first-past-the-post system. Despite this reform, instability has persisted since the continuing allocation of seats based upon a party's proportion of the national vote still gives great influence to parties that won a majority in only a few districts. Thus, the most recent referendum called for an entirely first-past-the-post electoral system.

Unfortunately, short-term factors have prevented the enactment of reform despite the support of a vast majority of Italians. The proposal was first considered in 1997 by Italy's Bicamerale, a parliamentary commission headed by D'Alema before he became Prime Minister. This group worked for 18 months on wide-ranging constitutional and political reforms, but, despite the length of its struggle, the Bicamerale failed in the end to change election laws. One reason for the commission's failure was its simultaneous work on revisions of the presidency and the judiciary; the commission's broad goals made success in any one area difficult. Furthermore, some politicians sought to suppress D'Alema's rising political power by sabotaging the committee's work.

Recognizing the government's inability to resolve the problem, politicians decided in late 1998 to turn the vote over to the people in the April 18 referendum that failed by a narrow margin. This failure can be explained partially by the distraction of other events that vied for the public's attention. At the time of the vote in April 1999, the Kosovo campaign dominated the news, and many people were unaware of the referendum. Others stayed away because of their lack of understanding of the issue, and politicians took to blaming each other for voter ignorance.

However, more permanent obstacles also impede electoral reform. Such reforms are difficult for current officeholders to swallow. While many supporters of electoral reform claim that it will lead Italy toward a more stable, two-party order, a governing coalition comprised of eight different parties contradicts the foundation of its own power if it supports the creation of only two large political forces. Moreover, under the new law, many parties would no longer have seats in parliament; these parties are among the most fervent opponents of change.

It is also unlikely that the chances for reform will improve outside the government. Concern over Kosovo and a misunderstanding of the issues are not the only reasons for the low voter turnout of the April referendum. Political apathy, brought on by the Italian governments overuse of referenda in recent years, also played a role. Ever since a 1946 referendum ended the monarchy, Italy has relied upon referenda to pass laws mired in parliamentary deadlock. Unfortunately, the use of this method for so many minor issues has trivialized the process and led to lower voter turnout. Electoral reform is only the latest victim of voter apathy.

On May 21, Italian voters will once again consider an electoral reform proposal, one of seven referenda coming up for a vote. However, even if this referendum passes, perhaps the largest obstacle to electoral reform will remain: Italy's entrenched political traditions. Proponents of a new electoral system speak of the bipolar political order they hope will emerge. This hope ignores a half-century of Italian history and a deeply ingrained political culture that encourages small, regional parties that serve specialized, parochial interests. The trend in recent years has been toward a system that is more fractured, not less: at least 50 political parties currently exist in Italy, an increase from 13 in 1993. This reality will not change overnight, and the many obstacles to reform suggest that instability will persist for years to come.