Since the end of the Cold War, relations between NATO and Russia have vacillated between reluctant cooperation and outright antagonism. While Russia has raised many objections to the enlargement of NATO in the past, its opposition has recently abated.
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Historically, Eastern European countries have turned to Russia for support and protection. Based upon close linguistic and cultural ties among the Slavic nations, the support of the Russian government was crucial to many countries. Throughout the 19th century Russia championed their claims for independence, and in the 20th century the Russian army played a key role in freeing these countries from Nazi occupation. However, the aftermath of World War II brought many grievances from the Eastern European region as this relationship soured. Although citizens chose communist governments in some countries such as Yugoslavia, Russia forcibly brought Soviet-controlled puppet governments to power in others like Poland and Czechoslovakia. Under the patronage of the Soviet Union, these countries soon adopted Soviet-style policies and acceded to Soviet demands.
The first NATO Secretary-General, Lord Ismay, commented that the organization's function upon its 1949 inception was "to keep the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down" in reference to the balance of power in the North Atlantic region. Following the end of the Cold War, NATO refocused its goals and transformed itself into an organization concerned with regional stability and security; nonetheless, an increase in NATO power and proximity still makes Russia uneasy. Enlargement of NATO to include smaller Eastern European states decreases Russian influence in the region, and the entry of the Baltic states brings the alliance within the former Soviet perimeter. The stated goal of NATO enlargement is to unite democratic countries and to abandon former lines of division. However, many feel that eastward expansion simply moves the dividing line between Russia and the West closer to Russian borders. There is particular concern for the future of the Kaliningrad region within Russia. Wedged between Poland , Lithuania, and the Baltic Sea, this area could soon find itself surrounded by NATO countries, which would cause substantial insecurity given Russia's current weak position vis-a-vis NATO.
Contrary to Russian reservations, prospective NATO member states are eager to join the alliance. Having grown wary of the ubiquitous Russian influence, with history still vivid in the minds of their citizens, these countries have moved away from cooperation--political, economic, and military--with Russia. NATO membership would provide these states, which are too small to ensure their own security, with protection. As Estonian media commentator Hannes Rumm observed, "If Estonia and other Baltic states were invited to NATO next year ... Estonian security problems would be solved far better than [at any previous time] during the last thousand years." Moreover, these countries were alarmed by the fervent Russian opposition to the previous NATO expansion, perceiving it as an attempt to continue to exert control over them. They therefore see NATO membership as a guarantee of sovereignty, ensuring independence from Russia.
While the NATO accession of the Baltic states--Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania--as well as of the former Yugoslav Republic of Slovenia seems probable and expansion to the other potential member states is similarly likely as they stabilize and prosper, the general trend of Russian opposition to NATO expansion has led many to question the impact that such concerns should play. On one hand, many feel that the Russian position should be taken into account since good relations with Moscow are vital for general European stability. On the other hand, while a hostile Russia aggravated by the arrival of NATO on its doorstep could undermine European security, many believe that Russian concerns should not be treated differently. Jesse Helms, the influential Republican on the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, commented that just as the United States never recognized the Soviet annexation of the Baltics in the 1940s, it should not recognize a Russian sphere of influence in the region Moscow still calls the near abroad ." But while NATO did not want to make relations with Russia excessively "privileged" and thus stop the enlargement process due to Russian objections, Moscow was reluctant to appear weak by accepting NATO enlargement easily.
The new common threat of international terrorism, along with armament talks due to new pressures on nuclear treaties in the wake of the proposed US National Missile Defense program, has prompted new cooperation between Russia and NATO. Moscow seems to be moving past its old fear of an expanded NATO, instead hoping that NATO enlargement can forge a breakthrough toward greater cooperation and constructive interaction. Though Russia does not want to join NATO--Putin and other politicians have made it clear that they consider Russia capable of ensuring its own security--it is placing a new premium on fostering ties with its NATO neighbors.
Other forms of greater cooperation are definitely possible. Russia's willingness to enhance collaboration was confirmed by the NATO-Russia Founding Act signed on May 27, 1997. The agreement established the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, the main mechanism for consultation and cooperation between the two, allowing for regular meetings on matters of security and policy. The new pact signed in May 2002 established a NATO-Russia Council that will allow Russia to engage with individual NATO members instead of just with NATO as a whole.
With proposals for closer ties between Russia and NATO, the elimination of former divisive lines seems more attainable than ever. As the West recognizes Russia as an important strategic partner on the world scene and Russia accepts the inevitability of NATO enlargement and its loss of direct control over Eastern Europe, the two sides seem to be abandoning the remnants of mutual distrust.