Mass movement: indigenous turmoil in Bolivia.

In October 2003, a coalition of mainly indigenous farmers, students, and union members paralyzed Bolivia in what was dubbed "Bloody October." Protestors dynamited bridges, felled telephone poles, and tore roads apart, preventing the delivery of food, fuel, and medical resources to the capital

When explaining the reason behind "Bloody October," international media highlights the country's natural gas export plan, the US-backed eradication of illegal coca crops, and the economic recession. Although valid from a short-term perspective, these explanations fail to acknowledge the fundamental political changes in the mid-1990s that mobilized and empowered the indigenous masses.

Even after Bolivian democratization began in 1982, poor indigenous or mixed race mestizo persons, who comprise up to 70 percent of Bolivia's population, considered themselves excluded form the political system. Their civic society organizations (CSOs) of churches, unions, and political groups reflected this mentality by frequently rejecting party politics altogether and resorting to methods such as road blockades and city sieges to effect political change. Only recently has CSO mobilization been severe enough to cause a president to resign. In 1993, an advisor to Lozada declared that Bolivia needed "to get away from the rigid centralized system that had been in place ... because it [was] very limited in its capacity to respond to real problems." The government created the Popular Participation Law, which delegated substantial administrative functions and over 20 percent of state resources to local districts. Furthermore, half of the members of the Bolivian National Congress were to be direct representatives elected from the districts, replacing the members previously selected by central political parties.

Within a year, the number of district-level CSOs rose exponentially, nurtured by the devolved state resources. They ran grassroots mobilization campaigns that doubled the rural voting population from 300,000 to 700,000. As a result of the rise in CSOs, 80 percent of indigenous rural populations that previously identified with the rural peasant class now associate themselves with their ethnic identity. These populations began mobilizing along pre-existing ethnic lines within their districts, electing indigenous leaders to a quarter of nationwide district-level positions by 1995.

Harvesting the strengths of ethnic mobilization and empowerment, the Movement to Socialism (MAS), a group of indigenous coca growers led by Evo Morales, began gaining momentum. Morales slowly rose from being a district deputy in 1997 and became regional MAS leader over the entire Chapare area of Bolivia, building on established CSOs and using state resources to strengthen MAS and gain control over land distribution. Other indigenous leaders followed suit, competing for local offices under the MAS banner.

MAS quickly augmented the anti-systemic methods of indigenous CSOs with its newfound power. In April 2000, it began a coordinated siege on the city of Cochabamba to protest plans to privatize the municipal water delivery system, nearly toppling the Bolivian government. This episode was mirrored by massive indigenous protests across the nation, which called for accelerated land reforms, distribution of resources to indigenous groups, and funds for indigenous education. As a La Paz newspaper reported on October 8, 2000, "what previous revolutionaries Julian Apaza and Zarate Willka could not do in years ... Evo Morales and other indigenous leaders have done in three weeks."

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Morales's MAS and its indigenous supporters virtually sealed the fate of the Bolivian political system after the 2002 presidential elections. Florida International University Professor Eduardo Gamarra, an expert on Latin American politics, concluded, "the traditional political parties may have retained control of the legislature and the executive branch, but Evo Morales and the opposition forces retained effective control over the rest of the country." Lozada's resignation in the face of violent MAS-led protests was thus inevitable.

The question now remaining is whether Carlos Mesa, the new president appointed in Lozada's stead, can withstand the same MAS-led forces that overthrew his predecessor. The political landscape is complicated by US involvement; the United States demanded increased anti-narcotic efforts against MAS's cocaine producers in response to Mesa's request for aid in relieving Bolivia's US$100 million debt. Mesa thus faces a difficult dilemma of challenging or assuaging the same group that overthrew Lozada. Either way, the entrance of the indigenous population into the political arena has fundamentally altered Bolivia's future. If the new Bolivian administration is unable to reconcile the interests of this powerful new group with those of the country, Mesa will face the same fate as his predecessor.

staff writer

TIN-YUN HO