CORRECTIONAL ADMINISTRATORS' ATTITUDES: Making a Difference in Correctional Intelligence...

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In a post-9/11 world, domestic and international intelligence have become the cornerstone of U.S.homeland security. America's law enforcement community and the correctional community have been faced with

the challenge of working together and sharing intelligence. The correctional community has always had a significant amount of intelligence at federal, state and county levels. Traditionally, correctional administrators, outside law enforcement officials and prosecutors viewed intelligence gathering in corrections as information that only pertained to respective correctional institutions.

The main reason for this attitude is that most administrators and prosecutors are not aware that intelligence gathered within the correctional community has the potential to enhance prosecution of criminal cases. Most administrators and officials never had opportunities to be involved in cases where intelligence developed from the correctional community. In addition, there is a lack of resources to train and assign staff whose positions are dedicated to performing investigative and intelligence gathering on a full-time basis. This negative attitude also derived from the traditional task of correctional intelligence pertaining only to the respective correctional facility. Traditionally, the only need for investigation or intelligence gathering within a correctional facility was based on incidents that occurred within that facility.

The History of Security Intelligence

The 1950s and 1960s brought the growth of traditional prison gangs. To maintain order and security within institutions, it became necessary to monitor the movement of these groups, which subsequently were known as security threat groups (STGs). Larger state prison systems and the Federal Bureau of Prisons established full-time staff positions to perform these tasks. These staff members are referred to as special investigative investigators or SIS lieutenants in the BOP. In some state systems, they are called security captains or security investigators. Throughout the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, investigative/intelligence staff worked alone. Their responsibilities consisted of monitoring, identifying and documenting known and new gang members, performing investigations concerning internal affair matters and coordinating with outside law enforcement agencies in conducting interviews with inmates and dealing with criminal matters. The increase in the national crime rate and the "get tough on crime" attitude of the 1980s and 1990s, combined with new mandatory sentencing laws on the state and federal level, affected the rapid growth of the U.S. prison system at that time. This increase in the prison population made it necessary for correctional administrators to dedicate additional staff to assist in maintaining efficient investigative and intelligence gathering processes. The nation's prison system also experienced continuous growth that subsequently placed a large demand on the correctional investigative and intelligence communities.

Investigative And Intelligence Staff Today

Today, many correctional administrators, outside law enforcement officials and prosecutors still view correctional investigative and intelligence staff as being responsible only for gathering intelligence for their respective institutions. In some correctional and law enforcement circles, they are restricted from disseminating critical intelligence to outside law enforcement and prosecutors' offices. Correctional investigators and intelligence staff are considered a small component of the daily operations of a correctional institution and are limited in the resources they can offer to police and courts. At times, correctional investigators and intelligence staff also are restricted by state laws and, in some cases, judges' opinions on how information will be disseminated. For example, in states such as Maryland and Pennsylvania, state judges can place restrictions on county and state institutions concerning proactive intelligence-gathering operations. In many cases, if a judge feels that the information being gathered does not directly threaten the security of the institution, security/intelligence officers are not permitted to be proactive. Examples of proactive intelligence are monitoring inmates' mail and phone calls.

Traditionally, police and courts have not viewed corrections as an equal part of the criminal justice system. This attitude perpetuated the view that correctional staff were not considered law enforcement personnel, but custodial personnel. But the correctional intelligence community has proved itself throughout the years by assisting outside law enforcement agencies and prosecutors with evidence that has been successfully used in criminal prosecutions. Evidence developed by correctional intelligence staff to support investigations, such as 9/11, organized crime, and major drug and gang cases, have added to the validity and reliability of the evidence used from the correctional community. Intelligence correctional communities at federal, state and county levels have been creating relationships and partnerships in some areas of the country. Some of these relationships and partnerships are: the Joint Intelligence Sharing Initiative between the FBI and the BOP; the Regional Information Sharing System Program (RISS) intelligence network, which consists of federal, state and county law enforcement and county correctional intelligence/investigative offices throughout the country; and the East Coast Gang Investigators Association, which consists of federal, state and county law enforcement and correctional intelligence offices. However, these partnerships exist only in selected areas as described below.

Federal

In the early 1980s, the BOP made a significant effort to have its special investigative supervisors start networking with their counterparts in other federal correctional facilities. Efforts included finding the resources to upgrade their record keeping from paper to computers. In the 1990s, in the larger federal correctional facilities, special investigative agent positions were created, salaries were raised and promotional grades were upgraded. Special investigative agents are responsible for all of the correctional staff assigned to the investigative and intelligence office within their respective institutions. They also are responsible for all inmate and staff investigations, monitoring the inmate telephone system, STG movements and working as liaisons with outside law enforcement agencies. Intelligence within the federal correctional system became so significant in foreseeable prosecution cases that late in the 1990s, the BOP and FBI established a Joint Intelligence Sharing Initiative. The BOP went beyond the institutional walls and created intelligence operations officers and intelligence resource specialists. These two positions are organized in teams and assigned to the FBI in intelligence squads and gang task forces, mostly in large cities. The intelligence operations officers and intelligence resource specialists have become the nexus that is needed between correctional intelligence communities and outside law enforcement at all levels.

The BOP continues to support its intelligence programs and ensures that all staff members working in the investigative and intelligence offices are efficiently trained. Another initiative the BOP has developed is the Sacramento Intelligence Office, located in California. The Sacramento Intelligence Office consists of personnel from the BOP, the U.S. State Marshal Service and U.S. Probation Office. It not only is an intelligence resource for STGs and other intelligence on the federal level, but also is a resource for all law enforcement agencies throughout the country.

State

State correctional systems such as California, New Jersey and Pennsylvania maintain a comprehensive investigative and intelligence network with their co-correctional facilities, outside law enforcement agencies and prosecutors' offices. They have taken the responsibility of continuing to train their staff and upgrade their systems. Their staff is encouraged to share intelligence and participate in outside law enforcement organizations such as gang investigators' associations and the RISS intelligence network.

RISS has regional organizations all over the country and assists any federal, state or county jail or prison in establishing resources and computer systems to identify inmate-suspects in their facilities, and providing technical and gang training for staff and general assistance in investigative practices. RlSS offers services for a minimal annual fee of $350 per year.

RISS is composed of six regional centers that share intelligence and coordinate efforts against criminal networks that operate in many localions across jurisdictional lines. Typical targets of RISS activities are drug trafficking, terrorism, violent crime, cybercrime, gang activity and organized criminal activities. Each of the centers, however, selects its own target crimes and the range of services provided to member agencies. RISS is a federally funded program administered by the U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance. Each RISS center must comply with U.S. Department of Justice guidelines and 28 CFR Part 23, Criminal Intelligence Systems Operating Policies. RISS serves more than 6,600 member law enforcement agencies in 50 states, Canada, the District of Columbia, Australia, Guam, the U.S. Virgin Islands, England and Puerto Rico.

The vast majority of member agencies are at the municipal and county levels, but there is a number of state and federal agencies that are also members. The Drug Enforcement Administration, Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Attorneys' Offices, Internal Revenue Service, secret Service, Customs and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives are among the federal agencies participating in RISS.

Intelligence-Gathering Programs

The United States has become a country of transit crime where individuals, gangs, organized crime organizations, illegal aliens and terrorists travel throughout the country. On many occasions, these individuals end up in county jails, usually under aliases. The county jails and prisons in this country are probably the most important correctional facilities for gathering potential intelligence, but have the least resources and staff to dedicate to intelligence gathering.

Due to the lack of resources for intelligence gathering and staff training, several of the suspects are never found. Many suspects are incarcerated in county jails and serve sentences under aliases and are released to continue their deviant or terrorist-like behaviors. Lack of funds to obtain the necessary training and resources is a reason many correctional administrators are not supporting intelligence gathering within their facilities and intelligence-sharing initiatives with local, state and federal law enforcement agencies.

In some cases, correctional staff take it upon themselves to join local and state gang and investigative organizations to obtain knowledge of different gang signs, tattoos and general criminal behavior of inmate STGs and suspects. On many gang and investigative Web sites, such as the East Coast Gang Investigators Association (ECGIA), a member can post a tattoo or hand sign and share general identifiers of suspects in their jails at a $15 annual membership. Members of ECGIA share information with hundreds of investigators all over the country. For information about ECGIA, visit its Web site at www.ecgia.org. Other organizations that gather and share intelligence are ACA's Correctional Intelligence Task Force (www. aca.org) and the National Major Gang Task Force (www.nmgtf.org). A number of these gang and investigative personnel visit correctional facilities and conduct gang and investigative training free of charge.

There is a number of county jails in cities and rural areas throughout the United States that support intelligencegathering programs, even if funds and resources are not available. They support their staff in monitoring STGs, gathering intelligence and encouraging staff to reach out to outside law enforcement agencies. The county jails that support intelligence-gathering programs benefit because their proactive approach reduces the amount of incidents within their institutions, and gives outside law enforcement intelligence, which enhances their ability to counteract criminal activity while it is still in the planning stage.

It is easy for wardens in both large and small prison systems to ignore supporting intelligence-gathering programs and training, and creating intelligence initiatives with outside law enforcement agencies due to lack of funds, but this is no excuse. There are many gang and investigation organizations that staff can join for a minimal amount of money. Moreover, RISS has regional organizations all over the country and assists any federal, state or county jail or prison in establishing resources and computer systems to identify suspects in their facilities, provides technical and gang training for staff and helps conduct investigative practices. They offer their services for a minimal annual fee.

However, with all of the achievements that the correctional investigative and intelligence community have made throughout the years, it is only as good as the attitude of the correctional administration that has the fundamental impact on policy. If the administration does not see its investigative and intelligence staff as part of the overall law enforcement community or develop partnerships with outside law enforcement for the purpose of sharing intelligence, then the administration risks losing intelligence that may result in local prosecution or possibly, national security issues.

SIDEBAR

RISS has regional organizations all over the country and assists any federal, state or county jail or prison in establishing resources and computer systems to identify inmate-suspects in their facilities, and providing technical and gang training for staff and general assistance in investigative practices.

AUTHOR_AFFILIATION

Louis F. Garzarelli, M.A., M.eD., is a faculty member in the Department of Law and Justice Administration, Mount Aloysis College, Cresson, Pa. He retired from the Federal Bureau of Prisons as an intelligence operations officer assigned to the Joint Intelligence Sharing Initiative Program. For more information about RISS, contact Jim Burch, deputy director, U.S. Department of Justice, at (202) 307-5910; jim.burch@usdoj.gov.