Altruistically Inclined?

Altruistically Inclined? by Alexander J. Field. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press. 2001. ISBN: 0472112244, $54.50. 337 pages.

Professor Field has written a stimulating, critical work, one that institutionalists will welcome, though not without reservation. The fundamental question

addressed is, "Are we essentially social ... or is war of all against all ... the default in the absence of government?" (p. 110). Clearly, this is not a book that nibbles at the periphery of economic theory but, rather, goes directly to the core. In particular, Field's main focal point, neoclassical theory-specifically rational choice theory-comes out badly after his rather withering examination.

What Field attempts here is the uncovering of the fundamental biological hardwiring that determines our "essential behavioral dispositions" (p. 110). Are we, as prevailing economic theory would have, basically individualistic, Hobbesian egoists? Or, as others, including most institutionalists, would assert, altruistic and cooperatively minded? Field is very careful to separate himself from the sociobiologists in not claiming that humans are controlled by some determinist characteristic that pre-disposes us to a single type of behavior. Culture matters, though as culture is variable, and humans are the outcome of biological evolution, we cannot seek in culture that which is some universal feature of all humanity. The central task is to discover what is universal about human norms-and such norms do exist; some version of the golden rule exists in virtually all cultures. And, so it is claimed, these norms that are invariant across cultures are the consequence of some millions-years-old biological trait that allowed evolution to work its way to our eventual emergence as recognizable humans. Field's argument is novel, at least for economists: "My claim is that a tendency to practice first move(r) altruism toward humans outside of the immediate kin group is part of universal human culture, and that it evolved because groups with high frequencies of individuals with such propensities tended to grow more rapidly. They did so because they were more successful at coordinated foraging as well as coordinated defense ... and because such groups suffered less from internal conflict. All of these factors contributed to greater reproductive success relative to other groups" (p. 138).

Field begins his argument by dissecting the conclusions reached by game theoretic experiments. Rational choice economists predict that individuals, acting on the basis of supposed egoism, will defect in prisoner's dilemma games, attempting to advantage themselves at the expense of the other party, and this leads to the worst possible outcome for both players (Nash equilibrium). In real world experiments, most players cooperate, defying the logic of rational choice theory. This outcome is further confirmed by forays into other experimental games (Ultimatum, etc.), and in the real world of public goods provisioning and voting behavior, most people do not free ride and many (often most) people vote even though it's irrational (by neoclassical standards) to do so. How do neoclassical economists respond to such demonstrations? Generally, they ignore the facts and go on as if their argument is uncontested. After all, why should egoistic individualists behave so irrationally? Some, like Robert Frank (Passions within Reason) do attempt to come to grips with this seeming anomaly but, in attempting to reconcile self-interested behavior with obvious altruism, get stuck in a quagmire of contradictions that appear almost schizophrenic (chapter 4, "Deconstructing Frank"). (It should be noted that Frank, unlike some others discussed in Field's account, displays intellectual integrity in acknowledging his argument's weaknesses [p. 2071).

Following reviews of the relevant biological literature and that coming out of the social scientists plying the evolutionary path (including evolutionary game theory where learning is incorporated in the games), Field advances his thesis. Before succinctly developing this thesis, I point to two oversights (at least in my opinion) in the above literature reviews. Field does not mention the work of the Harvard biologist (now emeritus) Richard Leowontin, one of the most vehement and politically astute of the anti-reductionist biologists. (See his Biology as Ideology as one illustration of his approach.) Leowontin's work is favorably disposed toward Field's thesis and might have assisted in further specifying the issues at stake. Furthermore, Field mentions no institutionalists, in particular, Veblen. I cannot understand this oversight, as surely institutionalists have contributed to this ongoing debate regarding the fundamental nature of humans.

Field's thesis is fairly straightforward. The starting point is that natural selection works not just at the level of the individual-the Hobbesian-based case-but also at the level of the group. True, reductionist theories allow for selection at the level of kin (gene sharing, etc.) but cannot consistently go beyond this level. Field, incorporating evidence from experimental economics, evolutionary biology, anthropology, sociology, and economic history (his main area), argues that group selection favors altruism, defined as "failure to harm" (p. 23) and mitigates against "first strike" (individualist) behavior as such behavior would be absolutely destructive to the group. If we all engaged in first strike, it would be a war of all against all, and we never would have gotten off the evolutionary ground. Nor would we have been able to invent our Leviathan as, if we are to be internally consistent, none would have the incentive to do so. Altruism allows reproductive success and thus becomes "hardwired" in our brains at the onset of the evolutionary process. As it's hardwired, it is a universal norm and is thus extended to groups beyond immediate kin. It is then no surprise to discover that, again, contrary to the standard Hobbesian-neoclassical approach, we aren't constantly fighting, mugging, or destroying each other; that war is not the usual state of affairs; that, indeed, we generally get along tolerably well. Field does agree that, while we may have a predilection toward altruism, we nevertheless can learn to engage in all sorts of other behaviors-as we certainly have. And some of these are harmful. But we've succeeded as an animal because our overriding propensity is that of altruism, not self-interested egoism. In sum, we're a cooperative animal (though, as Field observes, cooperation itself may lead to disastrous outcomes-the Nazi extermination of the Jews, etc.).

In the concluding chapter, Field calls for a rather eclectic approach to the "curriculum." Interested readers should take note of his proposal, laid out on pages 306 and following, as institutionalists will largely welcome this plan of attack. While it doesn't dispense with conventional microeconomic analysis, this branch of study does not constitute the bulk of the proposed training program. Indeed, economics as currently understood would form only a small part of the program: evolutionary biological theory, anthropology, cognitive psychology, and so on would constitute much larger portions of the curriculum than economics proper.

Without endorsing every point in this work, I strongly recommend this book to institutionalists. In my opinion, a major failing of his argument is the way that it is framed: there is a tendency to couch even the altruistic argument in individualist terms. Suppose, rather than defining altruism as failure to harm, we be more positive and say that it represents the hardwired proclivity to do good? If, indeed, this is our evolutionary foundation, then doing good to others best advantages all as each individual will be the recipient of the good done by others. Nevertheless, this is an excellent study in clearly demonstrating some major failings of neoclassical economics, forces an examination of "preconceptions" (including our own), and provides a strong argument supporting the position that humans are much more (and much better) than a great deal of conventional theory-arising in all fields of inquiry-would have us.

AUTHOR_AFFILIATION

John F. Henry

California State University, Sacramento