Been There, Done That, Not Over It

The Iraq Study Group's major recommendation regarding the U.S. military commitment in Iraq has been tried before and failed. The group favors an accelerated "Iraqization" of the conflict in which American units are to shift from major combat operations to supporting Iraq's army and police. Thousands

of additional American advisers, embedded down to the company level with Iraqi units, will provide the steely resolve Iraqi forces so far have failed to demonstrate. The group's report does not explain how these newly bolstered units will be purged of the corrupt leaders and sectarian recruitment process that have produced a force feared more by innocent Iraqi civilians than by terrorist groups. Nevertheless, they are expected to calm Iraq's deadly streets and defeat an ever more effective Sunni insurgency, tasks the American military has been unable to achieve.

The proposed approach is not new. In March 2005, Marine Corps Lt. Gen. James T. Conway, director of operations for the Joint Staff, said the United States could begin withdrawing its troops within a year or two. That drawdown was to be enabled by a shift on the part of American units from combat operations to training Iraqi security forces. That spring, Army Gen. George casey announced a new strategy of moving the main counterinsurgency effort from American to Iraqi forces. American commanders were told that up to one-third of their units would be dedicated to training and advising the Iraqi military. The ambitious plan called for embedding 61-member military transition teams with Iraqi Army battalions. The hope was that by December 2005, the Iraqi army would be able to conduct combat operations without U.S. military support. It didn't happen.