Learning to cope with complexity: We can enhance our future security by learning more about our society's complexities. (Future...

During times of great crisis, human beings typically turn to one of two strategies: fight or flight. There is, however, a third strategy: learning and deep change. It is based on the principle that all events, especially the most tragic, are ripe with opportunities for learning.

The September 11 terrorists demonstrated expertise in systems theory. They knew that complex systems always have two sides. One is creative and allows for great speed and efficiency (for example, civil aviation aircraft and high-rise office towers). The other is potentially destructive and can generate major catastrophes (using civil aviation against the high-rise target).

All of our current complex systems, including information systems, biotechnology, air travel, nuclear power, and the mail system, have these two major characteristics. All are susceptible to organizational error (the Challenger tragedy), human error (Bhopal, Chernobyl, or Exxon Valdez), and terrorism (Tylenol, Oklahoma City). Yet terrorism is the darkest and most dangerous side of our complexity.

In the case of the World Trade Center, terrorists deliberately exploited the "destructive side" of aircraft and highly populated office towers. If one simply joins hijacking with car bombing, and magnifies their effects, then September 11 is the result.

The lesson we must learn from September 11 is that our management practices, private and public, are onedimensional. Whether it is with regard to civil aviation safety or real estate, our world is dominated by concerns about profitability. These constrain us from implementing needed and proven safety procedures in aviation and high-rise office design. The focus on profitability also pushes our systems to grow unreasonably large, rendering them more vulnerable to terrorist attacks.

Approximately 76% of the criteria used to measure organizational efficiency are financial. Only 24% consider nonfinancial indicators such as health, safety, or the global impact that organizations have on communities and the world in general. Devoting more of our attention to nonfinancial indicators can help us develop new strategies to match the complexity of fighting terrorism. The fields of risk and crisis management already use some of these strategies.

* Search for the destructive side of complexity. After the poisoning of Tylenol capsules in 1982, Johnson & Johnson concluded that future terrorist attacks directed against their products were highly probable. As a result, they modified both the packaging and the products themselves.

* Increase safety by redesigning products. The Pentagon resisted terrorist attacks much more readily than the World Trade Center because it was built with safety in mind. This has important implications for the future design of office towers, hydroelectric dams, and nuclear power facilities.

* Separate the different elements of systems to reduce their impacts on each other. It is well known that to neutralize the potential spread of smallpox in animals we need to separate animal populations from the virus. This has profound implications with regard to globalization. Globalization constantly creates connections between disparate elements of complex systems and regions of the globe. It pushes us to increase the volume of financial and nonmonetary transactions and the speed between connections.

* Promote a more ethical distribution of wealth. The French revolutionaries of 1789 screamed, "Let's risk everything, since we have nothing." People in countries such as Afghanistan, who earn less than $1 per day, may be provoked to violent measures to alter their desperate conditions.

* Build a true culture of civil security. We should develop the capacity to envision the destructive side of our complex systems and to prepare for it. For instance, New Zealanders are prepared to survive independently for up to three days in the event of major catastrophes. Unfortunately, far too many of us expect to live in a zero-risk world. This means that widespread panic can be triggered if fewer than 10 letters out of millions in the postal system have been tampered with.

* Promote active learning from previous crises. It is imperative that we learn to tolerate cultural and religious differences, especially bearing September 11 in mind, while at the same time neutralizing terrorism as much as we can. We must also remember that there is no better way to drive people to undertake desperate acts than to humiliate them.

These lessons are not merely about learning how to fight more effectively or better prepare for flight. The lessons are really about learning how to live in ways that can reduce the chances of future assaults, especially since we can never fully prevent them.

About the Authors

Thierry C. Pauchant is professor of management at Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales, 300 chemin de la Cote-Sainte-Catherine, Montreal, Quebec H3T 2A7, Canada. Telephone 1-514-340-6375; e-mail Thierry.Pauchant@hec.ca.

Ian I. Mitroff is the Harold Quinton Distinguished Professor of Business Policy at the Marshall School of Business and professor of journalism at the Annenberg School for Communication, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California. He is also president of Comprehensive Crisis Management, 834 Second Street, Manhattan Beach, California 90266. Telephone 1-310-372-3418; e-mail ianmitroff@earthlink.net.

A longer version of this essay is posted on the World Future Society Web site's special section on the Threats of Terrorism, www.wfs.org/terror.htm.