The costs of state-sponsored terrorism: the example of the Barbary pirates.

INTRODUCTION

Bruce Davie was known for his interest in U.S. economic history. He taught economic history, was especially knowledgeable about the history of technology, and had an encyclopedic knowledge of U.S. fiscal history. While the following does not relate directly to taxes, or

In the aftermath of 9/11 and as the U.S. increased its military involvement in the Middle East, a number of observers pointed out similarities to America's dealings with the Barbary Pirates in the early days of the republic. The perception of parallels is understandable. The U.S. became militarily involved with Islamic powers thousands of miles away. Assembling an international coalition proved difficult for familiar reasons, including France's desire to do business with the powers involved. American hostages were taken and held. As part of its activity there, the U.S. sponsored an attempt at a regime change. It abandoned that attempt and left most of the local participants at the mercy of the existing regime.

Unlike many foreign affairs, the costs and benefits of this one are unusually quantified. The goals of both sides were mercenary and commercial. While data are not good enough for rigorous econometric treatment, there are sufficient data for some economic analysis. It is possible to examine many of the sums involved to determine something about the incentives faced by both the Barbary powers and those powers engaged in Mediterranean commerce.

WHO WERE THE BARBARY PIRATES?

The Barbary powers were Morocco, Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli (some lesser states, such as Barca, are sometimes included, but these were considered parts of the aforementioned four, especially in the time-frame relevant for this discussion). Morocco was an independent state, ruled by an emperor. The other three powers were nominally part of the Ottoman Empire, and ruled by a Dey, Bey, and Pasha (or, Bashaw), respectively. By the time of the U.S.'s involvement with them, the Dey of Algiers was still selected by the city's Turkish garrison from among its own members. But Tunis had received recognition from Constantinople of its hereditary leader, while Tripoli was transitioning de facto to a similar arrangement. (1)