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The Legal Status of Abortion in the States if Roe v. Wade is Overruled

By Linton, Paul Benjamin
Publication: Issues in Law & Medicine
Date: Sunday, July 1 2007
HEADNOTE

ABSTRACT:

This article explores the legal status of abortion in the States if the Supreme Court overrules Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), as modified by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). Although an overruling

decision eventually could have a significant effect on the legal status of abortion, the immediate impact of such a decision would be far more modest than most commentators-on both sides of the issue-believe.

More than two-thirds of the States have repealed their pre-Roe laws or have amended those laws to conform to Roe v. Wade, which allows abortion for any reason before viability and for virtually any reason after viability. Pre-Roe laws that have been expressly repealed would not be revived by the overruling of Roe. Only three States that repealed their pre-Roe laws (or amended them to conform to Roe) have enacted post-Roe laws attempting to prohibit some or most abortions throughout pregnancy. Those laws have been declared unconstitutional by the federal courts and are not now enforceable.

HEADNOTE

Of the less than one-third of the States that have retained their pre-Roe laws, most would be ineffective in prohibiting abortions. This is (1) because the laws, by their express terms or as interpreted, allow abortion on demand, for undefined health reasons or for a broad range of reasons (including mental health), or (2) because of state constitutional limitations. In yet other States, the pre-Roe laws prohibiting abortion may have been repealed by implication, due to the enactment of comprehensive post-Roe laws regulating abortion.

In sum, no more than twelve States, and possibly as few as eight, would have enforceable laws on the books that would prohibit most abortions in the event Roe, Doe and Casey are overruled. In the other States (and the District of Columbia) abortion would be legal for most or all reasons throughout pregnancy. Although the long-term impact of reversing Roe could be quite dramatic, the author concludes that the immediate impact of such a decision would be very limited. This article is current through May 1st, 2007.

The death of Chief Justice Rehnquist, the retirement of Associate Justice O'Connor, and the possibility that one or more other justices may leave the Supreme Court during the remainder of President Bush's second term have fueled speculation that a differently-constituted Court may overrule Roe v. Wade,1 as modified by Planned Parenthood v. Casey,2 and return the issue of abortion to the States. This speculation is decidedly premature. Only two justices now on the Court-Associate Justices Scalia and Thomas-have voted to overrule Roe. Although Justice Kennedy dissented in the Supreme Court's decision striking down the Nebraska partial-birth abortion ban act seven years ago,3 he did not join the dissenting opinions of Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas calling for Roe and Casey to be overruled.4 Chief Justice John Roberts and Associate Justice Samuel Alito may be expected to defer to reasonable efforts by the States to regulate the practice of abortion. Nevertheless, it is questionable whether the Chief Justice would be willing to overrule Roe and Casey without further erosion of both precedents, in light of his respect for precedent and his understanding of the evolutionary nature of constitutional adjudication. Much the same may be said of Justice Alito.5 Given the intense scrutiny that would be given to any further vacancies on the Court in the next eighteen months, the possibility that President Bush would be able to place anti-Roe justices on the Supreme Court (even assuming that he would want to) is decidedly remote.

However remote an overruling decision may appear to be at this point, the mere possibility of such a decision has led to concern regarding the legal status of abortion in the States if Roe and Casey are overruled. Regrettably, much that has been written about the effect of an overruling decision is inaccurate or misleading. The purpose of this article is to evaluate, on a State-by-State basis, the impact of a decision overruling Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v. Casey on the legal status of abortion. A review of the relevant statutes and cases leaves no doubt that, in the absence of new legislation, for which there would have to be a contemporary political consensus, abortion would be legal in the overwhelming majority of States at least through viability and very probably after viability, as well. Barely a handful of States would have laws on the books prohibiting abortions in most circumstances throughout pregnancy.

Alabama

The pre-Roe statute prohibited performance of an abortion on a pregnant woman unless the procedure was "necessary to preserve her life or health and done for that purpose."6 The statute, which has not been repealed,7 has not been declared unconstitutional nor has its enforcement been enjoined. Because the scope of the health exception is not defined, the statute may not effectively prohibit many abortions, even if Roe v. Wade were overruled.8

Alaska

The pre-Roe statute allowed abortion on demand prior to viability,9 and impliedly prohibited abortion after viability.10 Section 18.16.010(d) was repealed in 1997." The provision of the pre-Roe statute that prohibited post-viability abortions would not be revived by a decision overruling Roe v. Wade. Abortions could be performed for any reason at any stage of pregnancy.12 Regardless of Roe, any attempt to prohibit abortion (at least before viability) in Alaska would be barred by the Alaska Supreme Court's decision recognizing a fundamental right to abortion on state constitutional grounds (privacy).13

Arizona

The principal pre-Roe statutes prohibited abortion on a pregnant woman unless the procedure was "necessary to save her life,"14 and made a woman's participation in her own abortion a criminal offense (subject to the same exception).15 Pursuant to Roe, the statutes were declared unconstitutional by the Arizona Court of Appeals.16 Their enforcement was not enjoined. Although the pre-Roe statutes have not been expressly repealed,17 they may not be enforceable, even if Roe v. Wade were overruled, because of a state supreme court decision striking down restrictions on public funding of therapeutic abortions on state constitutional grounds (privileges and immunities).18 It is also possible that the statutes have been repealed by implication with the enactment of substantial post-Roe legislation regulating abortion.19

Arkansas

Analysis of the current status of the Arkansas pre-Roe statutes is complex. The pre-Roe statutes included an 1875 law that prohibited all abortions except to save the life of the mother,20 and a more recently minted law based upon § 230.3 of the Model Penal Code,21 which prohibited abortions except when there was "substantial risk that continuance of the pregnancy would threaten the life or gravely impair the health of the . . . woman," when there was "substantial risk that the child would be born with grave physical or mental defect," or when the pregnancy resulted from a promptly reported act of rape or incest.22 In 1980, a three-judge federal district court held that the substantive provisions of the 1875 law had been repealed by implication with the enactment of the 1969 law, and then declared unconstitutional and enjoined the provisions of the 1969 law.23

All of the abortion provisions on the books on January 22, 1973 were superseded by or omitted from the Arkansas Code of 1987, except § 41-2553, the first section of 1969 law, which prohibits all abortions,24 and section 41-2560, which guarantees rights of conscience.25 The exceptions in the 1969 law based on the Model Penal Code were deleted from the books with the adoption of the Arkansas Code of 1987, leaving only the section prohibiting abortion.26 Thus, current Arkansas law is based upon a post-Roe codification of law that substantially revised the pre-Roe laws.

The prohibition of abortion embodied in § 5-61-102 may be subject to a challenge that it has been repealed by implication with significant post- 1987 legislation regulating abortion. Assuming, however, that § 5-61-102 is not successfully challenged on that basis, abortion would be illegal in Arkansas if Roe v. Wade were overruled, once the injunction issued in Smith v. Bentley is dissolved.27

California

The pre-Roe abortion statutes were based upon § 230.3 of the Model Penal Code.28 The California Penal Code prohibited abortions not performed in compliance with the "Therapeutic Abortion Act" of 1967,29 and made a woman's participation in her own abortion a criminal offense (subject to the same exception).30 The Therapeutic Abortion Act authorized the performance of an abortion on a pregnant woman if the procedure was performed by a licensed physician and surgeon in an accredited hospital, and was unanimously approved in advance by a medical staff committee.31 An abortion could not be approved unless the committee found that there was a "substantial risk that continuance of the pregnancy would gravely impair the physical or mental health of the mother," or that "[t]he pregnancy resulted from rape or incest."32 An abortion could not be performed on grounds of rape or incest unless there was probable cause to believe that the pregnancy resulted from rape or incest.33 No abortion could be approved after the twentieth week of pregnancy for any reason.34

In a pre-Roe decision, the California Supreme Court declared substantial provisions of the Therapeutic Abortion Act unconstitutional on state and federal due process grounds (vagueness).35 Sections 274 and 275 of the Penal Code were repealed in 2000;36 the Therapeutic Abortion Act was repealed in 2002. 37 None of these statutes would be revived by a decision overruling Roe v. Wade.i8 Abortions could be performed for any reason before viability, and for virtually any reason after viability.39

Finally, regardless of Roe, any attempt to enact meaningful restrictions on abortion in California would be precluded by the California Supreme Court's 1981 decision in Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers.40 In Myers, the state supreme court struck down restrictions on public funding of abortion on state constitutional grounds (privacy). In the course of its decision, the court stated that under the privacy guarantee of the state constitution, "all women in this state-rich and poor alike-possess a fundamental constitutional right to choose whether or not to bear a child."41

Colorado

The pre-Roe abortion statute was based upon § 230.3 of the Model Penal Code.42 Under the statute, an abortion could be performed at any stage of pregnancy (defined as "the implantation of an embryo in the uterus") when continuation of the pregnancy was likely to result in the death of the woman, "serious permanent impairment" of her physical or mental health, or the birth of a child with "grave and permanent physical deformity or mental retardation."43 An abortion could be performed within the first sixteen weeks of pregnancy (gestational age) when the pregnancy resulted from rape (statutory or forcible) or incest, and the local district attorney confirmed in writing that there was probable cause to believe that the alleged offense had occurred.44 Pursuant to Roe v. Wade, the limitations on circumstances under which abortions could be performed and the requirement that all abortions be performed in hospitals were declared unconstitutional by the Colorado Supreme Court in People v. Norton.'*5 Enforcement of the statute was not enjoined.

The pre-Roe statute has not been repealed,46 and would be enforceable if Roe v. Wade were overruled. The broad exceptions in the statute, however, in particular the exception for mental health,47 would allow almost all abortions to be performed.

Connecticut

The principal pre-Roe statutes, based upon an 1860 law, prohibited performance of an abortion on a woman unless it was "necessary to preserve her life or that of her unborn child,"48 and made a woman's participation in her own abortion a criminal offense (subject to the same exception).49 In a pre-Roe decision, those statutes were declared unconstitutional by a three-judge federal district court.50 Enforcement of the statutes was not enjoined. After the district court entered its judgment and before the case was remanded by the Supreme Court, Connecticut enacted a new abortion statute with provisions similar to those previously invalidated by the federal district court.51 Section 1 of the Act stated in part that it was "[t]he public policy of the state and the intent of the legislature to protect and preserve human life from the moment of conception . . . ."52 This statute was also declared unconstitutional (and permanently enjoined) by the same three-judge federal district court.53 On remand from the Supreme Court, the federal district court held that the older statutes had not been repealed with the enactment of the newer statute and declared both sets of statutes unconstitutional under Roe and permanently enjoined their enforcement.54 The pre-Roe statutes were repealed in 1990, 55 and would not be revived by a decision overruling Roe v. Wade.56 Abortions could be performed for any reason before viability, and for virtually any reason after viability57

Delaware

The principal pre-Roe statutes were based on § 230.3 of the Model Penal Code.58 The statutes prohibited performance of an abortion on a pregnant woman unless the procedure was a "therapeutic abortion,"59 and made a woman's participation in her own abortion a criminal offense (subject to the same exception).60 An abortion could be performed at any time when continuation of the pregnancy was "likely to result in the death of the mother."61 An abortion could be performed within the first twenty weeks of gestational age when (1) there was "substantial risk of the birth of [a] child with grave and permanent physical deformity or mental retardation," (2) the pregnancy resulted from incest or rape, or (3) continuation of the pregnancy would involve "substantial risk of permanent injury to the physical or mental health of the mother."62 The pre-Roe statutes have not been declared unconstitutional, nor has their enforcement been enjoined.63 The statutes have not been repealed,64 and would enforceable if Roe v. Wade were overruled. The exception in the statute for mental health,65 however, would allow almost all abortions to be performed throughout the twentieth week of gestation. After the twentieth week, however, abortions could be performed only if continuation of the pregnancy was "likely to result in the death of the mother."66

District of Columbia

The pre-Roe statute prohibited performance of an abortion unless the procedure was "necessary for the preservation of the mother's life or health . . . ."67 The constitutionality of the statute was upheld in United States v. Vuitch,68 where the Supreme Court broadly defined "health" as "the state of being sound in body or mind," which "includes psychological as well as physical well-being."69 The pre-Roe statute was repealed in 2003. 70 The overruling of Roe v. Wade would not affect the legality of abortion in the District of Columbia. Abortions could be performed for any reason at any time of pregnancy.

Florida

The pre-Roe statute was based on § 230.3 of the Model Penal Code.71 The statute provided that an abortion could be performed at any stage of pregnancy when (1) "continuation of the pregnancy would substantially impair the life or health of the female," (2) there was "substantial risk that the continuation of the pregnancy would result in the birth a child with a serious physical or mental defect," or (3) there was "reasonable cause to believe that the pregnancy resulted from rape or incest."72 Pursuant to Roe, major portions of the 1972 law were declared unconstitutional by a three-judge federal district court in Coe v. Gerstein,73 and by the Florida Supreme Court in Wright v. State.74 The statute was later repealed.75 The overruling of Roe v. Wade would not revive the pre-Roe statute. Abortions could be performed for any reason before the third trimester, and for virtually any reason thereafter.76 Regardless of Roe, any attempt to prohibit abortion (at least before viability) in Florida would be barred by the Florida Supreme Court's decision recognizing a fundamental right to abortion on state constitutional grounds (privacy).77

Georgia

The pre-Roe statute was based upon § 230.3 of the Model Penal Code.78 Under the statute, an abortion could not be performed unless (1) "continuation of the pregnancy would endanger the life of the pregnant woman or would seriously and permanently injure her health," (2) the "fetus would very likely be born with a grave, permanent, and irremediable mental or physical defect," or (3) the pregnancy resulted from forcible or statutory rape.79 The statute did not place any express limits on the stage of pregnancy at which an authorized abortion could be performed. Major provisions of the statute were declared unconstitutional by a three -judge federal district court in Doe v. Bolton,80 whose decision was affirmed, as modified, by the Supreme Court.81 The statute was repealed in 1973,82 and would not be revived by the overruling of Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton. Abortions could be performed for any reason before the third trimester, and for virtually any reason thereafter.83

Hawaii

The pre-Roe statute explicitly allowed abortion on demand prior to viability and implicitly allowed abortion after viability for any reason.84 The statute, which has not been repealed,85 has not been declared unconstitutional nor has its enforcement been enjoined. Recently, the Hawaii Legislature amended the pre-Roe statute to eliminate the hospitalization and residency requirements,86 which were unenforceable under Doe v. Bolton. The legality of abortion would not be affected by a decision overruling Roe v. Wade. Abortions could be performed for any reason before or after viability87

Idaho

The principal pre-Roe statutes prohibited performance of an abortion on a pregnant woman unless the procedure was "necessary to preserve her life,"88 and made a woman's participation in her own abortion a criminal offense (subject to the same exception).89 These statutes were repealed in 1973,90 and would not be revived by a decision overruling Roe v. Wade. Abortions could be performed for any reason before the third trimester. Under a separate statute, however, abortions could not be performed during the third trimester except to preserve the life of the pregnant woman or where the pregnancy would result in the birth or delivery of a fetus unable to survive.91

Illinois

The principal pre-Roe statute prohibited performance of an abortion unless the procedure was "necessary for the preservation of the woman's life."92 Pursuant to Roe, this statute was declared unconstitutional by the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Frey,93 and was later repealed.94 The statute would not be revived by a decision overruling Roe v. Wade.95 Abortions could be performed for any reason before viability, and for virtually any reason after viability.96 Indiana

The pre-Roe statutes prohibited performance of an abortion on a pregnant woman unless the procedure was "necessary to preserve her life,"97 and made a woman's participation in her own abortion a criminal offense (subject to the same exception).98 Both statutes were repealed in 1977,99 and neither would be revived by a decision overruling Roe v. Wade. Abortions could be performed for any reason before viability. Under a separate statute, however, abortions after viability could be performed only to prevent substantial permanent impairment to the life or physical health of the pregnant woman.100

Iowa

The principal pre-Roe statute prohibited performance of an abortion on a pregnant woman unless the procedure was "necessary to save her life."101 Pursuant to Roe, this statute was declared unconstitutional by a three-judge federal district court in Doe v. Turner,102 and was repealed in 1976. 103 The pre-Roe statute would not be revived by a decision overruling Roe v. Wade. Abortions could be performed for any reason through the second trimester, and for virtually any reason thereafter.104

Kansas

The principal pre-Roe statute was based on § 230.3 of the Model Penal Code.105 An abortion could be performed at any stage of pregnancy when (1) there was "substantial risk that a continuance of the pregnancy would impair the physical or mental health of the mother," (2) there was "substantial risk . . . that the child would be born with physical or mental defect," or (3) "the pregnancy resulted from rape, incest or other felonious intercourse."106 This statute was repealed in 1992, 107 and would not be revived by a decision overruling Roe v. Wade. Abortions could be performed for any reason before viability. Under a separate statute, however, abortions could be performed after viability only to preserve the life of the pregnant woman or to prevent substantial and irreversible impairment of a major bodily function.108

Kentucky

The pre-Roe statutes prohibited performance of an abortion upon a pregnant woman unless it was "necessary to preserve her life,"109 and punished the offense as a homicide if the woman died as a result thereof.110 Pursuant to Roe, these statutes were declared unconstitutional by the Kentucky Court of Appeals (the name of Kentucky's highest court before 1976) in Sasaki v. Commonwealth,111 and were repealed in 1974. "2 The pre-Roe statutes would not be revived by a decision overruling Roe v. Wade.lu Abortions could be performed for any reason before viability, and for virtually any reason after viability114

Louisiana

The principal pre-Roe statute prohibited all abortions.115 Although § 14:87 did not on its face permit any exceptions, given the requirement of a specific criminal intent,116 an abortion performed to save the life of the mother probably was lawful. This construction would have been consistent with another statute that barred disciplinary action against a physician who performed an abortion for that purpose.117 Pursuant to Roe, § 14:87 and § 37:1285(6) were declared unconstitutional in a pair of three-judge federal district court decisions.118 Following the Supreme Court's decision in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,119 the Louisiana Attorney General and the District Attorney for New Orleans Parish sought to reopen the earlier decisions invalidating § 14:87 and enjoining its enforcement. A threejudge federal district court convened to hear the case held that § 14:87 had been repealed by implication with the enactment of comprehensive post-Roe legislation regulating abortion.120 The legislature thereafter enacted a new § 14:87 prohibiting abortion except to preserve the life or health of the unborn child, to save the life of the mother or to terminate a pregnancy that resulted from a reported act of rape or incest.121 This statute was also declared unconstitutional.122 Recently, the Louisiana Legislature repealed and reenacted § 14:87, deleting the exceptions for rape and incest, retaining the life-of-the-mother exception and adding a very narrow physical health exception (preventing permanent impairment of a life-sustaining organ of a pregnant woman).123 The amendments take effect when Roe v. Wade is overruled or the United States Constitution is amended to restore the authority of the States to prohibit abortion.124 Section 14:87 would take effect and be enforceable if Roe v. Wade were overruled or if the federal constitution were amended to restore the States' authority to prohibit abortion.125

Maine

The pre-Roe statute prohibited performance of an abortion unless the procedure was "necessary for the preservation of the mother's life."126 The statute was repealed in 1979, 127 and would not be revived by a decision overruling Roe v. Wade. ns Abortions could be performed for any reason before viability, and for virtually any reason after viability.129

Maryland

The principal pre-Roe statute was based on § 230.3 of the Model Penal Code.130 An abortion could be performed at any stage of pregnancy when "continuation of the pregnancy [was] likely to result in the death of the mother."131 An abortion could be performed within the first twenty-six weeks of gestation when (1) there was "substantial risk that continuation of the pregnancy would gravely impair the physical or mental health of the mother," (2) there was "substantial risk of the birth of [a] child with grave and permanent physical deformity or mental retardation," or (3) the pregnancy resulted from a forcible rape.132 The State's Attorney had to confirm that there was probable cause to believe that the rape had in fact occurred.133

Pursuant to Roe and Doe, the limitations on the circumstances under which abortions may be performed and the requirement that all abortions be performed in hospitals were declared unconstitutional by the Maryland Court of Special Appeals in State v. Ingel,134 and Coleman v. Coleman,135 and by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Vuitch v. Hardy.136 With the exception of the conscience provisions, all of the provisions of the pre-Roe statutes, recodified in 1987,137 were repealed in 1991.138 These statutes would not be revived by a decision overruling Roe v. Wade. Abortions could be performed for any reason before viability, and for virtually any reason after viability.139

Massachusetts

The principal pre-Roe statute prohibited performance of "unlawful" abortions.140 Although the statute itself did not define what constituted an "unlawful" abortion, in a series of cases the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court interpreted the statute to allow abortions for reasons of the pregnant woman's physical or mental health.141 Pursuant to Roe, § 19 of ch. 272 was declared unconstitutional in an unreported decision of a three-judge federal district court.142 The pre-Roe statute has not been repealed.143 However, in light of the judicially engrafted exceptions for physical and mental health, it is doubtful that the statute would effectively prohibit any abortions even if Roe v. Wade were overruled.144 Moreover, regardless of Roe, any attempt to prohibit abortion (at least before viability) in Massachusetts would be barred by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's decisions recognizing a fundamental right to abortion on state constitutional grounds (due process).145

Michigan

The principal pre-Roe statute prohibited performance of an abortion on a pregnant woman "unless the same shall have been necessary to preserve the life of such woman."146 Another statute provided: "Any person who shall administer to any woman pregnant with a quick child any medicine, drug or substance whatever, or shall use or employ any instrument or other means, with intent thereby to destroy such child, unless the same shall have been necessary to preserve the life of such mother, shall, in case the death of such child or of such mother be thereby produced, be guilty of manslaughter."147 And under a third statute, the "wilful killing of an unborn quick child by any injury to the mother of such child, which would be murder if it resulted in the death of such mother, shall be deemed manslaughter."148

In People v. Bricker,149 and Larkin v. Calahan,150 the Michigan Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of these statutes in light of the Supreme Court's decisions in Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton. In Bricker, the court, while affirming the conviction of a layman for conspiracy to commit an abortion, held that under the Supremacy Clause, the State's public policy to proscribe abortion had to be subordinated to the federal constitutional requirements elucidated in Roe and Doe.151 Accordingly, § 750.14 was construed not to apply to an abortion performed by a physician in the exercise of his or her medical judgment.152 "[A] physician," however, "may not cause a miscarriage after viability except where necessary, in his or her medical judgment, to preserve the life or health of the mother."153 "[E]xcept as those cases defined and exempted under Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton, . . . criminal responsibility attaches."154

In Larkin, the supreme court held that § 750.322 "is limited in its scope to abortions caused by felonious assault upon the mother, which result in the death of an unborn quick child en ventre sa mere."155 Finally, in conformity with Roe v. Wade, the court held that the word "child," as used in §§ 750.322 and 750.323, means "a viable child in the womb of its mother."156 The pre-Roe statutes have not been repealed,157 and would be enforceable if Roe v. Wade were overruled.

Minnesota

The principal pre-Roe statutes prohibited performance of an abortion upon a pregnant woman unless the procedure was "necessary to preserve her life, or that of the child with which she [was] pregnant,"158 and made a woman's participation in her own abortion a criminal offense (subject to the same exception).159 Pursuant to Roe, § 617.18 was declared unconstitutional in a pair of decisions by the Minnesota Supreme Court.160 Both § 617.18 and § 617.19 were repealed in 1974, 161 and neither would be revived by a decision overruling Roe v. Wade. Abortions could be performed for any reason before viability, and for virtually any reason after viability.162 Regardless of Roe, any attempt to prohibit abortion (at least before viability) in Minnesota, even if Roe were overruled, would be barred by a Minnesota Supreme Court decision recognizing a fundamental right to abortion on state constitutional grounds (privacy).163

Mississippi

The principal pre-Roe statute prohibited the performance of an abortion except when (1) the procedure was "necessary for the preservation of the mother's life," or (2) when the pregnancy was caused by rape.164 Pursuant to Roe, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that § 97-3-3 is unconstitutional with respect to physicians, but constitutional with respect to non-physicians and upheld the conviction of a laywoman for performing an abortion.165 Although § 97-3-3 has not been repealed,166 it would not be enforceable, even if Roe were overruled, because of a Mississippi Supreme Court decision recognizing a right to an abortion on state constitutional grounds (an implied right of privacy).167 The court reviewed the "undue burden" standard of review the Supreme Court developed in Planned Parenthood v. Casey168 for evaluating the constitutionality of abortion regulations under the United States Constitution and chose to adopt that standard for measuring the validity of abortion regulations under the Mississippi Constitution.169 Under that standard, abortions could be performed for any reason before viability, and for virtually any reason after viability.

Missouri

The principal pre-Roe statute prohibited performance of an abortion on a woman unless the procedure was "necessary to preserve her life or that of an unborn child."170 Pursuant to Roe, this statute was declared unconstitutional and permanently enjoined in an unreported decision of a three-judge federal court.171 The statute was later repealed,172 and would not be revived by a decision overruling Roe v. Wade.173 Abortions could be performed for any reason before viability, and for virtually any reason after viability174

Montana

The principal pre-Roe statutes prohibited performance of an abortion unless the procedure was "necessary to preserve the life of the mother,"175 and made a woman's participation in her own abortion a criminal offense (subject to the same exception).176 Pursuant to Roe v. Wade, these statutes were declared unconstitutional by a three-judge federal district court in Doe v. Woodahl,177 and were later repealed. 178 The pre-Roe statutes would not be revived by a decision overruling Roe v. Wade. Abortions could be performed for any reason before viability. Under a separate statute, however, abortions could be performed after viability only to save the life of the pregnant woman or to prevent substantial and irreversible impairment of a major bodily function.179

Finally, regardless of Roe, any attempt to prohibit abortion (at least before viability) in Montana would be precluded by the Montana Supreme Court's decision recognizing a fundamental right to abortion on state constitutional grounds (privacy).180

Nebraska

The pre-Roe statutes prohibited performance of an abortion unless the procedure was "necessary to preserve the life of the mother, or shall have been advised by two physicians to be necessary for such purpose."181 Pursuant to Roe, these statutes were declared unconstitutional in an unreported judgment of a three-judge federal district court,182 and were later repealed.183 The pre-Roe statutes would not be revived by a decision overruling Roe v. Wade. Abortions could be performed for any reason before viability, and for virtually any reason after viability.184

Nevada

The principal pre-Roe statutes prohibited performance of an abortion on a pregnant woman unless the procedure was "necessary to preserve her life or that of the child,"185 and made a woman's participation in her own abortion after quickening a criminal offense (subject to the same exception).186 An attorney general opinion ruled that the statutes were unconstitutional under Roe to the extent that they prohibited most first and second trimester abortions.187 The substantive provisions of these statutes were repealed in 1973 and replaced with provisions conforming to the requirements of Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton.188 The substance of the pre-Roe provisions would not be revived by a decision overruling Roe v. Wade. Abortions could be performed for any reason before the twenty-fourth week of pregnancy, and for virtually any reason thereafter.189

New Hampshire

The pre-Roe statutes prohibited performance of an abortion on a pregnant woman before quickening for any reason,190 and after quickening unless, "by reason of some malformation or of difficult or protracted labor, it shall have been necessary to preserve the life of the woman or shall have been advised by two physicians to be necessary for that purpose."191 These statutes were repealed in 1997, 192 and would not be revived by a decision overruling Roe v. Wade. Abortions could be performed for any reason at any stage of pregnancy.

New Jersey

The pre-Roe statute prohibited performance of an abortion on a pregnant woman "maliciously or without lawful justification."193 This statute was declared unconstitutional by a three-judge federal court in 1972,194 and was repealed in 1978. 195 The pre-Roe statute would not be revived by a decision overruling Roe v. Wade. Abortions could be performed for any reason at any stage of pregnancy. Regardless of Roe, any attempt to prohibit abortion (at least before viability) in New Jersey would be barred by the New Jersey Supreme Court's decisions recognizing a fundamental right to abortion on state constitutional grounds (privacy).196

New Mexico

The pre-Roe abortion statute was based on § 230.3 of the Model Penal Code.197 An abortion could be performed at any stage of pregnancy (defined as the "implantation of an embryo in the uterus") when (1) continuation of the pregnancy was likely to result in the death of the woman or "grave impairment" of her physical or mental health, (2) the child probably will have a "grave physical or mental defect," or (3) the pregnancy resulted from reported rape or incest.198 Pursuant to Roe and Doe, the limitations on the circumstances under which abortions could be performed and the requirement that all abortions be performed in hospitals were declared unconstitutional by the New Mexico Court of Appeals in State v. Strance.199 Enforcement of the statute was not enjoined. The pre-Roe statute has not been repealed,200 but would not be enforceable, even if Roe v. Wade were overruled, because of a state supreme court decision striking down abortion funding restrictions on the basis of the state equal rights amendment.201

New York

The pre-Roe statutes allowed abortion on demand through the twenty-fourth week of pregnancy.202 After the twenty-fourth week, an abortion could be performed on a pregnant woman only if there was "a reasonable belief that such is necessary to preserve her life."203 In a pre-Roe decision, the New York Court of Appeals (New York's highest court) rejected a challenge to the law brought by a guardian ad litem for unborn children.204 The legality of abortion would not be affected by the overruling of Roe v. Wade. The pre-Roe statutes, which have not been repealed,205 allow abortion on demand through the twenty-fourth week of pregnancy. After the twenty-fourth week, however, abortions could be performed only to preserve the woman's life.

Regardless of Roe, any attempt to prohibit abortion (at least before viability) in New York probably would be barred by language in the New York Court of Appeals' decision in Hope v. Perales,206 a challenge to the New York Prenatal Care Assistance Program. In Hope, the court of appeals noted in passing that "it is undisputed by defendants that the fundamental right of reproductive choice, inherent in the due process liberty right guaranteed by our State Constitution, is at least as extensive as the Federal constitutional right [recognized in Roe v. Wade]."207

North Carolina

The pre-Roe statutes were based on § 230.3 of the Model Penal Code.208 Sections 14-44 and 14-45 prohibited all abortions.209 Section 14-45. 1 excepted from the scope of §§ 14-44 and 14-45 abortions performed by licensed physicians in licensed hospitals when (1) there was "substantial risk that continuance of the pregnancy would threaten the life or gravely impair the health of [the pregnant woman] ," (2) there was "substantial risk the child would be born with grave physical or mental defect," or (3) the pregnancy resulted from incest or promptly reported rape.210 The statutes did not place any express limitation on the stage of pregnancy at which an authorized abortion could be performed.211

In May 1973, § 14.45. 1 was substantially amended to conform to the Supreme Court's decisions in Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton.212 Under current law, abortions may be performed after the twentieth week of pregnancy by licensed physicians in licensed hospitals only "if there is substantial risk that continuance of the pregnancy would threaten the life or gravely impair the health of the woman."213

The substance of the pre-Roe statutes would not be revived by a decision overruling Roe v. Wade. Abortions could be performed for any reason before the twentieth week of pregnancy and, depending upon how the post-twenty week statute is interpreted, for virtually any reason thereafter.214

North Dakota

The pre-Roe statutes prohibited performance of an abortion on a pregnant woman unless the procedure was "necessary to preserve her life,"215 and made a woman's participation in her own abortion a criminal offense (subject to the same exception).216 Pursuant to Roe, these statutes were declared unconstitutional by a federal district court in Leigh v. Olson,217 and were later repealed.218 The statutes would not be revived by a decision overruling Roe v. Wade. Recently, the North Dakota legislature passed a "trigger" law that would make abortion illegal except "to prevent the death of the pregnant female," and in cases where pregnancy resulted from "gross sexual imposition, sexual imposition, sexual abuse of a ward, or incest," all of which are treated as affirmative defenses.219 The law takes effect "on the date the legislative council approves by motion the recommendation of the attorney general to the legislative council that it is reasonably probable that Section 1 . . . would be upheld as constitutional.220

Ohio

The pre-Roe statute prohibited performance of an abortion on a pregnant woman unless it was "necessary to preserve her life, or [it was] advised by two physicians to be necessary for that purpose."221 Pursuant to Roe, this statute was declared unconstitutional by the Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Kruze.222 While Kruze's petition for certiorari was pending, the statute was repealed,223 and its substantive provisions re-enacted.224 That statute, in turn, was repealed in 1974.225 The pre-Roe statute would not be revived by a decision overruling Roe v. Wade. Abortions could be performed for any reason before viability. Under a separate statute, however, abortions could be performed after viability only to prevent the death of the pregnant woman or to prevent substantial and irreversible impairment of a major bodily function.226

Oklahoma

The pre-Roe statutes prohibited performance of an abortion on a pregnant woman unless the procedure was "necessary to preserve her life,"227 and made a woman's participation in her own abortion a criminal offense (subject to the same exception).228 Pursuant to Roe, these statutes were declared unconstitutional by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals in Jobe v. State,229 and by a three-judge federal district court in Henrie v. Derryberry.230 Enforcement of the statutes was not enjoined.

The pre-Roe statutes have not been expressly repealed,231 and would be enforceable if Roe v. Wade were overruled, assuming that they have not been repealed by implication with the enactment of comprehensive post-Roe legislation regulating abortion.232

Oregon

The pre-Roe statutes were based on § 230.3 of the Model Penal Code.233 The statutes allowed an abortion to be performed before the one hundred fiftieth day of pregnancy when (1) there was "substantial risk that continuance of the pregnancy [would] greatly impair the physical or mental health of the mother," (2) "the child would be born with serious physical or mental defect," or (3) the pregnancy resulted from felonious intercourse.234 After the one hundred fiftieth day, abortion was permitted only if "the life of the pregnant woman [was] in imminent danger."235

Pursuant to Roe, most of these statutes were declared unconstitutional in an unreported decision of a three-judge federal court,236 and were later repealed.237 The pre-Roe statutes would not be revived by a decision overruling Roe v. Wade. Abortions could be performed for any reason at any stage of pregnancy238

Pennsylvania

The pre-Roe statutes prohibited "unlawful" abortions.239 The statutes themselves did not define what an "unlawful" abortion was, nor was the word given an authoritative interpretation by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Pursuant to Roe, the statutes were declared unconstitutional by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in a pair of decisions,240 and were later repealed.241 The pre-Roe statutes would not be revived by a decision overruling Roe v. Wade. Abortions could be performed for any reason before the twenty-fourth week of pregnancy. Under a separate statute, however, abortions could be performed after the twenty-fourth week of pregnancy only to prevent the death of the pregnant woman or to prevent substantial and irreversible impairment of a major bodily function.242

Rhode Island

The principal pre-Roe statute prohibited the performance of an abortion on a woman unless the procedure was "necessary to preserve her life."243 Pursuant to Roe, this statute was declared unconstitutional in a pair of unreported decisions by a three-judge federal district court,244 and was repealed in 1973.245 In response, Rhode Island reenacted the statute, adding a "conclusive presumption" that "human life commences at the instant of conception" and that said human life "is a person within the language and meaning of the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution of the United States."246 This statute was declared unconstitutional by a federal district court in Doe v. Israel,2*7 but its enforcement was not enjoined.

In 1975, Rhode Island enacted a statute which prohibited performance of an abortion on a "woman pregnant with a quick child" unless "the same be necessary to preserve the life of such mother."248 This statute was declared unconstitutional by a federal district court in Rodos v. Michaelson,249 but that judgment was later reversed by the court of appeals, which found that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the statute.250 Neither the 1973 statute nor the 1975 statute has been repealed.251 Assuming that the 1973 statute has not been repealed by implication with the enactment of the 1975 statute and other legislation regulating the practice of abortion, it would be enforceable if Roe v. Wade were overruled.

South Carolina

The pre-Roe abortion statutes were based on § 230.3 of the Model Penal Code.252 Sections 16-82 and 16-83 prohibited performance of an abortion on a pregnant woman unless the procedure was "necessary to preserve her life or the life of [her] child,"253 and § 16-84 made a woman's participation in her own abortion a criminal offense.254 Section 16-87 excepted from these sections abortions performed on pregnant women by licensed physicians in licensed hospitals when (1) there was "substantial risk that continuance of the pregnancy would threaten the life or gravely impair the mental or physical health of the woman," (2) there was "substantial risk that the child would be born with grave physical or mental defect," or (3) the pregnancy resulted from promptly reported rape or incest.255 This statute did not place any express limits on the stage of pregnancy at which an authorized abortion could be performed. Pursuant to Roe, the abortion statutes were declared unconstitutional by the South Carolina Supreme Court in State v. Lawrence,256 and were repealed in 1974.257 The pre-Roe statutes would not be revived by a decision overruling Roe v. Wade. Abortions could be performed for any reason before viability, and for virtually any reason after viability258

South Dakota

The pre-Roe statutes prohibited performance of an abortion on a pregnant woman unless the procedure was "necessary to preserve her life,"259 and made a woman's participation in her own abortion a criminal offense (subject to the same exception).260 Pursuant to Roe, the former statute was declared unconstitutional by the South Dakota Supreme Court in State v. Munson,261 and both statutes were later repealed.262 The pre-Roe statutes would not be revived by a decision overruling Roe v. Wade. In 2005, South Dakota enacted a "trigger" statute which would prohibit abortion, except "to preserve the life of the pregnant female," which takes effect "on the date that the states are recognized by the United States Supreme Court to have the authority to prohibit abortion at all stages of pregnancy"263 Recently, South Dakota enacted a statute to prohibit abortions except to prevent the death of the pregnant woman.264 The statute was to take effect July 1, 2006, but, pursuant to a citizen initiative, its effective date was suspended while the statute was referred to the voters in a law referendum. On November 7, 2006, the voters rejected the statute. The earlier "trigger" statute, however, remains on the books to take effect once state authority over abortion has been restored by the Supreme Court.

Tennessee

The pre-Roe statutes prohibited performance of an abortion unless the procedure was necessary "to preserve the life of the mother."265 The substantive provisions of these statutes were repealed with the enactment of post-Roe legislation,266 and would not be revived by a decision overruling Roe v. Wade. Abortions could be performed for any reason before viability, and for virtually any reason after viability.267 Regardless of Roe, any attempt to prohibit abortion (at least before viability) in Tennessee would be barred by a decision of the Tennessee Supreme Court recognizing a fundamental right to abortion based on state constitutional grounds (privacy).268

Texas

The principal pre-Roe statutes prohibited performance of an abortion on a pregnant woman unless the procedure was undertaken "for the purpose of saving [her] life."269 These statutes were declared unconstitutional in Roe v. Wade.270 Enforcement of the statutes was not enjoined. Although the pre-Roe abortion statutes have not been expressly repealed,271 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has held that the statutes have been repealed by implication with the enactment of significant post-Roe legislation regulating the practice of abortion.272 That holding is not binding upon a state court, but may be persuasive. Whether the pre-Roe statutes would be enforceable if Roe v. Wade were overruled thus depends on whether they have been repealed by implication, a question on which no state court has pronounced an opinion to date.273

Utah

The pre-Roe statutes prohibited performance of an abortion on a pregnant woman unless the procedure was "necessary to preserve her life,"274 and made a woman's participation in her own abortion a criminal offense (subject to the same exception).275 Pursuant to Roe, these statutes were declared unconstitutional in an unreported decision of a three-judge federal district court.276 The statutes were repealed in 1973.277

In 1991, Utah enacted comprehensive new abortion statutes.278 Under those statutes, an abortion could be performed at any time of pregnancy if the procedure was "necessary to save the pregnant's woman's life," "to prevent grave damage to the pregnant woman's medical health," or "to prevent the birth of a child that would be born with grave defects."279 An abortion could also be performed during the first twenty weeks of gestation where the pregnancy resulted from a reported act of rape or incest.280 Those statutes were declared unconstitutional by the federal courts.281 The post-Roe statutes have not been repealed,282 and would be enforceable if Roe v. Wade were overruled. Nevertheless, the statutory language allowing abortion "to prevent grave damage to the pregnant woman's medical health," could be subject to abuse. The Abortion Task Force Committee that drafted the bill that the legislature enacted considered and rejected a definition of the "grave danger to maternal health" exception that would have excluded mental health.283

Vermont

The principal pre-Roe statute prohibited performance of an abortion on a woman unless the procedure was "necessary to preserve her life."284 In Beacham v. Leahy285 a pre-Roe decision, the Vermont Supreme Court held that the abortion statute is unconstitutional because it arbitrarily and unreasonably prevents a woman from obtaining a safe and antiseptic abortion from a physician. Although the preRoe statute has not been repealed,286 the decision in Beacham v. Leahy would prevent that statute from being enforced. The legality of abortions would not be affected by a decision overruling Roe v. Wade. Abortions could be performed for any reason at any stage of pregnancy.

Virginia

The pre-Roe statutes were based on § 230.3 of the Model Penal Code.287 An abortion could be performed only by a licensed physician in an accredited hospital when (1) continuation of the pregnancy was likely to result in the death of the woman or "substantially impair" her mental or physical health, (2) there was a "substantial medical likelihood" that "the child [would] be born with an irremediable and incapacitating mental or physical defect," or (3) the pregnancy resulted from incest or promptly reported rape.288 The statutes did not place any express limits on the stage of pregnancy at which an authorized abortion could be performed.

The pre-Roe statutes were repealed in 1975,289 and would not be revived by a decision overruling Roe v. Wade. Abortions could be performed for any reason before viability, and for virtually any reason after viability.290

Washington

Washington had two sets of pre-Roe abortion statutes. Older statutes prohibited performance of an abortion upon a woman unless the procedure was "necessary to preserve her life or that of [her] child,"291 and made a woman's participation in her own abortion a criminal offense (subject to the same exception).292 In November 1970, however, the voters approved by referendum a new abortion act.293 This act, which by its terms did not repeal the older statutes,294 allowed abortion on demand of a woman "not quick with child and not more than four lunar months after conception."295 Following Roe v. Wade, the attorney general stated that the hospitalization requirement in the statutes adopted in November 1970 was unenforceable during the first trimester of pregnancy, and that the residency requirement was also unconstitutional.296 The parental consent requirement was declared unconstitutional on federal constitutional grounds by the Washington Supreme Court in State v. Koome.297 Washington repealed all of its pre-Roe statutes in 199 1,298 and the overruling of Roe v. Wade would not revive those statutes. Abortions could be performed for any reason before viability, and for virtually any reason after viability.299

West Virginia

The pre-Roe statute prohibited performance of an abortion on a pregnant woman unless the procedure was done "in good faith, with the intention of saving the life of [the] woman or [her] child."300 Pursuant to Roe, the statute was declared unconstitutional by a federal court of appeals in Doe v. Charleston Area Medical Center, Inc.301 The statute has not been repealed,302 and may be enforceable if Roe v. Wade were overruled. Because of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals decision in Women's Health Center of West Virginia, Inc. v. Panepinto303 however, there is some uncertainty as to the enforceability of the pre-Roe statute. In Panepinto, the state supreme court struck down state restrictions on public funding of abortions performed on indigent women. The basis of the decision was that the restrictions violated the equal protection guarantee of the state constitution because they discriminated against the exercise of a federal constitutional right. The court, however, declined to decide whether the state constitution protects a right to abortion separate from and independent of Roe v. Wade.30* Whether Panepinto would allow enforcement of the pre-Roe abortion statute is uncertain and undecided.

Wisconsin

The pre-Roe statute prohibited the performance of an abortion unless the procedure was "necessary to save the life of the mother."305 In Babbitz v. McCann,306 a three-judge federal district court declared the statute unconstitutional, insofar as it prohibited abortions before quickening (16-18 weeks gestation). The same court thereafter permanently enjoined enforcement of the statute.307 That injunction, however, was subsequently vacated by the Supreme Court.308 The pre-Roe statute, which has not been repealed,309 would be enforceable if Roe v. Wade were overruled.310

Wyoming

The principal pre-Roe statutes prohibited performance of an abortion on a pregnant woman unless the procedure was "necessary to preserve her life,"311 and made a woman's participation in her own abortion a criminal offense "except when necessary for the purpose of saving the life of the mother or the child."312 Pursuant to Roe, the statutes were declared unconstitutional by the Wyoming Supreme Court in Doe v. Burk?n and were later repealed.314 The repealed pre-Roe statutes would not be revived by a decision overruling Roe v. Wade. Abortions could be performed for any reason before viability, and depending upon how the post-viability statute is interpreted, for virtually any reason thereafter.315

Conclusion

As the foregoing survey indicates, more than two-thirds of the States have repealed their pre-Roe statutes or have amended those statutes to conform to Roe v. Wade, which allows abortion for any reason before viability and for virtually any reason after viability (no reviewing court has ever upheld a law restricting postviability abortions). Those statutes would not be revived if Roe were overruled. Only three of those States-Louisiana, Rhode Island and Utah-have enacted postRoe statutes purporting to prohibit some or most abortions throughout pregnancy (those statutes have been declared unconstitutional by the federal courts and are currently enforceable). Louisiana and two other States that have repealed their preRoe statutes-North Dakota and South Dakota-have enacted "trigger" statutes that would prohibit abortions in almost all circumstances if state authority to regulate and prohibit abortion is restored. Of the foregoing States, only Louisiana, North Dakota, Rhode Island and South Dakota have enacted post-Roe statutes (or "trigger" statutes) that would effectively prohibit most abortions if Roe, as modified by Casey, were overruled. The legislative history of the Utah statute suggests that abortions could be performed for reasons relating to the mental health of the pregnant woman, an exception which, based upon the experience of States (particularly California) before Roe, proved to be unworkable.

Of the slightly less than one-third of the States that have not repealed their pre-Roe statutes, most would be ineffective in prohibiting most abortions, either because the statutes, by their terms or as interpreted, allow abortion on demand (Hawaii and New York), for a broad range of reasons, including mental health (Colorado, Delaware, Massachusetts and New Mexico), or for undefined reasons of health (Alabama), and/or because of state constitutional limitations (Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Mexico, New York, Vermont and possibly Arizona and West Virginia). In yet other States, pre-Roe statutes prohibiting abortion may have been repealed by implication with the enactment of comprehensive post-Roe statutes regulating abortion, as the Fifth Circuit has already determined with respect to the Texas statutes struck down in Roe v. Wade. Only three States that have not repealed their pre-Roe statutes would prohibit most abortions throughout pregnancy-Michigan, Oklahoma and Wisconsin. In addition, an unrepealed provision of the pre-Roe Arkansas statute probably would prohibit all abortions.

Taking into account both pre-Roe and post-Roe enactments, no more than twelve States-Arizona, Arkansas, Louisiana, Michigan, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, West Virginia and Wisconsin-and very possibly as few as eight States-Louisiana, Michigan, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Wisconsin and probably Arkansas-would have enforceable statutes on the books that would prohibit most abortions in the event Roe and Casey are overruled (the Arizona and West Virginia statutes may be unenforceable on state constitutional grounds; the Texas statutes may have been repealed by implication; and the Utah statute, depending upon how it is interpreted, may not effectively prohibit most abortions). These eight States account for less than 10% of the total population in the United States. In the other forty-two States (and the District of Columbia), which account for more than 90% of the population, abortion would be legal for most or all reasons throughout pregnancy.

FOOTNOTE

1 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

2 505 U.S. 833 (1992).

3 See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 956-79 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).

4 Id. at 952 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); 953-56 (Scalia, J., dissenting); 980-83 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

5 This is evident from the failure of Chief Justice and Justice Alito to join Justice Thomas' concurrence in Gonzales v. Carhart, No. 05-380, April 18, 2007, in which he reiterated his view "that the

Court's abortion jurisprudence . . . has no basis in the Constitution." Thomas J., concurring, slip op at 1.

6 ALA. Code tit. 14, § 9 (1958).

7 See ALA. CODE § 13A-13-7 (1994).

8 If Roe were overruled, an argument probably would be made that the health exception should be given an open-ended interpretation. Such an argument could be based upon the broad interpretation the Supreme Court gave to the health exception in the District of Columbia statute in United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 72 (1971) ("the general usage and modern understanding of the word 'health' . . . includes psychological as well as physical well-being"). In Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), the companion case to Roe v. Wade, the Court, relying on Witch, held that in determining whether an abortion is medically necessary, "all factors-physical, emotional, psychological, familial, and the woman's age-relevant to the well-being of the patient" may be considered. Id. at 192. Whether, apart from the pre-Roe statute, Alabama's post-viability statute, ALA. Code § 26-22-1 et seq. (Supp. 2004), would effectively prohibit post-viability abortions is discussed, along with other post-viability statutes, in Appendix A.

FOOTNOTE

9 Alaska Stat. § 11.15.060 (1970), renumbered as § 18.16.010 in 1978 and reorganized in 1986. See Alaska Stat. § 18.16.010 (Michie 1994).

10 Id. § 11.15.060(a) (second sentence), renumbered as § 18.16.010(a) (second sentence) in 1978, and reorganized as § 18.16.010(d) in 1986.

11 1997 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 14, § 6.

12 Alaska Stat. §§ 18.16.010(a)(1), -(2) (Michie 2004).

13 Valley Hospital Ass'n v. Mat-Su Coalition for Choice, 948 P.2d 963, 969 (Alaska 1997) (defining the scope of the fundamental right to an abortion as "similar to that expressed in Roe v. Wade"). In a decision reviewing Alaska's parental consent statute four years later, the Alaska Supreme Court reaffirmed this holding. State of Alaska v. Planned Parenthood of Alaska, 35 P3d 30, 35-39 (Alaska 2001).

14 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-211 (1956), renumbered as § 13-3603 by 1977 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 142, § 99. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3603 (West 1989).

15 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-212 (1956), renumbered as § 13-3604 by 1977 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 142, § 99. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3604 (West 1989). No prosecutions were reported under this statute. Although more than one-third of the States had statutes prohibiting a woman from aborting her own pregnancy or submitting to an abortion performed on her by another, no prosecutions were reported under any of those statutes. Research has disclosed only two cases in which a woman was charged in any State with participating in her own abortion. In Commonwealth v. Weible, 45 Pa. Super. 207 (1911), the defendant was found guilty in a jury trial of self-abortion. The trial court, however, arrested judgment on the ground that a woman could not be convicted at common law or under statute of administering drugs to herself with the intent of causing a miscarriage. The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed, stating that in the absence of clear statutory authority, "the woman who commits an abortion on herself is regarded rather as the victim than the perpetrator of the crime." Id. at 209. The words used in the abortion statute "reasonably imply that the actor in the crime is intended to be some person other than the mother, and they must be given a strained and artificial construction to include her." Id. at 210. And in Crissman v. State, 245 S.W 438 (Tex. Crim. App. 1922), an appeal from a conviction of an abortionist, the court made passing reference to the fact that the woman upon whom the abortion has been performed had been indicted for the same offense. Id. at 438. No American court has ever upheld the conviction of a woman for self-abortion or consenting to an abortion and, with the exception of Weible and Crissman, there is no record of a woman even being charged with either offense as a principal or as an accessory. That experience sug- gests that if Roe were overruled, no woman would be prosecuted for self-abortion or consenting to an abortion, even in those few States where abortion prohibitions would be enforceable.

16 Nelson v. Planned Parenthood Center of Tucson, 505 R2d 580, 590 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1973) (on rehearing); State v. Wahlrab, 509 E2d 245 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1973). In its original opinion in Nelson, decided less than three weeks before Roe v. Wade, the Arizona Court of Appeals upheld the statutes.

17 See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-3603, 13-3604 (West 2001).

18 See Simat Corp. v. Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System, 56 P.3d 28 (Ariz. 2002). In deciding the case on the basis of the privileges and immunities provision of the Arizona Constitution, the supreme court expressly refrained from deciding whether art. 2, § 8, of the state constitution confers a right to abortion independent of the one recognized on federal constitutional grounds in Roe v. Wade. Id. at 34.

19 Whether, apart from the pre-Roe statutes, Arizona's post-viability statute, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 36-2301.01 (West 2003), would effectively prohibit post-viability abortions is discussed in Appendix A.

20 ArK. Stat. Ann. § 41-301 (Supp. 1969), renumbered as § 41-2551 in 1977. See Ark. Stat. Ann. §41-2551(1977).

21 The text of § 230.3 of the Model Penal Code is set out in Appendix B.

22 Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 41-303, 41-304. (Supp. 1969), renumbered as §§ 41-2553, 41-2554 in 1977. See Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 41-2553, 41-2554 (1977). The law imposed other conditions. Abortions could be performed only in licensed, accredited hospitals and two physicians, in addition to the attending physician, had to certify that the procedure was justified by one of the circumstances specified in the statute. Id. §§ 41-306, 41-307, 41-308, renumbered as §§ 41-2557, 41-2558, 41-2559 in 1977. If the abortion was being sought by an unmarried minor or an incompetent, the consent of her parents or guardian was required and, if she was married, the consent of her husband was required. Id. § 41-305, renumbered as § 41-2555 in 1977. There was also a residency requirement, id. § 41-306, renumbered as § 41-2556 in 1977.

23 Smith v. Bentley, 493 E Supp. 916 (E.D. Ark. 1980).

FOOTNOTE

24 Now codified as Ark. Code Ann. § 5-61-102 (Michie 1997).

25 Now codified as Ark. Code Ann. § 20- 16-601 (Michie 2000).

26 See Ark. Code Ann. Tables, Vol. A (1995) at 299 (Act No. 4 of 1875); Vol. B (1995) at 86 (Act No. 61 of 1969).

27 Section 2 of a state constitutional amendment adopted on November 8, 1988, provides that "The policy of Arkansas is to protect the life of every unborn child from conception until birth, to the extent permitted by the federal constitution." Ark. Const, amend. LXVIlI, § 2. This language "would empower the General Assembly to prohibit abortion under any circumstances to the extent permitted under the Constitution of the United States." Arkansas Women's Political Caucus v. Riviere, 677 S.W2d 846, 849 (Ark. 1984) (enjoining, on technical grounds, state officials from placing earlier version of Amendment LXVIlI on the ballot). Apart from specific statutory language prohibiting abortion (e.g., § 5-61-102), however, the constitutional language, by its own terms, does not criminalize or otherwise prohibit abortion. Section 2 "merely expresses the public policy of the state," and is not self-executing because it "does not provide any means by which [that] policy is to be effectuated." Knowlton v. Ward, 889 S.W2d 721, 726 (Ark. 1994). Whether, apart from § 5-61-102, the Arkansas post-viability statute, Ark. Code Ann. § 20-16- 705(a) (Michie 2000), would effectively prohibit postviability abortions is discussed in Appendix A.

28 Cal. Health & Safety Code § 25950 et seq. (West Supp. 1971), renumbered as § 123400 et seq. in 1995. See Cal. Health & Safety Code § 123400 et seq. (West 1996). The text of § 230.3 of the Model Penal Code is set out in Appendix B.

29 CAL. PEN. Code § 274 (West Supp. 1971).

30 Id. § 275. No prosecutions were reported under this statute. See note 15, supra.

31 Cal. Health & Safety Code § 25951 (West Supp. 1971), renumbered as § 123405 in 1995.

32 Id. Unlike other statutes based upon § 230.3 of the Model Penal Code, the California Therapeutic Abortion Act did not expressly authorize an abortion for reasons of genetic defect. Alone among pre-Roe statutes with a mental health exception, California attempted to define what would qualify as a mental health related abortion in terms at least as strict as the standard for civil commitment, i.e., that the pregnant woman "would be dangerous to herself or to the person or property of others or is in need of supervision or restraint." Id. § 25954, renumbered as § 123415 in 1995. Notwithstanding that narrow definition, more than 60,000 abortions were performed in California in 1970, 98.2% of which were performed for mental health reasons. People v. Barksdale, 503 R2d 257, 265 (Cal. 1972). In Barksdale, the California Supreme Court expressed "[s]erious doubt . . . that such a considerable number of pregnant women could have been committed to a mental institution" as the result of becoming pregnant. Id. The experience in California strongly suggests that mental health exceptions in abortion statutes are inherently manipulable and subject to abuse.

33 Id. § 25952, renumbered as § 123407 in 1995.

34 Id. § 25953, renumbered as § 123410 in 1995.

35 Barksdale, 503 P2d at 262-67.

36 2000 Cal. Stat. ch. 692, § 2.

37 2002 Cal. Stat. ch. 385, §§ 2-7.

38 In repealing the Therapeutic Abortion Act, California enacted the "Reproductive Privacy Act." Id. § 8, codified as Cal. Health & Safety Code § 123460 et seq. (West Supp. 2005). The Act declares that "every individual possesses a fundamental right of privacy with respect to personal reproductive decisions." Id. § 123462. Consistent with that declaration, the Act expresses the public policy of the State of California that, "Every woman has the fundamental right to choose to bear a child or to choose and to obtain an abortion, except as specifically limited by this article," id. § 123462(b), and that "The state shall not deny or interfere with a woman's fundamental right to choose to bear a child or to choose to obtain an abortion, except as specifically limited by this article." Id. § 123462(c). In repealing their pre-Roe statutes, several other States have enacted similar expressions of public policy. No such statement of public policy is required to make abortion legal. In the absence of specific legislation making abortion criminal (either pre- or post-Roe), abortion would remain legal even if Roe v. Wade were overruled.

39 Whether the California post-viability statute, Cal. Health & Safety Code § 123468 (West Supp. 2005), would effectively prohibit post-viability abortions is discussed in Appendix A.

40 625 P2d 779 (Cal. 1981).

41 Id. at 784. In a decision striking down California's parental consent statute sixteen years later, the California Supreme Court reaffirmed this holding. American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 940 P2d 797, 809-10 (Cal. 1997) ("the protection afforded by the California Constitution of a pregnant woman's right of choice is broader than the constitutional protection afforded by the federal Constitution as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court").

42 Colo. Rev. Stat § 40-6-101 et seq. (Perm Supp. 1971), renumbered and rearranged as § 18-6-101 et seq. See Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18-6-101 et seq. (West 1986).

43 Id. § 40-6-101(l)(a), renumbered and rearranged as § 18-6-101(l)(a).

44 Id. § 40-6-101(b), renumbered and rearranged as § 18-6-101(l)(b). The law imposed other conditions. The procedure had to be unanimously approved by a three-member hospital review board and could be performed only in a hospital. Id. §§ 40-6-101(1), -(4), renumbered and rearranged as §§ 18-6-101(1), -(4). If the abortion was requested on mental health grounds, the diagnosis had to be confirmed in writing by a psychiatrist. Id.§ 40-6-101(a), renumbered and rearranged as § 18-6-101(a). If the abortion was being sought by a minor, the consent of one of her parents or her guardian was required; if the woman was married, the consent of her husband was required. Id. § 40-6-101(1), renumbered and rearranged as § 18-6-101(1).

45 507 P2d 862 (Colo. 1973).

46 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18-6-101 et seq. (West 2004).

47 The potential abuse of mental health exceptions is discussed in note 32, supra.

FOOTNOTE

48 Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53-29 (West 1958).

49 Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53-30 (West 1958). No prosecutions were reported under this statute. See note 15, supra.

50 Abele v. Markle, 342 F. Supp. 800 (D. Conn. 1972), judgment vacated and cause remanded Jor consideration oj question ojmootness, 410 U.S. 951 (1973).

51 See 1972 Conn. Acts 1, § 1 (Spec. Sess.), codified as Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53-31a (West Supp. 1972).

52 "id.

53 Abele v. Markle, 351 F Supp. 224 (D. Conn. 1972), judgment vacated and cause remanded for further proceedings in light of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 951 (1973).

54 Abele v. Markle, 369 E Supp. 807 (D. Conn. 1973).

55 1990 Conn. Acts 90-113, § 4 (Reg. Sess.).

56 In repealing its pre-Roe statutes, Connecticut enacted a new section which provides that "The decision to terminate a pregnancy prior to the viability of the fetus shall be solely that of the pregnant woman in consultation with her physician." Id. § 3(a), codified as Conn. Gen. Stat. § 19a-602(a) (West 2003). As previously noted, see note 38, supra, no such statement of public policy is required to make abortion legal in any State. In the absence of specific legislation making abortion criminal (either pre- or post-Roe), abortion would remain legal even if Roe v. Wade were overruled.

57 Whether Connecticut's post-viability statute, see Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 19a-602(b) (West 2003), would effectively prohibit post-viability abortions is discussed in Appendix A.

58 Del. Laws ch. 145 (1969), id. ch. 235, codified as Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, §§ 222(21), 651-654 (1975); id. tit. 24, §§ 1766(b), 1790-1793 (1975). The text of § 230.3 of the Model Penal Code is set out in Appendix B.

59 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 651. A "therapeutic abortion" was one performed pursuant to title 24. id. § 222(21).

60 Id. § 652. No prosecutions were reported under this statute. See note 15, supra.

61 Id. tit. 24, §§ 1790(a)(1), -(b)(1).

62 Id. § 1790(a)(2)-(4). The law imposed other conditions. An abortion could be performed only in an accredited hospital and had to be approved by a hospital abortion review authority. Two physicians had to certify that the procedure was justified under one of the circumstances specified in the statute (except in cases where the pregnancy resulted from rape, in which case the Attorney General had to certify that there was probable cause to believe that the alleged rape did occur). Id. §§ 1790(a), 1790(a)(3)(B), -(b)(2), -(c). In the case of an unmarried minor under the age of 19 or a mentally ill or incompetent woman, the written consent of her parents or guardian was required. Id. § 1790(b)(3).

63 Based upon an Attorney General opinion that the statutes were unconstitutional and a formal policy not to enforce them, a challenge to the constitutionality of the statutes was dismissed for want of a "justiciable controversy." Delaware Women's Health Organization, Inc. v. Weir, 441 F. Supp. 497, 499 n. 9 (D. Del. 1977).

64 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 222(26), 651-54 (2001 & Supp. 2004); tit. 24, §§ 1766(b), 1790-93 (1997).

65 The potential abuse of mental health exceptions is discussed in note 32, supra.

66 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1790(b)(1) (1997). This statute is discussed in Appendix A.

67 D.C CODE ANN. § 22-201 (1967), renumbered as § 22-101 in 1988. See D.C Code Ann. § 22-101 (2001).

68 402 U.S. 62(1971).

69 Id. at 72.

70 Act No. 15-255, signed Nov. 25, 2003, effective April 29, 2004, D.C. Law 15-154.

71 1972 Fla. Laws 608, ch. 72-196. The text of § 230.3 of the Model Penal Code is set out in Appendix B. The Florida legislature enacted the 1972 statute in response to a decision of the Florida Supreme Court decision the same year striking down, on vagueness grounds, older statutes that prohibited abortion unless the procedure was necessary to preserve the life of the pregnant woman. State v. Barquet, 262 So.2d 431 (Fla. 1972), invalidating FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 782.10, 791.10 (West 1965).

72 1972 Fla. Laws 608, ch. 72-196, § 2. The law imposed other conditions. Abortions could be performed only by licensed physicians in approved facilities. Id. §§ 1, 2. Except in emergency cases, an unmarried woman under 18 years of age had to obtain the written consent of either parent or of her guardian; a married woman living with her husband had to obtain his written consent. Id. §§ 3(1), -(2).

73 376 F. Supp. 695 (S.D. Fla. 1974), appeal dismissed for want of jurisdiction, cert, denied, 417 U.S. 279 (1974), affd sub nom. Poe v. Gerstein, 517 E2d 787 (5th Cir. 1975), ajfd sub nom. Gerstein v. Coe, 428 U.S. 901 (1976).

74 351So.2d708(Fla. 1977).

75 1979 Fla. Laws 1618, ch. 79-302, § 5.

76 Whether Florida's third-trimester statute, see FLA. STAT. Ann. § 390.01 1 1(1) (West 2002), would effectively prohibit abortions at that stage of pregnancy (defined as after the twenty-fourth week of pregnancy, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 390.01 1(8) (West 2002)), is discussed in Appendix A.

77 In re T.W, 551 So.2d 1186, 1196 (Fla. 1989) (striking down parental consent statute). More recently, the Florida Supreme Court invalidated a parental notice statute. North Florida Women's Health and Counseling Services, Inc. v. State of Florida, 866 So.2d 612 (Fla. 2003). Although that decision has been effectively overturned by an amendment to the Florida Constitution adopted on Nov. 2, 2004, see FLA. CONST, art. X, § 22, the amendment does not purport to overturn the Florida Supreme Court's doctrine on privacy rights generally or abortions specifically other than recognizing the authority of the legislature to enact a parental notice statute.

78 GEO. CODE Ann. § 26-1201 et seq. (1972). The text of § 230.3 of the Model Penal Code is set out in Appendix B.

79 Id. §§ 26-1202(a)(l), -(2), -(3). Unlike most statutes based upon § 230.3 of the Model Penal Code (other than Maryland), the Georgia statute did not expressly authorize an abortion where the pregnancy resulted from incest. The law imposed other conditions. The abortion had to be performed in a licensed and accredited hospital and had to be approved in advance by a majority vote of a medical staff committee of the hospital. Id. §§ 26-1202(b)(4), -(5). In addition to the attending physician, two other physicians had to certify in writing that, based upon their separate personal examinations of the pregnant woman, the abortion was, in their judgment, necessary because of one of the reasons specified in § 26-1202(a). Id. § 1202(b)(3). If the abortion was sought because the pregnancy resulted from rape, the rape had to be reported in writing under oath to a local law enforcement officer or agency and both a certified copy of the police report and a written statement by the solicitor general for the judicial circuit where the rape occurred (or allegedly occurred) that there was probable cause to believe that the rape had occurred had to be completed. Id. § 26-1202(b)(6). The woman upon whom the abortion was to be performed had to certify in writing under oath that she was a bona fide legal resident of the State, id. § 26-1202(b)(l), and the attending physician had to certify in writing that he believed that the woman was a bona fide resident of the State, id. § 261202(b)(2). The law also allowed the solicitor general of the judicial circuit in which an abortion was to be performed and any person who would be a relative of the child within the second degree of consanguinity to petition the superior court of the county in which the abortion was to be performed for a declaratory judgment to determine whether the performance of the abortion would violate any constitutional or other legal rights of the fetus. Id. § 26-1202(c).

80 319 E Supp. 1048 (N.D. Ga. 1970).

81 410 U.S. 179(1973).

82 1973 Ga. Laws No. 328, § 1; Vol. I Ga. Acts & Resolutions 635, 636-37 (1973).

83 Whether Georgia's third-trimester statute, see Ga. Code Ann. § 16-12-141(c) (2003), would effectively prohibit abortions at that stage of pregnancy is discussed in Appendix A.

FOOTNOTE

84 HAW. REV. STAT. § 453-16 (Supp. 1971). The statute prohibited "abortion" unless the procedure was performed by a licensed physician or surgeon, or a licensed osteopathic physician and surgeon, in a hospital licensed by the Hawaii Department of Health or operated by the federal government or an agency thereof. Id. §§ 453-16(a)(l), -(2). The statute also imposed a residency requirement. Id. § 453- 16(a)(3). The term "abortion," however, was limited to the intentional termination of a pregnancy of a "nonviable fetus." Id. § 453-16(b) (emphasis added). As a result, the "prohibition" set forth in the first sentence of the statute did not prohibit (and does not prohibit) any abortion of a viable fetus.

85Id. §453-16(2002).

86 See H.B. No. 1242 H.D. 1, 2006 Haw. Sess. Laws Act 35 (signed Apr. 26, 2006).

87 See note 84, supra, and Appendix A.

88 IDAHO CODE § 18-601 (Supp. 1972).

89 Id. § 18-602. No prosecutions were reported under this statute. See note 15, supra.

90 1973 Idaho Sess. Laws 443, ch. 197, § 2.

91 Idaho Code § 18-608(3) (2004). Idaho's third-trimester statute is discussed in Appendix A.

92 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, 1 23-1 (1971).

93 294 N. E. 2d. 257 (Ill. 1973). Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade, the Illinois Supreme Court rejected an attempt to engraft mental or psychiatric grounds onto the statute. People ex rei. Hanrahan v. White, 285 N. E. 2d 129 (Ill. 1972). The pre-Roe statute was also struck down by a three-judge federal district court. Doe v. Scott, 321 E Supp. 1385 (N. D. 1971), vacated and remanded sub nom. Hanrahan v. Doe, 410 U.S. 950 (1973).

94 Ill. Public Act 78-225, § 10 (1973).

95 The preamble to the Illinois Abortion Act of 1975 states that if the decisions of the United States Supreme Court recognizing a right to abortion are "ever reversed or modified or the United States Constitution is amended to allow protection of the unborn then the former policy of this State to prohibit abortions unless necessary for the preservation of the mother's life shall be reinstated." 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 510/1 (West 2003). In the absence of new legislation criminalizing abortion (the pre-Roe statute having been repealed), the preamble would not, by its own terms, make abortion illegal. It contains no operative provisions and authorizes no punishment. Conduct is not criminal in Illinois unless a statute defines the particular conduct as criminal. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1-3 (West 2002). Moreover, one General Assembly cannot bind another to enact legislation. See ILLINOIS GENERAL ASSEMBLY LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH UNIT, EFFECTS ON ILLINOIS IF Roe v. WADE IS MODIFIED OR OVERRULED (Feb. 9, 1989).

96 Whether the Illinois post-viability statute, see 720 III. Comp. Stat. Ann. 510/5 (West 2003), would effectively prohibit post-viability abortions is discussed in Appendix A.

97 Ind. Code Ann. § 35-1-58-1 (Burns 1971).

98 Id. § 35-1-58-2. No prosecutions were reported under this statute. See note 15, supra.

99 1977 Ind. Acts 1513, 1524, Pub. L No. 335, § 21. In Cheaney v. State, 285 N.E.2d 265 (Ind. 1972), cert, denied for want of standing of petitioner, 410 U.S. 991 (1973), the Indiana Supreme Court rejected a challenge to the constitutionality of the state abortion statute brought by a nonphysician who had been convicted of performing an abortion.

100 Ind. Code Ann. § 16-34-2-l(a)(3) (Michie Supp. 2004). Indiana's post-viability statute is discussed in Appendix A.

101 Iowa Code § 701.1 (1950).

102 361 E Supp. 1288 (S.D. Iowa 1973). Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade, the Iowa Supreme Court upheld the statute, rejecting arguments that it was impermissibly vague and denied equal protection of the law. State v. Abodeely, 179 N.W2d 347 (Iowa 1970), appeal dismissed, cert, denied, 402 U.S. 936 (1971)

103 1976 Iowa Acts 549, 774, ch. 1245, § 526.

104 See IOWA CODE ANN. § 707.7 (West 2003). Whether Iowa's statute would effectively prohibit abortions after the second trimester is discussed in Appendix A.

105 Kan. Stat. Ann. § 2 1-3407 (Vernon 1971). The text of § 230.3 of the Model Penal Code is set out in Appendix B.

106 Id. § 21-3407(2). The law imposed other conditions. Abortions could be performed only by licensed physicians in licensed, accredited hospitals. Id. §§ 21-3407(2), 65-444. Except in emergency cases, no abortion could be performed unless three physicians certified in writing the circumstances that existed that justified the abortion. Id. §§ 21-3407(2)(a), -(b), 65-444. The hospitalization and three-physician concurrence requirements were declared unconstitutional by a three-judge federal district court in a pre-Roe decision. Poe v. Menghini, 339 F Supp. 986 (D. Kan. 1972). The potential abuse of mental health exceptions is discussed in note 32, supra.

107 1992 Kan. Sess. Laws 723, 729, ch. 183, § 9.

108 Kan. Stat. Ann. § 65-6703 (2002). The Kansas post-viability statute is discussed in Appendix A.

109 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 436.020 (Michie 1962).

110 Id. §435.040.

111 497 S.W2d 713 (Ky. 1973). In its original decision, the Kentucky Court of Appeals upheld the statute. Sasaki v. Commonwealth, 485 S.W.2d 897 (Ky. 1972), vacated and remanded, 410 U.S. 951 (1973). Prior to Roe, a three-judge federal district court also upheld the statute. Crossen v. Attorney General, 344 E Supp. 587 (E.D. Ky. 1972), vacated and remanded, 410 U.S. 950 (1973).

112 1974 Ky. Acts 484, 487, ch. 255, § 19; 1974 Ky. Acts 831, 889, ch. 406, § 336.

113 Kentucky has enacted a statute stating that "Ii]f . . . the United States Constitution is amended or relevant judicial decisions are reversed or modified, the declared policy of this Commonwealth to recognize and to protect the lives of all human beings regardless of their degree of biological development shall be fully restored." Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 311.710(5) (Michie 2001). In the absence of new legislation criminalizing abortion (the pre-Roe statutes having been repealed), this expression of legislative policy would not, by its own terms, make abortion illegal. It contains no operative provisions and authorizes no punishment. Conduct is not criminal in Kentucky unless a statute defines the particular conduct as criminal. See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 500.020(1) (Michie 1996).

114 Whether Kentucky's post-viability statute, Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 31 1.780 (Michie 2001), would effectively prohibit post-viability abortions is discussed in Appendix A.

115 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:87 (West 1964).

116 See State v. Sharp, 182 So.2d 517, 518 (La. 1966).

117 The state board of medical examiners was empowered to revoke the license of a physician who performed an abortion "unless [the procedure was] done for the relief of a woman whose life appears in peril after due consultation with another licensed physician." La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 37:1285(6) (West 1964). In Rosen v. Louisiana Board of Medical Examiners, 318 E Supp. 1217, 1225 (E.D. La. 1970), vacated and remanded, 412 U.S. 902 (1973), the court construed §§ 14:87 and 37:1285(6) in pari materia and upheld their constitutionality.

118 Rosen v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners, 380 E Supp. 875 (E.D. La. 1974), summarily affirmed, 419 U.S. 1098 (1975); Weeks v. Connick, Civil Action No. 73-469 (E.D. La. 1976), summarily affirmed sub nom. Guste v. Weeks, 429 U.S. 1056 (1977). Prior to Roe, the Louisiana Supreme Court consistently rejected attacks on the constitutionality of § 14:87. State v. Campbell, 270 So.2d 506 (La. 1972); State v. Scott, 255 So.2d 736 (La. 1971); State v. Shirley, 237 So.2d 676 (La. 1970); State v. Pesson, 235 So.2d 568 (La. 1970).

119 492 U.S. 490(1989).

120 Weeks v. Connick, 733 E Supp. 1036 (E.D. La. 1990).

121 1991 La. Acts, No. 26, codified as La Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:87 (West 2004).

122 Sojourner T. v. Roemer, 772 E Supp. 930 (E. D. La. 1991), affid sub nom. Sojourner T. v. Edwards, 974 E2d 27 (5th Cir. 1992), cert denied, 507 U.S. 972 (1993).

123 2006 La. Acts Pub. Act 467, § 2 (signed June 17, 2006).

124 Id. § 1 (adding § 1299.30 to the Louisiana Revised Statutes Annotated).

125 Whether, apart from § 14:87, Louisiana's post-viability statute, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.4 (West Supp. 2005), would effectively prohibit post-viability abortions is discussed in Appendix A.

126 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 51 (West 1964).

127 1979 Me. Laws 513, ch. 405, § 1 (1st Sess.).

128 In 1993, Maine enacted a statement of policy regarding abortion: "It is the public policy of the State that the State not restrict a woman's exercise of her private decision to terminate a pregnancy before viability except as provided in section 1597-? [transferred to § 1598(A)]." 1993 Me Laws ch. 61, § 2. As previously noted, see note 38, supra, no such statement of public policy is required to make abortion legal in any State. In the absence of specific legislation making abortion criminal (either pre- or post-Roe), abortion would remain legal even if Roe v. Wade were overruled.

129 Whether Maine's post-viability statute, Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 1598(4) (West 2004), would effectively prohibit post-viability abortions is discussed in Appendix A.

130 MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 137 (1971), transferred to MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 20-208 (1990), by 1982 Md. Laws 4184, 4184-85. The text of § 230.3 of the Model Penal Code is set out in Appendix B.

131 Id. § 137.

132 Id. Unlike most statutes based on § 230.3 of the Model Penal Code (other than Georgia), the Maryland statute did not expressly authorize an abortion where the pregnancy resulted from incest. The potential abuse of mental health exceptions is discussed in note 32, supra.

133 Id. The law imposed other conditions. Abortions could be performed only by licensed physicians in licensed hospitals accredited by the Joint Committee on Accreditation of Hospitals. Id. § 137(a). The procedure had to be approved by a hospital review authority, which was required to keep detailed written records of all requests for authorization and its action thereon. Id. §§ 137(b)(2), -(c).

134 308 A.2d 223 (Md. Ct. Sp. App. 1973).

135 471 A.2d 1115 (Md. Ct. Sp. App. 1984).

136 473 E2d 1370 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 824 (1973).

137 MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. §§ 20-103, 20-201 to 20-208, 20-210, 20-214 (1990).

138 1991 Md. Laws 1, ch. 1, § 1. In repealing its pre-Roe statutes, Maryland enacted a new statute providing, inter alia, that "the State may not interfere with the decision of a woman to terminate a pregnancy: (1) Before the fetus is viable; or (2) At any time during the woman's pregnancy, if: (i) The termination procedure is necessary to protect the life or health of the woman; or (ii) The fetus is affected by genetic defect or serious deformity or abnormality." Id., codified as MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 20-209(b) (Supp. 1991). As previously noted, see note 38, supra, no such legislative statement is required to make abortion legal in any State. In the absence of specific legislation making abortion criminal (either pre- or post-Roe), abortion would remain legal even if Roe v. Wade were overruled.

139 MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 20-209(b)(2) (2000). Viability is defined in § 20-209(a). This statute is discussed further in Appendix A.

140 MASS. GEN LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 19 (West 1968).

141 Kudish v. Board of Registration in Medicine, 248 N.E.2d 264, 266 (Mass. 1969); Commonwealth v. Brunelle, 171 N.E.2d 850, 851-52 (Mass. 1961); Commonwealth v. Wheeler, 53 N.E.2d 4, 5 (Mass. 1944). The potential abuse of mental health exceptions is discussed in note 32, supra.

142 Women of the Commonwealth v. Quinn, Civil Action No. 71-2420-W (D. Mass. Feb. 21, 1973).

143 See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 272, § 19 (West 2000).

144 The same may be said of the Massachusetts statute, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12M (West 2003), which allows abortions to be performed during or after the twenty-fourth week of pregnancy to save the life of the mother or where continuation of the pregnancy would impose on her a substantial risk of grave impairment of her physical or mental health. This statute is discussed further in Appendix A.

145 See Moe v. Secretary of Administration & Finance, 417 N.E.2d 387, 397-99 (Mass. 1981) (striking down restrictions on public funding of abortion); Planned Parenthood League of Massachusetts v. Attorney General, 677 N.E.2d 101, 103-04 (Mass. 1997) (partially invalidating parental consent statute). In Moe, the majority opinion stated, "we have accepted the formulation of rights that [Roe] announced as an integral part of our jurisprudence." 417 N.E.2d at 398.

146 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.14 (West 1968).

147 Id. § 750.323.

148 Id. § 750.322.

149 People v. Bricker, 208 N.W2d 172 (Mich. 1973).

150 Larkin v. Calahan, 208 N.W2d 176 (Mich. 1973).

151 Bricker, 208 N.W.2d at 175. This gloss on the pre-Roe statute, effectively limiting its application to post-viability abortions, is discussed in Appendix A.

152 Id.

153 Id.

154 Id. at 176. See, e.g.. People v. Higuera, 625 N.W2d 444 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001) (upholding indictment of physician for performing non-therapeutic, post-viability abortion in violation of § 750. 14, as construed by Bricker).

155 Larkin, 208 N.W.2d at 179.

156 Id. at 180.

157 See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.14, 750.322, 750.323 (West 2004). The Michigan Court of Appeals has held that § 750.14 has not been repealed by implication with the enactment of substantial post-Roe legislation regulating abortion. People v. Higuera, 625 N.W.2d at 448-49.

158 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 617.18 (West 1971).

159 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 617.19 (West 1971). No prosecutions were reported under this statute. See note 15, supra.

160 State v. Hultgren, 204 N.W2d 197 (Minn. 1973); State v. Hodgson, 204 N.W2d 199 (Minn. 1973). Prior to Roe, a three-judge federal district court dismissed a challenge to the principal pre-Roe statutes for want of a justiciable "case or controversy." Doe v. Randall, 314 E Supp. 32, 34 (D. Minn. 1970).

161 1974 Minn. Laws 265, 268, ch. 177, § 7.

162 Whether Minnesota's post-viability statute, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.412 subd. 3 (West 1998), would effectively prohibit post-viability abortions is discussed in Appendix A.

163 See Women of the State of Minnesota v. Gomez, 542 N.W2d 17, 27 (Minn. 1995) ("the right of privacy under the Minnesota Constitution encompasses a woman's right to decide to terminate her pregnancy") (striking down restrictions on public funding of abortion).

164 MISS. CODE ANN. § 2223 (Supp. 1970), renumbered as MISS. CODE ANN.§ 97-3-3 (1991).

165 Spears v. State, 278 So. 2d 443 (Miss. 1973). In its original opinion, the Mississippi Supreme Court rejected a challenge to the statute. Spears v. State, 257 So.2d 876 (Miss. 1972) (per curiam), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1106 (1973).

166 See MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-3 (1999).

167 See Pro-Choice Mississippi v. Fordice, 716 So. 2d 645, 650-54 (Miss. 1998). The same is true of the "trigger" bill the Governor of Mississippi signed into law on March 22, 2007, that would take effect upon the overruling of Roe v. Wade. S.B. 2391 , 2007 Leg. Sess. (Miss. 2007).

168 505 U.S. 833 (1992).

169 Pro-Choice Mississippi, 716 So.2d at 654-55.

170 MO. ANN. STAT. § 559.100 (Vernon 1969).

171 Rodgers v. Danforth, Civ. No. 18360-2 (W.D. Mo. May 18, 1973), aff'd 414 U.S. 1035 (1973). In its original decision, the three-judge court dismissed the challenge to the law on abstention grounds. Rodgers v. Danforth, Civ. No. 18360-2 (W.D. Mo. Sep. 10, 1970). That judgment was vacated and the cause was remanded for further consideration in light of Roe v. Wade. Rodgers v. Danforth, 410 U.S. 949 (1973). In another pre-Roe decision, the Missouri Supreme Court rejected a challenge to the statute. Rodgers v. Danforth, 486 S.W2d 258 (Mo. 1972), vacated and remanded, 410 U.S. 949 (1973).

172 1977 Mo. Laws, 658, 662-63.

173 Missouri has enacted a statute stating:

It is the intention of the general assembly of the state of Missouri to grant the right to life to all humans, born and unborn, and to regulate abortion to the full extent permitted by the Constitution of the United States, decisions of the United States Supreme Court, and federal statutes.

MO. ANN. STAT. § 188.010 (West 2004). In the absence of new legislation criminalizing abortion (the pre-Roe statutes having been repealed), this expression of legislative intent would not, by its own terms, make abortion illegal. It contains no operative provisions and authorizes no punishment. Conduct is not criminal in Missouri unless a statute defines the particular conduct as criminal. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 556.026 (West 1999).

174 Whether Missouri's post-viability statute, MO. ANN. STAT. § 188.030 (West 2004), would effectively prohibit post-viability abortions is discussed in Appendix A.

175 MONT. CODE ANN. § 94-401 (1969), later renumbered as § 94-5-611 by 1973 Mont. Laws ch. 513, §29.

176 MONT. CODE ANN. § 94-402 (1969), later renumbered as § 94-5-612 by 1973 Mont. Laws 1335, 1416-17, ch. 513, § 29. No prosecutions were reported under this statute. See note 15, supra.

177 360 F Supp. 20 (D. Mont. 1973).

178 1977 Mont. Laws 1130, 1171-72, ch. 359, § 77.

179 MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-109 (2003). Montana's post-viability statute is discussed in Appendix A.

180 See Armstrong v. State of Montana, 989 P.2d 364 (Mont. 1999) (striking down statute prohibiting non-physicians from performing abortions).

FOOTNOTE

181 NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-404, 28-405 (1964).

182 Doe v. Exon, Civil No. 71-L-199 (D. Neb. Feb. 21, 1973).

183 1973 Neb. Laws 801, 806, L.B. 286, § 24.

184 Whether Nebraska's post-viability statute, NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-329 (Michie 2003), would effectively prohibit post-viability abortions is discussed in Appendix A.

185 NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.120 (1967).

186 Id. § 200.220. No prosecutions were reported under this statute. See note 15, supra.

187 Op. Nev. Att'y Gen. (Feb. 2, 1973).

188 1973 Nev. Stat. 1637, 1639-40, ch. 766, §§ 7, 8.

189 Nevada allows abortions to be performed after the twenty-fourth week of pregnancy to prevent grave impairment of the pregnant woman's physical or mental health. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 442.250 (Michie 2000). This statute is discussed in Appendix A. The potential abuse of mental health exceptions is discussed in note 32, supra.

190 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 585.12 (1955) (a misdemeanor).

191 Id. § 585.13 (1955) (a felony).

192 1997 N.H. Laws 81, ch. 99, § 1.

193 NJ. Stat. Ann. § 2A:87-1 (West 1969). There was little case law interpreting this language, although, at a minimum, it appears that the statute would have allowed those abortions necessary to save the life of the mother. See State v. Moretti, 244 A.2d 499, 504 (N.J. 1968).

194 YWCA. of Princeton, NJ. v. Kugler, 342 E Supp. 1048 (D. NJ. 1972), vacated and remanded, 475 E2d 1398 (3d Cir. 1973), judgment reinstated, Civil No. 264-70 (D. N.J. July 24, 1973), affa mem. op., 493 E2d 1402 (3d Cir. 1974). Prior to Roe, the New Jersey Supreme Court rejected a vagueness challenge to the statute. Moretti, 244 A.2d at 504.

195 1978 NJ. Laws 482, 687-88, ch. 95, § 2C98-2.

196 See Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925, 934 (N.J. 1982) ("The right to choose whether to have an abortion ... is a fundamental right of all pregnant women") (striking down restrictions on public funding of abortion); Planned Parenthood of Central New Jersey v. Farmer, 762 A.2d 620 (N.J. 2000) (invalidating parental notice statute).

197 N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40A-5-1 et seq. (Michie 1972). The text of § 230.3 of the Model Penal Code is set out in Appendix B.

198 Id. § 40A-5-1. The law imposed other conditions. Abortions could be performed only in licensed hospitals by licensed physicians "using acceptable medical procedures." Id. No abortion could be performed unless a "special hospital board," composed of two physicians, reviewed the request for an abortion and certified that the request satisfied one of the grounds specified in the statute. Id. § 40A-5-l(C), -(D). If the woman requesting the abortion was a minor, the consent of her parent or guardian was required. Id. § 40A5-1(C). The potential abuse of mental health exceptions is discussed in note 32, supra.

199 506 R2d 1217 (N.M. Ct. App. 1973).

200 The statute has been renumbered and now appears at N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-1 et seq. (Michie 2004).

201 See New Mexico Right to Choose/NARAL v. Johnson, 975 E2d 841 , 850-57 (N.M. 1998), cert, denied, 526 U.S. 1020 (1999).

202 N.Y. Penal Law § 125.00 et seq. (McKinney Supp. 1971).

203 Id. § 125.05(3). This statute is discussed in Appendix A. Although self-abortion was a criminal offense under certain circumstances, no prosecutions were reported under the law. See note 15, supra.

204 Byrn v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corp., 286 N.E.2d 887 (N.Y. 1972), appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal question, 410 U.S. 949 (1973).

205 N.Y. PENAL LAW §