Communicating Change: Four Cases of Quality Programs.

Human and organizational factors are

commonly identified as causes and contributors to failures and difficulties in implementing planned change. This study examines the implementation of quality programs in four organizations; the communication used to introduce the programs and to encourage employees to participate; and employees' perceptions of the programs, implementation activities, and change agents. The purpose of this study was to provide empirical evidence of key communication problems common to planned change implementation. Four key themes emerged: (a) creating and communicating vision, (b) sensemaking and feedback, (c) establishing legitimacy, and (d) communicating goal achievements. Conclusions and implications for future communication research are discussed in a final section.

Keywords: Change Communication, Sensemaking, Quality Programs, Vision

An organization's survival may hinge on its success in implementing large-scale changes (e.g., reorganization, downsizing, major production technologies). Cushman and King (1994) suggest that there is a trend of increasingly rapid change in organizations. Those planned change implementation efforts often fail. In the case of some technologies, for example, implementation failure rates have been said to be as high as 50 to 75% (Majchrzak, 1988). Implementing planned change is almost always difficult; communication problems are commonplace (Lewis, 2000). Human and organizational factors have been commonly identified as causes and contributors to failures and difficulties in implementation efforts. For example, Miller, Johnson, and Grau (1994) suggest that the resistance that may occur during change efforts--reduction of output, quarreling and hostility, work slowdowns, and pessimism regarding goal attainment--can be attributed to numerous political, cultural, normative, and individual causes. Indeed, Bikson and Gutek (1984) concluded that less than 10% of the failures in the companies they studied were due to technical problems. In one survey of 89 implementers of planned change, the most frequently noted categories of problems encountered were "communicating vision" and "negative attitudes" (Lewis, 2000). Understanding just how change programs are implemented and how communication affects this process appears increasingly central to predicting the outcomes of planned change efforts.

Tornatzky and Johnson (1982) define implementation as the translation of any tool or technique, process, or method of doing, from knowledge to practice. It encompasses that range of activities which take place between "adoption" of a tool or technique (defined as a decision or intent to use the technology) and its stable incorporation into on-going organizational practice. (p. 193)

Implementation activities might include forming and communicating goals, selecting and training users, altering performance criteria, and assessing implementation outcomes. This study describes four cases of implementation of quality programs, the means used to introduce them to employees, and employees' perceptions of the programs, implementation activities, and change agents. The purpose of this study was to provide empirical evidence of common communication problems encountered during planned change implementation and to discuss how organizations address them and sometimes create them.

These case descriptions are intended to illustrate the centrality of communication during implementation and direct our attention to research questions that can be explored in future investigations. While other communication scholarship--related to invention, design, adoption, and responses to planned change--has provided strong and persuasive grounds for hypothesizing about the scope and importance of the role communication plays during implementation of planned change (for a review see Lewis & Seibold, 1998), it is time we began to build an empirical basis for such claims.

Methods

This paper presents case studies of four organizational planned change implementations. Many researchers, across disciplines, have demonstrated the utility of case studies to describe (Barley, 1990; Nutt, 1986), test theory (Mohr, 1985) and build theory (Eisenhardt, 1989; Gersick, 1988). "The case study approach to qualitative analysis is a specific way of collecting, organizing, and analyzing data. The purpose is to gather comprehensive, systematic, and in-depth information about each case of interest" (Patton, 1990, p. 384).

Procedures

Observations, examination of organizational documents, formal interviews, and questionnaire responses were used as sources of data to build these case descriptions. Observations were made of implementers' meetings, team and unit meetings, departmental operations, and general organizational environments. Time spent in contact with each organization varied from two weeks to several months. Documents such as newsletters, meeting agendas, minutes, internal memos, program goals and mission statements, descriptions of implementation plans, assessments of innovation outcomes, problem statements, and formal policy statements regarding the quality program were examined. In all four organizations, documents were used to trace the historical development of the innovations, to identify key turning points and critical incidents, and to compare formal descriptions of goals and procedures against informal understandings of them. Fifty-four formal structured interviews were conducted across three of the four organizations ( Outreach Education, VA Hospital, and Messaging Technology). Both managers and non-supervisory staff were interviewed as well as key individuals involved in the implementation of the new programs. The fourth organization (University Services) declined to be available for formal interviews, but observations of many informal meetings and discussions were used as a basis for the conclusions discussed below.

The structured interview schedule used for all the interviews included eight questions and took approximately 20-30 minutes to conduct. Each participant was made aware that the interviews were a part of a larger effort to assess the successes and challenges facing the change program. Each participant was also promised confidentiality. Interviews were not recorded, but permission for note-taking was requested and given in each case. The following questions were asked in this sequence:

(1) Why do you think [the organization] has implemented [the program]?

(2) Describe your role in the [the program].

(3) What role would you like to have in [the program]?

(4) What has [the program] accomplished at [this organization]?

(5) How do you think people are reacting to [the program]?

(6) What concerns do people have regarding [the program] at [this organization]?

(7) What direction should [the program] be going in?

(8) What do you predict for the future of [the program] at [this organization]?

Questions were followed by a number of optional probes.

Respondents' answers to open-response questionnaire items were also used as another source of direct quotes. Respondents filled out questionnaires which were distributed in each organization during work hours and returned either by direct mail or through collection boxes. Three open-response items were used to solicit written comments: "Please state, in your own words, what you think the general purposes of the [name of quality program] at [organization] are," "Please list any actions you have taken in responding to the [name of quality program] at [organization]," "Please use the space below to add any comments about the [name of quality program]."

Data Analyses

The data were analyzed inductively. Inductive analysis involves "immersion in the details and specifics of the data to discover important categories, dimensions, and interrelationships.... [One begins by] exploring genuinely open questions rather than testing theoretically derived (deductive) hypotheses" (Patton, 1990, p. 40). Aside from the structure imposed by the formal interview protocol and the use of open-response questions, no pre-specified categories or models were used to guide the research. At the conclusion of contact with each organization, I examined notes from interviews, observations, informal conversations, archival documents, and questionnaire responses. Direct quotations (both written and oral) were given special attention in the analyses. "Direct quotations are a basic source of raw data in qualitative inquiry, revealing respondents' depth of emotion, the ways they have organized their world, their thoughts about what is happening, their experiences, and their basic perceptions" (Patton, 1 990, p. 24).

The data were organized and issues grouped by use of several filters including chronological order; majority and minority views; cross-organizational similarities and differences; cross-hierarchical-level differences and similarities, "pro-program" and "con-program" comments; process-related and content-related focus; description vs. explanation vs. evaluation. The issues that stood out across these filtering categories were then developed into themes.

Limitations

Some qualifications of this study's methods are warranted. First, these case studies represent only four U.S. organizations' efforts at implementing one particular type of innovation--quality programs. None of these organizations employed professional consultants in designing or implementing their programs. For the most part, they relied on popular press publications, their own experiences, and short-term trainers and facilitators. However, the experiences of these organizations may be more typical of small to mid-sized organizations without resources to employ expensive professional consultants to implement innovations. Second, much of the case analyses have concentrated on the negative side of these implementation efforts. While it was not a goal of the study to examine "problems," that is what seems to have emerged as most relevant from the data sources I used. Third, there are clear disadvantages of using only one observer for the collection of case study data and field research. I did not have the benef it of systematic comparison of my perceptions against those of another "outsider's" perceptions. I did compare my perceptions to those of my consultant colleague and "insiders" with whom I was particularly well acquainted. However, it needs to be noted that the descriptions offered here are wholly my own account of these organizational stories.

The Cases

Four U.S. sites (University Services, Outreach Education, Veterans Hospital, Messaging Technology) were selected on the basis of their availability for inclusion in the study, their use of a "quality" program, and a size criterion of 50-200 employees. The identities of the organizations have been disguised to assure anonymity.

University Services

The University Services unit of a mid-sized public U.S. university on the west coast was the first organization in which data were collected. Departments included Accounts Receivable, Central Stores, Parking Services, Transportation, Mail, Loan Collections, Printing and Reprographics, Purchasing, and the Administrative Office that oversees all of these departments. My contact with University Services began when, along with a colleague, I agreed to provide feedback to the group implementing a new quality program. Over the following two years, I worked with University Services by making periodic observations of the implementation group's meetings, providing process consulting, participating in training of front-line supervisors, and observing departmental operations and departmental meetings. Additionally, undergraduate students under my supervision interviewed key members of the implementing group about its history. Other undergraduate students enrolled in a senior-level course in organizational communication performed a communication audit using observations, interviews, and questionnaires in four of the departments: Loan Collections, Accounts Receivable, Transportation, and Parking. Essentially, my role with this organization has been one of providing assessment, feedback, and process consultation.

The University Services unit employed 100 people at the time the study was conducted (1993) and has three levels of management: administration, department managers, and supervisors. Departments range in size from 7 to 15 employees. At the time of this study, the fiscal health of this campus, and indeed of the entire state, was in dire circumstances. Budgetary cutbacks had caused two rounds of layoffs and one round of early retirement to reduce staff. Survivors of staff reductions were subjected to a 5% pay cut across the organization. Just prior to the administration of a questionnaire instrument used in the larger study from which these data were gathered, the Printing and Reprographics Department was eliminated, at the cost of 15 jobs.

Outreach Education

The second site was the Outreach Education unit of the same U.S. university. I was invited to join a colleague to provide assessment and process consulting to the management group of Outreach Education as well as to the group responsible for implementing a quality program in the unit. Over the following year, I periodically met with implementers, steering committee, and various task and department groups. Additionally, I observed the management group meetings. On these occasions, my role was to provide team skill training.

While affiliated with the University and affected by some of the same fiscal circumstances, this organization was a stand-alone operation with its own budget and administration. The mission of Outreach Education is to aid people throughout the community and beyond in enhancing their careers, improving professional competencies, and enriching personal lives through university-level education and training. At the time of the study (1993), Outreach Education enrolled 12,000-15,000 students annually in both degreed and non-degreed programs and served four surrounding counties, reaching over 10,000 residents through its various publications. Regular staff employees numbered 65-75, and the unit had three levels of management: dean, directors, and supervisors.

Veterans Hospital

The third organization was a Veterans Hospital located in the northwestern United States. My acquaintance with this organization was through a contact who had done other projects with the Veterans Administration (VA). The hospital agreed to participate in the study in order to gather some insight into its new quality program; however there was no long-term consulting arrangement between the hospital and me. VA medical centers serve a specific regional population of eligible veterans. The VA is also involved in the training of physicians and nurses and provides facilities for medical research to the affiliated medical school. This VA facility is a mid-sized hospital (121 beds) with nearly 90,000 outpatient visits per year. Services to veterans include primary medical, emergency, and psychiatric care; social work; and pharmaceutical, dietetics, physical, and respiratory therapy.

Messaging Technology

The fourth site was a technology firm. Messaging Tech (MT), which has been publicly traded on the NASDAQ National Market since 1990, is situated in a small west coast community near a large metropolitan area. As with the VA hospital, my relationship was limited to activities associated with collection of the data for this study over a relatively short period of time. MT agreed to the research project in order to gain some needed insight into employee reactions to the quality program. Founded in 1977 by a group of engineers, MT produces digital signal-processing equipment for the professional audio industry. MT markets widely to national and international customers. Financially, MT had experienced a recent downturn in the two years prior to data collection. Net sales had decreased by more than 30%; the company's net loss was $5.7 million. Within a year before data collection, the company reduced its workforce from 165 to 130 employees (some attrition was accomplished through generous incentive packages). At t he time data were gathered (1993), MT employed 130 people. The formal structure of MT includes three levels of management: 3 officers at the top level, 17 directors and managers, and S-S front-line supervisors.

Quality Programs in the Four Cases

Quality improvement programs are increasingly common in business, industry, government agencies, and even academia. As Spencer (1994) notes, "During the past few years, American managers have been inundated with articles, books, and seminars describing the 'quality revolution"'(p. 446). Dean and Bowen (1994) identify the three key principles of Total Quality: a customer focus, continuous improvement, and teamwork. Both the prevalence of Total Quality programs in organizations and the common difficulties encountered in their implementation make them particularly intriguing to study. The programs at each of these four organizations had as their mission improving service and/or products to internal and external customers. All had some form of cross-functional problem-solving teams and aimed, at least in part, to improve staff morale through empowerment, increase participation in decision-making, and increase access to management. Further, all of the organizations used similar popular press publications in desig ning their quality programs (e.g.. Crosby, 1979; Deming, 1986; Juran, 1989).

At Outreach Education, the Veterans Hospital, and Messaging Technology, the quality programs were initiated and implemented from the "top down." High-level managers decided to adopt a quality program and assigned individuals within the organization to implement it. At University Services, a manager of one department initiated the idea and, with permission from his superiors, created a task force of employees (from across levels in the organization) to implement the program. Top management supported the program with resources (e.g., staff release time, clerical support, and a small budget).

The following sections describe each of the programs' characteristics (summarized in Table 1), implementation activities (summarized in Table 2), and key events that served as turning points.

PACT at University Services

The University Services quality program grew out of a customer service and team building in-service training. One of the department directors developed the concept of PACT (Progress through Action, Communication, and Teamwork) that was initially aimed at identifying and proactively seeking solutions to problems affecting all the departments, such as low morale, communication breakdown, and inefficient processes. This "innovation champion" (Kanter, 1983) often invoked Total Quality principles in promoting PACT, and although few formal TQM techniques were ever employed by the PACT implementers, the philosophy was strongly embraced and the "Quality" language was often used in printed materials. The PACT concept was approved by the chief administrative officer of University Services and granted a small operating budget.

A PACT Task Force, made up of representatives from each department, was established. The PACT FLASH, a newsletter concerning PACT's efforts and general issues of concern to University Services, was published periodically beginning with the first semester of PACT's existence. The FLASH was put together by volunteers from two departments and included contributions from the administration and PACT committee members, and "letters to the Editor." Several subcommittees were created around general goals (e.g., increasing social opportunities, increasing recognition, increasing communication among departments, assessing and diagnosing issues and problems, and training). The first year's anniversary edition of the FLASH listed a number of accomplishments including a number of public relations events, social functions, training sessions, and the communication audits of four of the departments conducted by Communication undergraduates.

At the end of this study, the PACT Task Force continued to exist with a small but fairly stable membership and focused mostly on social and morale-building events. The sub-committee structure was abandoned due to lack of regular meetings and lack of interest by volunteers. The major planned events of the year after initiation of the program were the Christmas Party and the University Services Town Hall Meeting. The Town Hall Meeting, a mandatory event for all University Services employees, came on the heels of an announcement that Printing and Reprographics was being cut and so had a negative effect on morale.

CQI at Outreach Education

The Continuous Quality Improvement (CQI) effort at Outreach Education was born out of the energy and commitment of its own "innovation champion," the Assistant to the Dean of Outreach Education. This individual saw a need to boost morale and solve problems in the organization and felt that a quality program would be a vehicle to those ends. In the first stage of CQI, Outreach Education set up two cross-functional committees--the Customer Service Group and the Computer User Group--to address issues of concern across the organization. After weeks of lengthy meetings, the Customer Service Group generated a list of brief, vaguely worded recommendations (e.g., "staff meetings," "empowerment," "reviewing deadlines/refund policies," "class organizers need to be more well informed," and "software training"). The Computer User Group was established to provide planning and guidance in maintaining and upgrading computer software and hardware that the organization relied upon for marketing, class enrollment records, fin ancial record-keeping, and administration. This group, too, developed lists of problems and attempted to develop short-term and long-term goals to address those problems (e.g., "training of staff," "database development," "hiring a systems analyst"). Later in the program's first year, the senior management team established four cross-functional teams (CFTs) and a steering committee, developed a CQI mission statement, and inaugurated regular monthly all-staff meetings. Accomplishments of the CFTs by late in the second year of the program included creating a master event planner and a new employee handbook, presenting customer service and team facilitation training and initiating organizer training, revising the instructor manual, upgrading micro hardware, developing an upward evaluation mechanism, and reviewing and revising the organizer system. The senior managers had also begun to engage in strategic planning.

At Outreach Education, the frequency of Steering Committee meetings lessened in the later part of the second year, and the members expressed a feeling that they lacked purpose. In fact, some suggested that the committee disband. After discussion, the committee decided to continue and take on the additional task of creating ways of rewarding and recognizing the members of various CFTs. One respondent's remarks concerning the purpose of CQI captures the sense of apathy well:

Work is work. I do my job to the best of my ability and like to see others do the same. We're all human beings and some days are better than others. Maybe this theory works, maybe it doesn't. My guess is nobody really cares.

Another respondent commented on CQI's stagnation: "CQI started out with a bang--since then it's slowly phasing out. Many found CQI to be too time consuming. A lot of time spent in meetings and not enough work getting done."

In terms of the accomplishments of CQI at Outreach Education, there seemed to be a widely shared perspective that CQI was in the phase of promising a lot and not producing many observable outcomes. Some expressed a great deal of anticipation for the outcomes; others seemed discouraged and skeptical at this state of affairs. Several also reported a concern that CQI wasn't going to accomplish anything for all of the effort put into it. Some were concerned that it might be discontinued. Another common concern was that managers would not change their interaction styles (which seemed to many of the staff to be a chief goal of CQI). One respondent noted how frustrating it is to be asked to generate problems and solutions and then not be empowered to act on them. This sense of frustration may relate to a common problem of Quality programs in general. Also, there was a common perception that many Outreach Education staff were neither enthusiastic about CQI nor strongly opposed, but rather adopted a "wait and see" at titude. It seems, at best, many staff think it would be a good idea if "someone" would make it work.

FIRM System at Veterans Hospital

The VA hospital that participated in this research project inaugurated the FIRM System approximately three years prior to my contact with it. Medical Firm systems were first created in Great Britain based on law firms. The purpose in medical centers was to increase continuity between providers and consumers of care. FIRM is not an acronym; the letters do not stand for anything. The FIRM System was prompted by several factors arising externally and internally to this VA facility. First, throughout the United States the increasing trend towards emphasizing primary care was clear. President Clinton's proposals for health care reform signaled that the direction of health care initiatives in this country would be focused on providing cost-effective, preventive primary care. The Department of Veterans Affairs had committed itself to participate with excellence in the reformed environment and therefore had strong motivation to transform itself from an in-patient-centered, specialty services orientation to a patient -centered, primary-care-based health care system.

The immediate environmental pressures at this particular VA facility that encouraged the FIRM System were described in initial problem statements by implementers of the new system: (a) fragmented primary care services, (b) no continuity between care team and phone triage, (c) no ambulatory experience for medical students, (d) poor resident supervision, (e) patient abuse of system (e.g., taking advantage of discontinuity of providers by soliciting prescription drugs from several different doctors), (f) lack of continuity between scheduling and clinic staff. Some of the problems that had contributed to a lack of continuity in care (i.e., patients not seeing the same medical care givers over time) were attributable to the rotational coverage of nursing, clerical, and other functions. Clinician continuity was disrupted when unscheduled visits (which made up 31% of out-patient visits) or staff schedule changes occurred. These problems caused a lack of attention to needed follow-ups, inappropriate or inefficient u se of the system, breakdowns in health care plans, and dissatisfaction of patients and staff. Patients complained about poor telephone access to health care offices, poor dissemination of information regarding new services, difficulty in getting appointments, and long waits in reception and in examination rooms.

The northwest VA facility that took part in this research project drew heavily from TQM principles in implementing a FIRM System, incorporating a primary focus on the customer (i.e., patient), the team orientation, and the use of statistical analytic tools. Initial launching activities of the FIRM System included choosing a FIRM "champion" and a planning associate, delineating the FIRM organizational structure, and establishing policies and procedures. The planning of the FIRM System at this VA facility took approximately nine months.

A "Firmeister" served as the innovation champion who aided coordination, trouble-shooting, cheerleading and planning. A proposal for staffing FIRMs was prepared, carefully outlining the specialists, clinicians, and clerks who would provide services. Once the FIRMs were established (Red Team, Blue Team, Gold Team) and physically located in specified areas in the facility, each patient was assigned to a team and received all future care from it. Decentralization of phone triage took place at this point during implementation, making the individual teams responsible for their own patient scheduling and central reception responsible for walk-ins and patients unsure of their team assignment. When continuity of care, quality of care, patient satisfaction, and staff satisfaction were assessed one year after implementation of the FIRM System, all had improved. Still, there was a feeling among many staff that the program had stalled out in progress toward new goals.

Of the four programs I studied, the FIRM System was perceived as most successful by its members. However, although interviewees predicted that the FIRM system would continue in its present form, most were highly skeptical as to any further progress on other long-term goals that it had initially embraced. For example, several expressed the desire to see the FIRM system expanded to include in-patient care. However, the tremendous logistical problems that such a move would present would require strong committed leaders to resolve. Overall, individuals suspected that the innovativeness of the program had reached its peak and that the new leadership would not likely pick up and run with more ideas.

Quality First at Messaging Technology

Quality First was created and initially implemented at Messaging Technology (MT) three years prior to data collection in response to extreme pressure from customers and potential customers to document quality products and procedures--reflected in the Malcolm Baldrige Award and the ISO 9000. Trouble that MT experienced in servicing some large organizations in a timely fashion resulted in near loss of those accounts. MT's customers increasingly viewed the quality programs of suppliers as important indicators of efficiency and assurance of product reliability. MT was considering applying for the Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Award, an important seal of approval in this industry, which is given only after a rigorous review of an organization's operating procedures, quality program, and extensive documentation of all steps taken to ensure quality in products and service. In addition, another set of quality criteria (ISO 9000) was rumored to become a requirement for organizations in this industry in order to p articipate in European markets.

A second but still significant motivator in the development of Quality First was the low morale and strong concerns of a majority of MT's staff. What is now referred to as the "employee revolt" took the form of a protest of many employees concerning poor supervision, poor management style, poor service of internal customers, lack of interdepartmental communication, and high degree of turnover. After employee complaints were lodged with senior management, the solution, in part, to these concerns was embodied in Quality First. This program's philosophy reflected the dual goals of solving quality issues and addressing the low staff morale. Quality First explicitly used the statistical and analytic tools developed as a part of Continuous Quality Improvement programs (Juran, 1989). The Quality First program was committed to systematic problem-solving in which analysis of problems would be based on numerical data. Quality First also emphasized teamwork and communication.

Activities to launch Quality First at MT included a series of company-wide training sessions on the concepts, tools, and principles of Total Quality Management: communication of the mission and vision statements to all employees; and the training of a number of "Quality Specialists" who were used to help facilitate meetings that used the new Total Quality tools and problem-solving methods. In addition three teams were created and each given a charge that arose from the list of employee concerns developed during the "revolt." In addition to these formal teams, a number of departmental teams were created to use the Quality First method and philosophy to solve problems within their own units.

At the time the data for this study were collected, there was a reported feeling that things had improved at MT, but more progress on major issues was needed. The program appeared to be stalled. Having completed initial training activities, the handful of committees and the steering committee had little sense of purpose. The steering committee met infrequently and members expressed confusion as to their charge. The communication committee was ready to disband at the time I was introduced to the organization (three years after the program's initiation) since their major task of developing an upward appraisal system was accomplished. The other two committees continued to meet infrequently. An interviewee at Messaging Technology summed up this "plateau phase" well with this comment, "We are not continuing to enforce or keep it alive, it's kind of fading." Relatedly, several interview participants pointed out that few people were actively promoting it. They admitted that "no one actively dislikes it," but few dem onstrated great enthusiasm for it.

End of the Stories

Towards the end of my contact with each of the four organizations, there existed a predominant perception that no one was sure what should take place next, who would take the lead, or what the exact goals were. It appears that in each of these organizations, an initial set of needs clearly indicated the need for some quality improvement. However, once structures for change (e.g., setting up committees, procedural rules, guidelines, mission statements, goal statements, and communicative structures) were created and put into motion, and some initial accomplishments made, the members of the organizations seemed to lose either faith in the program, energy to devote to the program, a sense of purpose for the program, or all three. This "crisis of direction and commitment" led University Services and the VA hospital to a change in leadership which further increased fears that the program had peaked and would now be abandoned. In Outreach Education and Messaging Technology, attention to these programs was so low th at they appeared to be disintegrating.

Communication Practices: Key Themes

Implementers of change clearly see communication as a significantly challenging aspect of change. Data collected from 89 implementers of planned change programs found that "among those examined, problems centrally concerned with communication rank among the most problematic in implementers' hindsight" (Lewis, 2000, p. 63). Lewis's study also revealed that implementers have difficulty predicting exactly how problematic communication will be. She found that implementers both underpredict and over-predict the frequency with which they will encounter problems with communicating goals, communicating vision, and communicating implementation information.

In the cases presented here, communication played a key role in bringing about both positive and negative outcomes. Implementers struggled with problems related to creating and communicating vision, sensemaking and feedback, establishing legitimacy, and communicating about goal achievement.

Creating and Communicating Vision

Several authors in the planned change literature have noted the importance of vision and motivation (Fairhurst, 1993; Ford & Ford, 1995; King, 1974). Ford and Ford (1995) argue that one of the key breakdowns in planned change efforts is the "failure to create a shared understanding among participants to produce a clear statement of the conditions of satisfaction for the change" (p. 557). Reger, Gustafson, Demarie, and Mullane (1994) argue that a "vision" must be not only created but also framed in such a way as to avoid being too radical: "change should proceed through mid-range modifications that motivate the organization to change; it should not be so radical that organizational members either fail to comprehend the change or perceive it to be unacceptable" (p. 566).

Fairhurst (1993) noted the importance of "grass-roots" involvement in creating and promoting a vision for organizational change programs. In an analysis of an organization implementing a Total Quality program, she highlighted how leaders may fail to serve as good resources for organizational members in providing information that would help them make sense of the vision or reduce conflict. "As such, the discourse gives us a unique look as to how visions may be cast aside. Specifically, it does not appear that individuals abandon the vision in a single, momentous decision. Rather, it takes place in a series of interactional moments where a specific problem at a specific point in time is poorly addressed" (p. 365). One implication of her findings may be that vision is communicated as much in daily informal interactions among organizational members as in formal "organized" informational campaigns (Fairhurst, 1993).

The struggle to create and communicate vision is evidenced in the stories of the four organizations I have studied.

The first task of the CQI Steering Committee at Outreach Education was to develop a statement of its own charge and purpose. After each member contributed ideas and their own drafts, the committee developed the following statement:

The Steering Committee's charge is to facilitate a process for change that results in empowered cross-functional teams (CFTs) who work together with the Dean, The Management Team, and the entire organization to achieve the goals established for Outreach Education. The Steering Committee serves as the primary communication and coordination link among these entities and provides guidance on expectations and time lines for the CFTs while continuously soliciting input from all staff.

Employees at Outreach Education responded to this mission statement with a fair degree of indifference. Presentation of the statements at a general all-staff meeting generated little discussion. While they did not seem to spark controversy, neither did they seem to greatly decrease employees' uncertainty about the general purpose of the program. In fact, there was little consensus among employees regarding the goals of the program. While many noted improved communication, some felt the more general goal was to improve the efficiency of the organization and improve customer service, while others felt the paramount goal was to improve staff morale by improving inadequate managerial practices.

It appears that this is a good example of a failed effort to communicate. Employees were neither inspired nor informed by this statement or its presentation. While the intent to rally the troops around a common set of goals was praiseworthy, the communication that was executed to accomplish this intent failed to bring about the desired result. The change program suffered from a lack of direction that could have been avoided had a sense of purpose been created from the beginning. The later lack of direction and commitment experienced by employees of this organization certainly had some relationship to the poor beginning in establishing vision. A mission statement that crystallized the purpose of the program and inspired participation by the employees could have launched the program with the strong enthusiastic support and energy it needed.

In contrast, more enthusiasm and energy resulted from Messaging Technology's efforts to establish a mission. This organization expended a significant amount of energy in creating and publicizing mission, vision, goal, and objective statements. This program's philosophy reflected the dual goals of solving quality issues and addressing the low staff morale:

The objectives of our Quality First program are simply stated as: (1) To ensure that Messaging Technology employees provide our external and internal customers with innovative products and services that fully satisfy their existing and potential requirements. (2) To establish as a way of life, management and work practices that enable all MT employees to pursue continuous quality improvement in meeting customer requirements. This will require throughout MT, visibly supportive management practices which establish clear, consistent objectives and create an environment of openness, trust, respect, discipline and patience.

A "Quality Policy," Mission Statement, Vision Statement, and Values Statement were created, printed, and displayed throughout meeting rooms and elsewhere in the organization. It appeared that the frequency of exposure to these statements and the prevalence of them in the workplace aided employees' understandings and internalization of the values of the program. Unlike the Outreach Education employees, MT employees were much more uniform in expressing the purpose of the program as improvement of the quality of the final products by improving problem-solving procedures. In this case, it appears that the presentation of the statement was as important as the qualities of the content. The statements were consistently used and displayed and the management group continued to refer to them and use them as a basis for decision-making. Employees observed these statements as having force in the organization. This both reinforced the messages themselves as well as the meanings behind them. Additionally, the mission stat ement of MT's program was constructed to address desirable outcomes whereas Outreach Education's mission statement read more like a job description for the Steering Committee. The MT statement provided a more meaningful vision for employees. It gave a true picture of what the organization wanted to be like. That appeared to be more successful in instilling a sense of commitment to the program for the employees--at least initially. However, these cases also illustrate that a strong mission statement alone is not enough to guarantee the sustained commitment to a new change initiative. While MT provided a strong beginning by creating buy-in to the mission of the new program, the company wasn't able to sustain it. The lesson here may be that a reinvigorated campaign that continues to grow and develop with a planned change program is necessary for ultimate success.

Sensemaking and Feedback

Both sensemaking about the mission and giving feedback to implementers were problematic in these organizations. In several instances, there is evidence that lower-level employees developed their own "theories" about the purposes of the quality programs in their organizations. These organizational members expressed doubt about the espoused purposes of the programs communicated to them by implementers. Reger, Gustafson, Demarie, and Mullane (1994) suggest that this skepticism is not rare: "organizational members are active 'framers' as they attempt to make sense of change using cognitive frameworks that may or may not match those of upper managers. . . . In sum, the literature suggests that framing occurs at all organizational levels" (p. 568).

At University Services one respondent replied to the questionnaire item asking about the purpose of the PACT program this way: "I think PACT is a waste of time, so that means money being wasted for a group of people to get together and talk." An Outreach Education employee was even more negative: "Initially, I felt this CQI was more of an attempt by the business to eliminate the need for managers by having CFTs solve problems normally handled by management. Thus increasing our work load under the guise of giving workers more to say in the running of Outreach Education." An employee at the VA hospital simply wrote "Political" in an apparent reference to the motivation of the implementers who forwarded the FIRM plan. Finally, at Messaging Technology an interview respondent explained different theories of QF, "There are a couple of camps, . . . some think QF is beneficial, to others it is eye wash to the customers and a waste of time . . . what's it do for me?"

All of these examples point to the potential of lower-level employees to reframe implementers' visions for planned change. While each organization attempted to formally frame the purpose of the program with documents, statements, memos, and announcements, each individual employee had opportunities to reconstruct the "vision" as he/she saw fit. Those reconstructions became competing or sometimes complementary notions of the vision. When such restatements of vision become problematic, implementers need to find ways to reinforce or reinvent their "vision communication." None of these organizations ever devised a campaign to reinvigorate the purpose and mission of its program. This failure may have contributed to the stalling out of each of the programs.

Feedback was also problematic for these organizations. Feedback gathering from employees concerning implementation issues serves an important evaluative function for organizational leaders. Additionally, it may be important to provide channels and opportunities for employees to gather feedback about their own participation in change programs. Research reveals that feedback serves a number of needs for individuals and for organizations including improving performance, reducing uncertainty, enhancing self-image, and managing self presentation goals (Ashford & Cummings, 1983).

In these organizations, feedback gathering was minimal and generally informal. Little was done in these organizations to collect information about how individuals were learning new roles, interpreting program goals, or reacting to changes in work. Aside from the data provided by my investigation focusing on communication issues, three of the four organizations did no systematic review of goal achievement or employee responses to the changes. The VA hospital conducted systematic measurement of program goals but did little to investigate the responses of employees to the new program. While the reports I provided these organizations made observations and reported common issues and complaints, my reports were not formal program evaluations. To my knowledge, none of the organizations created mechanisms to give employees feedback on their performance in the program. Employees were not coached to improve team skills, decision-making skills, or quality knowledge. The lack of clear markers (or rewards) for mastery of these skills and knowledge may have contributed to lack of enthusiasm for participating. It certainly inhibited the mastery of new roles for many employees. The VA hospital did incorporate work evaluation with the team structure and so was able to manage the "feedback" problem more effectively. However, the hospital did little to create new structures that would provide feedback on new skills required in the new work arrangement.

One reason that feedback systems can be so important during change efforts is to channel resistance to change efforts. Resistance can be beneficial to organizations "by preventing the installation of systems whose use might have on-going negative consequences" (e.g., stress, turnover, reduced performance; Markus, 1983, p. 431). Resistance that is uncritically opposed by implementers or ignored by leaders can lead to unproductive cycles of formal and informal power battles. Implementers who devise ways to listen to confused, disenchanted, disgruntled, and unconvinced employees may benefit from their perspectives. Evidence points to the importance of grass roots campaigns of low-level employees in either promoting or demoting planned change (Fairhurst, 1993; Lewis & Seibold, 1993, 1996). "Listening systems" that create two-way evaluation and feedback channels are likely to provide opportunities to re-vitalize dying change programs or reinvent poorly operationalized programs.

Establishing Legitimacy

While implementers at all the organizations in this study struggled to communicate a vision for their planned change programs, in some cases implementers also determined a need to "prove" the legitimacy of the program to important stakeholders. Communication channels were used to do this. A prime example of the legitimacy problem arose at University Services. Because PACT was a bottom-up program (created by employees and "sold" to management) at University Services, it was important to establish legitimacy of the program in the eyes of University Services employees and in the eyes of managers and upper-level decision makers. PACT's champion used the FLASH newsletter as the communicative vehicle to accomplish this. A series of letters to the editor was created by the editor of the newsletter (and presented as if they were genuine letters from readers) to begin a discussion of issues he felt staff should discuss and management should address. This was an attempt to make FLASH a key communicative vehicle for the organization and establish PACT as a lightning rod for change in the organization. Some Letters read as follows:

PACT people: You know, all of this TQM and teamwork and all that only goes so far. Sure, I'm willing to put in my eight hours, and then some, but superficial kudos and more efficient production and all that doesn't pay my bills! ... It seems that in these times of budget woes for the State I'm giving way more than I'm taking. ... why should I do extra to make things better for everyone else[?] ... what's in it for me?

I realize that things can change, but the bottom line is that I have a job to do and if I don't have the authority to instill discipline in my employees, then anarchy will result and I'll get the blame. I'm all for getting input on some issues but the buck stops at my desk. ... Signed, Buck Stopper.

Dear PACT: Haven't you got the cart before the horse? All this lip service to delegating authority and responsibility to the workers like me sounds good in theory. I've been saying for years that we're the ones who know what's going on. But am I going to get more money out of this? ... If I have more responsibility, I expect C.O.D. (Collect on Delivery). Signed, Cash N Carry.

Dear Editor: I like the idea of the University Services Award of Excellence and other ideas [PACT] might have about non-monetary rewards, and I don't mean to complain, but I have to say one thing. You get what you pay for. Seriously, why should I maintain my efficiency and quality of service provided; let alone increase them? If my department, or the University, or the legislature or the taxpayers are not willing to pay for my (and my fellow workers') services, why should I maintain my level of service? Signed, Anonymous.

The letters ironically revealed a legitimacy problem that PACT faced. As the bottom-line sentiments expressed by these (fictitious) letters suggest, many of the problems in this organization related to large strategic, budgetary, or leadership issues, none of which PACT was empowered to directly address. These letters tended to underscore the major stumbling block for the PACT task force: many of the problems in inefficiency, lack of morale, and lack of supportive management were perceived to be caused by the bleak financial situation of the University. The task force members often seemed to be distracted and frustrated by the reality that nothing they could do would directly affect that situation. Many in the task force appeared to feel that the purpose of PACT was to help compensate for what was not, or could not, be done regarding the reality of budgets, staffing problems, and pay cuts. Whether individuals in University Services really held the concerns stated in the letters and lacked enthusiasm for PACT because of them, or whether that impression was manufactured through the production and publication of these letters is uncertain. However, it is likely that the content of these letters affected PACT's fate and its apparent failure to establish legitimacy.

The problem created by this use of FLASH was exacerbated when the Vice Chancellor for University Services read these letters in the newsletter and asked if he could respond to the last one in particular. The Vice Chancellor's response to the letter by "anonymous," given in the apparent belief that it was a genuine letter, does not mention the role of PACT in aiding University Services to weather the fiscal storm, but rather focuses on issues that have little to do with resources, policies, or interventions that could be directly affected by PACT:

Who, then, is responsible for the temporary pay cut? (1) the State ... is going broke; the State's revenues aren't enough to cover its costs; (2) structurally, the State government only has discretionary control over a small portion of the budget.... What, then, are we to do?... There are steps we can take to improve communication and the working environment: (1) The Chancellor, Executive Vice Chancellor and others will produce a series of statements to keep the campus community up to date on the fluid ... budget situation and plans; (2) a series of town-hall budget forums will be held on campus to inform and listen to concerns; ... (4) Supervisors and managers will be encouraged to identify in their units ways to improve the quality of campus work life (e.g., flexible schedules, greater employee participation in work assignments, deadlines, plans, etc.).

Additionally, none of the accomplishments listed in the first year's Anniversary Edition of the FLASH--a number of public relations events, social functions, trainings, and the communication audit of four of the departments by Communication undergraduates--could be convincingly connected to the issues which dominated the letters to the FLASH Editor. This seeming lack of connection between the issues that were attributed to employees as important and salient ones and the accomplishments of PACT may have contributed to what became a severe curtailing of the ambitions of the task force. Thus, the Editor of the newsletter and champion of the PACT program managed to damage the legitimacy of the program in an attempt to gain attention and stimulate communication about the program and its goals.

Communicating Goal Achievements

Dean and Bowen (1994) suggest that the definition of "quality" and thus the mission of the program is often ambiguous to the users of quality programs. They argue that "despite thousands of articles in the business and trade press, total quality remains a hazy, ambiguous concept" (p. 394). This definitional issue became relevant when organizational members attempted to assess and demonstrate the achievements of their quality programs to internal and external audiences. In each organization, implementers struggled with how to publicize what they perceived as positive results of their programs. The implementers learned over time that the success of the program depended, in large part, on the perception among employees that it was accomplishing something.

Different methods were used by implementers to publicize accomplishments. At University Services, the PACT FLASH, an internal newsletter to all University Services employees, served as the public relations tool. Although its initial purpose was to increase communication among departments, it eventually was dominated with news of what PACT was accomplishing. Some informants apparently judged PACT largely on what they saw in the FLASH. A respondent commented that the FLASH was the only "real" change that PACT had brought about. During a lull in publication of the FLASH, one respondent commented, "Since we don't receive the PACT FLASH anymore--the newsletter that kept you somewhat abreast of what PACT was about or was trying to do, I feel like I can't answer any of the above questions [on the questionnaire]."

The Outreach Education's Dean's Assistant used large portions of the monthly staff meetings to publicize the accomplishments and progress of CQI committees. While this emphasized what goals had been accomplished, it also tended to remind other employees of how long achieving a goal took. For example, for a few months in a row one committee reported on the progress, or lack of success, of getting a sign on the building. Such publicity may have added to the frustration experienced at this organization, that little was produced by all of the meetings in which they and their coworkers were participating.

University Services, Outreach Education, and Messaging Technology tried to publicize accomplishments, and most informants in these organizations noted that while they agreed with the goals of the programs, they were frustrated that progress towards achievement was slow or non-existent. The VA hospital used few formal channels to inform employees of the achievement of stated goals, and yet most reported a strong sense that goals had been accomplished. The difference appears to be that the VA employees could see the results of the program in their own work. As one VA employee put it, "I'm very pleased with the outcomes of the FIRM system mostly due to giving more personalized care to veterans who are appreciative since implementation of the FIRMs, which [arrow up] my satisfaction. It has been a very positive change." Another respondent praised the implementation at the VA: "They [implementers] had a positive approach to everyone. A 'can do' attitude created success with administrative support and creativity! I have seen many positive changes in the quality of care!" Still another noted the contrast between before and after implementation: "I really used to hate my job.... I was frustrated.... now I feel like I have an impact."

In contrast, an employee at Messaging Technology demonstrates the reaction from those who do not see direct impacts from the Quality First program: "the QF program has, at least apparently, had almost zero impact on the areas in which I work." Another stated, "people need incentives to participate. . . . they don't see that it makes changes." A similar reaction is noted by University Services employees: "PACT has been a non-issue in my daily working environment." "I have never felt that PACT had any impact on day-to-day conduct of business or was intended to do so." Interestingly, at Messaging Technology several interviewees perceived that the Quality First program had not been appropriately credited for its accomplishments. As one respondent put it, "I don't know that people in the company associate the changes in the company with the QF program. ... The QF program doesn't label the changes and so people don't attribute changes accurately and therefore don't value QF as much as it deserves."

Part of determining goal achievement, of course, is recognizing the means to measure the original goal. The Quality First strategic plan at Messaging Technology did present a host of goals and expected results for each year. However, the expected results were often stated in highly subjective terms. For example, "the problem solving process is being consistently used by employees as a part of process improvement teams" and "trained senior managers are viewed as role models for their management practices" were two results expected at the end of the first year. There is little in the document that specifies how implementers would be able to tell when such goals had been achieved. As one interviewee put it, "philosophy is fine, but we need to get into the nuts and bolts of quality." In contrast, the FIRM System specified quantifiable measures that would be used to determine if goals such as continuity of care and patient responsiveness to systems had been met. This practice of specifying and measuring desired o utcomes may have contributed to the overall feeling among VA employees that they had truly accomplished something.

Conclusions

Creating vision, maintaining buy-in to mission, sense-making and feedback, establishing legitimacy, and communicating goal achievement have been seen to be keys to maintaining commitment to these change programs. In some of the cases (University Services, Outreach Education) a lack of organization and planning appeared to contribute to difficulty in maintaining a clear picture, in the minds of employees, of the program goals and a belief that they were being achieved. At others (VA hospital, Messaging Technology) extensive initial planning was present, but little was done to reinvigorate interest and value of the program as time went on. Failures in communication contributed to these stalled and/or failed programs of change.

Concerning vision and planning, Beer and Walton (1987) point out, "even managers have a hard time following grand plans . . . and must sometimes be out of control. Change is not brought about by following a grand master plan but by continually readjusting direction and goals" (p. 356). These cases suggest that viewing goal and vision development in a more procedural and "organic" (Beer & Walton, 1987) sense may provide a better guidepost for researchers to identify important behaviors involved in establishing vision. Vision is not a creation born on one momentous occasion (Fairhurst, 1993), but evolves slowly--perhaps punctuated by moments of critical significance. It would be wise for practitioners to recognize this evolutionary nature of mission development and goal achievement as well. Employees need to have such messages reinforced over time. There may even be a need to re-design mission statements as the purpose of a program becomes out-dated or informally is reconstructed in the minds of employees to h old a negative connotation.

Covin and Kilmann (1990) suggest that it is critical to communicate information (e.g., mission statements and goal achievement status) during change. They found that "failure to share information or to inform people adequately of what changes are necessary and why they are necessary [was] viewed as having a highly negative impact" (p. 239). In the cases presented in this study, various formal channels were used to inform employees about planned changes. In all four cases, documents were created. However, the extent to which these documents were circulated and re-visited throughout the implementation varied. At University Services, FLASH was the key written mode of communication about the program and came to be closely identified with what was going on. Other organizations used staff meetings, organization-wide training, or small group meetings to inform employees about the change efforts.

These are not atypical of the channels used to communicate implementation information. Lewis (1999) found that general informational meetings and small informal discussions are the most common channels for disseminating information regarding change; line supervisors were rarely used. Several authors have noted the potential power of using line supervisors to communicate information to employees (Baronas & Louis, 1988; Larkin & Larkin, 1994; Argote, Goodman, & Schkade, 1983). These authors believe that line supervisors play a significant role in affecting the attitudes of employees toward change initiatives. Supervisors influence the opinions of their directly reporting subordinates and are best positioned to translate major change initiatives into everyday realities for employees. Had line supervisors been used in these organizations as a key component of implementation efforts, perhaps some problems in disseminating and reinforcing goal and vision information, gaining and giving feedback, and in maintaining high levels of commitment to the programs could have been avoided.

Organizational scholars have long acknowledged the importance of communication processes in explanations of organizational change processes (Albrecht & Ropp, 1984; Fairhurst & Wendt, 1993; Fulk, Schmitz, & Steinfield, 1990; Lewis & Seibold, 1993, 1996; Rogers, 1995; Van de Ven, Angle, & Poole, 1989). However, their efforts primarily have focused on the invention, design, adoption, and responses to planned organizational change, as well as outcomes of change efforts. Central communication processes involved in the implementation of planned changes within organizations have received far less attention by communication scholars, as Lewis and Seibold (1998) note:

there are few systematic empirical studies of specific activities that implementers utilize. Studies rarely concentrate on implementers' actual actions in installing planned change programs such as the formation of implementation teams, goal setting, presentation of written documents concerning the change, training methods used in preparing users for change, means of gathering feedback and monitoring change responses, practices of incorporating change agents and opinion leaders, negotiation of the parameters of change programs, and assessment of change efforts. (p. 124)

Lewis and Seibold (1998) propose that a communication perspective on implementation would intensify focus on the specific activities that implementers use; provide data about why implementers choose the "strategies" or activities they choose, or if they are even conscious of their "strategy" choices; and likely offer a more dynamic perspective that highlights the active agency of all organizational members during implementation--including "reinvention" (Rice & Rogers, 1980), "modification" (Lewis & Seibold, 1993), and resistance. These case analyses embrace these recommendations by focusing on communication, highlighting specific tactics and strategies used to introduce and encourage utilization of four quality programs, and drawing on the perspectives of multiple levels of users within these organizations. More research which details these specifics and which addresses questions of how change is communicated, by whom, and with what results is needed. Specifically, I recommend the following three research to pics be addressed in future work. First, how is vision created by implementers and lower-level employees during a planned change? This will be crucial to understanding how change programs come to have a purpose in organizations and gain the commitment of important players. Until the importance of mission statements, vision statements, goal statements, plans for implementation, and channels used to disseminate them are understood, it will be difficult to assess the usefulness of formal communication about planned change programs. Practitioners will continue to be in need of advice about what to communicate, when, to whom and through what channels. Such systematic research about the relative effectiveness of communication strategies about change is scant.

Second, questions related to the importance of informal communication about change programs and its impact on the formally communicated information would be insightful. We have enough evidence to date to suggest that receivers of formal change communication formulate their own ideas about what a change means and what its purposes might be. How such individual sensemaking at the level of the average employee comes to play into creating an identity for change initiatives and in determining their fates (e.g., in terms of commitments of employees to its success or failure) is still unknown. Research should focus on the sensemaking activities of lower-level and higher-level employees who receive implementation messages. How are these messages received and how are they altered as they circulate and recirculate in organizations? What factors of organizational structure, communication channel, source of message, and message strategies influence how they are received? These cases have illustrated that sometimes messag e strategies fail to be acknowledged, sometimes produce ironic results, and sometimes produce the intended result. What is less certain are the exact predictors of these outcomes. Systematic research which compares various means and styles of sensemaking about change will help reveal answers to these questions.

Third, perhaps most importantly is the question which asks the degree to which communication predicts the outcomes of change efforts. Some practitioners will suggest that communication is everything. Others will say that it is merely a tool to express ideas, and it is the quality of the ideas that counts. The degree to which communication successes or failures play a role in determining the fate of change programs will be important for practitioners to know. Should planning the communication about change be a critical part of any implementation effort? Should it be merely a component of a plan that focuses as much or more attention to structural, procedural, and personnel issues? We saw some evidence in these cases that communication, even if done well, does not guarantee continued good results. Perhaps communication failure is merely a correlate of poor planning and ill-conceived change programs. Perhaps it is not crucial. It seems from the accumulated evidence so far that this is not the case, but more exam ination of the relative contribution of communication dynamics during change initiatives is needed.

Laurie K. Lewis is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Communication Studies at the University of Texas at Austin.

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