The relationship between women corporate directors and women corporate officers.

Boards, investors, and researchers alike have long tried to quantify the distinct contributions that women directors offer to their boards. In what ways do women corporate directors, as a unique group, serve in the governance of large corporations? Yet few convincing answers have come forth.

Indeed, "a substantive case for women corporate directors has yet to materialize" (Bilimoria, 2000: 27; Burke, 2000). This is partly due to the difficulty researchers have had in isolating the impact of a single director, or a very small group of directors, on corporate performance, although recent studies have begun to make strides in this direction (e.g., Carter et al., 2003). As Juanita Kreps, a labor economist and an early woman director on numerous boards, noted in her speech, "Help! There's a Woman in the Boardroom," one woman on a board is not likely to change corporate policy (Mattis, 1993). It has also been difficult for researchers to find a measure of corporate performance that would be relevant to the specific contributions of women at the governance apex.

However, recent theoretical writings and descriptive studies (anecdotal accounts and survey reports) speculate that a specific area of impact, unique to women directors, can be identified and assessed: their impact on the gender composition of the top management team. By virtue of their position at the top of the corporate hierarchy, female directors may help keep the issues of recruitment, retention, development, and advancement of top women high on the executive team's agenda (Bilimoria and Wheeler, 2000; Mattis, 1993; Nation's Business, 1990; Schwartz, 1980). Their presence in positions of visible power and legitimacy may help break down the barriers that constrain top corporate women from effective representation and recognition. In these ways, the visible presence of women corporate directors may indirectly encourage and support women's effective representation in high-level corporate executive teams.

The present study investigates the proposition that women directors have positive effects on the gender composition of senior management by examining their impact on the number of women corporate officers, the number of women officers holding line jobs, the presence of a critical mass of women officers, the extent to which women officers hold powerful titles, and women officers' pay. The study contributes to extant literature on this topic by undertaking an empirical investigation of a previously theorized notion.

Hypotheses are developed in the next section, followed by discussions of the methodology employed and the results obtained. The concluding section provides a discussion of the implications of the findings for corporations interested in diversifying their top management teams, as well as the limitations of the research and future research directions.

The Institutional Impact of Women Corporate Directors

Institutional theory addresses the role of social influence processes on organizational actions, emphasizing the importance of organizational legitimacy, which represents the level of acceptance from the external environment (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 1987, 2001; Zucker, 1987). An institutional perspective has been used to explain the organization-level determinants of women in management; companies reap symbolic legitimacy advantages from high-level managerial women (Blum and Fields, 1994). As Daily and Dalton note, "women in strategic decision-making positions communicate that an organization is committed to the advancement of women at all levels" (2003: 8). Bilimoria (2000) argues that the mere presence of female corporate board directors signals to employees the value placed on, and the recognition for success achieved by, women in the corporation. This enhances the corporation's reputation of having a leadership culture that is friendly to women's careers and lives, one that facilitates their performance and advancement. It also offers the organization a competitive edge when it comes to recruiting and retaining talented women (cf., Kanter, 1977; Morrison et al., 1987). Through these symbolic processes, corporations gain legitimacy by incorporating women into their board structures and behaviors.

In addition, a particular type of institutional legitimacy that firms seek relates to their signals of corporate top management team diversity. Companies face mimetic, normative, and coercive institutional pressures (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991) to encourage gender diversity in their management ranks (Blum and Fields, 1994). Appointing women directors to the board offers a corporation a means of gaining legitimacy within its industry by signaling a broad corporate commitment to diversity. Previous research indicates that the presence of women corporate directors impresses stockholders and those members of the public who are concerned with issues of diversity in corporations (Burke, 1994b). Indeed, many chief executives say that maintaining a positive image with shareholders, and signaling the company's commitment to diversity, are among their top reasons for appointing women directors to their boards (Catalyst, 1995). And large institutional investor groups have voiced their concerns about the lack of women on certain corporate boards, arguing that board diversity creates positive benefits for the management of large corporations (cf. Bilimoria, 2000). Thus, by incorporating socially legitimated elements (women on their corporate boards), firms increase their institutional legitimacy and enhance their likely future successes (cf. Meyer and Rowan, 1977).

Other corporate governance research supports the beneficial institutional role of women corporate directors, especially for other women employees. Chief executives often say that having women on their boards makes female employees at the company generally feel more positive about their own career prospects (Burke, 1994a). About a third of the women directors surveyed in a 1993 Catalyst study felt that their presence alone had a specific and positive impact on the overall recruitment of women in the organization and the representation of senior women in management (Mattis, 1993).

In summary, the visible presence of women directors thus enhances a firm's legitimacy, especially among stakeholders interested in corporate diversity. It does so by indicating the institutional importance and success of women at the highest level in the corporation and signaling to female employees, investors, and the general public the existence of a corporate culture that is friendly to women's careers and lives, one that encourages their performance and advancement. These signals enhance the self-selection and retention of women top managers in organizations with such leadership, and encourage male executives to advance and retain talented women in the senior management ranks. Thus, firms with women directors gain institutional approval that increases their likelihood of attracting and retaining women in their executive ranks.

Much has already been written about the under-representation of women in corporate senior management, particularly with regard to the continued existence of a glass ceiling in the executive suite (Morrison et al., 1987; Daily et al., 1999). To measure the extent of gender diversity in the executive suite, five separate but related counts are relevant: the number of women corporate officers in the top management team, the number of women officers who hold line (operational contribution) positions, the presence of a critical mass of women in the executive ranks, the extent to which women hold influential titles, and women officers' pay. Each of these is briefly described below.

First, the total number of female officers is important to examine because this number reflects the degree to which corporate leaders are open to gender diversity at the highest executive echelons of their corporations. Second, the number of women officers who hold line positions can be a particularly good indicator of the representation of women at the highest ranks, because women executives are generally less likely to occupy positions in a company's line functions than they are in its staff functions. Organizations that foster the advancement and retention of women in these nontraditional positions may have workplace environments that are more open to the operational contributions of women.

Third, a critical mass of women in the executive ranks is important to investigate because its presence suggests that women are not being treated as token employees because of their disproportionately low representation and the relative lack of variation within their group (cf. Kanter, 1977). A critical mass of women in the senior management team (25% or more) serves as a measure of whether women are considered real, not token, contributors to the operations of the top executive team. While a percentage count of women members of the top management team yields general information about the extent to which openness to diversity exists at the top of a corporation, the existence of a critical mass of women executives puts a higher standard of compositional diversity on the company's senior management--it suggests that the top executives are cognizant that gender-based token dynamics are less likely in teams where a critical mass of women are present.

Fourth, the extent to which women officers hold influential or "clout" titles is another important measure of gender diversity in the top management team. When women hold significant titles within the top management team, it provides evidence of women's ascension to the highest corridors of corporate power and precludes the attribution of a viable glass ceiling. Finally, women officers' pay is a similarly powerful measure of corporate attention to gender diversity. The presence of women in corporate lists of the highest paid executives indicates that the company appropriately recognizes and values the contributions of its female officers. Not only do titles and pay have the effect of showcasing top female talent, they also provide institutional clues that gender diversity is valued throughout the company.

For the reasons mentioned earlier, the legitimacy signals provided by the presence of women corporate directors are likely to positively influence gender diversity at the highest corporate ranks through institutional approval from organizational stakeholders, self-selection and retention by women executives themselves, and encouragement of male corporate executives to promote and retain women officers. Thus, we would expect the following:</p> <pre> Hypothesis: The number of women directors

on a corporate board will be positively associated with the number of women officers, the number of women line officers, the presence of a critical mass of women among the top executive team, the number

of women officers holding high-ranking titles, and the number of women top corporate earners in that company. </pre> <p>METHODS

To determine the relationship between women directors and women officers, I undertook a series of linear and logistic regression tests on the companies in the 1999 Fortune 500 list using the following variables.

Independent and Dependent Variables

Data on the main independent variable, the total number of women directors, were collected from the Catalyst 1999 Census of Women Board Directors of the Fortune 1,000 (Catalyst, 1999). All data about women officers (the dependent variables) were collected from the Catalyst 2000 Census on Women Officers and Top Earners (Catalyst, 2000), which lists, for each company in the Fortune 500, the names of all women officers and their titles. The first dependent variable was measured as the total number of women officers in a company. The second dependent variable investigated was the number of women officers holding line positions. For this study, I defined a woman line officer as a woman having an operational function title (for instance, vice president, systems operations), a general management title (for example, president or COO), or a product or area title (for instance, senior vice president, roofing systems; executive vice president, Europe). Each woman officer in the 2000 Catalyst list was reclassified as holding a line position or not, and the total number of women line officers was then calculated for each company.

The third dependent variable measured whether or not a critical mass of women officers existed in a company's top management team. The 2000 Catalyst directory listed the names of companies where women make up 25% or more of the corporate officers. Since I was particularly interested in the potential for tokenism that arises from the lack of a critical mass of women represented in the top management team, a dichotomous variable utilizing the 25% cutoff (1 = 25% or more women officers, 0 = less than 25% women officers) was constructed.

The fourth dependent variable was the number of women officers in a company who held important executive titles. I followed Catalyst's definition for the determination of high-ranking or corporate "clout" titles. Accordingly, women corporate officers with clout titles were those with any of the following titles: CEO, chairman, vice chairman, president, COO, senior vice president, or executive vice president. The total number of such women officers was calculated per company.

The fifth dependent variable was whether a company had at least one woman in its list of top five corporate earners. The 2000 Catalyst directory listed the names of companies having a woman among their top five corporate earners. Since 73 (out of 500) companies had only one woman in their top five earners, and only ten companies had two women in their top five earners, a dichotomous variable (1 = at least one woman in top five earners, 0 = all else) was considered appropriate.

Control Variables

For each of the tests conducted, I controlled for a variety of possible explanations for variance in the number of women officers across companies: company size, company profitability, industry type, industry profitability, size of the top management team, and size of the board. While the scope of the study precluded separately hypothesizing the individual effects of these variables on the dependent variables of interest, it was important to address these possible influences so that the explanatory effect of women directors could be determined after controlling for them.

Company and industry data on the following variables were collected from the 1999 Fortune 500 list. Following the norms of the Fortune 500 list, a company's size was measured by its total revenues. Company profitability was measured by after-tax profits. To determine industry type, I used Fortune's classification of the 62 industries to which the 500 companies belonged. Since this number was too unwieldy for the construction of dummy variables, for analytic purposes I used the industry descriptors to theme the 62 industries into common groups, yielding 7 industry types: (1) heavy and light manufacturing, metals, and energy (167 companies), (2) diversified and specialty retailers and wholesalers (72 companies), (3) computers, electronics, and telecommunication (60 companies), (4) financials, banks, and insurance (85 companies), (5) food and drugs manufacturing and services (57 companies), (6) transportation, airlines, railroads, mail, freight, trucking (18 companies), and (7) services including health care, advertising, temporary help, entertainment, hotels and casinos, publishing and printing, and waste management (39 companies). Categorical (dummy) variables were subsequently created for each industry. For purposes of subsequent regression analyses, I retained industry types based on the decision that there was at least one significant correlation between the industry dummy and the five dependent variables. Two industries were dropped on the basis of this decision rule: (1) computers, electronics, and telecommunications, and (2) food and drugs manufacturing and services.

In addition to industry type as a control variable, industry profitability was measured by the Fortune 1,000 industry median after-tax profits. Industry profitability was important to include as a potential explanatory variable, especially of the executive salary (top five earner) dependent variable. Data on the final two control variables were collected as follows. Data on board size (total number of directors on a board) were collected from the Catalyst 1999 Census of Women Board Directors of the Fortune 1,000 (Catalyst, 1999). Data on the top management team size (total number of corporate officers) were collected from the Catalyst 2000 Census on Women Officers and Top Earners (Catalyst, 2000).

Data Analysis

Since the companies listed in Catalyst's 2000 census of women corporate officers were not identical to those listed in its 1999 census of women corporate directors, there was a discrepancy in the number of companies for which data on these two sets of variables were available. Data were available for 498 companies in the 1999 list, but only 447 of these companies appeared in the 2000 list. I attempted to reconcile those figures through independent Internet searches, but determined that most of the 51 firms that were missing no longer existed, had been merged into other firms, or had not published appropriate annual statements and proxy statements during the 19992000 period while they were undergoing transformation. Since systematic data were not consistently available for the missing companies, I decided to restrict the data collection only to those listed in Catalyst's census directories. The sample of 1999 Fortune 500 companies for which I had data on both the women directors' and the women officers' variables was thus 447.

Analyses of the sample distributions on the key variables of number of women directors and number of women officers revealed that there were certain extreme outliers. In particular, a scatter plot indicated that three companies were extreme outliers: one of these companies had nine women directors (as compared with the sample mean of 1.34), and two of the companies had 43 and 68 women officers, respectively (as compared with the sample mean of 3.16). These three companies, all from the financials, banks, and insurance industry type, were dropped from subsequent analyses, leaving a final sample size of 444 firms.

The results reported in this study are based on tests employing the number of women directors and officers. By conducting tests on the actual numbers of women rather than their proportions, I was able to individually examine the effects of control variables such as board size (total number of directors) and top management team size (total number of officers) on the dependent variables, which I could not have done using the proportion variables. However, I conducted parallel tests utilizing percentages of women directors and officers. These results were substantively identical to those reported below for each dependent variable investigated (i.e., the proportion of women directors was significantly related to all the female officer representation variables), and hence they are not repeated here.

RESULTS

The objective of the study was to determine the association between women directors and women officers in large corporations. Descriptive statistics and correlations are reported in Tables 1a and 1b. The results indicate that the number of women directors was positively correlated with a majority of the variables investigated. The number of women officers and the number of women line officers were positively correlated with all variables except industry median profits and certain industry types. The presence of a critical mass of women officers (25% or more) was positively correlated with the number of women directors and all of the other women officer variables. The number of women officers with high-ranking or "clout" titles was positively related with the total number of directors, the number of women directors, and all other female officer variables. The presence of women among the top five corporate earners was positively correlated with the number of women directors and all other women officer variables. To test the hypothesis, I first ran linear regressions with the number of women officers and the number of women line officers as the dependent variables. The results, reported in Table 2, indicate that the total number of officers was significantly associated with these two dependent variables.

Thus, women executives and female line executives are more likely to be present in larger top management teams. The number of women directors was also positively correlated with these two dependent variables, indicating that an increase in the number of women directors in these Fortune 500 companies would result in an increase in the number of female executives and line executives in these firms. Corporate revenues were positively associated with the number of women line officers, indicating that greater numbers of women line officers are employed in larger companies. Industry effects were obtained for both dependent variables: the number of women officers is higher in firms in the transportation and service industries and the number of women line officers is significantly higher in service industries.

To further test the hypothesis, I conducted a logistic regression analysis using the presence of a critical mass (25% or more) of women officers as the dependent variable. The results reported in Table 2 indicate that the only significant explanatory parameter in the model was the number of women directors (Wald statistic = 10.730). Marginally significant effects were obtained for the size of the top management team and for service industries. Though not reported in Table 2, the results also showed that the predicted change in odds of the dependent variable for a unit increase in the number of women directors was 1.84. That is, for every additional woman director placed on a board, the odds of having a critical mass of women officers almost doubled.

To continue assessing the impact of women directors on the representation of women executives in top management teams, I conducted a linear regression of the number of women officers holding clout titles. The results, also reported in Table 2, indicate that the number of clout titles held by women officers is positively related to the number of women directors. Clout titles were also significantly more frequent in the financial industry type than in other industries. Thus, this analysis indicates that women officers hold more powerful titles in financial, banking, and insurance companies and when there are more women board members.

Finally, I conducted a logistic regression of the presence of women among the top five corporate earners in a company, which revealed that industry median profits, company profits, total number of directors, and the number of women directors were significant explanatory variables. No significant industry effect was observed for this variable. While not reported in Table 2, the results showed that there was a 1.79-unit predicted change in the odds of a woman being among the top live corporate earners for every one-unit increase in the number of women directors. These results indicate that a woman is much more likely to be in a Fortune 500 company's list of top five earners when the company is more profitable, is in a more profitable industry, and has a larger board and more women directors.

Thus, the results of the five tests show consistent support for the hypothesis: there is a positive relationship between the presence of women corporate directors and the representation of women executives in Fortune 500 top management teams. The number of women directors is positively associated with the number of women officers, women line officers, a critical mass of women in the executive team, women officers with clout titles, and top-earning women officers.

DISCUSSION

The findings of this study empirically support the notion that women corporate board directors and top management gender diversity are positively related. Since the empirical data on women corporate executives lagged the data on women corporate directors by a year, these results provide preliminary evidence that women directors are specifically significant for the success of other corporate women. Corporations seeking to improve the gender diversity of their senior management team would do well by also enhancing the gender diversity on their boards.

The findings also provide support for previous research findings that certain corporate and industry environments may be relatively more open to and friendly toward women employees, especially women executives, than others. Larger executive teams were associated with more women officers and women line officers, and marginally with the presence of a critical mass of women in the top management team. Larger company size was associated with more women in line positions. Industry effects indicated that higher numbers of women officers and women line officers are employed in service industries (including health care, advertising, temporary services, entertainment, hotels, and publishing), and that firms in these industries are slightly more likely to achieve a critical mass (at least 25%) of women officers within their top management teams. Firms in transportation-related industries (airlines, railroads, mail, freight, and trucking) also employ more women in their top management teams while companies in the financial industries (financials, banking, and insurance) are significantly more likely to have women officers with powerful titles.

Singh and Vinnicombe (2003) suggest that the particular characteristics and contingencies of companies (e.g., sector, CEO or board chair characteristics, board demographics) may influence the environment as incubators for successful women. Similarly, Zelechowski and Bilimoria (2004) found that board environments adopting a stewardship rather than agency model of governance (characterized by CEOs with longer board tenure, more family ties, and fewer director interlocks, as well as the utilization of a management Chair of the board, larger boards, and more insider directors) offer a conducive environment for top women executives to also serve as board members. Future research should more specifically investigate the direct workplace factors conducive to women's success and advancement in corporations, particularly at the highest corporate levels, and the roles that women corporate directors can directly and indirectly play in engendering these more progressive workplace cultures.

A related implication of the findings is the potentially cascading positive effects of senior women on junior women throughout the organization. Just as the number of women corporate board directors is beneficial for gender diversity in the top management team, these women senior executives may themselves contribute to higher numbers and improved workplace experiences of the women below them. For example, a study of women partners and associates of law firms indicated that gender roles were more stereotypical and more problematic for women associates in firms with relatively low proportions of women partners (Ely, 1995). Future research should further examine the impact of the representation of women corporate executive officers on high-level and mid-level women employees, in an effort to more fully explicate the effects of the presence and behavior of senior women on other women corporate employees.

Of course, the important benefactor role that women directors play, as demonstrated by this study, may not come without controversy or cost for these women. Previous research indicates that women corporate directors often appear to be uncomfortable with their role in advancing other women and women's issues in the boardroom. Even while believing that an important reason they were recruited is because they are women (Burke, 2000; Mattis, 1993, 2000; Mitchell, 1984; Sethi et al., 1981), many women directors view themselves as simply directors, not women directors (Burson-Marsteller, 1977; Catalyst, 1993; Collins, 1978; Sethi et al., 1981). Women directors recognize that CEOs frequently cite as a reason for not recruiting more women to the board is fear that these new directors will disrupt an otherwise cooperative boardroom climate by adversarially raising difficult women's issues (cf. Burke, 1994a; Dobrzynski, 1993; Lear, 1994). Women directors themselves acknowledge their fear of being perceived as having a feminist agenda or as being a single-issue or constituent director, and being discredited because of that (Burson-Marsteller, 1977; Catalyst, 1993; Investor Responsibility Research Center, 1993).

Bradshaw and Wicks (2000) found that most of the 20 women directors of Canadian boards that they interviewed felt they were not there to represent women's issues or points of view. The researchers concluded that the inherently gendered nature of organizations, and in particular of boardrooms, limits women directors' acts to transform existing institutional arrangements. These limiting factors and the complex relational structures that constrain or facilitate women directors' relationships with other corporate women should be more specifically examined by future research to fully understand and constructively improve the workplace environment for women in the executive suite and throughout the company.

Two limitations of the study suggest implications for future research. First, while the results indicated a positive association between women directors and women executives, the one-year lag in the number of women directors may not be sufficient to infer a direct and consistent causal connection. Future research should verify this relationship utilizing greater time lags.

Second, this study addresses the unique contributions made by female corporate directors by confirming their positive association with gender diversity in the executive suite. However, their powerful institutional legitimacy signals to corporate stakeholders, particularly women employees and male managers, were indirectly inferred in the present study. Future research should more directly examine the distinct contributions women directors make to other senior women in the organization, exploring specifically how women directors positively influence the workplace treatment of women executives. For example, by serving as champions of change at the highest echelons of the corporate hierarchy, women directors may help create more gender-diverse and positive corporate climates at the top and throughout organizations (Burke, 2000). Their consistent championing and scrutiny of women's issues may put male executives on notice for the inequitable treatment of women employees. They may also counteract the negative stereotypes of women that may be held by male colleagues, and champion the promotion and development of specific high-performing women. The impact of these and other direct actions of women directors should be examined in future research.

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Diana Bilimoria

Associate Professor of Organizational Behavior

Case Western Reserve University

Table 1a
Descriptive Statistics

                                     N       Mean        S.D.

 1. Company Revenues                495    11325.28    15632.07
 2. Company Profits                 494      705.96     1558.38
 3. Industry Profits                495      228.68      331.76
 4. Total Officers                  444       26.09       31.34
 5. Total Directors                 495       12.12        3.42
 6. Women Directors                 495        1.34        0.93
 7. Women Officers                  444        3.16        3.93
 8. Women Line Officers             444        0.70        1.39
 9. 25% Women Officers              444        0.09        0.29
10. Clout Titles                    444        0.44        1.08
11. Top Five Earner                 444        0.16        0.37
12. Manufacturing Industries        495        0.34        0.47
13. Retail Industries               495        0.15        0.35
14. Financial Industries            495        0.17        0.37
15. Transportation Industries       495        0.04        0.19
16. Service Industries              495        0.08        0.27

Table 1b
Correlations

                               1          2          3          4

 1. Company Revenues
 2. Company Profits          .672 **
 3. Industry Profits         .071       .264 **
 4. Total Officers           .287 **    .163 **   -.054
 5. Total Directors          .195 **    .129 **    .172 **    .174 **
 6. Women Directors          .211 **    .177 **    .124 **    .071
 7. Women Officers           .226 **    .129 **   -.011       .729 **
 8. Women Line Officers      .244 **    .147 **    .028       .426 **
 9. 57 Women Officers       -.025      -.001       .034      -.071
10. Clout Titles             .065       .087       .071       .093
11. Top Five Earner         -.024      -.055       .074      -.019
12. Manufact. Industries    -.023      -.069      -.186 **   -.088
13. Retail Industries       -.003      -.111 *    -.204 **    .083
14. Financial Industries     .008       .078       .182 **    .020
15. Transport. Industries   -.021      -.030       .057       .079
16. Service Industries      -.065      -.086      -.156 **   -.022

                               5          6          7          8

 1. Company Revenues
 2. Company Profits
 3. Industry Profits
 4. Total Officers
 5. Total Directors
 6. Women Directors          .410 **
 7. Women Officers           .158 **    .179 **
 8. Women Line Officers      .133 **    .222 **    .651 **
 9. 57 Women Officers        .011       .153 **    .234 **    .246 **
10. Clout Titles             .194 **    .229 **    .300 **    .461 **
11. Top Five Earner         -.061       .134 **    .183 **    .204 **
12. Manufact. Industries    -.086      -.035      -.147 **   -.167 **
13. Retail Industries       -.190 **   -.107 *     .064       .069
14. Financial Industries     .436 **    .147 **    .005       .039
15. Transport. Industries    .003      -.024       .132 **    .044
16. Service Industries      -.085       .038       .079       .135 **

                               9          10         11         12

 1. Company Revenues
 2. Company Profits
 3. Industry Profits
 4. Total Officers
 5. Total Directors
 6. Women Directors
 7. Women Officers
 8. Women Line Officers
 9. 57 Women Officers
10. Clout Titles             .275 **
11. Top Five Earner          .338 **    .246 **
12. Manufact. Industries    -.099 *    -.157 **    .067
13. Retail Industries        .065       .035       .011      -.294 **
14. Financial Industries     .000       .205 **   -.049      -.318 **
15. Transport. Industries    .012      -.063       .033      -.139 **
16. Service Industries       .123 **    .052      -.119 *    -.209 **

                               13         14         15

 1. Company Revenues
 2. Company Profits
 3. Industry Profits
 4. Total Officers
 5. Total Directors
 6. Women Directors
 7. Women Officers
 8. Women Line Officers
 9. 57 Women Officers
10. Clout Titles
11. Top Five Earner
12. Manufact. Industries
13. Retail Industries
14. Financial Industries    -.184 **
15. Transport. Industries   -.080      -.087
16. Service Industries      -.121 **   -.130 **   -.057

* p < .05. ** p < .01

Table 2
Linear and Logistic Regressions

Dependent Variable                  Women              Women Line
                                   Officers             Officers

N                                    442                  442

Independent Variables                Beta                 Beta
Manufacturing Industries            -.036                -.056
Retail Industries                    .028                 .066
Financial Industries                 .027                 .053
Transport Industries                 .082 *               .029
Service Industries                   .090 *               .144 **
Company Revenues                     .010                 .124 *
Company Profits                     -.009                -.022
Industry Profits                     .021                 .046
Total Officers                       .716 ***             .384 ***
Total Directors                     -.035                -.050
Women Directors                      .135 ***             .179 ***

                               [R.sup.2] = .566     [R.sup.2] = .262

Dependent Variable                25% Women           Clout Titles
                                   Officers

N                                    443                  442

Independent Variables                Wald                 Beta
Manufacturing Industries             .666                -.053
Retail Industries                   2.288                 .086
Financial Industries                 .008                 .158 **
Transport Industries                 .499                -.045
Service Industries                  2.998 (+)             .064
Company Revenues                     .507                -.048
Company Profits                      .415                 .063
Industry Profits                     .291                 .027
Total Officers                      3.500 (+)             .074
Total Directors                      .273                 .045
Women Directors                    10.730 ***             .183 ***

                             [R.sup.2] = 27.39 **   [R.sup.2] = .112

Dependent Variable                 Top Five
                                    Earner

N                                     443

Independent Variables                Wald
Manufacturing Industries             .622
Retail Industries                    .004
Financial Industries                 .039
Transport Industries                 .356
Service Industries                  2.426
Company Revenues                     .522
Company Profits                     3.912 *
Industry Profits                    5.069 *
Total Officers                       .008
Total Directors                     5.672 *
Women Directors                    13.090 ***

                           [chi square] = 29.233 ***

(+) p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001