Summary judgment for intentional infliction of emotional harm.

CASE ON POINT: Vincent v. Essent Healthcare of CT 470 F. Supp. 2d 140 (2007) -CT

ISSUE: Few can imagine the emotional harm suffered by a parent when he or she realizes that his or her child may have sustained a debilitating injury in the course of the child's birth. However, as this

case illustrates, a parent cannot prevail in a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress suffered by her against a person or entity allegedly guilty of medical malpractice, which allegedly caused his or her child's condition. Although a mother may have a suit against her physician, hospital, and/or others, providing it is filed within the time allowed by the applicable statute of limitations, she may not be able to bring suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress she sustained as a parent years later when she realizes the extent of the damage her child.

CASE FACTS: As early as in 2001, Heather Vincent was seen as a patient by Dr. Howard Mortman, an employee of Sharon Ob/Gyn Associates, P.C., "a d/b/a of Physicians for Womens's Health." Dr. Mortman provided prenatal, delivery, and postpartum care in relation to the birth of Brianna on March 15, 2003 at Sharon Hospital. Heather alleged that as a result of a claimed unreasonably delayed emergency caesarean section, Brianna suffered from cerebral palsy and multiple related conditions. Heather filed suit against Dr. Mortman and Sharon Ob/Gyn on March 4, 2004. A separate suit against Physicians for Women's Health (PWH) was filed later, asserting vicarious liability for the malpractice of Dr. Mortman and Sharon Ob/Gyn. Ob/Gyn filed a motion for summary judgment on all claims against PWH claiming that the statute of limitations' bar on Heather Vincent's claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress. Heather Vincent maintained that neither Dr. Mortman nor anyone else "ever brought to her attention that Sharon Ob/Gyn is a D.B.A. for Womens [sic] Health, LLC." She maintained that she never heard of and was unaware of that PWH existed or that it operated Sharon Ob/Gyn, until her lawyers received a letter from defendants' counsel stating, "Sharon Ob/Gyn Associates, P.C. is a d/b/a of Physicians for Women's HealtVincent also maintained that pursuant to the "discovery rule," the statute of limitations should not be applicable in her suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress since she was not even aware of the existence of PWH until her attorneys informed her that they had received a communication from defense counsel notifying them of it.

COURT'S OPINION: The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut denied the motion on all claims against PWH and granted the motion on Heather Vincent's negligent infliction of emotional distress claim. The court held, inter alia, that while the plaintiff's statements of her emotional condition reflect the deep despair and emotional anguish suffered in parenting a severely disabled child, they do not support a claim that the defendants' conduct during the labor and delivery process caused these injuries to her, since her emotional distress admittedly did not exist until the catastrophic results of the allegedly negligent obstetrical care became apparent in baby Brianna. Heath Vincent failed to adduce any evidence from which reasonable jurors could conclude that her emotional distress was caused by the defendants' medical treatment of her, independent of the emotional distress caused to her when she witnessed the consequences of the alleged malpractice that injured her baby. Thus, the court concluded that Heather Vincent's emotional distress, by her own account commencing only when Brianna's injury became apparent, is derivative of her baby's injuries and not independently caused by the defendants' malpractice on her. Accordingly, the court granted the motion for summary judgment on Heather Vincent's claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress. However, the PWH's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the statute of limitations had run was denied.

LEGAL COMMENTARY: In moving for summary judgment against a party who will bear the ultimate burden of proof at trial, the movant's burden of establishing that there is no genuine issue of material fact in dispute will be satisfied if he or she can point to an absence of evidence to support an essential element of the non-moving party's claim. However, in moving for summary judgment on an issue on which the movant bears the burden of proof at trial, the movant must make a strong showing. The showing must be sufficient for the court to hold that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than the moving party. On a motion for summary judgment, the court draws all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.

Meet the Editor & Publisher: A. David Tammelleo, JD, is a nationally recognized authority on health care law. Practicing law for over 40 years, he concentrates in health care law with the Rhode Island firm of A. David Tammelleo & Associates. He has presented seminars on medical, nursing and hospital law throught the United States. In addtion to his writings as Editor or Medical Law's, Nursing Law's & Hospital Law's Regan Reports, his legal articles have been published in the most prestigious health law journals. A prolific writer, his thousands of articles, as well as his achievements as an attorney and lecturer, have won him recognition in Martindale-Hubbell's Bar Register of Preeminent Lawyers, Marquis Who's Who in American Law, Who's Who in America and Who's Who in the World.