Legal Malpractice-Chapman v. Bearfield: Redefining the Legal Standard of Care for Tennessee...

When attorney misconduct causes a client to suffer harm, the attorney-client relationship may quickly become a defendant-plaintiff relationship if the client asserts a claim against the attorney for legal malpractice. By deciding to file a claim against the former attorney, the client immediately encounters a litany of challenges, beginning with the quest to find a new attorney to represent the malpractice action. The real hurdle in pursing the claim, however, may well be the crucial task of finding an expert to testify that the former attorney failed to handle the original matter according to the appropriate legal standard of care. Until recently in Tennessee, this presented an overwhelming obstacle as many Tennessee courts required expert witnesses to be familiar with a specific standard of care, namely, the standard of care existing in the defendant's community.1

This Comment will trace how the legal standard of care in Tennessee evolved into its present form after a recent 2006 Tennessee Supreme Court ("Supreme Court") decision in Chapman v. Bearfield,2 in which the court declared the applicable standard of care to be the degree of skill, ability, and learning exercised by attorneys practicing in the State of Tennessee, regardless of their specific location within the state.3 By construing the legal standard to encompass the entire state, the court broke barriers to litigation and made it easier for plaintiffs to procure qualified expert testimony. Also, this ruling clarifies the once murky legal standard, thus giving future notice to all Tennessee practitioners that a statewide paradigm will be used to evaluate the discharge of their legal responsibilities.

Historically, Tennessee followed the national trend allowing a legal malpractice action when the plaintiff establishes the traditional elements of a negligence claim, including proof of the applicable legal standard of care, breach of that standard by attorney misconduct, and proof that the attorney's negligence caused the plaintiff actual harm.4 Typically, courts require a plaintiff to prove the applicable standard of care by producing expert testimony, unless the attorney's negligence is such that it violates obligations common to a layman's understanding.5 Furthermore, the general rule provides that an expert must be qualified in the skill, training, education, knowledge, and ability on which he proffers judgment and opinion.6 In legal malpractice cases, the expert witness must offer such evidence that will assist the trier of fact by explaining how attorneys carry out their professional obligations under given circumstances.7 Although expert testimony is required in order to make the plaintiffs case, the exact standard that the expert should testify to, and that the court should apply, eluded definition in Tennessee until recently.8

In an attempt to elucidate the appropriate legal standard of care, in Spalding v. Davis,9 the Tennessee Supreme Court held that an attorney is liable for damages that result from his failure to exercise reasonable care as compared to other attorneys in his jurisdiction.10 In Spalding, the plaintiff brought a legal malpractice action against his divorce attorney, alleging the attorney erroneously advised him regarding future alimony payments to his exwife.11 In establishing an applicable standard of care, the Supreme Court compared the defendant's decisions and conduct with that of other attorneys faced with similar circumstances and fact patterns, including an attorney in a Nebraska divorce case.12 Although the court did not compare the defendant's actions and judgments to other lawyers in his community, county, or even the State of Tennessee, the court did reference previous Tennessee case law establishing a reasonable standard of care for any professional lawyer.13 The Supreme Court then fashioned the applicable rule by stating an attorney will be liable for damages resulting "from his failure to exercise ordinary care, skill, and diligence ... which is commonly possessed and exercised by attorneys in practice in the jurisdiction."14

In Spalding, the Supreme Court set a precedent that confined the legal standard of care to the borders of an attorney's "jurisdiction," thus establishing a locality rule limiting the comparison of attorney conduct to those attorneys practicing in the same geographic area.15 Based on this single expression, Tennessee lower courts have inconsistently defined "jurisdiction" in later legal malpractice actions.

One line of cases formulated the standard of care to mean the constricted geographical area in which the attorney practices, usually his community, city, or county. The initial spark for this rationale is found in Cleckner v. Dale,16 where the court of appeals upheld the Spalding standard of attorneys "practicing in the same jurisdiction," but also introduced language that further restricted the locality rule to that often found in medical malpractice actions.17 As the court explained, "A lawyer's standard of care does not differ markedly from that of physicians or other professionals."18 In Cleckner, the plaintiff brought a legal malpractice action against his attorney for misconduct in a real estate transaction.19 The lower court had prohibited the plaintiff's use of expert testimony, but the Tennessee Court of Appeals reversed based on the evidentiary principles typically applied in medical malpractice actions.20 The court drew a distinct parallel between the legal malpractice action and the medical malpractice action, by simply concluding, "[T]he evidentiary principles developed in medical malpractice cases are equally applicable to legal malpractice cases," and therefore the legal malpractice action must include expert testimony to determine the applicable standard of care.21

By comparing the legal standard of care to the medical profession, Cleckner provided opportunity for other courts to interpret the legal "jurisdiction" standard as identical to the locality rule used in medical malpractice cases.22 Although Cleckner primarily compared the legal and medical malpractice actions in terms of analogous evidentiary principles, later courts began analyzing legal malpractice cases along the general outline of the medical malpractice analysis, specifically holding that the legal standard of care should be restricted to the geographic locality standard, as similarly set forth in the statutory medical standard of care.23

Using this rationale in other types of professional malpractice cases, defendants often sought to invoke a locality standard of care in order to preclude the testimony of the plaintiffs expert witnesses if those witnesses did not practice in the defendant's community or county. However, courts narrowed the locality rule to legal and medical malpractice actions, distinguishing these from other professional malpractice actions, which do not use the locality standard to qualify expert testimony.

For example, in Underwood v. Waterslides of Mid-America,24 the plaintiff brought a malpractice action against a contractor and engineer of a waterslide that collapsed, causing plaintiffs injuries.25 On appeal, the contractor and engineer defendants argued the plaintiff's expert witness's testimony should not be admissible evidence because the expert was not familiar with the standard of care for contractors and engineers in that county of Tennessee, nor was the witness even licensed in Tennessee.26 The Tennessee Court of Appeals, however, quickly distinguished the standard of care appropriate for professional contractors and engineers from that of legal and medical practitioners.27

The court found the defendants' reasoning to be misguided because it viewed the professional standard of care as a separate species from the medical and legal standards.28 The court explained that both the medical and legal standards of care are defined by the practitioner's locality, evidenced by both the Medical Malpractice Review Board and Claims Act of 1975,29 and the Spalding and Cleckner cases.30 The Underwood court drew a corollary between Spalding and Cleckner, interpreting legal malpractice actions and medical malpractice actions as identical because both define the standard of care as the community in which the defendant practices.31 Although Underwood offered this locality restriction as dicta, it became a prevailing rule among many Tennessee courts dealing with legal malpractice actions.32

In a subsequent case on point, Mutter v. Cohen,33 the court indicated that although the locality rule was not completely dispositive, the court would still adhere to it.34 In Hutter, the plaintiff filed a legal malpractice action against his two former attorneys practicing in Blount County asserting that they failed to represent the plaintiff with such care, skill, and diligence commonly possessed by "the ordinary attorney in similar circumstances."35 In response, both defendant-attorneys filed their own affidavits stating that they were knowledgeable as to the standard of care for attorneys practicing in Blount County and that they had neither failed to exercise such care nor had they deviated from the standard exercised by "attorneys in practice in this jurisdiction."36 After the defendants filed for summary judgment, the plaintiff filed his own affidavit as expert testimony, stating that in his opinion, both defendants fell below the standard of attorneys in Blount County, in "similar communities," and "in this jurisdiction."37 The court quickly disposed of the case because the plaintiff failed to produce expert testimony; however, in citing Cleckner, the court stated that the defendants had established that they did not deviate from the applicable standard of care for "a professional in that community."38

The Spalding "jurisdiction" standard led to a second interpretation among courts holding that "jurisdiction" not only denotes geographic subdivisions of the state, but also includes the particular circumstances attorneys encounter if they practice in specific areas of law. For example, in Logon v. Winstead,39 a criminal defense attorney's client, convicted in Hawkins County on two drugrelated felony counts, filed a legal malpractice action alleging that his attorney had breached the standard of care in several ways during the course of the criminal proceedings.40 The defense attorney produced his own expert affidavit representing that he was familiar with the standard of criminal defense attorneys, as he had practiced for over seventeen years as the District Attorney General for the Third Judicial District and had worked for several years as a criminal defense attorney in Hawkins County.41 After noting this testimony included relevant information regarding both the location of practice and the standards of defense attorneys, the court affirmed summary judgment for the attorney, crediting his affidavit with the correct and applicable standard of care for criminal defense attorneys in the "jurisdiction."42

Other courts have likewise found that the type of case involved, along with the area in which the attorney practices, should control the applicable standard of care for Tennessee lawyers. For example, in Davis v. Simpson,43 when the plaintiff filed a legal malpractice action against her former divorce attorney, the court analyzed the validity of the allegations according to the standard of care specifically related to domestic relations attorneys practicing in Knox County.44 The defendant presented expert testimony from a fellow domestic relations attorney who had actually represented the plaintiffs husband in the divorce proceedings.45 The expert testified to the applicable standard for "attorneys practicing domestic relations and divorce cases in and around Knox County."46 The plaintiff likewise presented expert testimony, but the court found that it lacked any relevant statement concerning the standard for domestic litigation lawyers in this particular area of Tennessee.47

Although the previous cases have provided examples for Tennessee courts holding in favor of the general locality rule or a geographic rule imposed on specialized practice, a Tennessee appellate court broadened the standard of care beyond a constricted "locality" definition. In 1995, in Wood v. Parker,48 the Tennessee Court of Appeals found that the term "jurisdiction" could reasonably be interpreted as the entire State of Tennessee.49 In Wood, a client brought a malpractice action against her former attorney, who had previously represented the client in a sexual discrimination suit originating in Rutherford County.50 The attorney later withdrew from representing the client, who then sought new counsel to pursue the sexual discrimination suit in the Chancery Court of Rutherford County while simultaneously bringing a legal malpractice action in Davidson County.51 The client-plaintiff alleged the former attorney had failed to exercise ordinary skill, care, and diligence on a number of matters; supporting this allegation, the plaintiff presented an expert witness from Davidson County.52 While citing Spalding's "jurisdiction" standard as support, the court found the former attorney had not breached the accepted standard of care for attorneys practicing in Tennessee.53 By this reference to the state, the Wood court may have purposefully left out any reference to "locality" or "community" as a declaration that Tennessee and jurisdiction are synonymous when determining the applicable standard of care in legal malpractice actions.

Enlarging the scope of this analysis to include the wide range of legal malpractice standards that have developed across the jurisdictions of this nation, the courts that narrow their focus to geographic considerations have focused on the "community" or "locality."54 These courts often note that expert testimony should express the standard for attorneys practicing in the same area, community, or locality as the defendant-attorney.55 For example, in Cook v. Mon,56 the Texas Court of Civil Appeals found that an attorney must represent his clients with the required skill "necessary to the practice of his profession and which others similarly situated ordinarily possess."57

In Cook, the plaintiff commenced a legal malpractice action for alleged negligence in the prosecution of the plaintiff's personal injury case that transpired in El Paso, Texas in El Paso County.58 The plaintiffs submitted the testimony of a licensed attorney from Alpine, Texas in Brewster County, who offered the "standard of care of the average general practitioner in the State of Texas."59 The court criticized the expert witness testimony and found the expert's opinion was unqualified because he was from a "vastly different locality" in both location and size than the defendant.60 However, the opinion also mentions that the expert witness had never tried any type of case in El Paso County and did not profess to testify as to any degree of skill, diligence, or care customarily exercised by lawyers practicing in that county.61 Thus, in Cook, the court found the expert could not offer the correct standard of care because he was not from a similar locality as the defendant, and specifically, he was not from the defendant's county.62 By holding the reasonable standard of care to be the knowledge, skill, and abilities of attorneys in similarly situated localities, the court broadened the traditional notions of a strict locality rule to incorporate the possibility of expert testimony coming from similar locations rather than limiting expert testimony to the exact same locality as the defendant.63

Although some states founded their particular legal standards in terms of a specific jurisdiction or county, others focus on specific locations defined by customs within the state. These latter jurisdictions adjudge between attorneys based on their specific geographic locations and the controlling customs within those locations. For example, in Herring v. Wainwright,64 a Louisiana appellate court disqualified expert testimony from an attorney practicing outside of the particular location in which the defendantattorney practiced.65 The plaintiff brought a malpractice action in the Caddo Parish against a former attorney, alleging the attorney erred by failing to seek a written extension of the case from opposing counsel.66 To establish the standard of care, the plaintiff offered the testimony of an attorney practicing in Opelousas Parish, but the court held this was insufficient because the defendant practiced in Caddo Parish.67 The court reasoned that allowing testimony from separate parishes would only support a "statewide" standard, whereas the Louisiana court abided by the "community or locality" standard.68

One policy argument in support of the locality rule followed in the Louisiana case is that some states may wish to protect rural attorneys who act within the peculiarities of a particular community. Likewise, these states may wish to prohibit other attorneys, unfamiliar with local customs, the opportunity to testify as to a general standard of care.69 However, this policy argument is often countered by a stronger argument that discourages such restrictions on the standard of care, as many fear this would lead to small pockets of lower standards that preclude citizens of those areas from access to quality legal counsel.70

A growing majority of states maintain the legal standard of care is that skill, ability, and knowledge exercised by attorneys across that specific state.71 In Russo v. Griffin,72 for example, the Supreme Court of Vermont found that expert testimony from attorneys located within the defendant's city should not be given complete priority over expert testimony from attorneys located in neighboring cities.73 In holding the standard of care for practitioners in Vermont extended statewide, the court faulted the locality rule because it: immunized local attorneys from legal malpractice, precluded plaintiffs from bringing malpractice actions since local experts are reluctant to testify against their colleagues, and drew an unnecessary distinction between a degree of care and an attorney's knowledge of local rules.74 In discussing the applicable standard of legal care, the Russo court also introduced language that queried the use of technology to further standardize attorney conduct.75 The court also discussed attorney specialties at some length, noting that as the specialization of attorney education and practice continues to develop and expand throughout jurisdictions, a likely nationwide standard of care may concurrently develop.76

The statewide standard of care also controlled the court's analysis in Cook, Flanagan & Berst v. Clausing,77 as the court held that the standards for lawyers practicing "in this jurisdiction" are the same standards as lawyers practicing throughout the State of Washington.78 The plaintiff commenced a legal malpractice action against his former attorney for general negligence in handling his prior claim.79 The defendant-attorney appealed from the trial court's judgment entered on a jury verdict, the Supreme Court of Washington reversed and remanded the case for further clarification on the correct standard of care.80 Noting that the legal malpractice action must include a specific component that articulates the applicable standard of care, the court found the jury instructions providing the applicable standard were faulty because they lacked any clear standard of care relevant for measuring the defendant's conduct.81 To remedy the faulty jury instruction, the court held that the applicable standard is the skill, ability, and knowledge exercised by the reasonable attorney in the State of Washington.82 The court explained that the standards that qualify an attorney for practicing law throughout this "jurisdiction" are uniform for all attorneys practicing in Washington and do not differ according to individual communities.83 Because all attorneys must be qualified to the same degree, the correlating standard of reasonable care is likewise uniform throughout the "state."84

Additionally, in Moore v. Lubnau,85 the Wyoming Supreme Court set a precedent that an attorney's requisite skill and ability to practice is defined by the state because the court believed this definition to be more logical and more widely accepted than the locality rule.86 In Moore, the client sued her former divorce attorney, alleging he was negligent in failing to call witnesses whose testimony would have been relevant to her child custody dispute and to her receiving a greater share of the marital property.87 Her former attorney presented the deposition of the judge who tried the case, along with his own affidavit, which stated that he was knowledgeable regarding the appropriate standards for divorce attorneys in Campbell County, Wyoming and that he met and exceeded these standards.88

Although the defendant compared his conduct to that of other attorneys in the same county, the court stated that this affidavit was insufficient because such a locality rule did not exist in Wyoming.89 Because the state had not previously established a test for analyzing the legal standard of care, the court began by following the existing medical malpractice paradigm, which had "moved away from the locality rule."90 In keeping their analysis aligned with the medical malpractice action, the court further noted that the medical standard of care comported with existing authority upholding a "jurisdiction" standard for weighing attorney conduct.91 The court adopted the jurisdiction standard as meaning the statewide level of reasonable skill and ability for practicing Wyoming lawyers.92 The court reasoned that negligence cannot be excused simply because others similarly situated are likewise negligent, as practitioners' abilities should not vary with geography.93 Furthermore, the court stated that every practicing lawyer must pass the state bar admissions exam and be qualified to adhere to certain minimum requirements necessary to practice in Wyoming.94 Although the court found the defendant's affidavit insufficient in light of the statewide legal standard rule, the court did credit the defendant's expert witness's testimony-the deposition of the judge-as establishing the defendant's conformance with the standard of skill, care, knowledge, and ability of Wyoming attorneys.95

Recently, in Chapman v. Bearfield, the Tennessee Supreme Court reviewed the acceptable standard of attorney conduct in Tennessee.96 In 2001, the Chapman family retained Rick Bearfield, an attorney from Johnson City, to represent them in a medical malpractice action.97 The Chapman family became increasingly unsatisfied with Bearfield's representation, and in July 2004 upon advice of new counsel, the family filed a legal malpractice suit against Bearfield in Washington County Circuit Court.98 In a motion for summary judgment, Bearfield filed his own expert affidavit, stating that he did not commit legal malpractice according to the "professional standard of care applicable to attorneys 'in the upper East Tennessee area.'"99 In response to this motion, the Chapmans submitted the affidavit of Richard Duncan, a Knoxville medical malpractice attorney.100 Duncan's affidavit stated that he was familiar with the statewide Tennessee legal standard of care and that Bearfield's conduct in handling the Chapman medical malpractice action was below that of "a reasonable attorney under similar circumstances."101

After a hearing in October 2004, the trial court granted summary judgment to Bearfield, finding the Duncan affidavit did not meet the "locality rule."102 On appeal, Bearfield argued the legal standard of care should be limited to the local standard used for medical malpractice actions.103 The Tennessee Court of Appeals found this argument was misguided, as there was no basis for a legal "locality rule" in Tennessee and thus reversed the trial court's ruling.104 The court did acknowledge that other Tennessee courts differed in their interpretations of Spalding, so it deferred to the Supreme Court to determine whether a locality rule existed.105 The Tennessee Supreme Court held, affirmed. A single, statewide standard of care exists in Tennessee for attorneys practicing law; therefore, the Chapman's expert need only be familiar with the legal standard of care in Tennessee. Chapman v. Bearfield, 207 S.W.3d 736,740-41 (Tenn. 2006).

In its analysis, the Supreme Court initially focused its attention on the apparent dichotomy among the lower courts in Tennessee in their interpretation of Spalding. The court began by noting that, although Spalding created a general rule that attorneys are held to the same care exercised in the jurisdiction, Spalding also left room for disparate construction by the lower courts to determine what constitutes "jurisdiction."106 In assessing the various interpretations existing in the courts below, the Supreme Court acknowledged the emergence of a locality rule in Underwood and Cleckner equating the locality standards used in legal and medical malpractice actions.107 The court further noted that several unpublished Tennessee cases found "jurisdiction" to mean a "political subdivision of the state."108 Additionally, the court noted the lower court in Wood had found that "jurisdiction" was best interpreted as a statewide standard of care for Tennessee attorneys.109

In response to the conflicting interpretations of Spalding, the Chapman court offered several pieces of logic to refute the locality rule. The court first explained that an interpretation of Spalding should go no further than recognizing that "jurisdiction," by simple definition, meant power that is exercised within a specific geographic area.110 Second, the court reasoned that because all attorneys are admitted to the Tennessee bar and have the power to practice anywhere in the state,111 all attorneys should be held to a single standard that exists throughout the state.112 The court found that because "jurisdiction" impliedly relates to geography and because Tennessee-licensed attorneys may practice anywhere within the state, these two ideas must merge to create a statewide standard of care.113 The court then applied this reasoning to the necessary expert witness testimony in a legal malpractice action: "an expert who opines in a legal malpractice case . . . must be familiar with the statewide professional standard of care."114

Once the court firmly established the applicable statewide standard, it next turned to counter the adverse reasoning found in both Bearfield's argument for a locality rule as well as those courts that first asserted the locality rule in Tennessee. Initially, the court acknowledged Bearfield's argument, extending the medical locality rule to the Tennessee legal malpractice action.115 However, the court succinctly distinguished the legal standard of care and the medical standard locality rule by explaining the medical standard is expressly created by statute.116 The court pointed out that the Tennessee legislature has not created any similar statute or standard for the legal malpractice claim, nor will such a rule be judicially created at this time.117

Furthermore, the court drew a distinction between local rules of practice and an applicable standard of care; a rule of practice may exist in a particular locality within the state, but there cannot be any localized standards of attorney conduct.118 Although the court firmly dismissed the locality rule, it did not offer any further explanation for why a local rule of practice did not bear any weight on the standard of care analysis. The court does strengthen its holding, however, by offering a litany of other states as well as a few lower courts in Tennessee that have adopted statewide professional standards of care.119

To further substantiate its holding, the Supreme Court identified three policies supporting its decision. First, the court explained that a statewide standard would enable a plaintiff to pursue a cause of action because it would be easier to find experts outside the defendant's realm of colleagues.120 The primary concern is that, by limiting the standard of care to a restricted geographic area, local attorneys would be reluctant to testify against their fellow attorneys working in the same close environment.121 By broadening the pool of attorneys qualified to testify, the client can better prove his or her legal malpractice case.122

Second, the court stated that a single, uniform standard would decrease the disparate probabilities of malpractice actions from locality to locality throughout Tennessee.123 By implication, the court reasoned this would increase efficiency and equity in Tennessee legal practice because attorneys should neither hide behind the substandard practices of a certain locality, nor should they be frequently targeted for malpractice due to the higher standards existing within their practicing area.124

Lastly, the court believed its ruling would modernize the standard of care analysis, as the Internet and other technology balances legal research across county and city boundaries.125 To support this final policy rationale, the court cites Russo, following a trend in modern commentary to view the Internet and technology as an equalizing medium, cutting across otherwise unlike circumstances.126 In concluding its analysis, the court affirmed the holding of the court of appeals, as the Chapmans' expert witness needed only to be qualified in his knowledge of the legal standard of care for attorneys practicing in the State of Tennessee.127

With this brief opinion, the Supreme Court gave a blanket rule that only one statewide standard of care exists for attorneys practicing in Tennessee. The bright-line nature of the rule answers several unresolved conflicts lingering in the backdrop of legal malpractice litigation among the lower courts. Primarily, the court's basic statewide standard of care benefits plaintiffs, the court system, and attorneys alike.

By creating a statewide standard, the court undoubtedly will increase the public's access to fair litigation. Plaintiffs will no longer confine their search for an expert witness to a specific locality or county; now, plaintiffs will have the full expanse of the statewide pool of attorneys that may testify to the applicable standard. No longer will a rural plaintiff be impaired because no other attorney in the community will testify against his colleague because such a plaintiff is now able to find an impartial expert witness from outside of the defendant's realm of influence and friends.128

Additionally, this benefit to the plaintiff carries further advantages for the court, as a statewide rule results in greater efficiency in the adjudication of malpractice claims. The court will now have a simplified query into the qualifications of the plaintiffs expert testimony. Instead of questioning whether the expert is an attorney of the same county, community, or locality as the defendant, the court's basic investigation will only go so far as to determine if the expert is licensed to practice within the State of Tennessee.

Moreover, the Chapman rule benefits the attorneys licensed and practicing in Tennessee. For example, this single rule will protect metropolitan attorneys from facing an unreasonably high level of care mat may result from the density of specialty lawyers practicing in a specific metropolitan area.129 As many attorneys who work in urban areas often have the resources and opportunity to specialize, general practitioners working in metropolitan areas should not be held to a higher standard simply because they are surrounded by attorneys who have a high degree of competency in a specialized area.130 Likewise, as the Chapman court explained, the statewide standard of care will prohibit local customs or special local rules from unduly lowering the standard of care for the specific area in which these customs or rules are in force, thus protecting the profession from lax standards in any particular area of the state.131

Although the court's reasoning in Chapman is succinct and follows logical lines, there is language within the opinion that may lead to further proposed alterations to the standard of care. The court supported a statewide standard of care by adding specific language concerning how attorneys use the Internet as the primary source of legal research.132 The court used the Internet to suggest that such technology rids the profession of "transportation" and "communication arguments favoring local variations in the standard of care."133 This simple language may ultimately prove to be a Pandora's box of inquiry, as many courts and legal commentators are currently suggesting that the widespread popularity of the Internet may be quickly leading to a more unified standard amongst attorneys nationwide.134 These opinions primarily assume that easy accessibility to current law via on-line services acts to balance the comparison between those who previously did or did not have access to modern law libraries; the everyday modem and laptop may render these libraries antiquated rooms mat no longer serve as a primary source for the rural or metropolitan practitioner's research.135

Carrying this reasoning to its end, many scholars argue that if all attorneys have access to the same current, applicable law, why not make all attorneys subject to a national standard of care?136 However, there are at least two points of reflection concerning this modern movement. First, the Internet-based legal researching tools do not wear cheap price tags; most of these services are expensive, and many clients either refuse or cannot afford for their attorneys to use them. Second, regardless of accessibility to the large domain of law and authority contained in these on-line services, attorneys practicing in state court must still be able to apply the research to the applicable standards and contexts of their individual states, thus leaving ample room for researching error that will not fit neatly into a national standard of care paradigm.

The Tennessee Supreme Court's decision in Chapman clearly sets a statewide precedent for the legal standard of care that is fair and balanced for both clients and attorneys. The Supreme Court correctly refused to uphold the locality rule existing in lower courts, as it presents unreasonable hurdles to plaintiffs, as well as unjustly creates pockets of inconsistency between Tennessee attorney standards. In contrast, the adopted statewide rule strongly upholds two important policies: first, litigants will have greater access to the courts, and second, practitioners have fair notice that, in pending malpractice cases there is one standard, which is circumscribed only by the borders of Tennessee. Although many scholars advocate a higher standard that may evolve into a nationwide standard, as suggested by the normalizing effects of the Internet, the better rule is that attorneys licensed in Tennessee and required to maintain state standards of practice should likewise be held to a statewide standard of care.