Precommitment theory and international law: Starting a conversation

Precommitment theory has already demonstrated its explanatory power in settings far beyond the interpersonal arena set forth by Jon Elster and Thomas Schelling a generation ago. Its most significant application in the legal realm has been in the area of constitutional law, though this application

This Essay offers a preliminary sketch in this direction. It attempts to ascertain whether precommitment theory offers useful tools for examining certain behavior by international actors. In particular, it explores the ways that states and international organizations seek to restrain their future conduct through treaties and other international legal undertakings. In so doing, it identifies the Elsterian precommitment as a special form of self-restraint by states, with legal consequences that formal doctrine may or may not already recognize. At the same time, the Essay also suggests that many forms of self-binding on the international plane are not bona fide precommitments. Nonetheless, the distinctions between those state actions that qualify as precommitments and those that do not can have important ramifications for the way international law and institutions should treat various commitments by states to constrain their future activity.