'Limitations on lifting' not sufficient for ADA suit.

CASE ON POINT: Lundquist v. Rice Memorial Hospital, 2005 WL 156640 -MN

ISSUE: Is the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) applicable to nurses who have limitations on the amounts they are allowed to lift? That was the issue with which the federal courts were confronted in this interesting

CASE FACTS: Rachel Lundquist was employed by Rice Memorial Hospital as a nurse during three distinct time periods. She was first hired in 1968. She voluntarily left her position in 1975 due to child care responsibilities and injuries she sustained in a motor vehicle accident. In 1980, the hospital rehired her. In 1995, she experienced neck pains. She was diagnosed with degenerative changes at several levels of her neck including a herniated disc. In March 1995, her physician restricted her physical activities to exclude any heavy lifting. The hospital accommodated this restriction by assigning her to a position as Shift Coordinator. In July 1995, her neurologist restricted her physical activity further. He ordered that she not lift more than 15 to 20 pounds at one time and that she should not lift this weight repetitively for more than thirty minutes at a time. Bending and twisting motions were also ordered restricted. The hospital placed Lundquist on medical leave in August 1995 pursuant to the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). On February 27, 1996, the hospital terminated Nurse Lundquist for the first time, reasoning that she could not perform the essential functions of nursing. Lundquist filed a grievance, which resulted in an arbitrator's order that she be allowed to return to work providing that she was willing to perform the essential requirements of her job. She returned but could not or would not do any lifting. On January 15, 1997, the hospital placed Lundquist on administrative leave. Lundquist maintained that the hospital discriminated against her on the basis of disability by (1) placing her on unrequested medical leave; (2) wrongfully terminating her employment in February 1996; and (3) failing to provide reasonable accommodation for her disability. While Nurse Lundquist was on leave the first time, the hospital sent two different job descriptions to her. The hospital instructed Lundquist to submit the job descriptions to her neurologist to assess whether she could perform either of the jobs described. The neurologist explained that although Lundquist could perform the "cerebral" aspects, she could not meet the physical demands of either. He later stated that if lifting is an essential duty of a job, then Lundquist would not be able to perform that job. During Nurse Landquist's second leave of absence, the hospital required her to undergo a Functional Capacities Evaluation (FCE) to determine whether she could fulfil the physical requirements for a staff nurse position. The FCE indicated that Lundquist could not perform patient transfers (except under very limited circumstances) but could carry out most other physical nursing activities. The hospital considered this statement to be "inconclusive" and ordered another FCE. The second FCE concluded that Lundquist could "rarely" or "occasionally" lift or push weight in excess of twenty pounds. The hospital hired a company to create a functional job description for the staff nurse position and sent it to Lundquist's physician to assess whether she could meet its requirements with or without reasonable accommodation. The physician responded that Lundquist "could not meet" some of the physical demands. The hospital fired Lundquist a second time on December 31, 1997. Her firing was based on the medical evaluation from which the hospital reasoned that Lundquist's physical restrictions were permanent and that she was unable to perform the essential functions of her job. Lundquist brought suit against the hospital in federal court. Although the deadline had passed for amending her complaint, Lundquist attempted to add allegations of retaliatory discharge under the ADA. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania denied the motion. Lundquist did not appeal; however, she filed another suit against the hospital (hereinafter known as Lundquist If). This suit claimed disability discrimination under the ADA and various state laws but was allegedly related to a different time period from Lundquist I and involved a heretofore unmentioned claim for the second termination. The trial court granted the hospital's motion for summary judgment. Lundquist appealed.

COURT'S OPINION: The Untied States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, affirmed the decision of the District Court, the court found, inter alia, that essentially Lundquist presented only one truly new piece of evidence in the case--a report of a rehabilitation consultant, which recounted her many unsuccessful efforts to find a new nursing job.

LEGAL COMMENTARY: The first element that a plaintiff must establish to succeed on a claim under the ADA is that the individual in fact lives with a "disability" as that term is defined by the ADA. The ADA defines a disability to be a "physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities." This element is of threshold importance! If a plaintiff cannot establish this, he has no claim.