As You Like It: Senior Federal Judges and the Political Economy of Judicial Tenure

Albert Yoon, "As You Like It: Senior Federal Judges and the Political Economy of Judicial Tenure," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 2 (2005): 495-549.

In this extensive study, drawing on Federal Judicial Center data and interviews with senior judges, Northwestern law professor Albert Yoon

explores why federal judges, when eligible, take senior status rather than remaining in active status or retiring from the bench, particularly when the latter would allow them their pension and private-sector salary. The result of their decision to become senior judges is that they "are willing to work essentially for free" (p. 498).

Yoon recaps the history of federal judicial pensions (particularly the 1869 and 1919 statutes, the latter establishing senior status) and shows their effects on length of judicial service. He then explores the extent to which senior judges assist with federal court caseload; their significant contribution is clear (see pp. 518-21). The core of the article involves several questions. One is when judges take senior status (rather than retirement)-most do so shortly after becoming eligible-and the trends in their doing so, as well as their remaining in that status-often, until shortly before they die; whether "political" factors (such as which president would fill the resulting vacancy) play a part is also discussed. The second concerns the effect of a judge's taking senior status on the confirmation of their successors and, thus, on the length of time an active-duty judgeship is vacant. The third is senior judges' views as to why they took senior status and remain in it; there the desires to create a vacancy, to have more time for travel and hobbies, and to curtail workload all play major roles.

Yoon's article is an important contribution to our knowledge of judicial tenure and retirement, particularly given the limited literature on the subject. SLW