Compensation, benefits and work schedules.

Compensation, Benefits and Work Schedules

The empirical research literature of the past 25 years which is thought to be intellectually useful for public managers is summarized for these three titled areas. The article concludes with a discussion of topics from theory and practice which

Compensation, Benefits and Work Schedules--these topics are somewhat disparate. However, from the point of view of human resources management, the research literature reveals common areas of impacts and effects. Some of these areas are employee morale, motivation, and performance; and workforce recruitment, retention, and turnover. Although it has been necessary to limit the extent of this research review, it is with these and other commonalities that this review is concerned.

Compensation

Job Evaluation Systems

Considering the number of years that job evaluation systems have been in use, there is a paucity of valuative and comparative research on the effectiveness of different systems. Even the intuitively acceptable assumptions such as that jobs stand in hierarchical relationship to each other with respect to pay they merit has not been questioned. No attempt has been made to define "value" or "worth".(1)

There have been three published studies in which the same jobs were evaluated with more than one plan and the evaluations compared. Chesler(2) described the results of evaluation of 35 different office jobs under six job evaluation plans to be highly correlated. Information to determine if the job evaluation plans were substantially different was not provided. In 1966 Hay Associates compared evaluations of 52 jobs, under the U.S. General Schedule Classification with the Hay System. Hay points and GS grade levels were correlated at .94.(3)

Treiman(4) compared 21 jobs under two systems, the Hay method and a factor point system. Some jobs were evaluated substantially different in the two governmental jurisdictions studied (as much as 60% difference for some jobs). The Hay system appeared to make larger distinctions at the upper end of the scale and smaller distinctions towards the lower end of the scale than did the factor-point system. This produced a much lower correlation than was found in the other two studies.

The Paterson method is a single-factor job evaluation method based on decision making. Paterson(5) claims he has data that establish a logarithmic relationship among wage rates paid to the different decision grades as defined by this method.

Comparable Worth

Comparable worth is a public policy issue of the 1980's which has been debated, in part, on questions of job value as determined by job evaluation criteria. The latter are seen as both partial solution and problem. The main criticisms of job evaluation systems found by Treiman in his National Academy of Sciences study (1979) were problems of the choice of factors and factor weights; the ultimate subjectivity of judgments; and the use of different job evaluation plans for different segments of an organization's workforce.

Forty percent of the variance between equally valued male and female dominated jobs (in terms of job evaluation factors and weights) appears to be attributable to differences in work force experience and on-the-job training and, more fundamentally, attributable to motherhood.(6) Job evaluation systems and market valuation of occupations appear to have institutionalized undervaluation of female dominated jobs.(7)

Factors which should mitigate this situation in the evolving future are: * interest in the issue by labor unions and collective bargaining on the

issue; * awareness and identification of bias in job evaluation criteria and

weights; * legislation; * civil rights enforcement; * aggressive pursuit of male dominated jobs by career oriented women; * changing cultural values on the economic and social role of women; * institutional supports such as convenient access to child care facilities.

Pay for Knowledge

Pay for knowledge is paying on the basis of the number of jobs a person can perform. Originally thought to be primarily a practice in manufacturing concerns, pay for knowledge has been found to be used more extensively than previously thought, including for white collar occupations.(8)

Merit Pay, Satisfaction and Intrinsics

Several studies suggest a clustering of these factors rather than their occurrence as separated values. Effort was highest in organizations which reward it; and, where intrinsics are valued and effort was rewarded, nurses who worked hardest were most satisfied with pay.(9)

Persons who are dissatisfied with non-monetary rewards also tend to be dissatisfied with pay.(10) Strong associations and causal relationships have been shown for merit increases, higher job performance, and higher job satisfaction.(11) There was no evidence that people are productive because they are better satisfied.(12)

Though there are conflicting empirical findings, most studies have rejected Deci's hypothesis(13) that expectation of reward that is contingent upon performance will decrease intrinsic motivation.(14)

Regardless of race and ethnicity (and for both public and private employees), people seek a mixture of intrinsic and extrinsic rewards in the work place. However, there is some tendency for minorities of lower socio-economic status to favor extrinsic rewards.(15)

Schay(16) determined that perceptions of equity are important if a performance-contingent pay system is to work. From her study of a government research and development laboratory, she concluded that level of pay satisfaction was basically predicted by equity perceptions.

Women who are secondary wage earners with children look not only for challenging and materially rewarding work, but also jobs that do not make excessive demands (hours, overtime, travel, physical effort).(17)

The admonition that personnel development issues and compensation should not be discussed in the same performance appraisal meeting is contradicted by a more recent study. It was found that salary discussion had its strongest positive impacts when there was a strong need for employee development and clear communications in appraisal meetings.(18)

Pay for Performance in the Federal Government

Beginning with the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, rewards for federal supervisors and managers are to be based on competitive merit. This is a most significant civil service reform initiative. However, like other statutory compensation policies, such as pay comparability, there has been more slippage of purpose than achievement. There is by now a well documented and contrasting set of experiences between the U.S. Navy Demonstration Project and the rest of the federal managerial work force.

For this kind of a system to work there are a number of requirements which must be met: * Desired achievements which are to be rewarded must be within the

ability of the individual to carry out. * Participants (superiors and subordinates) must be trained in the

process of setting performance objectives. * Setting meaningful performance objectives must be within the state

of the art of the particular function involved. * Undesired behaviors which are prompted by the setting and

rewarding of specific objectives must be anticipated and circumscribed (e.g.

concentrating on some objectives to the neglect of others which are

not objects of special reward). * The reward must be valued by the person who is to perform. The

person must be able to perform and willing to perform. * Performance is monitored and compared with plans. In other words,

there must be feedback and evaluation. * At this point questions arise from the previous steps. Were any of the

conditions changed in process? Were either rewards or outcomes

imprecisely or insufficiently identified? * Finally, is the entire process worth it in cost-effectiveness or

cost-benefit terms--for the individual, for the organization?

Merit pay failed these tests for the federal managerial work force in general. Perhaps the basic idea is flawed, but the failure had more to do with the way it was implemented than any other observable factor. The following summarizes the deficiencies described in the literature. Many goals conflicted with proper implementation (for example, distortion of evaluations in order to retain younger professionals in RIF situations); there were many non-objectified goals; implementation was hurried and training of participants was neglected; managers were forced to ignore the totality of jobs in order to pursue planned objectives; there were difficulties with the mechanics of competition within pay pools for payouts; Congress reduced rewards to inconsequential amounts; there is evidence of low motivation to work harder and to achieve for more money; there is a valuing of intrinsics and extrinsics other than direct cash payments (challenging responsibilities, coworkers, and retirement benefits); there is a lack of perception of linkage between performance and pay by subordinates; there were various problems of mid-stream process changes; and ultimately, there was the assessment by many that the costs of the system were not worth the benefits derived.(19)

The situation for the U.S. Navy Demonstration Project was different.(20) GS grades were consolidated into pay bands which precluded many of the pay pool composition problems experienced elsewhere. Goal setting and evaluation has been effective. Employees are willing to work harder for more pay. The performance-reward connection is understood by employees. There is no evidence of goal displacement or performance objectives being outside of the control of the employee. Finally, the monetary rewards (which were about 5% higher than for other federal employees) were considered to be worth the process.

The Group Incentives Alternative

Because pay for performance is impractical in many work situations in which cooperative behavior is required in order to produce outputs, the idea of group incentives appears to make sense.(21) The research review illustrated two practical applications of group incentives using the concept of gainsharing. One application requires the setting of performance standards for a group--preferably systemically associated to produce outputs. Workers in the production system would share in savings for achievement above standard (by 50%, for example).(22)

In another approach, not unlike Quality Circles, employees would share in cost savings or receive bonuses which result from innovative improvements. The federal government now has several programs such as Pacer Share. However, these have yet to be fully evaluated.(23)

For managers, perhaps a combination of gainsharing and merit pay would be an efficacious strategy. As the formal leaders, managers would be able to influence the productive efforts of their employees. Employee success should be managerial success. Managers might also be required to undertake achievement of special objectives which might be directly under their control (for example, system improvement). The reward could then be on the basis of achievement of planned objectives as well.

Pay, Recruitment, and Turnover

The literature permits a limited profiling of employment behaviors of government employees. The following are salient factors related to pay which affect recruitment and retention of the public work force. Public employees value intrinsics such as work itself, opportunities to exercise professional judgement, and service to the public, as well as extrinsics such as working conditions and coworkers. They value monetary rewards but have made intellectual trade-offs in going to work for government in the first place, and would not necessarily work harder for more pay. They tend to be risk averse and therefore part of their trade-off of security for less pay includes deferred compensation.(24) However, there is evidence that if properly managed, merit pay systems can promote retention of high performers and turnover of low ones.(25)

Deferred benefit systems tend to result in long service and little turnover among higher civil servants. Recent changes in federal retirement law to a combination of a thrift-type plan and social security will make pension benefits lower but more portable for the future work force. The effect of this will be to facilitate turnover of managerial and professional personnel (at all levels) who in the past have tended to stay until retirement age (early retirement having been financially penalizing). Lowest level employees tend to turn over frequently anyway unless economic conditions reduce opportunities.(26) Statutory requirements not withstanding, presidents have restricted incrementation of federal pay relative to other employers for about nine years. Levels of compensation relative to non-federal employees are quite low (federal employees are about 24% cumulatively behind the private sector). Both the federal experience and research findings in general document the relationship between compensation level and the ability to hire qualified employees.(27) This has been felt most sharply in the federal government which has an aging professional and managerial work force (waiting out eligibility for retirement under the old system).(28)

Thus, two factors appear to be salient in recruitment and retention of professional and management employees: a defined benefit retirement system, and pay ranges adjusted for averages of other employers. This assumes that high turn over is not desired. If it is desired, a more portable form of deferred compensation, and a pay structure which is attractive to entry and middle level personnel, but which discourages long stayers, seems appropriate. High performing, hard to recruit and retain personnel seem to do best under a merit pay system when it is properly administered.

Benefits

Health Care

Health care premiums for employers have increased by outrageous proportions.(29) The two strategies of cost containment and health improvement have been found to be effective in dealing with increases.

A variety of cost containment actions have been successful. Three of these involve cost shifting to employees by requiring them to bear some of the burdens of cost, such as deductibles, co-insurance, limitation of coverage in certain areas, and total maxima for yearly or lifetime coverage. Cost shifting has been shown to reduce health care expenditures in direct proportion to the degree of the costs shifted. Other areas of health benefit cost containment which have been effective are research on utilization patterns and organizational self-insurance.(30)

The second major health care cost reduction strategy is health promotion. Included are activities such as changes in life style, counseling, information dissemination, safety interventions, physical examinations, fitness programs, diet change, and smoking cessation. When extensive health promotion programs are conducted along with cost containment programs health care expenditures have been reduced by millions of dollars. While most of the research in the area has not involved use of control groups, one of the major ones with the largest reported savings did use a control group evaluation design.(31)

Control of Employee Sick-Time

Multiple costs to the employer are involved in excessive sick-time use by employees. Costs extend beyond the obvious ones associated with absenteeism to subtler areas such as over staffing in general and lowered morale of other employees who may resent doing someone else's work.(32)

Several studies concur on the pattern of users of sick leave benefits. The high user pattern is the following: * age--younger and older workers, except for public professionals and

managers, where the age 31-40 group are biggest users; * gender--females use more sick-time than males; * education--college graduates use less sick-time than high school

graduates; * married men use less sick-time than married women; * non-married public managers and professionals use more sick-time

than married ones; * minorities use more sick-time than non-minorities; * workers with children use more sick-time than workers with no

children; * tenure and absenteeism are inversely related; * public managerial and professional employees ready to retire use less

sick-time than those with more time before retirement; * job level and absenteeism are inversely related; * public professionals use more sick-time than public managers; * distance to work and absenteeism are positively related; * job satisfaction and absenteeism are inversely related; * there is a greater use of sick-time during colder months except for the

beginning and end of school terms in the spring and fall.(33)

Control strategies have been investigated extensively. Penalties reduce absenteeism.(34) Garcia(35) found the same results, but within the context of a progressive discipline program. Rewards were found to have mixed results,(36) failed,(37) or were successful.(38) Garcia also found that satisfaction was higher where controls were most effective.

Flexible Benefits

Research has shown that employee preferences in fringe packages vary with age, organizational position, family status, and number of years employed by the organization.(39) The traditional nuclear family supported by a male wage earner is passing as a modal phenomenon. Today nearly half the workforce is female, the average household is supported by a two-paycheck income, and the age composition of the workforce is changing. Not only have new needs emerged, such as child care and physical fitness, but benefits available to employed spouses are redundant. For example, some employees might prefer to be covered by their spouse's health insurance plans, if it were possible to thereby free up benefit credits on their own plans.

So-called cafeteria benefits programs allow employees to spend credits or dollars on benefits from a menu or to take cash.

These programs have payoffs for both employers and employees: * a strategy for controlling acceleration in the cost of fringes; * allowing employees from two pay check families to optimize from

two sets of fringes; * eliminating the tendency for bargaining units to "piggy back" on the

negotiated benefits of other groups; * making employees aware of the real costs of fringes (which they

normally tend to under value).

Retirement

As previously summarized, retirement policy decisions can significantly affect work force composition and retention.(40) In general, public employees tend to be more risk averse than private sector employees, therefore they will accept lower wages in exchange for more generous retirement benefits. Most public employee retirement systems are designed to cater to these needs.

Normal retirement age at full benefits usually is earlier in most public plans than in private ones by five to ten years. Many public plans allow early retirement with reduced benefits. Whether or not the early retirement possibilities are desirable depends on the value of older public employees. Early retirement, of course, is more costly because benefits are paid out for longer periods.

If job turnover is undesirable, shorter vesting periods would be preferable. If little is gained from low turnover, longer periods are appropriate. Several research studies have investigated factors which influence the decision to or not to retire. As one might expect, economic factors (including financial incentives and disincentives) dominate individual early retirement decisions.(41)

Lower job level employees are more likely to retire. Extending the minimum permissible mandatory retirement age to 75 or abolishing mandatory retirement altogether would have only a minor effect on retirement planning. Opportunities to work beyond age 70 appeal to very few senior workers. However, various incentives would induce continued working beyond intended retirement age by 17 to 20 months.(42) Older workers from higher economic management and professional occupations appear to be interested in part-time employment, particularly involving assignment to less responsible jobs.(43)

Work Schedules

Flextime, Compressed Work Schedules, and Reduced Work Time Options

A considerable body of program evaluation research has accumulated since 1970 which examines the efficacy of various flexible working hour arrangements. These mostly report success. However, they have been criticized from methodological points of view on ground such as lack of control group design, post-test only studies, lack of "hard" performance data outcomes (various groups excluded from experimental populations), and insufficient data on supervisory effects.(44)

On balance, it can be concluded that these approaches can have the effects of improving organizational performance in terms of use of sick leave, absenteeism, tardiness, and turn over.(45) While there is evidence that part-time employment is becoming more prevalent in the public and private sector,(46) there is little evidence that it has made a difference in productivity or effectiveness factors. Private organizations have demonstrated minimized effects of layoffs.(47)

Overtime

One study of federal agencies showed overtime used as being negatively associated with productivity, and positively associated with increases in staff.(48) An industrial study showed overtime to be positively related to both incidence and severity of industrial accidents and illnesses.(49)

Shift Work

A number of studies have documented worker problems associated with shift work, particularly afternoon, night, and rotating shifts. This is a major area of difficulty related to family problems, particularly among younger employees.(50)

There is evidence that certain types of persons, including workers who require less supervision, those who prefer to work with fewer people, and those who have little need to communicate with others are best equipped to deal with shift induced stress.(51) There is also evidence that organizational variables such as work design are more important than shift in predicting attitudes about work site, supervision, coworkers, and satisfaction.(52)

Research Needs

This literature review suggests areas in which further research efforts might be concentrated relative to knowledge gaps, particularly for concepts that will be of utility to management.

Toward a More Generic Set(s) of Job Evaluation Factors. While it may not be possible to develop a universal body of factors through which all jobs may be evaluated, the needs of internal equity in organizations, as well as such driving forces as legislation and collective bargaining, indicate that the future will require such systems. Treiman's comparison of jobs evaluated under two systems is an important beginning. An older work which might be explored further is the Position Analysis Questionnaire (PAQ).(53) Another possibility may be in the direction of one or more job evaluation factors, as in the work of Paterson on which decision making levels were used.

Managing to Budget. In several federal agencies managers are allowed discretion is making pay grade level allocations regardless of standards if total workforce cost can be managed within authorized budget levels. This practice should theoretically unencumber management in obtaining and retaining key personnel and in achieving mission. The reality of these outcomes as well as consequences should be evaluated. An example of a consequence is reduced morale of persons who are under compensated as a result of this authority.

Pay for Knowledge. This idea seems to be taking hold in the private sector, including white collar jobs. It might be a useful addition to the process of public pay administration. Private sector applications and comparisons with comparable public service jobs would be two logical foci of study.

Perceptions of Pay Equity. What is it that different job holders in various organizations and levels compare in developing personal feelings of equity or inequity in compensation? Existing research evidence leaves a good deal of unexplained variance in such feelings. While it may never be possible to achieve "total" human happiness in the workplace it is worth understanding people's comparisons and their feelings of inequity.

Contingent Reward Effects on Intrinsics. Deci's (1971) hypothesis that expectation of a reward that is contingent upon performance will decrease intrinsic motivation appears to be rejected by the preponderance of research evidence. However, there is room for further research in which greater control is exercised over variables of the work setting and how pay is administered.

Pay-for-Performance in Government. While the federal experience has been well researched in terms of its failures, there still remains a need to understand more about outcomes of the U.S. Navy experimental laboratories for which there are positive trends from longitudinal comparison of attitude survey data. There are still no hard measures of success except those for achievement of the project's fundamental objective. This was to recruit and retain high ability and high performing scientists and engineers and to encourage turnover of low performers. Even attitudinal data on organizational impacts, such as performance evaluations by system purchasers, have not be reported. At the state and local government level the subject is not well researched. Many governments report that merit pay is used, but this is questioned because of the traditional constraints on governmental pay systems. Still, some organizations such as the County of Los Angeles are developing such systems for executive compensation. These should be studied.

Group Performance Incentives. There is not extensive research literature on this subject for public organizations. Various federal and other gainsharing and group performance incentive programs should be systematically evaluated.

Health Benefit Cost Control. Several strategies of cost containment, many involving cost shifting to employees, have emerged. More extensive research on governmental organizations is needed, including effects on salaries, labor-management negotiations and contract provisions. Also, the efficacy of other strategies such as health promotion should be examined for public organizations. Will these cost containment programs have negative impacts which are reflected in employee health statistics?

Flexible Benefit Plans. Because flexible benefit systems promise savings for employers and greater utility of benefit dollar for employees there will be a growing number of these plans in various U.S. governments. A fruitful area of research should be the extent to which the anticipated payoffs actually materialize. Criteria such as the following are important: employee awareness and valuation of benefits, the extent of adverse selection impacts on various plans and providers, the extent of actual differences in employee choices, the cost impact on employers, and employee attitudes.

Retirement. Because retirement benefits have been such traditionally important factors in the attraction and retention of civil service employees, it is important to study the effects of changes in various policies, particularly the change from defined benefit to defined contribution based systems.

Reduced Work Options. Job sharing and part-time work are fast growing modes of employment. There is little systematic research which has examined effects in terms of hard data such as impact on total payroll, overtime, sick-time, productivity, error rates, and effectiveness.

Overtime. A study of the relationship of overtime in public service organizations to various organizational effects such as productivity, sicktime, and accident rates for the public service should be informative to management. Differentiation of findings by occupation, function, and other factors is also necessary.

Notes (1)D. Treiman, Job Evaluation: an Analytic Review, Interim Report to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, (Washington, DC: National Academy of Sciences, 1979) (2)D. Chesler, "Reliability and Comparability of Different Job Evaluation Systems," Journal of Applied Psychology (October 1948), 465-475. (3)L.A. Pappas, A. Fisher, and M. Doren, A Comparison of the Civil Service Classification System and the Hay Method of Job Evaluation, (Washington, DC: Hay Associates, 1976). (4)Treiman, Op. Cit. (5)T. Paterson, Job Evaluation (London: Business Books, 1970); T. Paterson and T. Husband, "Decision Making Responsibility: Yardstick for Job Evaluation," Compensation Review 2, n.2, 21-31. (6)M. Corcoran and G. Duncan, "Work History, Labor Force Attachment and Earnings Between the Races and Sexes," Journal of Human Resources 13 (Winter 1979), 3-20; V. Fuchs, "Sex Differences in Economic Well-Being," Science 232 (April 1986), 459-464. (7)E. Sorensen, "Effect of Comparable Worth Policies on Earnings," Industrial Relations 26, n. 3 (1987), 227-39; R. Kelly and J. Bayes (eds.), Comparable Worth, Pay Equity, and Public Policy. (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988), Chap. 15. (8)N. Gupta, G. Jenkins, and W. Currinton. "Paying for Knowledge: Myths and Realities," National Productivity Review 5, n.2 (1986), 107-23. (9)B. Schneider and L. Olson, "Effort as a Correlate of Organizational Reward System and Individual Values," Personnel Psychology 23, n.3 (1970), 313-26. (10)R. Monczka, L. Foster, W. Reif, and J. Neustrom, "Pay and Satisfaction: Money Is Not the Only Answer," Compensation Review 9, n.4 (1977), 22-8. (11)L. Porter, and E. Lawler, Managerial Attitudes and Performance, (Homewood, IL. Irwin/Dorsey, 1968); W. Ronan and G. Organt, "Determinants of Pay and Pay Satisfaction," Personnel Psychology 26, n.4 (1973), 503-20; R. Katzell and D. Yankelovich, Work and Productivity and Job Satisfaction: An Evaluation of Policy-Related Research, (New York: New York University, Psychological Corporation, 1975), Chap. 8. (12)C. Greene, "Causal Connections Among Manager's Merit Pay, Job Satisfaction, and Performance," Journal of Applied Psychology 58 (1973), 95-100. (13)E. Deci, "The Hidden Coats of Rewards," Organization Dynamics 4 (1976), 61-72. (14)R. Vecchio, "The Contingent--Noncontingent Compensation Controversy: An Attempt at a Resolution," Human Relations 35, n.6 (1982), 449-62; B. Schay, "Effects of Performance-Contingent Pay on Employee Attitudes," Public Personnel Management 17, n.2 (1988), 237-50. (15)R. Bloom and J.R. Barry, "Determinants of Work Attitudes Among Negroes," Journal of Applied Psychology 51 (1967), 291-94; C. O'Reilly and K. Roberts, "Job Satisfaction Among Whites and Nonwhites: A Cross Cultural Approach," Journal of Applied Psychology 62 (June 1973), 295-99; G. Shapiro, "Racial Difference in the Value of Job Rewards," Social Forces 56 (September 1977), 21-8; C. Davis and J. West, "Job Reward Preferences of Mexican-American and Anglo Public Employees," Public Productivity Review 4, n.3 (1980), 199-209. (16)Schay, Op. Cit. (17)J. Martin and S. Hanson, "Sex, Family Wage-Earning Status and Satisfaction With Work," Work and Occupations 12, n.1 (1985), 91-109. (18)H. Meyer, E. Kay, and J. French, "Split Roles in Performance Appraisal," Harvard Business Review 43 (1965), 123-29; J. Prince and E. Lawler, "Does Salary Discussion Hurt the Developmental Performance Appraisal?" Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 37 (1986), 357-75. (19)J. Sauter, "Role of PRB in the Bonus Decision: Pitfalls to Avoid," Public Personnel Management 10 (Fall 1981), 296-98; U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board, Status Report on Performance Appraisal and Merit Pay, (Washington, DC: June 1981), 31; U.S. Office of Personnel Management, Merit Pay Systems Design, (Washington, DC: 1981), 79; L. Nigro, "CSRA Performance Appraisals and Merit Pay: Growing Uncertainty in the Federal Workforce," Public Administration Review 42 (July-August 1982), 371-75; D. O'Toole and J. Churchill, "Implementing Pay-For-Performance, Initial Experiences," Review of Public Personnel Administration 2 (Summer 1982), 13-28; F. Sherwood, "Wrong Assumptions, Wrong Strategies," The Bureaucrat 11 (Winter 1982-83), 22-27; J. Pearce and J. Perry, "Federal Merit Pay: a Longitudinal Analysis," Public Administration Review 43 (July-August 1983), 315-25; J. Perry, and J. Pearce, "Initial Reactions to Federal Merit Pay," Personnel Journal 62 (March 1983), 236-37; U.S. General Accounting Office, "Report to the Honorable Jeff Bingaman: Analysis of OPM's-Report on Pay for Performance in the Federal Government--1980-1982," (October 1983); U.S. General Accounting Office, "Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Post Office and Civil Service, House of Representatives of the United States: a Two-year Appraisal of Merit Pay in Three Agencies," (March 1984); K. Gaertner and G. Gaertner, "Performance-Contingent Pay for Federal Managers," Administration and Society 17, n.1 (1985), 7-20; J. Pearce, W. Stevenson, and J. Perry, "Managerial Compensation Based on Organizational Performance: a Time Series Analysis of the Effects of Merit Pay," Academy of Management Journal 28, n.2 (1985), 261-78; M. Pagano, "An Exploratory Evaluation of the Civil Service Reform Act's Merit Pay System for GS 13-15s: a Case Study of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services," Chap. 10 in D. Rosenbloom, ed., Public Personnel Policy: the Politics of Civil Service, (Port Washington, NY: Associated Faculty Press, Inc., 1985); U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board, Federal Personnel Policies and Practices--Perspectives from the Workplace, (December 16, 1987), Performance Management and Recognition System: Linking Pay to Performance, (December 30, 1987), Toward Effective Performance Management in the Federal Government, (July 1988). (20)G. Siegel, "The Jury is Still Out on Merit Pay in Government," Review of Public Personnel Administration 7, n. 3 (1987), 3-15; Schay, Op. Cit.; U.S. General Accounting Office, Federal Personnel, Observations on the Navy's Personnel Management Demonstration Project, Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Post Office and Civil Service, GAO/GGD-88-79 (May 1988). (21)E. Lawler, Pay and Organizational Effectiveness: A Psychological View, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971). (22)D. Mohr, J. Riedel, and K. Crawford, "A Group Wage Incentive System Can Boost Performance and Cut Costs," Defense Management Journal 22, n.2 (1986), 13-17. (23)C. O'Dell, People, Performance, and Pay, (Houston, TX: American Productivity Center, 1987); T. Ross and R. Ross, "Understanding Gainsharing," Classifiers Column 19, n.7 (1988), 1-3. (24)G. Siegel, "Who is the Public Employee?" in W. Eddy, ed., Handbook of Organization Management, (New York: Marcel Dekker, Inc., 1983), 105-43; Pearce and Perry, Op. Cit. (25)Schay, Op. Cit. (26)U.S. General Accounting Office, Senior Executive Service, Reasons Why Career Members Left in Fiscal Year 1985, Fact sheet for the Honorable Vic Fazio, House of Representatives, GAO/GGD-87-106fs (August 1987). (27)A. Korman, A. Glickman, and R. 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Gilbert B. Siegel is Associate Dean and Professor, School of Public Administration. University of Southern California. He has taught, consulted, and published extensively in the public personnel field. He has also taught at the University of Pittsburgh where he received his Ph.D. in Political Science. In addition, he has had administrative experience with the County of Los Angeles, California.