Worst-case scenario: the Middle East: current trends indicate that a Middle Eastern war might...

At Forecasting International, we are less concerned that the Middle East will descend into chaos following the withdrawal of U.S. troops. We would put the likelihood of a regional war at no more than 10%. Yet, if this is a low-probability event, it would have an impact too large to be ignored.

The argument, of course, goes like this: Iran is supporting Shi'ite extremists in their attempt to dominate post-Saddam Iraq. The U.S. military is the primary force, and perhaps the only force, that prevents them from subjugating the country's Sunni minority. If U.S. forces leave Iraq, Syria and Saudi Arabia will enter the fray on the side of the Sunnis, as King Abdullah reportedly warned Vice President Cheney early in December 2006. Turkey, presumably, will take advantage of this chaos to settle its long-running conflict with the Kurds of northern Iraq and the adjoining regions. We now have a regional war.

There is more to come. After all, this is the most volatile region in the world. Sunnis and Shi'ites have carried on an intermittent religious and ethnic power struggle there for some 1,400 years. Worse, after World War I the victors deliberately broke the Middle East into artificial states that could never be stable, and thus could not easily be united under the banner of Pan Arabism. As Sesh Velamoor of the Foundation For the Future points out, if the West is unhappy with conditions in the Middle East, it has itself largely to blame. But the important point is that mere instability soon could break down into general chaos.

Here is one possible course of events: Hezbollah's current protests in Lebanon and the government's reactive crackdown may result in a larger war. Saudi Arabia could intervene here, too, as it has been actively supporting the government of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora. At the same time, Hezbollah and Hamas, in the Occupied Territories, will be encouraged to expand their struggle against Israel. In Egypt, the banned but still powerful Muslim Brotherhood would be encouraged to resume the battle for a fundamentalist Islamic state, endangering Western access to the Suez Canal. Extremists from distant reaches of the Muslim world will flood into the Middle East. Saudi Arabia, a land of Sunni Arabs, and Iran, the home of Persian Shi'ites, already on opposite sides in Iraq, might expand their conflict to do battle across the Persian Gulf, with fallout in Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates.

One way or another, it all spins out of control. Everyone in the Middle East fights everyone else for decades.

There are other ways to interpret the situation in Iraq. Velamoor suggests that Iraq may quickly become a Shi'ite theocracy on the model of Iran, slowly growing more liberal in the years ahead. Others hold that Iran is stirring the chaos in Iraq not so much to dominate its neighbor as to keep U.S. troops mired there. That way, if President Bush decides to attack Iran, Teheran will have 200,000 U.S. hostages at hand right next door.

Even so, the idea of a generalized war in the Middle East appears credible enough and its potential impact on the West serious enough to merit examination. It is the worst-case scenario and needs to be understood and either defended against or, if possible, turned to the West's advantage.

To date, most commentators have simply assumed that a generalized war in the Middle East would be a bad thing, and today's concerns have limited their analyses to policy implications for the U.S. occupation of Iraq. Certainly, wholesale carnage is never to be welcomed, and the risk of unrestrained slaughter must be factored into any decision the United States makes about the land it chose to occupy. Yet, the United States will not remain in Iraq forever, forced comparisons with Korea notwithstanding, and its departure is likely to leave a power vacuum in that country. Under the circumstances, there are questions that need to be answered in some detail. What would a regional war in the Middle East imply for the United States and its allies? And what should the West do to influence the situation to its advantage, now and in the future? Thus far, many possibilities have been overlooked.

For example, the Iraq war has inspired, recruited, trained, and battle-hardened a new generation of future terrorists who, when freed from Iraq, are likely to turn their attention to the United States and its allies, especially in the U.K. and France. Having a Middle Eastern war to keep them occupied may be the West's only protection against a jihad that could make terrorism to date seem relatively tame.

At least, it seems so to us. We offer the following analysis for comment and welcome whatever thoughts anyone may have to offer. Not everyone will agree with our premises. Many issues will look very different in the Middle East than they do in the West. This article is a "What if?" It seeks to begin the discussion of what may lie ahead in one specific scenario that is too important to remain unexamined.

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KEY ISSUES FOR THE U.S. AND THE MIDDLE EAST

The United States has only four basic interests in the Middle East: Israel, terrorism, nuclear nonproliferation, and oil. Let us take them in order.

* Israeli security. Israel is the only Western-style democracy in the Middle East and the one ally there that the United States can count on in a crisis. Israel provides the United States with useful intelligence about the region and some other areas of the world at least as often as the United States supplies it to Israel. Israel occasionally takes action that is in the American interest when the United States itself would find that difficult, as in the bombing of the Osirak Nuclear Research Facility in Iraq in 1981. And Israel has long been a victim of aggression, for which the United States generally has sympathy. It is significant also that many Americans, and especially many politically influential Americans, feel a deep personal interest in the fate of the Jewish homeland. In all, it is inevitable that the United States would consistently side with Israel in its efforts to survive the hostility of its neighbors.

Yet this is a sympathy for which the United States pays heavily in the enmity of Muslims around the world. Although U.S. support for Israel is not the only issue that draws Muslim ire to the United States, it is the source of the broadest antagonism. In a time of generalized war in the Middle East, Muslims will be angry enough at the United States for having allowed its crusade in Iraq to destabilize the region. America's close relationship with Israel can only add fuel to that fire.

Washington is now in a position to make amends by approaching the Israeli-Palestinian dispute from a new angle.

If Israel ever needed America's unquestioning patronage, it no longer does, despite its embarrassing inability to defeat Hezbollah in the Lebanon conflict of July 2006. Prime Minister Ehud Olmert made that clear when (apparently inadvertently) he admitted in December 2006 that his country does indeed possess nuclear weapons. Israel's neighbors may be hostile, but if they sometimes are suicidal as individuals, as nations they are not. Even if they are capable of destroying Israel, as Iran may soon be, they will take no action against it that would provoke a nuclear response.

This allows Washington to take a step that has long been needed. It must reassert itself in the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, but with much more balance than it has, in the common Middle Eastern view, displayed. The United States must press Israel to remove its settlements from the Occupied Territories and return the occupied land to Palestinian control. At the same time, it must press the Palestinians to recognize Israel's right to exist within secure borders. Most importantly, from its point of view, Washington must be seen to act as an honest broker between Israel and the Palestinians.

This kind of peacemaking has of course been tried before. In the Camp David 2000 summit, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak agreed to return all of the Occupied Territories to Palestinian control in return for a peace settlement with a Palestinian state. Under pressure from his Arab League allies, Yasir Arafat rejected the offer. We have no reason to believe that another attempt at a two-state solution would be any more successful in the near future.

Yet, columnist Roger Cohen, writing in the International Herald Tribune (June 7, 2007), suggests that there may be opportunities here to break through the current paralysis of the peace process.

He points out that "Israelis have become very adept at saying we have no interlocutor; we face a Hamas movement bent on our destruction; we withdrew from Lebanon and got Hezbollah; we withdrew from Gaza and got daily rockets; and we know what the Palestinians say about us in their school textbooks."

At the same time, Cohen continues, "Palestinians have grown slick about telling Israel and the West that you told us to hold an election and we did; you told us to form a democratic government and we did; you know that government represents over 90% of the Palestinian people; and yet you will not talk to us."

In Cohen's view, time is running out for a Palestinian peace, because the struggle for independence is being hijacked by Muslim extremists who will use it to advance their war against the West. This makes his three recommendations, much like Forecasting International's, all the more urgent.

First, ramp up U.S. leadership in the conflict to the level displayed by Henry Kissinger in the era of shuttle diplomacy. Someone--some American--must get the Israelis and Palestinians talking to each other.

Then lean on America's Arab allies for help. The Riyadh Arab initiative repeated the offer to recognize Israel in return for a withdrawal to 1967 borders. Run with it.

Also, prod the Arabs to aid Fatah against Hamas, support Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, block gunrunning to Hamas in Gaza, and--as a sign of good faith--open business offices in Israel.

Finally, get Israel and Mahmoud Abbas talking. Abbas is head of the PLO as well as of the Palestinian Authority, and Israel has talked with the PLO in the past. This won't be easy, but it should be at least possible.

In FI's view, this program actually has a chance of working, if only a small one. And even if it does not, the United States will benefit from the attempt. The United States must be seen to seek peace between Israel and its neighbors in a way that most Muslims will view as fair to the Palestinians. It is the only thing Washington can do to insulate its nation, even in part, from violence once it leaves Iraq.

There are implications here for Israel as well. If Fatah, Hamas, and Hezbollah are invigorated by the chaos of regional war, they will also be divided by it. Some of their partisans may remain focused on Israel, but many will be drawn away by the larger conflict. There are dangers here for Israel, such as that Muslim radicals will gain still more influence in the region, but on balance the problems of a Middle Eastern war seem unlikely to be much greater than the ones Israel faces today.

* Terrorism, quelling the threat. Terrorism is fundamentally a separate issue from the U.S. relationship with Israel. Al-Qaeda and its allies object to any U.S. presence in the Middle East, particularly in Saudi Arabia, the location of Mecca. For al-Qaeda, supporting the Palestinian cause is little more than an opportunity to curry favor among moderate Muslims. As things stand, a sustained and convincing display of even-handedness toward the Palestinians by the United States could weaken moderates' support for al-Qaeda, and this can only be beneficial for the West.

However, a Middle Eastern war changes that equation. In any credible future, we can expect to see much the same level of terrorism we already are accustomed to. Hotels owned or patronized by Americans will be bombed all too often. The United States and its allies will lose the occasional embassy. There may even be another attack on the scale of the World Trade Center every decade. But will a regional war bring more terrorism against the West or less? We see two possibilities.

An all-out war between the Sunni and Shi'ite lands could reduce the amount of anti-Western terrorism. In. this scenario, extremists throughout the Muslim world would rush toward the Middle East to fight for whichever side of the conflict holds their allegiance. Most are likely to be Sunnis, as they form a large majority in most of the Muslim world. These extremists will be too busy killing their fellow Muslims to bother much with the United States and its allies. Eventually, they could turn the training and experience won in the Middle East against the West. But it is at least possible that a long internal conflict might finally slake the extremists' appetite for slaughter. And two or three decades is long enough for the West to demonstrate good will toward Islam and reduce the appeal of jihad.

Alternatively, both sides could back away from a fratricidal war--but not before thousands of agitated extremists arrived in the region, posing a severe threat to established governments. For local rulers, the obvious answer would be to divert these extremists' energy to more distant targets. First covertly, and later perhaps overtly, Saudi Arabia and its neighbors would sponsor terrorist attacks against Israel and the West. At the same time, they would move rapidly toward fundamentalism, seeking support from the extremists and to some extent mortgaging their regimes to them in return. For the United States and its allies, this would dramatically raise the risk of attack for at least a generation.

Which of these scenarios is more likely also merits further study. However, in one critical aspect it hardly matters which comes to pass. Either case would imperil the flow of Middle Eastern oil to the West for many years.

* Nuclear proliferation: A new arms race for a new era. The future changes once nuclear weapons arrive in the Muslim lands of the Middle East. Thus far, the United States has focused its nonproliferation concerns on Iran, which, despite its denials, does appear to be working on the military applications of nuclear power. How soon Iran could build its first nuclear. Estimates range from two to 10 years. Teheran would not stage a full attack on Israel in normal times because to do so would invite its own destruction. However, the hazards of poor judgment in a time of regional war seem considerably greater, especially once Teheran has nukes of its own.

Israel views Iran as the single greatest threat to its security, according to Shabtai Shavit, a senior security adviser and former head of Mossad, Israel's foreign intelligence service. But Teheran's declared enemies are not the only people worried about a nuclear-equipped Iran. As recently as 2005, Saudi leaders said that their country was unlikely ever to need nuclear power. Today, they are working hard to develop the infrastructure required for an atomic power system. Turkey is building its first atomic power plant. Egypt has announced plans to build its first as well. Bahrain, Jordan, Syria, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates all have told the International Atomic Energy Commission that they are interested in developing nuclear power. Importantly, these efforts also make possible the eventual production of nuclear weapons. These all are lands with large Sunni majorities and serious worries about a Shi'ite Iran in possession of nuclear weapons.

Combined with Teheran's growing influence among Iraq's Shi'a majority, the threat of an Iranian nuclear weapon has led Washington to re-think its policies in the Middle East. Today, according to journalist Seymour Hersh and our own observations, the Bush administration views the Sunnis and their allies in Saudi Arabia as less threatening than an Iran that is no longer counterbalanced by a strong Iraq. Therefore, the White House is working, independently and in concert with the Saudis, to support both Iraqi dissidents and the Lebanese government against Shi'ite extremists.

It seems unlikely that these efforts will divert the fundamentalist regime in Iran from developing a nuclear weapon there, much less provoke a change of regimes. Neither will they do much to undermine Hezbollah in Lebanon. When they fail, the United States will be left with only one option: to eradicate Iran's bomb program, either directly or by proxy through Israel. If it ever becomes necessary to attack the Iranian nuclear program, Saudi Arabia will allow Israeli planes to cross its airspace for the attack. As the Middle Eastern adage goes, "The enemy of my enemy is my friend."

The most ominous nuclear threat in the region may actually be Pakistan, the only Muslim land that already possesses nuclear weapons. To date, the United States has treated Pakistan as an ally in its so-called "war on terror." However, Abdul Qadeer Khan, the father of Pakistan's atomic weapons program, intended his creation to be an "Islamic bomb," at the service of the jihadi movement around the world. There is significant reason to suspect that this goal is widely held in the country's military establishment and government, but that may not matter. Fully 70% of the Pakistani population wants the present government replaced by a more jihad-friendly regime, and there have been at least three attempts on President Musharraf's life. A successful assassination is likely to bring in a government that will be much less cooperative with the West.

In a Middle Eastern war, the day could come when Pakistan donates nuclear weapons to the Sunni Side of the conflict, or to the battle against Israel. This requires the development of a strategy to prevent the use of Islamabad's nukes, either in the Middle East or against the West. So far as we know, based on the unclassified literature, this effort has yet to begin.

* Security risks continue with oil dependence. That leaves the matter of oil. The Middle East produces nearly 31% of the world's oil and consumes only one-fifth of its own output. About two-thirds of the petroleum used in the United States is imported. Perhaps one-fourth of that--around one-sixth of total consumption--comes from the Middle East. Japan imports all of its oil, most of it from the Middle East. Europe, India, and China all depend, to greater or lesser degrees, on Middle Eastern oil as well.

If something disrupts the flow of almost one-third of the world's oil as a major war in the Middle East inevitably would, the cost of energy throughout the world will soar. This is a recipe for prolonged recession, and perhaps even depression, in the United States and most of its trading partners. In a recent New York Times op-ed (May 12, 2007), Thomas Friedman points out, "You can't be in favor of setting a date to withdraw from Iraq without also being in favor of a serious energy policy to radically reduce our dependence on oil--now."

In the short run, healing the U.S. economy from the wounds inflicted by a sudden petroleum shortfall would mean accepting measures that many Americans would prefer to avoid. The United States could wind up competing with China for oil in totalitarian states that Washington currently shuns. It also might use its intelligence agencies to promote more favorable policies in Venezuela.

ENERGY INDEPENDENCE-NOW

* Arctic drilling. In the event of $100, $120, or $150 per barrel oil, tapping the oil reserves beneath the Arctic National Wildlife Reserve becomes a given. The West Coast also would be opened to drilling, though at distances beyond 20 miles from the beaches, not 10, as the law currently requires. Less controversially, the United States surely would buy more oil from Canada, where a significant new field has recently been discovered, and would develop the deep-water deposits under the Gulf of Mexico much faster than anyone now plans.

* More refineries. To meet America's current need for gasoline and heating oil, at least four new refineries should be built either on government-owned land or on property obtained through eminent domain. These might be sold or leased to oil producers or operated by the government itself. At the same time, Washington should use the Strategic Petroleum Reserve much more actively to mitigate temporary supply shortages.

* Nuclear power plants. An energy crisis finally would break the country's de facto ban on new reactors, allowing the construction of at least seven new nuclear power plants.

* Coal gasification. In an effort to wean the United States off foreign oil, the Department of Energy has mounted a substantial R&D program for coal gasification. A gasification pilot plant is expected to enter operation in 2010, and the zero-emissions FutureGen power plant, based on an advanced gasifier, is scheduled to begin producing electricity and hydrogen a few years later. Nothing can make coal mining environmentally friendly, but these technologies at least reduce the greenhouse and respiratory impact of burning coal for power. The gasification program will be one of the first alternative energy programs to be accelerated in time of Middle Eastern war. Coupled with consumer trends toward plug-in hybrid cars, real opportunities for energy efficiency exist through coal power.

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* Renewables. We can expect a much stronger push for renewable energy as well. Given the proper incentives--and a world oil shortage seems likely to qualify--solar, wind, and other renewable power technologies already have proven useful.

* Oil shale. With a prolonged disruption in its supply of foreign oil, the United States finally would be forced to develop oil shale. U.S. shale deposits contain upwards of 1 trillion barrels of oil, with around 560 million barrels recoverable. This is equal to roughly half the world's proven reserves of conventional petroleum. If the United States were to market even half of this shale oil it would become the world's most important supplier of oil, the Middle East could never again dominate the world's energy markets, and the United States would grow rich and powerful to a degree that it cannot even dream about today.

The downside to shale oil, of course, is severe environmental degradation. But exploitation of shale oil resources would also generate revenue for possible environmental remediation--and just about any other national goals the United States might set itself.

OTHER INTERNATIONAL IMPACTS OF A MIDDLE EASTERN WAR

China is well supplied with oil from Africa, which it has on longterm contracts. However, it is even more dependent on Iranian oil, which it would be unlikely to receive. This deficit would lead Beijing to develop its own oil shale, but its reserves are modest. China is likely to find its economic growth--and its global power--reduced for many years.

India, too, would be pinched for energy, but only temporarily. India owns two-thirds of the world's thorium, a resource that New Delhi already plans to develop for nuclear power. With most OPEC oil off the market, India will become an important provider of fuel for the world's latest generation of safe nuclear reactors. Its own energy position will be secure.

Russia clearly benefits from a Middle Eastern war. In any such scenario, Europe must become even more dependent on Russian oil than it is today, and Russia grows rich. This does not represent a significant change, of course; the trends are going in that direction already. In addition, by drawing Muslim extremists to the Middle East, a war between the Sunni and Shi'ite lands is likely to bring relative stability to Chechnya and the "stans" for so long as it draws terrorist attention away from local goals. Russia can only welcome this development.

Much of Europe already depends on atomic power. In time, it can build more reactors and fuel them with Indian thorium, weakening Russia's hold on its future.

The grimness of this potential war cannot be overestimated. Millions of people in that region would die needlessly. Many hundreds of millions elsewhere would face a period of economic chaos that could, if mismanaged, dwarf the Great Depression of the 1930s. Yet, for the United States there could be a redeeming feature even to this worst variant of the worst case.

In a paper delivered to the 15th Annual Defense Worldwide Combating Terrorism Conference in 2005, Forecasting International examined the possible outcome of Islamist terrorism if it continues on its present course. That scenario, too, involved millions of deaths in the Muslim world, but in that case they would occur at the hands of the United States, and perhaps its allies. From the U.S. viewpoint, it would be far better for such a catastrophe to originate within the Muslim lands.

Indonesia and the other remote Muslim countries outside the "stans" might reasonably distance themselves from the mess that would be a regional war across the Middle East. This would split the Muslim world between those who saw a war between Sunni and Shi'a as being worth fighting and those who did not. This possibility could only be improved, however slightly, by memories of a U.S-led attempt to make peace between Israel and the Palestinians that had failed primarily because of Palestinian intransigence.

In the long run, a divided Muslim world conceivably could be the beginning of broader change. In the end, we might finally see the birth of an Islam comparable to modern Christianity and Judaism--one that is able to coexist with other religions and with secular authority and one with which the West would find it much easier to coexist in turn.

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A WORST-CASE SCENARIO TO-DO LIST

1. U.S. disengagement from Iraq. This is both necessary and inevitable. What is the least painful way to withdraw U.S. forces from Iraq in stages? By regions? Can it be delayed long enough to allow preparation for a war in the Middle East?

Our own analysis is that the turning point came the day radical Shi'ite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr withdrew support from the Iraqi government in response to the arrest of some of his fighters. About three-fourths of Iraqis believe that the U.S. occupation is a mistake and that they would be better off if the United States withdrew its forces. Let the Iraqi government ask Washington to take its troops home. America then can honorably bow to the popular will, declare victory, and leave, much as it did in Vietnam. Continued war is not delivering benefits in proportion to its cost in lives, national prestige, and simple cash. It will do nothing to help avert or prepare for a regional war.

2. Intervention with Israel on behalf of Palestine. There is no guarantee that anything the United States does to ease the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians would have wider benefits in the Muslim world. Yet, American policies with regard to Israel and Palestine are one of the rare factors in the Middle East that are completely under Washington's control. They should be reconsidered, for whatever small benefit change might bring.

3. Supporting reform in Islam. One theme among those concerned with the relationship between the West and the Muslim world is that the United States and its allies need to support the liberal, modernist element among Muslim thinkers. For example, Irene Sanders, head of the Washington Center for Complexity & Public Policy, suggests that younger, Internet-connected Muslims might be able to shift the balance against both jihad and a regional war.

She may be right. Akbar Ahmed, a renowned Islamic scholar and anthropologist, recently toured the Muslim world with several of his students. He found that Muslims abroad felt that they were not understood in the West, and perhaps were being deliberately misrepresented by Western--particularly American--media. Despite being well informed about U.S. culture and politics, they knew little about Islam in the United States and were amazed that Ahmed's Muslim students could wear hair covers and go to mosque. They were even more impressed when one Christian student refused to enter a mosque because she did not have a scarf to cover her hair; the incident made every newspaper in Pakistan. One radical ideologue at India's Deoband University, author of a book that seeks to justify killing civilians in democracies seen to oppress Islam, was so impressed by the evident good will of the American group that he eventually sought permission to translate one of Ahmed's books into Urdu. It argues for dialogue between Islam and the West and is dedicated to a prominent Jewish scholar.

Attempts to support political dissidents and liberal thinkers in the Muslim world seem clearly destined to undermine the people whom the West most wishes to see prosper by damaging their credibility among other Muslims. However, the sort of dialogue carried out by Akbar and his students appears much more promising, particularly as it applies to the young, Net-savvy Muslims who are likely to become future leaders. These efforts clearly should be encouraged.

4 Defanging Pakistan. A nuclear-armed Pakistan is nearly as dangerous to the world as a nuclear-armed Iran. Its atomic weapons must be either removed or brought under effective control by a regime that will never allow them to be used for the jihadi cause. This will require an extensive program of intelligence gathering simply to begin the process. It may also require some reeducation of U.S. leaders.

5 Preparation for a war in the Middle East. The United States should significantly enlarge its Strategic Petroleum Reserve and use this reserve more actively to mitigate future spikes in oil prices.

Beyond this recommendation, there are questions to be answered: Which alternative sources of oil can be cultivated most effectively? How can dealing with pariah states that possess oil be made palatable to the American people and political interests? How quickly can deep-water oil in the Gulf of Mexico and in the Arctic National Wildlife Reserve be developed?

6. Development of shale oil. Independent of any prospects for a Middle Eastern war, the U.S. government should build at least four oil refineries around the country. These would ensure that a shortage of capacity--such as after a refinery accident or another major hurricane in the Gulf of Mexico--will never endanger the country's energy posture.

Under the circumstances, shale-oil technology becomes a national-security asset, not a matter solely for private business. The federal government therefore should license the cheap-oil process from A.F.S.K. Hom Tov for sublicense to all U.S. producers with access to shale, rather than allow it to be monopolized by a single licensee.

It also should begin immediately to survey America's shale-oil resources in detail. Shale oil is widely spread through the middle of the continent, as well as in the far West, and some of it may be inaccessible, either because it lies under heavily populated areas or for other reasons. The United States needs to know how much oil can be recovered and how quickly, assuming the task is undertaken on an emergency basis.

7. Develop alternative energy sources faster. Significant questions remain to be answered with regard to alternative energy. At present, it appears that biomass energy and thorium reactors are the most viable alternatives to shale oil. In this scenario, the United States will urgently need to know how quickly they can be can be brought online on a significant scale. More ambitious development programs would be useful for both of these technologies. At the same time, it needs a much more detailed understanding of what solar, wind, wave, and other renewable energies could contribute in a time of severe dislocation in the oil supply. Energy conservation also falls into this category, and it may be one of the greatest "resources" available.

JUGGLING THE SCENARIO RISK FACTORS

The risk of regional war in the Middle East after the United States leaves Iraq has become almost a matter of common wisdom, but our picture of what would happen in such a war remains unacceptably vague. We need to understand the likely dimensions of such a war; its impact on oil prices, the U.S. economy, and the economies of America's major trading partners; and what the United States and its allies can do to mitigate that impact.

War is not likely to break out the instant that U.S. troops depart, assuming that it occurs at all, but will develop over time. We should therefore also consider what to do to slow the process, or to accelerate it if keeping would-be terrorists busy turns out to be the greater priority. We need to project also what would happen in postwar terrorism. Would the United States experience less danger because would-be terrorists had died or exhausted themselves fighting each other in the Middle East? Or would they feel still more aggrieved as the "Great Satan" grew into the Arab world's major competitor in the global market for oil, their only significant resource? In short, every aspect of the post-occupation period must be weighed for its impact on the U.S. strategic and economic position.

Absent a Middle Eastern war, Forecasting International does not anticipate any significant, generalized recession or depression in the years ahead. However, neither can we foresee any circumstances in which the United States will substantially improve, or even maintain, its current position.

On the world's present course, the United States will remain a leader for many years to come, but it will never again enjoy the economic, scientific, diplomatic, and military dominance it once possessed. Many factors will erode its security. These include the growing economic might of India, China, and perhaps even Russia and Brazil; the diplomatic and military power of China; the nationalism and xenophobia of a resurgent Russia; and the progressive radicalization of the Muslim world, on which the United States will become first among equals. It could find itself beset on all sides by economic and diplomatic challenges that may be difficult to meet successfully.

At Forecasting International, we have an unjustified reputation for optimism. In fact, we are neither optimistic nor pessimistic. We simply follow where the data lead, without preconceptions, and the result usually is not as dire as the habitual pessimists believe. Unfortunately, this is not one of those cases. We can find little cause for hope that Iraq will become the stable, democratic country once envisioned by many Washington politicians and pundits. We do see evidence to suggest that Iraq may rapidly decline into chaos once U.S. forces leave and that this chaos could easily spread throughout the region. Yet, even this grim prospect seems to hold out at least a little bit of room for hope.

Bizarrely, if the chaos in Iraq continues to spin out of control, the result ultimately could be a world in which the United States is richer and more influential than ever before. We believe this possibility may be worth examining in much greater detail. We are eager to know whether others find this "best-of-the-worst" scenario as tantalizing as we do, and whether anyone sees implications or opportunities that we may have overlooked.

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THIRTY YEARS OF WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST: THAT IS WHAT THE COMMENTATORS ON PUBLIC RADIO IN MID-DECEMBER 2006 WARNED COULD COME FROM THE CURRENT MESS IN IRAQ. THEY WERE FAR FROM THE FIRST TO MENTION THIS POSSIBILITY. IT IS A GRIM VISION THAT MANY PESSIMISTS HOLD EVEN TODAY.

"The United States must be seen to seek peace in between Israel and its neighbors in a way that most Muslims will view as fair to the Palestinians. It is the only thing Washington can do to insulate its nation, even in part, from violence once it leaves Iraq."

RELATED ARTICLE: A Realistic Look at Iran's Missile Capabilities

According to former Israeli intelligence director Shabtai Shavit, Iran already has chemical and biological warheads for surface-to-air missiles with ranges of up to 3,500 kilometers, far more than long enough to attack all of Israel. Shavit also believes that Iran is developing missiles with a range of 5,000 kilometers and is working hard on missile-launching submarines, either of which could strike at the United States.

While the range and accuracy of Iranian missiles have yet to be confirmed, Iran made it clear that its goals include erasing Israel from the map and destroying all infidels. Under the circumstances, the possibility that it might be able to deliver chemical, biological, and someday nuclear weapons at long range is sufficient cause for Jerusalem's concern, and for Washington's as well.

--Marvin Cetron and Owen Davies

RELATED ARTICLE: War Is a No-Win Scenario.

By James Forest

A West Point terrorism expert sees no benefit to regional war.

A regional war in the Middle East would bring a variety of negative consequences for the United States. First, and most obvious, the global security environment would shift in a most unfavorable direction. The death and destruction would transcend geopolitical boundaries and possibly spill over into neighboring regions. The humanitarian crisis would overwhelm the unprepared regimes throughout the Middle East. Calls for intervention and relief could result in allies of the United States becoming involved.

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Meanwhile, the asymmetric nature of much of the fighting will offer new opportunities for many young, motivated men and women to acquire the skills of guerrilla warfare, making them attractive recruits for al-Qaeda and affiliate terrorist organizations. Wars bring an enabling environment for arms trafficking and other sorts of criminal activity, as well as human rights abuses--in some cases, even atrocities like genocide. It is also highly doubtful that, should such a war take place, the victors of the bloodshed will be inclined to establish the sort of liberal, open democratic societies that were fostered and nurtured in Europe and Asia following World War II.

The impact of a regional war on the world's increasingly interdependent economy would go beyond the price we pay to heat our homes and fuel our cars, which will increase dramatically. (Of course, this could force more serious private and personal investment in alternative energy sources, which is not a bad thing.) Key shipping lanes, like the Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf of Suez, will become hazardous for all types of commercial vessels. We have already witnessed how instability in the Middle East--punctuated by brief skirmishes like the Israeli-Hezbollah conflict in 2006--negatively affects global commodity prices, foreign exchange rates, and other facets of the global economy. A full-blown regional war would naturally exacerbate this.

Some observers have suggested that a regional war might actually benefit the United States in some way. For example, it has been suggested that a regional war would compel America to get serious about energy independence, thus helping us cut oil imports and reduce the trade deficit. Others have suggested that a regional war would give the United States an excuse to abandon our commitments in the entire region. And there are the conspiracy advocates who claim that America's defense industrial sector--the world's leading arms exporter--would benefit from a regional war.

On a personal level, as someone who over the past several years has watched some of his recent students return from Iraq and Afghanistan in body bags, I find these perspectives incredibly difficult to comprehend or digest. On a more pragmatic level, the unstoppable power of globalization means that the fortunes of nations and people in the Middle East are, and will remain, inextricably intertwined with America's own. Overall, to suggest that war benefits the citizens or institutions of a civilized nation-state raises a variety of moral, ethical, philosophical and pragmatic issues for academic or political debate. However, at the end of the day there is little evidence to indicate that U.S. security, economic growth, or position of leadership in the world could benefit from a regional war in the Middle East.

About the Author

James Forest is the director of terrorism studies at the U.S. Military Academy and the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. Web site www.ctc.usma.edu. The views expressed are those of the author and not of the Department of the Army, the U.S. Military Academy, or any other U.S. government agency.

RELATED ARTICLE: No Security without Understanding.

By Ziauddin Sardar

The United States cannot write the script for other countries to follow. Realizing that is the first step toward security, argues a prominent Muslim scholar.

Predicting the descent of the Middle East into war is counterproductive. Given that the Middle East is a region of fissures and divides--the Israeli-Arab divide, the religious-secular division, the Shia-Sunni discord, to name a few--the prediction could easily be fulfilled. A more interesting question is: What can we do about the looming disaster, the writing on the wall? More specifically, what can the United States and its citizens do?

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The idea that American liberalism is what's best for the Middle East and is superior to all other modes of existence is dangerously obsolete. The fight for global security and against global terrorism has to be a pluralistic endeavour. It ought to involve struggling for a consensus through multiplicity, by negotiation among equal partners. The "war on terror" is not and cannot be a "war." Rather, it must be a reasoned engagement, and must deal with the genuine cultural and political concerns of the people of the Middle East.

The United States also needs to realize, as Iraq demonstrates so well and Vietnam showed earlier, that freedom does not come in pre-packaged, ready-made form; it does not come off a production line of ideas that have nothing to do with the history, sentiment, circumstances, and actual or perceived needs of a people. The United States cannot write the script for freedom and democracy in the Middle East. It is something only the people of the region can do. They need the United States, as the only superpower, to exercise its power responsibly.

The practical effects of U.S. power on the rest of the world are invisible to ordinary Americans. The all-consuming sounds and symbols of America talking to itself effectively silence the opinions and attitudes of the rest of the world. And that is a serious problem. If Americans were to listen, they would hear that their energy-guzzling lifestyles are a threat to the life of others. Genuine global security will emerge only when Americans choose to know about the world outside of the United States in general, and the Middle East in particular, on the basis of equality.

The future of the Middle East is grim, particularly if the war on terror continues unabated in its current projection. Americans may or may not see this as good and virtuous. But the Middle East will long remember this war not as an exercise in fighting a constructed "evil," or for bringing "democracy" and "freedom" to the people of the region, but as something that heaped devastation on existing devastation, resulting in unimagined human pain and suffering. War is the hell where new hatreds fester and new terrorists are born and nurtured. Only a new kind of engagement with the world can unmake this fearful prospect.

About the Author

Ziauddin Sardar is the editor of Futures and the author of more than 40 books, including Islam, Postmodernism and Other Futures: A Ziauddin Sardar Reader. He is currently a visiting professor of postcolonial studies at City University in London, Northampton Square, London EC1V OHB, United Kingdom.

About the Authors

Marvin J. Cetron is president of Forecasting International Ltd. in Virginia. His e-mail address is glomar@tili.com.

Owen Davies is a former senior editor at Omni magazine and is a freelance writer specializing in science, technology, and the future. Cetron and Davies have collaborated on many books, including most recently Hospitality 2010: The Future of Hospitality and Travel with Fred DeMicco (Prentice Hall, 2005).

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