Guarding Turf

Among the many management challenges that Defense secretary Robert Gates has inherited-besides the Iraq war-is what to do about his predecessor's predilection for turf poaching. Under Donald Rumsfeld, Special Operations forces and defense components stepped up their intelligence efforts, particularly

through covert actions abroad aimed at influencing political, economic or military conditions. Those operations traditionally have been the domain of the CIA-the master spy agency Gates used to run. But under the global war on terror, the Pentagon is believed to have conducted covert actions in Middle Eastern countries that the CIA apparently was unwilling or unable to do. Rumsfeld also established internal analysis units to check or contradict the CIA's work on Iraqi weapons programs. All this threw the intelligence bureaucracy out of kilter. The question now is, will Gates-a career CIA man-restore the balance.

There are broad policy implications in play, especially since coven actions require presidential authorization and the notification of certain members of Congress. But intelligence management issues also loom large. With the creation of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the CIA's stature was diminished. Not only was its chief stripped of his second hat-director of central intelligence-but also of what little power he had to check the Defense secretary, who controls more than 80 percent of the intelligence budget and is one of the most powerful figures in the intelligence community. When Rumsfeld moved the Pentagon further into covert action territory and intelligence analysis, it was seen as a body blow to the CIA.