Reserve mobilization rapped

After the Sept. 11 attacks, the Pentagon's mobilization of military reserve forces was inefficient because the Defense Department had to cobble together a new strategy to deal with domestic terrorism, according to the General Accounting Office.

"Because DoD could not rely on existing operation

Before the attacks, mobilization plans did not include provisions for stationing National Guard troops at the country's civilian airports or for the extended use of Guard and Reserve members to fly combat air patrols over Washington and other major cities.

Under the process crafted immediately after the Sept. 11 attacks, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld signed 246 deployment orders to mobilize more than 280,000 reservists, compared with the less than 10 orders needed to mobilize more than 220,000 reservists during the 1991 Persian Gulf War.

Defense had trouble overseeing the entire mobilization process because it lacked adequate systems to track personnel and other resources, the report said. Coordination of the mobilization effort between Pentagon officials and service officials was also spotty because of incompatible tracking systems and poor communication, according to GAO.

GAO also surveyed civilian employers, many of whom said they didn't get adequate notice that their reservist employees were being called up. According to the report, the services "consistently" failed to meet the 30-day advance notification goal. The Defense Department agreed to study the issue.

-Kellie Lunney