Frontier-free

ON 25 MARCH, DENMARK, Sweden, Finland, Norway and Iceland, will begin to implement the Schengen Agreement on eliminating border controls. The agreement, already adopted by ten European Union member states, provides for the dismantling of all identity checks on frontiers between signatories through the strengthening and standardising of controls at the external borders of 'Schengenland'.

When the Schengen Agreement becomes operational in the Nordic countries, international travel between the fifteen signatories will in effect become domestic travel. Passengers, including third-country nationals, arriving from these countries are separated from other international arrivals at airports and seaports and enter without further controls.

The original aim of Schengen was to allow the free movement of people across Europe. Frustrated by the lack of progress on dismantling border controls as part of European integration, Germany, France and the Benelux countries launched the Schengen project in 1985 as a 'laboratory' for European Community cooperation on border controls.

All EU member states, apart from the UK and Ireland, have now signed the agreement, which was incorporated into the EU treaty framework at Amsterdam in 1997. Non-EU members Norway and Iceland have become associate members to allow for the continuation of the Nordic Passport Union, a much-treasured common travel area which began in 1952.

While duty controls will remain in place until 2004, this extensive frontier-- free space is at once the most symbolic and the most tangible manifestation of the political vision of a European Union. Yet it is also the most controversial.

Despite the advantages for continental travellers, the question of whether the system is beneficial remains hotly disputed across the political spectrum. A largescale information campaign last year did little to improve Schengen's image. But why has it failed to capture the imagination and the support of the Union's citizens?

CROSS-BORDER CRIME

The main concerns centre on security. Critics argue that open borders invite drug trafficking, human trafficking and smuggling, and inevitably lead to an increase in illegal immigration and 'bogus' asylum seekers. They contend that controls to offset the expected security deficit - the 'compensatory measures' -- are inadequate.

Ironically, the abolition of frontier controls requires more border guards, not fewer, to enforce a sophisticated system of behind-the-border controls. Denmark, which has traditionally had a large, well-- organised border police force to protect one of the main external frontiers of the Nordic Passport Union, has recruited a hundred and fifty new officers for the frontier units, a fifty percent increase. State-of-the-art surveillance technology has also been introduced at all external Schengen borders.

Controversially, the agreement allows for actual cross-border law enforcement in cases of 'hot pursuit, where police in carefully defined instances are allowed to continue to follow a suspect across an international frontier.

The pivotal additional security measure is the Schengen Information System (SIS), an online database located in Strasbourg. The system currently holds more than nine million entries, the so-called 'alerts, on visa applicants, wanted people, and missing vehicles and objects. These can be retrieved from over 45,000 access points across Europe.

Observers, however, suggest that the SIS is stretched beyond its limit and will not be able to cope with the Nordic enlargement, let alone any expansion to include new EU members to the east. To service the law enforcement agencies effectively, the system is in urgent need of re-design. A revamped system is expected to be fully operational in 2003.

However, in the absence of reliable figures for cross-border crime, civil liberties advocates stress that human trafficking, considered by many to be the main cross-border problem, is a result not of open borders, but of closed ones.

In a British election year, the extension of the Schengen area may well re-ignite the debate about the UK's non-- participation in European cooperation on border controls and highlight rifts within the Union. London maintains that its position as an island nation, coupled with limited internal identity check mechanisms, necessitate direct frontier controls. Nonetheless, as the rise in asylum applications demonstrates, the UK cannot shelter from the effects of increasingly open frontiers in continental Europe. It has therefore applied to participate in the SIS system, areas of police cooperation and mutual assistance in criminal matters, subject to unanimous approval by the full Schengen members.

This 'pick-and-mix' approach and the UK's decision merely to join in the security-oriented aspects of the Schengen system have been widely criticised. European Union partners fear that the insistence on selective application of its rules could set a dangerous precedent at a critical time in the enlargement process.

SCHENGEN WALL

The merger of the Schengen area and the Nordic Passport Union coincides with a special Summit on 23-24 March as part of the Swedish EU Presidency's much-- publicised focus on expansion and employment. It is doubtful, however, that representatives from Central and Eastern European applicant states will applaud this extension of Schengenland as they disembark in the non-Schengen area of Stockholm's Arlanda Airport. The dual process of freedom of movement within the EU and the tightening of external frontiers has proved a stumbling block to enlargement.

Border controls are a sensitive political issue, laden with symbolic significance in Central and Eastern Europe. As part of the membership requirements, applicant states are forced to introduce rigorous controls, sealing off and policing the Union's external borders. These measures threaten cross-border relations with neighbours to the east, and candidate states have voiced concerns over the apparent substitution of the Iron Curtain with a Schengen Wall. This is seen as undermining historical, cultural and political ties and exacerbating political instability in an already volatile region.

The full implementation of Schengen also threatens to create a rift between those applicant states closest to joining the EU and others whose membership prospects are more distant. Some have been refused reciprocal visa-free arrangements with the EU. Bulgaria and Romania, for example, have not yet been fully removed from the Schengen blacklist of countries whose nationals need a visa to enter the area Both have complained about being relegated to a second division of applicants and subjected to a 'humiliating visa regime'.

Prospective new members feel that despite having had no say in the process of dismantling internal borders, they will be left to foot the bill. The export of the Schengen system, which predominantly reflects the priorities and objectives of the core Union members, has thus had a negative impact on the support for membership in candidate countries.

CIVIL LIBERTIES

The incorporation of the Schengen Agreement into the EU framework is a maze of legal complexities. The majority of the most sensitive areas are part of the intergovernmental 'third pillar' of the EU treaty, and as such are not subject to uniform, transnational scrutiny by the European Parliament. As a result, civil liberties groups and human rights activists have criticised the project as lacking democratic accountability and for its negative impact on refugee protection in Europe.

The Schengen states have established their own Joint Supervisory Authority (JSA) to monitor the SIS. It includes members of national data protection authorities. But even the JSA has repeatedly complained about lack of transparency, breaches of security and insufficient funding to effectively supervise the SIS. The secretive attitude and the reluctance to be subjected to independent monitoring, which characterised the Schengen project before its incorporation into the EU system, persists.

Commentators also suggest that the preoccupation with security is a convenient pretext for limiting the Schengen states' responsibilities for refugee protection by preventing asylum seekers from entering Europe. This is reflected most clearly in the extensive Schengen blacklist of countries whose nationals require a visa.

Transparent decision-making, closely involving prospective EU member states in comprehensive regional networks rather than bilateral security-enhancing exercises, is urgently needed. Combined with adequate safeguards to protect sensitive personal information stored in the SIS, these measures would ensure a level of democratic accountability that would make the Schengen Agreement acceptable to both EU citizens and third-- country nationals. If not, Schengen will remain a remarkable public relations fiasco for the Union.