Metropolitan taxation in the 21st century.

Predicting the future of metropolitan taxation is a difficult task. There is, after all, no such thing as "metropolitan" tax policy, for that term implies some form of metropolitan government. With very few exceptions, metropolitan areas comprise numerous independent local governments usually

surrounded by a large central city. Thus, metropolitan taxation necessarily encompasses the aggregate tax policies of the cities, counties, and townships within a metropolitan area. That does not, however, lessen the importance of the subject. On the contrary, the ability of those independent governments to provide basic public services, as well as the relationship between and among those governments, is directly related to tax policy.

As we enter the 21st Century, local governments will face challenges to how they raise revenue. Existing local tax systems have, over the years, developed inherent problems that raise questions about their ability to meet future basic revenue needs. None of the major sources of local revenue have significant growth potential. Indeed, some local taxes are likely to decrease in importance. Moreover, economic and technological changes will inevitably and profoundly alter tax systems of all governments. Existing local government tax systems were not designed to function in a service economy dominated by electronic commerce, mobile capital, or rapidly expanding international trade. The problems with existing tax systems and future economic challenges will likely lead to an environment in which local taxation will be limited to an extent unseen in American history.

There are three significant consequences of these limitations for metropolitan governments. First, they will affect each local government's ability to fund basic services. That is, of course, not a trivial development since it affects the core functions of local government. The limitations will also affect the relationship between local governments within a metropolitan area. Such limitations will reduce the ability of local governments to use tax policy as a means of furthering economic development. Finally, limitations will lead local governments to seriously consider an alternative system for collecting revenue--land value taxation.

This essay discusses the future of existing local tax systems, the likely limitations that will be placed on those systems, and the effects of those limitations on metropolitan government.

METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT AND THE ROLE OF TAXATION

From a political perspective, there are two imperatives for local governments in metropolitan areas. First, the local governments within a metropolitan area must provide basic public services to their residents. They must police the streets, provide fire protection, repair roads, and so on and so forth. Local governments may not always be efficient and effective in providing these services. But it is almost beyond debate that local governments have primary and, usually, sole responsibility for these services. The basic services must be provided despite legal, economic, and political challenges that may affect the local government finances. After all, that Commerce Clause restrictions, state mandates, or federal laws may limit local tax options is of little solace to the citizen whose trash is not being collected. When basic public services are not consistently or adequately provided, citizens and firms eventually either leave or decide not to locate in a particular jurisdiction. Government leaders also often incur the wrath of the voters, a fact not lost on local politicians.

Of course, local governments must also pay for public services. And, the ability to raise revenue through taxes is directly related to the level and quantity of these services. Local taxation allows policymakers to raise the requisite revenue necessary to provide the desired level of services. Other sources of revenue (i.e., intergovernmental aid and debt) do not offer the reliability or flexibility necessary to provide a consistent level of services. In this regard, local government discretion to set policies is a function of its ability to impose taxes.

The second imperative is that local governments must foster economic growth and development, even at the expense of neighboring jurisdictions. In this regard, competition among local governments, especially those in metropolitan areas, is inherent in our federal system of government. The permeability of metropolitan government boundaries and the relative autonomy of local decision making create an environment in which local governments strive to lure and maintain "above average" taxpayers, i.e., those who contribute more tax revenue than they consume in government services.(1)

How local governments compete for economic development varies. Many governments attempt to offer superior public services as a means of enticing firms and households. Working infrastructure, low crime, and good schools all make a jurisdiction more attractive. In this regard, the imperatives to provide public services and promote economic development are closely related.

But, local governments also use tax policy in their quest for business, jobs, and residents. Some governments set their overall tax burdens at levels that are competitive with their neighbors. Many offer enterprise zones. Still others use targeted tax incentives aimed at specific firms. Metropolitan governments are especially prone to using tax policy to compete, since other variables that influence location decisions (transportation and labor costs) are often roughly equal across the metropolitan area.

Economists, in a multitude of studies, have discussed and debated the various aspects of interjurisdictional tax competition. The literature is replete with research on whether taxation affects locational decisions of firms, whether tax incentives improve the overall economic health of the jurisdiction in question, and whether specific types of tax policies are effective (Ladd, 1998; Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, 1997).

Not all of the literature on tax incentives involves economic studies. Normative opinions have been expressed as to the fairness of tax incentives (Lynch, 1996). Conversely, there are those who assert that interjurisdictional competition makes our federal system of government stronger and more efficient (Dye, 1990). There are those who take a more philosophical view of tax incentives, especially targeted incentives, and conclude they violate the principles of sound tax policy (Duncan, 1992; Brunori, 1997). Noted legal scholars have even suggested that many tax incentives may be unconstitutional (Enrich, 1996, Hellerstein and Coenen, 1996).

Unfortunately (for those of us who have faith in rationale policy debate), political considerations have long outweighed the intellectual arguments against tax incentives. Government leaders perceive that tax policy is an effective means of furthering economic development. Local officials either believe that reducing tax burdens and targeting specific companies for tax breaks work or are unwilling to take the chance that they do not work. The public officials may or may not secure the intended investment but no one will blame them for not trying.

But this is only part of the reason why local governments use tax incentives to compete. Another reason, albeit even much more cynical, is that public officials desire the immediate political benefits that securing development brings and are less interested in the long-term effects of their policies. The use of tax policy as an economic development tool addresses the political urgency of enticing businesses and jobs, for adjusting local tax ordinances can be accomplished relatively quickly. If a jurisdiction lowers its property tax rate, its neighbors can respond in kind. Moreover, local leaders can move swiftly to offer specific tax incentives to firms considering locating to (or leaving) the jurisdiction. The perceived benefits of tax incentives are also more immediate. Property tax abatements result in a calculable amount of savings. It takes far longer to see the effects of policies that enhance public services, reduce crime, or improve education. Even the promise to build roads or improve other infrastructure does not produce immediate, obvious benefits.

Providing tax incentives is thus a politically effective means of fostering economic growth. But, its effectiveness is attributable to the fact that it is expedient. Local governments use tax policy in this way because they have had flexibility over their fiscal affairs. Despite --or perhaps because of--property tax limitations, local governments have had diverse enough sources of revenue to selectively reduce tax burdens (whether generally or for targeted taxpayers) when the need arose. Intergovernmental aid, the growth of the local sales tax, user fees, and to a lesser extent local income taxes all added to this flexibility. The challenge for local governments in the future is that they will have fewer options and less flexibility over their fiscal affairs.

FUTURE LIMITS TO METROPOLITAN TAXATION

As we enter the 21st Century, metropolitan governments will be faced with serious challenges to the way they raise revenue. The first, and perhaps most serious, challenge will be that existing tax systems are unlikely to meet the revenue needs of local governments. Local governments in metropolitan areas rely on five main sources of revenue: property taxes, income taxes, sales taxes, user fees and charges, and intergovernmental aid. All five of these sources have economic, structural, or political problems that, at best, will reduce their effectiveness in raising future revenue.

Property Tax

While still dominant, the property tax has steadily declined as a source of local government revenue. Between 1970 and 1994, 42 states decreased their reliance on the property tax, with 21 states decreasing their reliance by more than ten percent (National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), 1997). In the 15 largest U.S. cities, the property tax accounts for only 27 percent of own-source revenue (Wassmer, 1998).

Public dislike of property taxes is legendary. Unfair assessments, large single tax bills, and hardships on lower and fixed-income homeowners have all served to diminish the tax in the eyes of the public. The political consequences of the public's dislike of the property tax are also by now well known. The property tax revolts profoundly changed the property tax around the country. A vast majority of states have limited property taxes to some extent. Thirty-eight states limit tax rates or require rate rollbacks; eight other states limit assessments (NCSL, 1997). Most states mandate exemptions for low-income or elderly homeowners.

More importantly, perhaps, is the general perception among policymakers that the public strongly dislikes the tax. Political leaders are hesitant to expand the reach of the property tax and invariably will refrain from opposing statewide efforts to limit the tax. This is, perhaps, the greatest deterrent to future growth of the tax.

The property tax remains a formidable source of revenue, and the large amount of revenue collected will ensure its viability far into the next century. Still, the public's dissatisfaction with the property tax is unlikely to recede. The accompanying political pressure directly results in large-scale limitations of the types recently adopted in Texas, Washington, and Montana (Youngman, 1997). The property tax--in its current form--is an unlikely source of revenue growth in the future. It is almost certain that it will never reach the dominance it enjoyed before the tax revolts.

Local Income Taxes

While income taxes raise just three percent of local government tax revenue, they play a more significant role in metropolitan areas. In the 15 largest U.S. cities, income taxes account for 11.7 percent of own-source revenue (Wassmer, 1998).

Yet, primarily for political reasons, the income tax will not be a source of revenue growth for metropolitan governments in the future. Local policymakers perceive the income tax as having a disastrous effect on the local economy. Intuitively, stark differences in income tax burdens would have a measurable impact on business and personal locational choices. This is especially true in metropolitan areas, where other factors such as labor and transportation costs are similar across jurisdictional lines. Mobility of people and firms deters expansion of local income taxes. Scholars have generally found what political leaders already surmised; that local income taxes deter economic growth (Grieson, 1980; Inman, 1992).

That local income taxes will not be a significant source of revenue in the future is already becoming evident. Most states do not allow local governments to impose the tax; only 15 states permit local governments to do so (NCSL, 1997). In two of those states--Arkansas and Georgia--no municipalities and counties permitted to impose the tax actually do so. In states allowing such revenue options, most jurisdictions have chosen not to pursue this course of action. Indeed, the vast majority of local governments (over 75 percent) levying an income tax are located in one state--pennsylvania. Given the perceived competitiveness problems, it is unlikely that local governments in general and those in metropolitan areas in particular will rely more heavily on income taxes in the future.

Local Sales Tax

In 1993, local governments collected over $35 billion in sales taxes, or about eight percent of total tax revenue. Local governments in 33 states can impose a sales tax (NCSL, 1997). In the 15 largest U.S. cities, the sales tax accounts for about eight percent of own-source revenue (Wassmer, t 998).

While the sales tax has experienced tremendous growth in recent years, its future is not likely to be as robust. The continuing shift to a service-dominated economy, as well as the proliferation of exemptions, will decrease the tax base (Fox, 1998). As noted below, electronic commerce will present its own challenges to local sales taxation.

Perhaps the most serious threat to local sales taxes will come from state governments, which are likely to limit local sales tax autonomy as part of their own economic development policies. Rates, tax bases, and collection requirements vary among the 6,000 local governments imposing sales taxes. There are substantial costs of complying with local sales taxes. That local governments can change their sales tax rules adds to the costs of compliance. The variety and volatility of local sales taxation increase the costs of doing business in the state.

State governments are likely to impose some limitations on local sales taxes--and then tout these limitations as part of their economic development policy. The most likely scenario is state imposition of uniformity requirements for rates, tax bases, and collections. The result, inevitably, will be less local autonomy over the sales tax. The sales tax will not be eliminated, but local reliance on the tax will be lessened.

User Fees and Charges

By far, user fees and charges have been the fastest growing source of revenue for local governments. Fees and charges raised more than $135 billion dollars in 1994, or about 35 percent of total local tax revenue (NCSL, 1997). In the largest 15 cities, user charges make up more than 40 percent of own-source revenue (Wassmer, 1998). Imposing fees and charges tends to be a politically attractive means of collecting revenue. If large amounts of revenue can be raised from fees, policymakers can avoid raising traditional taxes. Moreover, fees and charges are easier to defend on philosophical grounds. After all, the government is merely asking the residents and firms to pay for specific services that they use.

In the future, local governments will continue to impose user fees and charges. Such revenue sources may even increase in the near term. But, their use and growth are not unlimited. There are, after all, only so many types of services for which the government can charge fees. Such fees work for trash collection, water systems, and new construction. They do not work at all for police and fire protection or general infrastructure maintenance.

It is likely that local governments will eventually run out of activities for which to charge separate fees. Indeed, there is already speculation that local governments may have maximized their use of fees and charges (NCSL, 1997).

State Aid to Local Governments

State aid has been the primary nontax source of revenue for local governments. In 1992, state aid to local governments totaled over $197 billion and well over half of that aid funded education (Gold, 1994).

It is unclear what role states will play in assisting local governments. From 1957 to 1992, aid to local governments as a percentage of total state spending actually declined from 35.8 to 32.3 percent (Gold, 1994). Shifting of federal responsibilities, coupled with likely federal preemption of state taxation of electronic commerce, will create fiscal challenges for the states. Those challenges may lessen the ability of states to provide additional revenue to local governments (Ladd, 1998). If state aid remains constant, or declines, the inevitable result will be increased budgetary pressure on local governments.

NEW CHALLENGES

While existing local tax systems will be challenged to meet future revenue needs, those challenges will result from inherent structural and political limitations. The property tax is fervently unpopular, the income tax is perceived to deter development, the sales tax is likely to be regulated by the states, etc. Local governments, however, will face additional challenges to how they raise revenue. Those challenges will arise in the context of a dramatically changing economic environment. The age of electronic commerce and rapidly expanding international trade are two developments that will directly effect the ability of local governments to raise revenue through their existing tax systems.

That electronic commerce will have some effect on local taxation is beyond rhetorical debate. Many leading state and local tax scholars (Hellerstein, 1998, McLure, 1998) have opined on the effects of electronic commerce on existing tax systems, and the specifics need not be repeated here. Local governments, like their state counterparts, fear that much of the blossoming electronic commercial market will escape taxation. While there is evidence that electronic commerce will have a negative impact on local government revenue (NCSL, 1997), especially with respect to sales taxation, the more serious threat is likely federal preemption of local taxation of electronic commerce.

At this time, federal legislation that will restrict state and local taxation of electronic commerce is moving closer to almost certain passage. The latest version of what was first introduced as the Internet Tax Freedom Act (HR, 1054) imposes a three-year moratorium on state and local taxation of electronic commerce (Sheppard, 1998a). The moratorium applies only to taxes on Internet access, and does not limit sales taxes. But, state and local sales taxes, as applied to electronic transactions, are already limited by the Commerce Clause. Essentially, the federal legislation preempts a new source of revenue, without providing state and local governments the ability to impose sales taxes on most electronic commerce.

It appears certain that the age of electronic commerce will result in significant limitations on local tax power.

While getting less attention than electronic commerce, international trade will also seriously effect local taxation. The world is experiencing unparalleled growth in international trade. That trend will only intensify in the future when the number and severity of trade restrictions are likely to decrease dramatically, as governments throughout the world make concerted efforts to open international markets.

Local government taxation has always been constrained by the Foreign Commerce Clause. But new limitations are likely. Increased international trade will come with more (and more sophisticated) trade agreements among national governments. Many of these new trade agreements will take into consideration the taxing power of subnational governments. That is, state, and especially local, government tax policies that purportedly impede international trade will be subject to challenge. Those challenges will be brought not only in U.S. courts under the Foreign Commerce Clause, but before international tribunals under international trade agreements.

Increased international trade will also effect business locational decisions. For cheaper labor, more lenient regulatory environments, and perhaps lower taxes, American firms will be more likely to locate new facilities in foreign countries. Placing assets overseas results in slower domestic real estate appreciation, and consequently slower property tax growth (Strauss, 1996).

State governments will respond to increasing global competition and the challenges of electronic commerce by imposing limits on local tax systems. To compete in a global market, state governments are likely to examine the effects of multiple taxing jurisdictions within their borders. There are more than 80,000 local jurisdictions with taxing power in the United States. States will vie for mobile international trade and capital by simplifying (or nullifying) local tax structures. Even where local taxation of those goods and services survives both Constitutional challenge and likely federal restrictions, it poses a threat to state competitiveness. A recent report by the NCSL (1997) stated that allowing local governments "the autonomy to establish separate tax bases, exemptions, and collection activities will increase taxpayer compliance costs and confusion." That ominous, for local tax sovereignty, statement may be a precursor of uniform rate, tax base, and collection requirements for local sales and income taxes. In any event, states will almost surely restrict local government taxing authority--to some extent--to stay competitive in a global, high technology marketplace.

EFFECTS OF METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT TAX LIMITATIONS

If, in fact, metropolitan governments will have more limited taxing powers in the future, two developments are likely. Metropolitan governments will be less likely to use tax policy as a means of pursuing economic development. And, those same governments will search for alternative sources of revenue to meet basic service demands.

Effects on Competition

Tax policy has been an attractive method of furthering economic development goals, partly at least, because local governments have enjoyed the flexibility to manipulate their tax structures. If all major sources of revenue are limited, it stands to reason that local governments in metropolitan areas will have less flexibility with respect to their tax policies. And, policymakers will face more difficult choices about how to spend limited resources.

Local governments will have to find a way to pay for basic public services. Given the choice between maintaining certain levels of service, and providing tax incentives as a means of fostering economic development, political leaders will invariably choose the former, for the provision of basic services meets the needs of both current and potential residents and firms. Fiscal pressures will, in any event, deter local governments from granting wholesale tax exemptions, credits, and abatements.

That is not to say that local governments will cease competing, nor will they stop using tax policy as part of that competition. Indeed, to the extent they can, local governments will continue to use tax policy to further those goals. But, given the likely limitations, local governments will be less able to use tax policy to further economic development.

What may result is more competition based on the quality and quantity of public services. Local governments must already provide some basic level of services. Rather than ceding needed revenue, local governments may opt to direct available resources to improving those services. And, that could result in a new paradigm for metropolitan governments. Rather than engaging in a "race to the bottom" through tax competition, metropolitan areas may in fact become economically stronger as their governments promote development through better schools, infrastructure, and public safety.

Land Value Taxation as an Alternative

Regardless of whether a new paradigm develops, local governments in metropolitan areas will still be faced with the need to fund public services in a competitive environment. Given the limitations to existing taxes, metropolitan governments will seriously consider the adoption of some form of land , value taxation. First championed by the 19th Century reformer Henry George, the concept of land value taxation involves simply taxing the value of land, while exempting improvements. Local governments will not, however, consider exempting all improvements. Rather, they will explore split rate systems, in which land is taxed at a higher rate than improvements.

Land value taxation could assist local governments in meeting their dual imperatives. Land value taxation could provide a stable, reliable source of revenue without adversely affecting economic growth. Increasing the tax on land, of course, will not enhance development. But, almost as importantly, it will not seriously hinder development. Reducing the tax burden on improvements, however, would have a significant impact on development. For metropolitan governments, especially central cities, land value taxation may be a particularly attractive source of revenue. It would create an incentive to develop underutilized space, such as empty buildings, vacant lots, etc.

Pennsylvania is the only state that allows some form of land value taxation, and 16 cities use split rate systems. Pittsburgh is the only large city to use a split rate system, and there is evidence that it has had a positive effect on economic development (Oates and Schwab, 1998).

It is perhaps because of the uncertainties and imperfections of the existing tax system that there is renewed interest in land value taxation. While economists have always favored the concept, there has recently been heightened intellectual interest in land value taxation (Ladd, 1998; Brown, 1997; Youngman, 1998; Wassmer, 1998).

What will propel land value taxation to the forefront of tax policy debate, however, is interest on the part of local political leaders. And, there is growing evidence that land value taxation is catching the attention of policymakers around the country. Land value taxation has been the subject of discussion or study by policymakers in New York, Iowa, Washington, Maryland, Connecticut, Maine, and Nebraska. In the District of Columbia, a report prepared for the Tax Revision Commission details the costs and benefits of land value taxation in our nation's capital (Schwab and Harris, 1997).

Developments in Virginia best illustrate the growing interest in--and political potential of--land value taxation. In February 1998, the state attorney general, at the request of a Republican state senator, issued an opinion on the legality of a split rate property tax system. At the same time, a Democratic state senator proposed a joint committee to study split rate systems in the Commonwealth (Sheppard, 1998b). And, during the last year, Fairfax City Councilman Tony Coughlan, a vocal advocate of land value taxation, has been pushing to adopt a split rate system. A study conducted for the City found that 88 percent of homeowners in Fairfax City would pay less property tax (White, 1997).

Politically, there appears to be bipartisan interest in land value taxation in Virginia. More importantly, that tax burdens would decrease for a large majority of homeowners provides a palpable political argument for land value tax advocates. This will be especially true if services remain constant (as they did in the Fairfax City study). And, business might support land value taxation if the case can be made that it would spur development. It is unclear whether land value taxation will become a significant part of local government finance. Reform efforts that redistribute tax burdens inevitably engender opposition. In this case, opposition from land (versus improvement) rich property owners, upon whom the additional burdens will fall, is assured. There will also be state constitutional questions about land value taxation. And, of course, land value taxation is nothing more than a variation of the existing property tax. Policymakers will be forced to distinguish land value taxation from the current--and unpopular--property tax system.

Still, tax cuts for homeowners, increased development, and adequate funding for services would advance the cause of land value taxation. With the fiscal challenges ahead, political leaders are likely to pursue this very old public finance idea.

A Final Note

My conclusions rely on one vital assumption--that local taxation will be challenged in the future. Despite the negative connotations of that assumption, I am quite optimistic about local taxation and intrametropolitan relations, for the limitations will result (if my prognosticating is correct) in less tax competition and a possible tax reform effort endorsed by eight Nobel laureates.

ENDNOTE

(1) Peterson (1981) in his seminal work City Limits forcefully asserts this view.

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DAVID BRUNORI, The George Washington University Law School, Washington, D.C. 20052.