Sovereignty through welfare reform? A case study of the Klamath tribes of Oregon

INTRODUCTION

The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reorganization Act (PRWORA), or welfare reform, passed in 1996, grants states and federally recognized American Indian tribes and Native American Organizations (NAOs) the opportunity to administer their own Temporary Aid to Needy

Families (TANF) programs. The transition of control over welfare programs from the Federal government to states and tribal entities is consistent with the tenet that local municipalities have more insight into the needs of their citizens than does the Federal government. For decades American Indian tribes have invoked this concept as sovereign nations to increase control over tribal resources and decision-making. In tribal TANF Indian nations potentially exercise this sovereignty.

But, for American Indian tribes, welfare reform is a double-edged sword. With tribal TANF comes the heavy burden of transitioning individuals from welfare to work and responsibility for those who do not, or cannot, find work. Many American Indian TANF clients face substantial barriers to formal labor force participation and paid employment. Additionally, a large percent of the American Indian TANF caseload consists of children living with non-needy relative adult caretakers. Unlike adult clients, these children are not expected to gain self-sufficiency through gainful employment.

Since the passage of PRWORA, states' caseload figures have been watched carefully to determine whether the reform has been a success.1 However, the same cannot be said for tribal TANF programs. Indeed, many people are unaware that separate tribal programs exist. Little has been written about tribal programs and their performances, and data collection is both newly instituted and not yet enforced.2

Despite a lack of consistent tribal caseload data there is other information that lends to our understanding of tribal programs and the special issues tribes face in meeting the goals of self-sufficiency and employment. Within the framework of Indian economic development in general, this paper bears light on these issues, first by characterizing tribal TANF program rules, and second by presenting a case study of the Klamath Tribes of Oregon TANF program [Native American Families Assistance (NAFA)].

NAFA was the first tribal program in the nation to be implemented and the administrators have made available-for the purposes of this paper-the monthly TANF reports from April 1998 through May 1999.3 Additional information since that time has been gained through interviews with the current program manager, Marvin Garcia. Although limited, the data allow a comparison of caseload outcomes between the NAFA program and the State of Oregon's TANF program, as well as a comparison to preliminary national tribal aggregate caseload data and to a study of TANF and food stamp leavers by the Center for the Study of Women in Society (CSWS) Welfare Research Team at the University of Oregon [2001].

While data on individual caseloads provide useful information for understanding tribal TANF, I contend that tribal TANF programs should not be evaluated only at the individual level. As most tribes are venturing into social service delivery for the first time, the impact of TANF on tribal sovereignty should be considered to more fully understand the well-being of tribal members. This paper provides a framework for evaluating tribal TANF at both the micro and macro, or tribal, levels.

I begin by introducing the literature on the economic role of tribal sovereignty and other tribal institutions, which informs our discussion of the "macro" relationship between sovereignty and tribal self-sufficiency. Specifically, the "nation-building" model of Cornell and Kalt [1992b; 1995], which links tribal sovereignty and tribal institutions with economic development, provides the structure for thinking about the relationship between tribal sovereignty and human development. Tribal TANF has the potential to strengthen sovereignty and, through this effect, to increase a tribal member's willingness and/or ability to be gainfully employed. Simultaneously, as individual tribal members become more self-sufficient, tribal sovereignty can be strengthened. The bidirectional mechanisms of this relationship are explored.

In an attempt to gauge whether in principle tribal TANF strengthens or undermines sovereignty, I then compare the TANF regulations for states and tribes. This section is followed by a case study of the Klamath Tribes TANF program, which considers the means by which tribal TANF can increase tribal sovereignty and improve individual welfare. The case study begins with a brief history of the Klamath Tribes and is followed by comparing monthly caseload data from the NAFA program with data from the State of Oregon and from a cross-section of various tribal programs. Additionally, anecdotal evidence of NAFA outcomes is compared with the more formal study by CSWS. The final section summarizes the findings.

TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY AND DEVELOPMENT

Nation-Building

Tribal sovereignty is a principle that tribes have invoked over decades of interaction with other political entities, most notably the U.S. Federal Government. This principle recognizes the right of tribal governments to determine citizenship and laws, govern, and otherwise act as nation-states. In practice, tribal sovereignty historically has been undermined by the fact that many tribal assets are held in trust by the Federal government. The trust relationship has weakened tribal voice by creating numerous barriers to liquidating tribal assets and giving the Bureau of Indian Affairs the final say in contracts involving these resources. Additionally, the high number of poor and unemployed American Indians, coupled with inadequate tribal funds to treat these problems, has weakened tribal sovereignty and self-sufficiency as tribal governments are forced to turn to other governments for aid. This aid often carries with it specific guidelines that effectively decrease tribal voice and cultural integrity.

Recent literature examines the role of tribal sovereignty and political institutions in economic development [Cornell and Kalt, 1990; 1992a; 1992b; 1995; Cornell, 2001; Champagne, 1992; 1996; Anderson 1992; Mushinski and Pickering, 1996; Woodrow, 1998; Cross, 1993]. In a series of case studies Cornell and Kalt show that economically successful tribes are those that have adopted development strategies that take advantage of tribal sovereignty.

In virtually every case that we have seen of sustained economic development on American Indian reservations, the primary economic decisions are being made by the tribe, not by outsiders. In every case, the tribe is in the driver's seat. In every case, the role of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) and other outside agencies has shifted from decision-maker to resource, from the controlling influence in decisions to advisor or provider of technical assistance. [Cornell, in Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 1997]

Touring the country, Cornell urges tribes to engage in "nation building," rather than take up short-term business opportunities that cater to constituents' wishes. Nation building focuses on investing in new and existing tribal institutions, not resources, where investment is broadly defined to include time and talent. The most efficient institutions are those that allow tribes to control decision-making and to adopt development plans that fit with existing tribal culture. Attempts to implement foreign development models without consideration of tribal institutions can lead to sub-optimal outcomes. Similarly, lest tribes encounter a mismatch of local and adopted institutions, TANF rules must be sufficiently flexible and tribes must exercise voice in light of this flexibility to meet the special needs of tribal welfare clients and to uphold sovereignty in practice.

Implications for Social Service Delivery

While the nation-building model explores the relationship between institutional structure and economic development for tribes, it does not directly address the link between tribal sovereignty and human development. I expand the literature on tribal economic development to suggest such a relationship. The thesis is quite simple: the stronger the nation, the stronger the residents, and vice versa. Nation building strengthens tribal sovereignty and identity at both the group and individual level. Hence, tribes that exercise "nationhood" as a way to increase economic, political, and cultural integrity also have the potential to increase the ability of individual tribal members to become self-sufficient.

In this respect tribal TANF, as part of a nation-building strategy, creates a positive externality on two levels. A successful tribal TANF program that prepares and places individuals in meaningful work opportunities and generates self-sufficiency at the individual level also strengthens the tribe. Additionally, in administering tribal TANF, tribes exercise tribal sovereignty and increase the capacity for tribal members to move from welfare to work. This bi-directional relationship can be made manifest in a number of ways.

First, strengthened and effective tribal sovereignty may affect a tribal member's overall self-perception in a positive way and improve her chances for work. As a corollary, individuals are likely to be negatively impacted when they are members of an ethnic group that historically has had little political, cultural, and economic voice. There is some circumstantial evidence to suggest that weakened tribal voice negatively affects individuals. Indian Health Service [2000] reports some disturbing health statistics for American Indians. From 1994 to 1996, the age-adjusted suicide rate for American Indians was seventy-two percent higher than the U.S. average. Additionally, the age-adjusted alcoholism death rate for Indians was over seven times the U.S. rate, with higher rates in those regions that contain the poorest reservations. Certainly, these health issues act as barriers to individuals attempting to move from welfare to work.

Second, sovereignty may allow tribes to engage in business opportunities that create more jobs in Indian country. Evidence of the link between sovereignty exercised through gaming and individual welfare comes from Pace [2001]. He finds that since 1990 welfare participation has grown less on reservations with casinos than those without. And, since the passage of the Indian Gaming Act in 1988, tribal gaming revenues have grown from $100 million to $8 billion. In light of these profits, banks are starting to take an interest in Indian reservations [Wirtz, 2000; Zahrt Geib, 2003]. The arrival of banks on reservations potentially makes capital available for more business opportunity.

An additional component of the nation-building strategy is the transfer of responsibility for failure from shareholders to stakeholders. This transfer makes contracts incentive-compatible and increases the likelihood of a positive outcome. Synchronous with the title and intent of welfare reform, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reorganization Act, tribal TANF makes tribes responsible for finding ways to move individuals from welfare to work. Thus, unlike in the past, failure to meet program goals will be blamed on the tribes themselves, not outside agencies, and should create an extra incentive for tribes to prepare individuals for gainful employment.

Fourth, tribal sovereignty and nation-building place tribes in an historically unique moment. Historically tribes have been shielded from direct interaction with private industries and states because contracts involving assets in trust had to be approved by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA). Now tribes are being encouraged to deal directly with these entities. One advantage of this change is that local avenues for job placement and barrier removal are beginning to take shape. Over time, tribes will be able to utilize these new contacts to benefit individual tribal members.

This section has suggested some ways in which tribal voice and sovereignty has the potential to affect tribes at both the tribal and individual levels. The rest of this paper is devoted to characterizing tribal TANF-both in general and for the Klamath Tribes-to determine whether in practice tribal TANF can contribute to a tribe's sense of nationhood and promote self-sufficiency at the both the individual and tribal levels.

OVERVIEW OF WELFARE REFORM FOR TRIBES

Tribal Program Characteristics

Many American Indian welfare clients face substantial barriers to labor force participation. Unemployment rates across reservations average 25 percent. Only 8.9 percent of American Indians have a bachelor's degree or higher, compared to 20.3 percent for the U.S. overall. As of 1990, 53.4 percent of reservation households had no telephone and almost 25 percent lacked any motor vehicle [Census, 1995]. Reservations also lack adequate amounts of licensed day care. Additionally, teen pregnancy among Native Americans is unusually high: 46 percent of mothers were under age twenty when they had their first child compared to 25 percent of mothers overall [Indian Health Service, 2000]. And health issues, most notably diabetes, depression, and alcoholism, keep many individuals out of the paid labor force entirely, either because they themselves are afflicted with these diseases or because they must care for someone who is.

Approved Programs. Despite the many severe barriers to moving recipients from welfare to work, American Indian tribes are taking upon themselves the opportunity to provide TANF to tribal members. Table 1 lists the tribes or tribal consortia with approved tribal TANF plans. As of 17 February 2001, 31 tribal programs - some that involve several tribes - were serving clients, with several more plans in the works. To put this in perspective, there are 343 eligible American Indian communities; counting the plans pending, a tribal TANF plan will soon cover one-half of the eligible tribes or Alaska villages. It is estimated that once the plans that are currently pending are approved and implemented, tribal TANF programs will cover 25,000 American Indian Families [Nazario, 2000]

Tribes and States. Column 2 of Table 1 shows the average monthly caseload estimates for each plan. The total caseload ranges from eight for the Sakaogan Chippewa Community to 9,598 for the Navajo Nation program, with an average caseload across the approved tribal TANF programs of 506 families.

These figures take on greater significance when we consider the racial composition of state TANF caseloads. For example, the American Indian TANF caseload in South Dakota in fiscal year 1998 accounted for over 77 percent of the total cases [Department of Health and Human Services, 1999]. South Dakota's TANF caseload- as well as the caseloads in other states with large percentages of American Indian clients-will be drastically altered in number, composition, and funding once tribal TANF programs are implemented. Hence, a healthy working relationship between state and tribal TANF programs and officials is crucial to tribal and state programs and to individual well-being.

Another reason for a collegial working relationship between tribes and states is that once tribal TANF programs are approved, the funds granted to the tribes are deducted from the state's block grant for that fiscal year.4 The state then has discretion over whether any additional funds will be granted to the tribal program. A defining factor in a tribe's choice to administer TANF is whether or not the state will provide additional funds. In most cases tribes do not have sufficient resources to run TANF programs without this additional support. Hence, while tribes take on the administration of tribal TANF, states cannot abdicate their responsibility for moving individuals to work.

Tribal TANF and Sovereignty in Principle

Can tribes with approved TANF programs exercise sovereignty within the existing regulations? To address this question, Table 2 presents some of the program characteristics that differentiate tribal and state TANF programs. The top panel of Table 2 lists regulations related to financial items; the bottom panel considers other TANF program regulations.

IMAGE TABLE 1

TABLE 1

Tribes and Tribal Consortia with Tribal TANF Programs(a)

Funding. Because tribes have less experience than do states with social service delivery they are allowed to use a larger proportion of their budget for administrative costs. However, other funding differences in the program regulations are less favorable to tribes. States receive bonuses from the federal government when certain goals are met; tribal programs are not offered the same incentives. Some states have received performance evaluation funds. But tribes, who do not have the infrastructure that states have for data storage and evaluation, and who could take advantage of such funds, are not eligible to receive them.

It appears that tribes are not operating on a level playing field with the states, at least where finances are concerned. The lack of adequate funds potentially poses problems for tribal sovereignty.

IMAGE TABLE 2

TABLE 2

Comparison of State and Tribal TANF Programs

Services. While tribes may lag behind states where funding is concerned, consistent with the principle of sovereignty, tribes exercise more flexibility than do states in designing their own programs, establishing benefits, and specifying means for achieving program goals. Unlike the states, tribes specify their service area and service populations. And, while states must enforce a sixty-month lifetime limit on welfare receipt, the tribal lifetime limit may be longer if the tribe can provide a rationale for such policy. Additionally, tribes may exempt more cases from the rules than do states because tribal TANF recipients are more likely to face severe barriers to employment.

The principle of sovereignty is also reflected in the fact that tribes can choose the types of services their programs will provide, and can choose to provide the services themselves, through inter-tribal consortia, or they can contract the services with states or other entities. In this regard, tribal TANF programs that are subsumed under the auspices of PL 102-477 (the Indian Employment, Training, and Related Services Demonstration Act of 1992) have an advantage over tribal programs that are not. This act allows approved tribes to integrate funding from various federal categorical grants into a single program and therefore to make a larger sum of money available to serve clients.

Work Activity Provision. The flexibility in the regulations discussed above allows tribes-as part of a nation-building strategy-to craft programs that are sensitive to tribal population needs. However, the single most important component of tribal TANF that could most directly lead to tribal sovereignty and individual selfsufficiency is the work-activity definition provision. Because TANF clients must be engaged in a work activity twenty hours per week to remain eligible for welfare, and because work activities are intended to lead to meaningful employment, what counts as an eligible work activity is crucial to the success of TANF programs.

Most important, the choice of what constitutes an allowable work activity goes beyond these work-participation goals and gets to the heart of economists' definition of work. Poor communities worldwide, North American Indian tribes included, survive consistent high rates of unemployment by being productive in activities not measured by formal labor force and growth statistics. In tribal TANF, tribes have the unprecedented authority to count unpaid labor and traditional activities as work, authority that even the Bureau of Labor Statistics does not exercise. Through this provision tribes can exercise their sovereignty and acknowledge tribal member self-sufficiency. Tribes are being encouraged by the Department of Health and Human Services to be creative in this regard.

Unfortunately, tribes have not fully exercised their sovereign rights where the work-activity eligibility is concerned. Only a few tribes have included traditional modes of production as an allowable activity, and no tribe has yet counted childrearing as a work activity when done by the parent, even though it can be counted if one watches someone else's children in a licensed facility. Since the majority of TANF recipients are female, it is crucial that tribes not be gender biased in counting some traditional work activities and not others. Furthermore, there is some evidence that ignoring informal markets and production and forcing resources from the informal to the formal sector can actually undermine the existing social safety nets [Pickering, 2000; Morduch, 1995]. Tribes need to rethink "work" in light of these issues and the discretion they have over allowable work activities.

Outreach. Tribes also exercise sovereignty in the new relationships they are forging with non-federal government entities. Under tribal TANF, tribes are liberated to engage in "nation-to-state" and "nation-to-industry" negotiations, and are encouraged to work more closely with local agencies. As tribes, businesses, and social service agencies interact directly there is a potential to better serve clients. These new relationships can change the political economy of reservation development as local businesses begin to identify with tribal goals.

To summarize, in principle, except for unequal funding, tribal TANF regulations can strengthen tribal sovereignty and individual self-sufficiency. The next section considers whether in practice-at least for one tribal TANF program-tribes and tribal members are well served by tribal TANF.

CASE STUDY: THE KLAMATH TRIBES TANF PROGRAM

The Klamath Tribes

The Klamath Tribes was the term given to the Klamath, Modoc, and Yahooskin tribes in the Klamath Basin region of Oregon when the tribes signed a treaty with the Federal government in 1864. The treaty ceded 23 million acres of land to the Federal government, set up a 1.3 million acre reservation in the region, and began the trust relationship between the Federal government and the tribes [Klamath Tribes, 1999b].

As with many other tribes in the Pacific Northwest, the trust relationship between the Federal government and the Klamath Tribes was terminated by Congressional resolution in 1954. The reservation was sold and the Klamath Tribes lost their land base as well as all the resources associated with the land. On 27 August 1986, under Public Law 99-398, the relationship with the Federal government was reinstated and the Klamath Tribal service area in Klamath County, Oregon was established.5 While federal recognition and the trust relationship were reestablished, the Klamath Tribes regained only 390 acres of trust land.

Since reinstatement the Klamath Tribes have worked actively to bring resources to the tribes and to make the most of resources located in the service area. The tribes employed only six individuals prior to reinstatement, but by 1998 the Klamath Tribes' administration budget was over $12 million and the tribes employed over 150 individuals [Klamath Tribes, 1999a]. Over this period the tribes have built a community center, received a loan for construction of a Tribal Administration Complex, secured funding for housing and a tribal health facility, and initiated a cigarette tax compact with the State of Oregon. In 1997 they opened the Kla-Mo-Ta casino. The tribes also have emphasized cultural development and have worked diligently to reintroduce traditional tribal celebrations, preserve the Klamath language, and have recently begun preparations for a tribal court. By 1998 tribal membership stood at 3,243 members.

As part of this tribal and economic development, the Klamath Tribes actively pursued their own TANF program as soon as PRWORA allowed them to do so. They were the first tribe in the nation to apply for TANF funds and the first tribe to open their doors to their service population.

NAFA Performance

Background. The Klamath Tribes TANF program began serving clients in July 1997. Expecting a caseload of 70-90 families, and having received funding for that number, the program was immediately overwhelmed when over 120 families filed applications. American Indians who were previously eligible for aid from the state, but who opted not to receive this aid and thus were not counted in any official statistics used to determine funding, were now applying for aid through the NAFA program. There is evidence that other tribal programs face the same in-migration issues of equal or greater proportions [Parsons, 1999]. The opportunity to be served by a caseworker who is either Indian him/herself, or who is knowledgeable about the issues unique to Indian country, increases the likelihood of a Native American individual applying for tribal TANF. Three case studies of Native American welfare clients confirm that the caseworker/client relationship is crucial [CSWS, 2001].

The unexpected number of Indian clients put an immediate strain on the NAFA program. An additional strain came when a large proportion of this tribal caseload fell into the more expensive categories of no-parent and two-parent cases. Rather than abandon the program, the Klamath Tribes and the State of Oregon Adult and Family Services forged a unique legal, financial, and working relationship that allows both the Klamath Tribes and the State to take seriously the mandate that local entities can best serve their population.

An added challenge to the number and type of applicants was the fact that NAFA did not have adequate avenues for job placement set up. The program faced an ever-enlarging caseload with few, if any, mechanisms in place to relieve the pressure on services. Rather than turn to the state or the federal government for help, NAFA program administrators have sought out avenues for job placement and job training with local industries, non-profit organizations, and the tribe, as well as educational opportunities with local community colleges. As Marvin Garcia, current NAFA manager articulates, "We knew of these places, we just never interacted with them before now" [2001].

Caseload Figures. The statistics for the average monthly NAFA, State of Oregon, and Klamath Falls Branch caseload data from April 1998 though May 1999 are presented in Table 3.6 The total NAFA caseload varies between 82 and 107 cases, with an average monthly caseload of 96. The NAFA percent of no-parent cases varies from 21 to 29, and averages 26 percent of the total caseload per month. This compares to a state average of 15 percent and is twice as high as the Klamath Falls Branch figure of 11 percent. These are needy children living with a relative who does not meet need criteria. Most of these cases results from teen pregnancy. The NAFA program labels these cases "non-needy relative caretaker" rather than the industry standard term 'no-parent' cases to capture the unique structure of the case. Relative caretaker-as opposed to no-parent-cases are likely to be high in American Indian communities due to extended family and kinship networks [Lamphere, 1979].

The high number of no-parent cases is an issue not just for tribal programs but for states that serve American Indian populations as well. According to Robert Staver, data from the branch that serves the Warm Springs Reservation show that close to 75 percent of American Indian cases are no-parent household grants for which there are no work requirements [1999]. And, a recent report to Congress indicates that in tribal programs across the country, 21.3 percent of the cases are no-parent cases [Department of Health and Human Services, 1999]. These cases are costly to welfare programs as they can be on the roles for a long period of time.

In addition to the high number of non-needy relative caretaker cases, the NAFA program is characterized by an unusually high number of two-parent cases. Table 3 shows on average 30 percent are two-parent cases each month. This percentage is six times higher than the state average and four times higher than the Klamath Falls Branch average. The national average for tribal programs is 13.8 percent.

The size of the two-parent caseload is most likely an outcome of many factors including human capital attainment, remoteness, labor market discrimination, and health issues, but two particular factors merit discussion: the high rate of unemployment for American Indians in Klamath County and household demographics among American Indians.7 A recent estimate of American Indian unemployment in the Klamath Falls region places the unemployment rate at 58 percent [Bureau of Indian Affairs, 1995]. High rates of unemployment increase the possibility that no adult in the household is working, even in households where two parents are present. Second, American Indians have a higher percentage of two-parent households than other racial minorities [Sandefur and Sakamoto, 1988]. The greater the percent of married households in a community, all else equal, the higher the likelihood that there will be a greater proportion of two-parent cases on welfare.

As Table 3 shows, the average percent of NAFA cases closed each month (6.6 percent) is similar to the average for the Oregon (6.3 percent), but is lower than that for the Klamath Falls Branch (10.1 percent). Closure occurs when individuals secure job placements or become need or otherwise ineligible. Interviews with Marvin Garcia indicate that the majority of the job placements have been in low-paying service occupations or in seasonal work, with the Klamath Tribes, and at the casino [2001]. This is consistent with the CSWS study that finds that the majority of employed participants are employed in low-wage, service sector jobs [CSWS, 2001, 15-16].

IMAGE TABLE 3

TABLE 3 /p>

Klamath Tribes, State of Oregon, and Klamath Falls Branch TANF Caseload Averages, April 1998 to May 1999

It is not clear that caseload declines will continue at the rate that they have in the past. As those most employable leave the rolls the program is left serving those with the most severe workforce barriers. At the top of the list of barriers is lack of reliable transportation. Most of the individuals who found work early on live in Klamath Falls, the commercial center of the region. Those who live outside of Klamath Falls and who don't have reliable transportation find it difficult to impossible to maintain a work schedule. According to Garcia, 70 percent of those currently in NAFA lack transportation altogether [2001].

Garcia also ranks the disabling effects of depression and the symptom of self-medication that can accompany depression as major barriers to work participation. According to Garcia, there is a direct link between tribal termination, or nationhood, and depression. Although it has been seventeen years since the Klamath Tribes were reinstated the negative effects of termination have been passed from generation to generation. Transportation and health issues also rank as the top two barriers for getting and/or keeping a job in the CSWS study [2001].

The last column of Table 3 presents the average expenditure per case.8 The average NAFA expenditure per case is $432, and for Oregon and the Klamath Falls Branch are $408 and $409 respectively. NAFA cases receive slightly more funds than their non-Indian counterparts, reflecting not that the tribal program has more resources, but rather the larger percentage of more costly two-parent cases in the NAFA caseload. Also, because a larger percent of the total TANF grant can be used for administrative costs, the higher expenditure per case does not necessarily mean that more money is getting to the clients.

Summary. Although NAFA caseload declines are equal to those in Oregon over the same time period, we cannot draw conclusions from these individual statistics on the success of NAFA. We can, however, make some observations. Similar to TANF leavers across the state, NAFA leavers find jobs in the low-wage service sector or seasonal work, and live close to the jobs. Those without jobs face transportation and mental health barriers to paid employment. And, given the high percentage of no-parent and two-parent cases, funding for the NAFA program seems inadequate.

CONCLUSIONS

Many studies of welfare reform are based on individual outcomes. This study diverges from that template by analyzing welfare reform at both the tribal and individual levels. In doing so this paper offers two unique contributions. First, this study is one of the first to analyze tribal TANF programs and data. Second, this study is the first to frame welfare reform within the context of the nation-building model, and to suggest ways to think about the impact of welfare reform on tribal sovereignty, not just individuals. In light of these contributions, I offer four observations about the Klamath Tribes NAFA program and tribal TANF in general.

First, in an age of insufficient tribal funding, the financial and working relationship between tribal programs and states is vital to the ability of tribal programs to help individuals move from welfare to work. Where this relationship is functional and collegial, both programs can better serve American Indian clients, especially in states with large Native American populations. States need to recognize and maintain their financial obligation to move individuals to work. While a close financial relationship with states can undermine tribal sovereignty, the additional funding fosters individual self-sufficiency within tribal programs.

Second, the services provided by tribal TANF programs will reach more American Indians in need than will state programs because American Indian individuals are more likely to apply for aid through a tribal program than through the state. The client/caseworker relationship is crucial to success at the individual level. Hence, tribal TANF will not only reach more American Indian individuals but it should improve the welfare of these individuals as well. Thus, there is a direct relationship between tribal sovereignty and individual self-sufficiency that provides another avenue for nation-building in Indian country.

Third, programs that serve American Indian communities are likely to have a large number of no-parent and two-parent cases. These cases reflect the labor and cultural institutions in these areas and put an extra financial burden on tribal programs. The manner in which tribes seek to alleviate the pressure created by these cases determines whether or not sovereignty will be undermined. To the extent that tribal TANF programs can foster social safety nets already in place, neither tribal sovereignty nor individual self-sufficiency are undermined.

Finally, the answer to the question of whether or not tribal TANF has been successful is both "yes" and "no." In principle, tribal TANF allows tribes to exercise voice and engage in nation building. Tribes can choose their service area and service population, and define what counts as a tribal family and what counts as work. The fact that tribes have taken the initiative to serve members of their communities and have more control of resource allocation decisions should be considered a success in the movement toward greater sovereignty. In the Klamath Tribes case, new relationships with local businesses and non-profits increase tribal voice and individual well-being and create avenues for future collective action between the tribes and local institutions.

However, there are two reasons why, in practice, tribal programs fail to promote sovereignty. One is that tribes have not fully utilized the flexibility related to work definitions to recognize the many different forms of "work" that can occur in Indian country. Forcing individuals into paid employment could undermine the informal social safety nets in place, as well as undermine tribal member's sense of "nation." The other reason is that, at least in the case of the Klamath Tribes, inadequate funding levels mean that the tribes must rely on additional funding from states, effectively decreasing tribal self-sufficiency.

Ultimately, whether tribal TANF is successful at both the micro and macro levels depends on how tribes meet resource constraints, by looking within or without. At least in the short run there appears to be a tradeoff between individual and tribal sovereignty. An outward focus may better serve individual clients but undermine tribal sovereignty as funds are made available through states or other entities. An inward focus that affirms and utilizes informal work and social safety nets will increase tribal sovereignty, but it is unclear whether this focus will meet immediate individual needs. Only in the long run will tribes be able to simultaneously foster both individual and tribal sovereignty and self-sufficiency through tribal TANF.

SIDEBAR

Eastern Economic Journal, Vol. 29, No. 2, Spring 2003

FOOTNOTE

NOTES

An earlier version of this paper was presented as a CSWEP paper at the 2000 Annual Meeting of the Eastern Economic Association.

1. It is not this author's intent to suggest that movements in caseload totals are the only indicator of welfare reform success, rather that this approach has been used widely to gauge success.

2. A major multi-year study has been undertaken by a group of researchers at the Kathryn M. Buder Center for American Indian Studies at Washington University. [Panday, et al., 1999].

3. Subsequent requests to the Tribal Council for current caseload data are pending.

4. The grant amount is determined by the percentage of the state's 1994 budget that was used for American Indian cases in the service region.

5. There is a legal understanding that a tribal service area serves the same purpose as a reservation.

6. There are some limitations to this study. First, the monthly reports contain aggregate, not individual-level, data. Therefore demographic, human capital, and placement information is not available for an examination of personal outcomes. Second, the monthly reports cover a relatively short time period, from April 1998 to May 1999. Third, the Klamath Tribes do not track the experiences of former TANF recipients once they find employment.

7. This difference may also be partially explained by at least two other factors. First, there has been a concerted effort by the state to reduce the number of two parent household cases because these cases are expensive and believed to be easier to move to employment. Second, in Oregon, different and harsher rules applied to two-parent households than single parent households pre-TANF. These rules created an incentive for households to split up. Even though many of the two-parent households rules have changed, clients may not be aware of the changes and may structure their households in ways to which they have become accustomed.

8. Total expenditures include expenditures on one-parent, two-parent, and no-parent caseload maintenance and support services, and emergency assistance.

REFERENCE

REFERENCES

Andersen, T., ed. Property Rights and Indian Economies. Lantham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1992.

Bureau of the Census. Statistical Brief: Housing of American Indians on Reservations-Equipment and Fuels. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1995.

Bureau of Indian Affairs. Indian Service Population and Labor Force Estimates. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1995.

Center for the Study of Women in Society Welfare Research Team. Oregon Families Who Left Temporary Assistance to Needy Families or Food Stamps: A Study of Economic and Family Well-Being from 1998-2000, Vol. 1 & 2. University of Oregon, 2001.

Champagne, D. Economic Culture, Institutional Order, And Sustained Market Enterprise: Comparisons of Historical and Contemporary American Indian Cases. Property Rights and Indian Economies, edited by T. Anderson. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1992, 195-213.

_____. Sociocultural Responses to Coal Development: A Comparison of the Crow and Northern Cheyenne, in American Indian Economic Development, edited by C. Ward and C.M. Snipp. Research in Human Capital Development Vol. 10. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1996, 131-46.

Cornell, S. Enhancing Rural Leadership and Institutions: What Can We Learn from American Indian Nations? International Regional Science Review, January 2001, 84-102.

Cornell, S. and Kalt, J. P. Reloading the Dice: Improving the Chances for Economic Development on American Indian Reservations, in What Can Tribes Do? Strategies and Institutions in American Indian Economic Development, American Indian Manual and Handbook Series, no. 4. Los Angeles: American Indian Studies Center, 1992a, 1-59.

_____. Culture and Institutions as Public Goods: American Indian Economic Development as a Problem of Collective Action, in Property Rights and Indian Economies, edited by T. Anderson. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1992b, 215-52.

_____. Pathways from Poverty: Economic Development and Institution-Building on American Indian Reservations. American Indian Culture and Research Journal, November 1990, 89-125.

_____. Where Does Economic Development Really Come From? Constitutional Rule among the Contemporary Sioux and Apache. Economic Inquiry, July 1995, 402-26.

Cross, R. De-federalizing American Indian Commerce: Toward a New Political Economy for Indian Country. Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, Spring 1993, 446-92.

Department of Health and Human Services. Administration for Children and Families, Office of Planning, Research, and Evaluation. Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) Program, Second Annual Report to Congress, 1999, 109-129.

_____. Administration for Children and Families. Tribal Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Program (Tribal TANF) and Native Employment Works (NEW) Program; Final Rule. Federal Register, 18 February 2000.

_____. Administration for Children and Families, Division of Tribal Services. TANF Participation: Characteristics of Tribal TANF Plans as of February 17, 2001 [Online]. Available: <http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/dts/charact.htm>, 1 May 2001.

Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. Community Reinvestment, Winter Supplement, 1997.

Garcia, M. Klamath Tribes Native American Families Assistance Manager, interview, 19 March 2001.

Indian Health Service. Trends in Indian Health, 1998-1999 [Online], Available: <http://www.ihs.gov/PublicInfo/Publications/trends98/front.pdf>, 18 June 2000.

Klamath Tribes. Klamath Tribes Annual Report, 1998, 1999a.

_____. Klamath Tribes History [Online]. Available: <http://www.klamathtribes.rog/history.html>, July 21, 1999b.

_____. Klamath Tribes NAFA Monthly Reports, Dec. 1997-May 1999.

Lamphere, L. Traditional Pastoral Economy, in Economic Development in American Indian Reservations, edited by R. Dunbar Ortiz. University of New Mexico: Native American Studies, 1979, 78-90.

Morduch, J. Income Smoothing and Consumption Smoothing. Journal of Economic Perspectives, Summer 1995, 103-114.

Mushinski, D. and Pickering, K. Micro-enterprise Credit in Indian Country in American Indian Economic Development, edited by C. Ward and C.M. Snipp. Research in Human Capital Development, Vol. 10. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1996, 147-69.

Nazario, C. Deputy Assistant Secretary, Administration for Children and Families. Keynote Address, Empowering Tribal Families in the New Millennium Conference, Albuquerque, NM, 25 April 2000.

Pace, D. Indian Casinos. IRE Journal, March/April 2001, 8-9.

Panday, S., Brown, E. F., Scheuler-Whitaker, L., Gundersen, B., Eyrich, K., and Villarreal, L. Implementation of the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) on American Indian Reservations: Early Evidence from Arizona. Kathryn M. Buder Center for American Indian Studies, George Warren Brown School of Social Work, Washington University, 1999.

Parsons, R. Klamath Tribes Native American Families Assistance Manager, interview, 16 July 1999.

Pickering, K. Alternative Economic Strategies in Low-Income Rural Communities: TANF, Labor Migration, and the Case of the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation. Rural Sociology, 2000, 148-67.

Sandefur, D. and Sakamato, A. American Indian Household Structure and Income. Demography, February 1988, 71-80.

State of Oregon. Adult and Family Services Division. Public Assistance Programs Branch and District Data, April 1998-March 1999.

Staver, R. Tribal Relations Liaison, Adult and Family Services, State of Oregon Department of Human Resources, interview, 16 July 1999.

Wirtz, R. Breaking the Buckskin Curtain. The Region, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, 2000.

Woodrow, S. Tribal Sovereign Immunity: An Obstacle for non-Indians Doing Business in Indian Country? Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Community Dividend, Summer 1998.

Zahrt Geib, E. Indian Country: Underserved or Unbanked? Department of Economics, Portland, OR: Lewis and Clark College, Working Paper, 2003.

AUTHOR_AFFILIATION

Elizabeth Zahrt Geib

Lewis and Clark College

AUTHOR_AFFILIATION

Elizabeth Zahrt Geib: Economics Department, Lewis and Clark College, 0615 SW Palatine Hill Road, Portland, OR, 97219. E-mail: zahrt@lclark.edu