Acquisition woes.

* In the article, "Preventive Care Prescribed for Pentagon Big-Ticket Programs," (February 2008, page 8), Ms. Erwin makes an interesting observation concerning cost overruns of numerous Pentagon programs, but I suggest that the budget process is not the problem. Rather, it is the broken acquisition

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Three stories that also appear in the February issue are blatant examples of my point.

The article "Not So Fast on Fast Response Cutters, Coast Guard Says" reports that the contract award was delayed because of the initial requests for proposals proved too confusing. Too confusing? The urgency is only due to the failure of the previous effort to stretch the hulls of the existing 110-foot patrol boats. The Coast Guard was satisfied with the stretched design but the hulls proved too worn out and/or unsuitable for the alterations. Now, instead of manufacturing from start the longer-hull cutter, the Coast Guard does not even know what it wants in a "Fast Response Cutter" and is asking industry to design it. I have no problem with awarding a design and development contract, but in no way should this be a construction contract, given such an amorphous requirement.

The article "Numbers Game; More Amphibious Ships Are Needed, Marines Contend" is an interesting discussion of the challenges of fielding an adequate amphibious fleet, given changes in fleet totals, equipment, organizational and mission changes, etc. Yet then follows "Forces Afloat; Marine Corps Makes Strong Pitch for 'Sea Bases'" that lays out an alternative approach.

Worse, the "Sea Base" concept as described depends on the undefined Mobile Landing Platform (MLP), which in turn depends on undefined technical solutions and improvements to the Large Medium Speed Roll On/Roll Off (LMSR) ships. Still, "The Navy plans to award a contract for the MLP in 2010." Here we go again, beginning construction before finishing the design.

Worse yet, to extend appeal to joint force needs, the MPF design should also accommodate the Army's "favorite," the Joint Heavy Lift Rotorcraft (JHLR). Ladies and gentlemen, this is a "show stopper." The Army's JHLR is a lynchpin to the Army's Future Combat Systems (FCS) effort, yet the Training and Doctrine Command planners have yet to articulate a realistic operational concept of employment, let alone a production design. The only thing that is certain is that the JHLR will be huge, and since it carries cargo inside, it will take time to load.

In theory, you can line up and prepare any number of combat vehicles in a clearing or on a deck and then have heavy lift helicopters hover and snatch them off one at a time in reasonable order. The helicopters can then un-sling their cargoes and return for another load, repeatedly. But the huge JHLR has to land and then secure the internal load and then land and disgorge the load. The throughput rate is far too slow to be operationally effective. Add to that the "forte" of the JHLR being long range/deep insertion and the turnaround time rises dramatically.

Any objective review of the Marine Corps' contradictory interrelated technically unresolved proposals for funding acquisition could only result in one decision: "Whoa!"

The Pentagon needs to more quickly lay out joint and integrated concepts. The individual services need to develop their respective operational and organizational plans. The services' materiel developers need to resolve technical issues before committing to final designs. Only then should the acquisition agencies award production contracts, and then stick to them.

Chester A. Kojro

Rolla, MO