Russia adrift

HEADNOTE

Strategic Anchors for Russia's Foreign Policy

Ever since Christmas Day 1991, when Russia was thrust precipitately onto the international stage as a nation-state, it has been trying to fashion a nationalsecurity

policy for its changed status in a new era. The other 14 union-republics of theformer Soviet Union welcomed independence; Russia did not. Where other republics embraced the uncertain future and quickly learned to play the game of regional and world politics-some better than others, but all with a mixture of shrewdness and accommodation geared to preserving their unexpectedly bequeathed sovereignty and statusRussia's leaders were divided, fractious, and unable to forge consensus or cooperation.

The Romantic Interregnum

Initially, the foreign-policy orientation of Russian President Boris Yeltsin was unmistakably pro-West. Secretary of State James A. Baker III found him reassuring, forthcoming, and informed, noting that Yeltsin looked forward to developing a "strategic partnership" with the United States and that he agreed to work with the other former Soviet republics to control nuclear weapons, curb nuclear proliferation, and push quickly for ratification of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty (CFE). Yeltsin's foreign minister, Andrei Kozyrev, was in the Westernizing tradition of Russian foreign policy. Keen on collaboration with the West, he was confident that economic concessions and assistance would be forthcoming and prepared for an evolving politicalstrategic partnership that recognized Russia's role as a great power and charter member of the post-Soviet European Concert of Powers.

But the possibility of a RussianAmerican strategic relationship was never really explored. Yeltsin expected too much. His hopes that the United States would use its "peace dividend" to help finance Russia's democratic transformation and political integration into the West were disappointed in 1992 and dashed in 1993. Early on, Russia's reformers fell victim to Yeltsin's indecisiveness, to internecine turf struggles in the Kremlin, to the resistance of government bureaucracies, and to the rampant corruption spawned by crony capitalism. By 1994, Yeltsin's priorities were more accurately characterized as holding the line and the reins of power than as pushing basic reforms. The economy continued to show neative growth: from 1992 to 1999 there was not a single year in which Russia's GDP increased.

With the reformers discredited and the ultra-nationalists gaining in strength, in part because of NATO's preparations for enlargement, Yeltsin reversed course. Stung by his political opponents and seeking to strengthen his position for the presidential election injune 1996, Yeltsin sacked Kozyrev in January 1996 and superseded his pro-Western orientation with an eclectic "balance-of-interests" approach favored by Kozyrev's successor, Yevgeny Primakov. Perhaps Kozyrev's only success in collaborating with the United States was in persuading Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to relinquish their nuclear-weapons capabilities and join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as non-nuclear powers, thus making Russia the sole successor to the Soviet Union's status as a nuclear superpower and a logical partner with the United States in managing the complex nuclear issue.

The Return of Geopolitics

Though slow to crystallize, an ongoing and far-ranging debate did emerge among Russia's elites on what Russia's foreign and defense policy should be in a world of new realities starkly defined by the disintegration of the former Soviet Union and Russia's new borders. These debates invariably assumed that Russia would remain a world power and that its economy would soon recover. Furthen-nore, they expected that a coherent policy would be crafted for ensuring a strong military, coping with separatist movements, and keeping abreast of the growth and technological advances of other leading industrial nations. As the 201 century drew to an end, such assumptions were more self-indulgent romanticism than reality.

The most difficult problem was psychological: How would an elite whose historical memory and political experience was steeped in an imperial tradition respond to a drastically different set of circumstances? Geopolitically, the Russian Federation represented a spatial reversal of more than 400 years of imperial history. Shorn of 24 percent of the territory of the former Soviet Union and about 40 percent of its population, Russia found itself squeezed out of Europe, with its European perimeter moved significandy eastward both territorially and strategically. Its position in Transcaucasia is a throwback to the l7t' century, when Russia vied with the Persian and Ottoman Empires for dominance. The loss of Central Asia opened vulnerabilities in its soft underbelly not known since the Middle Ages. In brief, in the past decade Russia lost the commanding control of non-Russian surrogatestates and space that made for a strong national security.

A renewed Russian interest in geopolitics accompanied this stunning historical upheaval. "Geopolitics," which deals with the interrelationships between political actors and their spatial environment, was regarded during the Soviet era as a synonym for aggressive "bourgeois" expansion and associated with Nazism and the ideas of the German strategist Karl Haushofer. Its prominence in Russian political and military thinking may be inferred from the establishment of a Committee on Geopolitical Issues by the Russian Duma. For Russians, the strategic, political, and economic implications of their changed environment has become tied to the debate on what the national interest should be and how Russia should adapt to its new environment. A changed geography mandates new strategies for defense, economic development, and diplomacy. Repeated attempts by Yeltsin's National Security Council to devise a suitable national security strategy document have failed. The most recent formulation, "Russian Federation National Security Blueprint," dated December 17, 1997, is a hodge-podge intended to mollify competing factions and constituencies, not to guide policy or establish priorities.

Atlanticism vs. Eurasianism

Russia's first foreign-policy debate pitted Atlanticism (or Westernism) against Eurasianism. The Atlanticists, epitomized by Andrei Kozyrev and his adherents in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, maintained that Russia's democratization, socioeconomic transformation, and integration into Western civilization and international institutions depended on the West's goodwill and support. In keeping with Mikhail Gorbachev's advocacy of a "common European home," which would have included full partnership for the Soviet Union, they urged reforms to shift the country's command economy to a market-oriented economy and heavy reliance on the United States and the major West European powers. Their optimism, buoyed by the dramatic way the Cold War ended-supposedly with no winners and no losers-led them to expect that the West would be generous and welcoming and that Russia's re-entry into Europe would secure the peace, making Russia's democratization irreversible.

In the countervailing camp were the adherents of Eurasianism. Neither a new phenomenon nor a unitary concept, Eurasianism initially appeared on Russia's political and philosophical stage in the latter half of the 19,h century as a reaction to the narrowness of Panslavism. The 1990s variant was introduced bv Sergei Stankevich who, like Kozyrev, was a member of Yeltsin's early foreign-policy circle. He acknowledged the Atlanticist approach to be "rational, pragmatic, and natural: that's where the credits are, that's where the aid is, and that's where the advanced technology is," but warned that a policy of pragmatism unleavened "by a healthy idealism will most likely degenerate into cynicism." While not rejecting Atlanticism, he and other moderate Eurasianists argued that given its geographical and geopolitical boundaries as well as its imperial patrimony and distinctive civilization, Russia should strike a balance of Western and Eastern orientations. Accordingly, they favored differentiating Russia's partners in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), distinguishing between those who intended to go their own way and those for whom the Commonwealth-and close ties to Russia-was a fundamental choice and preference. They also supported a strong policy of defending the rights of Russians in the near abroad (a term referring to the space of the former Soviet union-republics) as well as close ties to countries such as Turkey, India, and China. At its core, the Eurasianist position considered Russia uniquely situated to serve as a land bridge between Europe and Asia, culturally more effective in interacting organically with peoples of Eurasia.

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Boris Yeltsin, 1991. Preaching Atlanticism to the masses before changing course.

Established on the eve of the USSR's dissolution, the CIS was quickly enlarged, with only the Baltic states-Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania-electing to go their own way. The chief priority of Russian diplomacy was said to be the transformation of the USSR into a community of sovereign and equal states desiring to promote political stability on the territory of the former Soviet Union, prevent and settle ethnic conflicts, foster economic cooperation, and build a system of security by forestalling the rise of hostile coalitions. Moscow sought to institutionalize Russia's leadership role through a "carrot-and-stick" approach. The "carrots" were security under Russia's nuclear umbrella, domestic stability, territorial integrity guaranteed by Russian-dominated CIS peacekeeping contingents, and economic largesse. The "sticks" were veiled threats of economic sanctions against those who refused to participate and tacit (as well as covert) support for oppositionist and secessionist forces within particular republics.

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Keep your chin upan isolated superpower in decline must adapt to evolving international conditions.

By late 1995, with Atlanticism increasingly discredited in elite circles, Yeltsin veered to the right, responding to increased antagonism toward NATO's plans for eastward expansion, the West's demonization of Serbia in the Yugoslav wars of succession, and the inadequacy of Western financial and investment flows to make much of a difference in Russia's internal situation. Other factors also contributed to the growing chill in Russian-American relations-tensions over nuclear issues, relations with Iran and India, rivalry in Transcaucasia, and arms sales to China. Indeed, in September, four months before his replacement of Kozyrev officially signalled the end of "romanticism" in Russia's relationship with the West, Yeltsin had issued a wide-ranging decree ("The Establishment of the Strategic Course of the Russian Federation with Member States of the CIS") which called for the creation of "an economically and politically integrated alliance of states" with@ Russia taking the lead in forging "a new system of inter-state political and economic relations over the territory of the post-Soviet expanse." Although Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov later solemnly declared that the sovereignty of all CIS states "is irreversible," he also said that this did not rule out economic reintegration.

Eurasianism seemed ascendant. Is the CIS Finished?

For a time, a cooperative strategy served Russia's interests as well as those of most CIS states. Decline at home, however, precluded Russia from providing the resources and expertise desired by CIS members lying to its south. Competing political factions in Moscow stifled policy initiatives and reinforced the influence of hidebound bureaucracies intent on staking out Soviet-style fiefdoms: indeed, bureaucratization may have become an even worse problem under Yeltsin than it was under Gorbachev. A persisting, ugly animosity between Yeltsin and the Duma made for stalemate and stagnation, both ofwhich heightened dissatisfaction in Transcaucasia and Central Asia. In addition, Russia's embarrassing military setback in Chechnya in 1995 left Yeltsin with little time and few resources with which to pursue an ambitious Eurasian strategy of integration.

In the non-Slavic sector of the CIS, Russia sought a mix of imperial influence, confederational integration, strategic denial, and security arrangements. But its faltering economy, inept efforts to create an effective customs union, weak currency, and growing emphasis on security threats have led individual countries to look elsewhere for development, trade, and even security. Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan want to attract Western investors and commitments to participate in bringing their natural gas and oil to Western markets; Kyrgyzstan sees China as a potential market for its abundant hydroelectric power; and Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova-together known as GUAM-formed an informal association to enlist Western help in developing the energy resources of Transcaspia.

At the CIS meeting in October 1997, Yeltsin admitted that too little had been done to foster economic integration. His proposals failed to rectify the damage. In the spring of 1999, Uzbekistan decided not to renew the CIS mutual-defense treaty; Georgia, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan followed suit, invoking clauses designed to curtail Russia's military presence and alerting Moscow to their interest in exploring options to their heretofore reliance on the Russian security connection. Along with Uzbekistan, there is a shared suspicion of Moscow's growing military presence and intrusiveness. The CIS seems destined for the dustbin of history. If so, it would signify a sharp setback to Moscow's hope to safeguard its exposed and weak southern flank by establishing a Russian variant of the American "Monroe Doctrine" in Trancaucasia and Central Asia.

An "Orthodox Axis"?

Russian strategists are deeply concerned by the failure to secure Russia's links to CIS states and by the paucity of promising options. Upset by signs of assertiveness in regions of Russia's historical preeminence and already uneasy over NATO's expansion to the East, they see further challenges in Western efforts to acquire a significant stake in Transcaspia's energy resources and pipelines and in NATO's attempts to develop military bridgeheads in Eurasia through a combination of joint exercises, arms sales, and defense-cooperation agreements. Innocuous individually, together these ventures may mislead regional actors into thinking that they are obtaining more from the Western powers than is the case; they may exacerbate Russian concerns unnecessarily, precipitating needless confrontations and reinforcing existing suspicions. It would be unfortunate if Russia believed that the United States was inclined to pursue a"Great Game" for influence in Eurasia.

At present, Russia feels isolated. With the exception of Belarus, it has no ally or close friend along its 12,500 miles of land borders. As it casts about for congenial partners, Russia can take little solace from its experience with policy oriented along religious or cultural fines. Pan-slavism, which was discussed but seldom influential in the late 192 century, was not a homogeneous force: some of its adherents stressed religion, others ethnicity, and still others the strengthening of the Russian state. Panslavism championed the liberation of Slavs ruled by the Austrian and Ottoman Empires. Though useful to Russia's rulers as a manipulative instrument, it rarely determined actual policy, and was never adopted as official policy or strategy.

In his widely-discussed Foreign Affairs essay, "The Clash of Civilizations?" Samuel Huntington postulates a future aggregation of major political coalitions and conflicts in international politics along civilizational lines. Broadly defined, culture is viewed as a primary determinant, reinforced by such catalysts of identity as language, ethnicity, religion, and historical memory. In Europe, for example, the divide of civilizations is between Western Christianity and Eastern Orthodox Christianity, in which Russia is the dominant power. Thus, Huntington notes that in Bosnia, Russia sided with Eastern Orthodox Serbia (Yugoslavia), while the West backed Roman Catholic Croatia.

However, reality is more complex than the most imaginative efforts made to conceptualize it. There is little likelihood that Russia will put much stock in the prospect of an alliance or alignment of partners based on shared cultural traditions. It understood that the West's strong military intervention in Bosnia on behalf of Muslims and against Serbs in late summer of 1995 was a reaction to the massacre of Muslims at Srebrenica. In Kosovo in the spring of 1999, the West's intervention against Serbia was again undertaken to help Muslims (Albanians). Moscow wanted to help fellow Orthodox Serbia, but it lacked the military capability to do so; diplomatic-ally it was thwarted by the refusal of kinship countriesGreece, Bulgaria, and Macedoniato grant permission for flights over their territory. Indeed, these Orthodox countries, looking to their own national interest, aligned themselves with NATO against Serbia. Even though they have reason to fear the emergence of a Greater Albania, they were reluctant to jeopardize NATO's goodwill and support. In the final analysis, the need to avoid a great power's enmity was worth more than any cultural-religious affinity for a beleaguered neighbor. None of this theorizing can succor a Russia intent on finding a counterweight to US power and intrusiveness in Europe and Eurasia. just as there was no "Orthodox axis" in the 1 9th century, there is no substance or geostrategic coherence for one in the 21 "century.

A power in decline, Russia knows it must adapt to an evolving international system unlike any heretofore known. Not only are empires and imperial expansion out of fashion, but so too are traditional alliancespatchwork coalitions of states seeking to contain the hegemony or ambitions of a rising power. At the dawn of a new century, nuclear weapons give otherwise weaker powers the ability to keep stronger powers at bay. It is of course true that globalization contributes to shaping the sea change underway in how governments relate to one another in the international system. But a tectonic shift in great power relationships is also in motion, taking us from a bipolar world to an acentric world.

Unlike the familiar multipolar world, each center in the emerging acentric world is characterized by possession of a credible nuclear deterrent. Such a deterrent obviates the need for alliances and rests on a strategy of nuclear deterrence. In June 1999, after its helplessness in the face of NATO's air war against Serbia, Moscow announced that it was predicating any future defense on a "firstuse" policy-a readiness to use nuclear weapons against any invading force or force threatening its security.

Virtually all of Russia's foreignpolicy elite, broadly conceved, would consider themselves derzhavnikibelievers in Rssia's great-power status-aswell as gosudarstvenniki-believers in strong central government. They blieve that as a nuclear superpower, Russia's interests in Europe, Inner Eurasia, Transcaucasia, and East Asia deserve recognition and respect. The perception of being marginalized by the United States has spawned a growing bitterness. But with the balance of power shifting against Russia and the domestic "time of troubles" showing few signs of abating, Moscow has a weak hand to play.

The Primakov "Doctrine"

Yevgeny Primakov, experienced academic, analyst, intelligence agent, diplomat, and respected politician, has as highly developed a sense of Russia's national interests as anyone in Russian politics today. As foreign minister in May 1998, he spoke at a ceremony commemorating the 2 00' anniversary of the birth of Prince Alexander M. Gorchakov, Russia's foreign minister during the reign of Alexander II.

Drawing on the Gorchakov legacy, Primakov used the occasion to compare the two epochs-the challenges Russia faced and the lessons to be learned. Gorchakov became foreign minister in 1856, the year after Russia's defeat in the Crimean War when "many thought they were present at a funeral for the Russian Empire or at any rate witnessing its transformation into a second-rate power." Primakov spoke with respect of his predecessor's skillful maneuvering and adept use of a variety of often contradictory tactics to safeguard and advance Russian foreign-policy interests. Having Russia's present situation clearly in mind, he contended that some of Gorchakov's views were as applicable now, and he singled out the following from Gorchakov's "arsenal of foreign policy tactics."

First, a weak Russia must not withdraw from the international arena, but on the contrary, pursue an active foreign policy. Even as Russia strives to implement necessary economic and military reforms (thus far, unsuccessfully), it must vigorously defend its position as a great power and as one of the principal players in the international arena.

Second, Russia should follow a multifaceted policy and avoid a unidimensional approach. In relations with the United States, Germany, France, Great Britain,Japan, China, and India congenial adroitness is important; but relations with secondary powers such as Turkey, Iran, Indonesia, Syria, and Greece must also be pursued. Without diversification of its foreign connections, Russia will not be able to overcome its difficulties or regain its great-power status.

Third, Primakov left no doubt that Russia had important chips to play. He stressed its "accumulation of political influence, special geopolitical position, early membership in the world's nuclear club, status as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, growing economic possibilities, and military production, which establishes the condition for military-technological cooperation with numerous foreign partners." Used cleverly, this assortment of diplomatic instruments can frustrate American policies and advance or safeguard Russia's interests.

Fourth, Primakov observed that many countries resent and fear a US dominated-world, and that their uneasiness could be mobilized to Russia's advantage.

Finally, like Gorchakov, Primakov believes that "there are no constant enemies, but there are constant national interests." Ruefully, he acknowledged the commission of serious mistakes during the Soviet period, when "we often deviated from this vitally important truth, and as a result in the circumstances of the time the national interests of our government were sacrificed in the struggle with 'permanent adversaries' and on behalf of 'permanent allies."' Today, he said, we need to pursue a "rational pragmatism" devoid of romanticism and unaffordable sentimentality, and Russia needs to look much farther afield for "constructive partnerships," especially to China, India, and Japan, as well as Iran, Libya, Iraq, and others.

How and when-and indeed if-Russia's leaders can turn the tenets of Gorchakov and Primakov into practice is one of the important questions whose answer lies in the decades ahead.

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Yevgeny Primakov greeted by US Marine Corps Commandant Gen. Charles Krulak as US Defense Secretary William Cohen looks on.

AUTHOR_AFFILIATION

ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN is Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania and Senior Fellow of the Foreign Policy Research Institute. His work include Red Star on the Nile (1977) and Moscow's Third World Strategy (1988).