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Financial contracting theory meets the real world: An empirical analysis of venture capital...

By Stromberg, Per
Publication: The Review of Economic Studies
Date: Tuesday, April 1 2003
HEADNOTE

We compare the characteristics of real-world financial contracts to their counterparts in financial contracting theory. We do so by studying the actual contracts between venture capitalists (VCs) and entrepreneurs. The distinguishing

characteristic of VC financings is that they allow VCs to separately allocate cash flow rights, board rights, voting rights, liquidation rights, and other control rights. We describe and measure these rights. We then interpret our results in relation to existing financial contracting theories. We also describe the interrelation and the evolution across financing rounds of the different rights.

1. INTRODUCTION

There is a large academic literature on the principal-agent problem in financial contracting.1 The papers in this literature often begin with a situation in which an investor negotiates with an entrepreneur over the financing of a project or company. Despite the large volume of theory, relatively little empirical work exists that compares the characteristics of real-world financial contracts to their counterparts in financial contracting theory.2 In this paper, we attempt to inform theory by describing in detail the contracts between VCs and entrepreneurs. We compare the actual contracts to the assumed and predicted ones in different financial contracting theories.

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