France's balancing act

Three hundred thousand demonstrators marched in Abidjan, the economic capital of the Cote d'Ivoire, on Saturday October 5, proclaiming their support for President Laurent Gbagbo and their displeasure with France. France, they claimed, was behind a recent army mutiny and coup attempt that has already resulted in more than 400 deaths, including that of General Robert Guei.

Guei is the man many suspected of conspiring with the French to instigate the rebellion. He had previously led a coup and taken power on Christmas Eve 1999, when he overthrew Henri Bedie.

Meanwhile, a smaller but just as vigorous demonstration was taking place at Bouake, in central Cote d'Ivoire, which had fallen to the rebels. Again it was the old colonial power France that was criticised, but here it was for preventing the rebel faction (regrouped around a new political party, the Mouvement Patriotique de la Cote d'Ivoire) from continuing their march south and taking control of Abidjan. That move would undoubtedly have resulted in even more death and destruction and led to the overthrow of President Gbagbo.

As all of these developments were taking place, a delegation of Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) Ministers were waiting impatiently at Yamoussoukro - Cote d'Ivoire's political capital. They were waiting for the arrival from Abidjan of a document with Gbagbo's signature accepting the ceasefire conditions as dictated by Ecowas.

BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE

Gbagbo, the legally-elected president of the country, had been determined to dictate the terms of any cease-fire agreement with the rebels, "in complete disregard," said one French diplomatic source, "of the true situation in which he finds himself".

Gbagbo's main problem is that the country's regular military, the Forces Armees Nationales de la Cote d'Ivoire (FANCI), are - in the opinion of the French intelligence services -- "completely demoralised:

Meanwhile, the young army officers leading the rebellion that now has taken control of the northern half of the country realise they have nothing to lose, and every chance of success if they wait before resuming their march on Abidjan.

Said one of the ECOWAS Ministers at Yamoussoukro airport -- increasingly irritated as the night-time curfew approached on October 5 - "Gbagbo and his government are obviously behaving in bad faith, and we've evidently come here for nothing."

But Gbagbo knew that his signature could easily be interpreted as an acceptance of the virtual partition of the country and a situation much like that of Sierra Leone or Liberia where central government loses control of substantial portions of its sovereign territory to armed rebels.

Gbagbo had accepted the presence of the ECOWAS delegation, but that acceptance had been more or less imposed on him. He would have much preferred the assistance of France under the 1960 mutual defence treaty. That would have obliged the old colonial power to send troops to prop up his increasingly unpopular government.

The French defence treaty should have - at least in the eyes of Gbagbo - been automatically triggered by the arrival of the forces of an outside power in the conflict.

Gbabgo lost no time in letting it be known that the rebels were in effect being supported by Burkina Faso, the mother country of at least 3m of Cote d'Ivoire's population of 16.4m. Most of those are Muslim, whereas the southern part of the country, under the control of Gbagbo and his ethnic 'Ivoiriens' tends to be either animist or Christian.

That's largely exaggerated, retorted the French military who were sent to Cote d'Ivoire, ostensibly to evacuate the 30,000 French, US and other Westerners in Bouake and Korhogo, the two principal rebel strongholds.

GROWING FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES

Cote d'Ivoire was, in any event, facing growing financial difficulties, despite higher cocoa prices and the recent release of some $380m in EU financial packages frozen for over three years due to the political situation in the country.

Cote d'Ivoire is an important member of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (Umemoa), and traditionally the strongest economy in Francophone Africa, providing 40% of Umemoa's economic GDP. The collapse of Air Afrique was symptomatic of the economic uncertainties that have been plaguing Cote d'Ivoire.

REBELS BETTER DISCIPLINED

As for the rebels, they may be relatively small in numbers but are much better armed, trained and disciplined than FANCI troops. Observers have also noted that having quickly taken control of the northern part of the country, little of the usual pillage that accompanies such military take-overs has occured.

That could change, however, say French diplomatic sources, as the rebels' ranks grow larger as they attract additional support from the north of the country - largely untrained and uneducated youths.

The rebel leaders, many of whom accompanied General Guei into exile after he was overthrown in October 2000, have proclaimed a 'collegial' leadership although four men have emerged as the prime leaders of the rebellion.

Sergeant Hercule is said to have been in charge of the sophisticated military strategy deployed since the start of the rebellion on September 19. The three others are a Sergeant Ousmane Cherif, Corporal Tchouk, and Adjutant Tuo Fozie, who have all served as spokesmen for the rebels during recent negotiations with the ECOWAS Ministerial delegation.

Although French defence representatives will not confirm or deny the story, all four have apparently been trained in France, which explains their knowledge of military strategy and relatively sophisticated weaponry.

The four men continue to insist that their objectives are apolitical. They have not yet given a convincing explanation of their aims in undertaking an uprising other than unseating Gbagbo, after which they have promised to hold elections and start applying the resolutions of last year's Forum of Reconciliation.

During one of his rare public meetings with the press, Sergeant Hercule said, rather undiplomatically, that he "couldn't care less" about the opinions of the international community. "If they (the international community) leave me alone, then you can be sure that I in turn will leave them alone too.'

French strategists familiar with the situation say they are puzzled by the military action and the real political motives behind the uprising. No prominent political figure seems to have been involved, with the exception perhaps of the late military strongman Guei.

The only other figure that might logically have been behind the uprising was Alassane Ouattara. Ouattara, a former Prime Minister, had been banned from taking part in the elections won by Gbagbo two years ago. He was banned because, although born in C6te d'Ivoire, his parents held passports from Burkina Faso and his nationality was considered suspect. He was, however, recognised as an Ivorian citizen in a recent High Court judgement.

As news of the rebellion broke in Abidjan, and a spate of attacks broke out against Burkinabe and other foreign nationals, Ouattara sought refuge at the French Embassy. French authorities say he is welcome to stay as long as he wants to, and no apparent effort has been made by the diplomats to stop him from publicly commenting on the recent political events in general or his bete noire, Gbagbo, in particular.

FRANCE PULLING THE STRINGS?

Could it be that the whole offair was masterminded by the French as a way of staging their return to a more active form of participation in African affairs?

It was not lost on anybody that the first major non-European diplomatic meeting conducted by the new French Foreign Minister, Dominique de Villepin, was in Libreville to meet with one of Francophone Africa's legendary strongmen, Omar Bongo.

President Chirac himself also made a stopover in Ndjamena, Chad on his way to the South African summit on Sustainable Development. Chad is a country that France effectively 'abandoned' under the previous government's policy of removing any military presence from former colonies.

Chirac is known to want to play a greater role in France's foreign affairs during the five years of his new Presidential mandate.

As far as the French political establishment is concerned, Ouattara is a man they feel they can do business with, especially now as the US is thought to be interested in Cote d'Ivoire's economic potential.

Strategists in Chirac's own camp fear that if France does not intervene quickly in the Cote d'Ivoire crisis, then American troops could be deployed, as originally announced by Washington, to protect the interests of their own nationals in the country.

And once US troops are deployed and US citizens are evacuated, that American intervention could well take on a more permanent presence.