Theorising professionalisation: a model for organising and understanding histories of the...

Introduction

Recent surveys of the accounting history literature identify the concept of professionalisation as a framework for writing histories of accounting associations in pursuit of professionalism (Carnegie & Napier, 1996; West, 1996; Carnegie & Potter, 2000). Understandings of professionalisation (and professionalism) rely on literature pertaining to the sociology of professions which, in many instances, is fragmented and disordered. Much of this literature concentrates on how professionalism can be defined (as a societal structure) or how occupations professionalise (through what process) (for example, see Wilensky, 1964; Vollmer & Mills, 1966; Freidson, 1970, 1988; Turner & Hodge, 1970; Johnson, 1972; Freedman, 1976; Larson, 1977; Collins, 1979; Parkin, 1979; Abbott, 1988; Macdonald, 1995).

This paper seeks to develop a model of professionalisation and professionalism which can help to create a conceptual "whole" from fragmentary concepts. The model is built around three key notions; conditions (of professionalism), dependencies (to be negotiated on the path to professionalism) and strategies (a threefold consolidation of the process of professionalisation). This model can structure organising principles for writing histories of professionalising activities of occupational associations of accountants and enhance understanding of those histories. Furthermore, a model dealing with professionalisation can, as suggested by the preceding points, assist in identifying aspects of the professionalisation of accounting which require further research and provide a framework for facilitating such research. Such a holistic model of professionalisation and professionalism is not found elsewhere in the literature.

The process of professionalisation is conceptualised as a series of interplays between occupational associations' and other social institutions, in relation to a particular set of conditions. Furthermore, interplays with other competing occupations are important in the struggle for occupational territory (Abbott, 1988). These interplays involve negotiation, posturing, confrontation, conflict and conciliation. The label "professionalism" is given to the outcomes of the process of professionalisation.2

The end-state - professionalism - is conceptualised as a "labour market shelter"3 (Freedman, 1976) where an occupational association has succeeded: in exercising "powers" of exclusion, demarcation and usurpation within the occupation (Weber, 1978; Parkin, 1979; Murphy, 1988); in achieving "control" of the market for services provided to consumers through the occupation (Larson, 1977; Collins, 1990); and in winning the ideological struggle involved in convincing consumers and government that "occupational independence" is a precondition of fulfilling obligations to consumers (Johnson, 1972).

It is argued that professionalism and professionalisation are two guiding concepts which can be used when writing and understanding histories of how occupational associations of accountants press their claims to be recognised as a "profession". Attributes of professionalism - control of work and power in the market for services (Johnson, 1972; Abbott, 1988; Freidson, 1994) - are significant for any analysis of how an occupational association achieves professional status, as is an ideological framework that rationalises, justifies and legitimises the use of such control and power. The process of professionalisation is theorised as the establishment and maintenance of the conditions that give rise to the exercise of control, power and ideology by an occupational association so that it can move towards, or attain the end-state of professionalism. The conditions associated with the attainment of professionalism have been recognised in the literature, which also recognises the dependencies involved in maintaining the monopoly position that professionalism gives over the supply of services. Professionalism is dependent on government acceptance that professionalism is in the "public interest", and on consumer acceptance that it is in their interest.

The paper traces the development of the theoretical model as follows. First, the components of the model, being professionalisation and professionalism and the conditions and dependencies associated with them, are discussed. This discussion is drawn from the general professionalisation literature and theorises: why professionalism attains societal acceptance as a way of controlling work and exercising power in the market for occupational services (conditions); what occupational associations have to do to achieve professional status (dependencies); and how occupational associations can manage such dependencies and conditions as they professionalise (strategies of professionalisation).

Second, from the professionalisation of accounting literature the paper explores diverse strategies that occupational associations of accountants are likely to engage in the process of professionalisation and distinguishes three overarching strategies. Finally, the paper concludes with a discussion of how the model can contribute to organising the writing and understanding of histories of the professionalising activities of occupational associations of accountants as well as how the model can assist in identifying areas for further research into the professionalisation of accounting.

Professionalisation

Professionalisation refers to the path taken by occupational associations to attain professionalism. This notion is referenced or alluded to in the literature with varying degrees of precision.

Larson (1977, p. 16) sees professionalisation as the process by which producers of special services seek to constitute and control markets for their expertise. Siegrist (1990, p.177) describes professionalisation as "divergent processes which occur within institutions of learning, the division of labour, the economic market, and areas of political and social power to generate an end result known as profession". Beckman (1990, p.l 17) suggests that it involves "raising the social standing of an occupational group mainly by means of higher requirements for formal training".

Vollmer and Mills (1966) defined professionalisation as a process by which an organised occupation, usually - but not always - by virtue of making a claim to special esoteric competence and to concern for the quality of its work and its benefits to society, obtains: exclusive rights to perform a particular kind of work; control over training for, and access to it; and control of the right to determine and evaluate how the work is performed.

Larson (1977, p. 17) elaborates her position in the following way:

Professionalization is thus an attempt to translate one order of scarce resources - special knowledge and skills - into another - social and economic rewards. To maintain scarcity implies a tendency to monopoly: monopoly of expertise in the market, monopoly of status in a system of stratification. The focus on the constitution of professional markets leads to comparing different professions in terms of the "marketability" of their specific cognitive resources. It determines the exclusion of professions like the military and the clergy, which do not transact their services on the market.

She states (p.6) that social mobility4 and market control are outcomes of a consistent and coherent course of action, even though "the goals and strategies pursued by a given group are not entirely clear or deliberate for all the members". Professionalisation as a process is directed towards exclusionary closure (a monopoly position) in the workplace (labour market) and in the (consumer) marketplace.

Most writers refer to a "process" of professionalisation leading to a particular type of end-state, such as: control of a market for expertise and upward social mobility (Larson, 1977); public recognition of professional status (Siegrist, 1990); raising the social standing of an occupation (Beckman, 1990); exclusive rights to perform a particular kind of work (Vollmer & Mills, 1966) and social closure (Macdonald, 1995). In general, discussion about professions generally has said little about processes - possibly because those processes are typically idiosyncratic and do not allow any prototype to be inferred easily.

There are a number of contributions to explaining the professionalisation of accounting. Carnegie and Potter (2000, pp.299-300) identified three "professionalising activities" in relation to accounting in Australia between 1975 and 1999 - "efforts to maintain rule-making sovereignty, to reduce competition from competing professional groups, and to enhance the jurisdiction of accountants". West (1996) saw that one critical aspect of professionalisation was the gaining of community sanction for the exercise of professional authority within certain areas, whilst admitting that "how such community sanction is achieved" is problematic (p.81).

Willmott (1986, p.558) saw professionalisation in accounting as a "strategy developed by skilled workers for consolidating and increasing the social distance between themselves and their clients". He argued that the success of such a strategy was dependent on acquiescence to, or support for the outcome by agents of the state. In turn, such acquiescence or support was dependent on a concurrent strategy of "responsibly" and "reliably" regulating the quality of services valued by clients. Carnegie and Edwards (2001, p.303) saw the strategic step involving formation of an organisational body as a visible public signal that professionalisation was underway. Ramirez (2001, p.392) conceptualised professionalisation as the implementation of collective strategies of "closure", deployed to monopolise economic and social rewards. While professionalisation is referred to as a process, and some key strategies are identified with the process - few writers explicitly "define" professionalisation.5 Instead the notion is given an implicit "taken-forgranted" meaning by reference to outcomes seen to emerge from the process - such as "monopoly", "status", "closure", etc. The question remains, what strategies do occupational associations use to arrive at such end-states?

In constructing the theoretical model for organising and understanding histories of the professionalising activities of occupational associations, this paper proposes conditions that have to be met to attain professionalism and dependencies that have to be maintained in securing this end-state. Professionalisation is characterised by the strategics used by occupational associations as they move towards meeting the conditions by managing the dependencies. The strategies direct (and "bracket") the process of professionalisation, which leads to outcomes where occupational associations: establish legitimate power (authority) over the supply of work; gain control over their members; and secure autonomy from government despite the monopolistic position of the association in the market for services (because the association has put into place conditions which will protect consumers). Figure 1 presents a diagrammatic representation of the model.

The three conditions of professionalism

The broad literature in relation to professionalism can be divided into descriptions of three conditions which characterise professionalism: (1) total legitimate power over the supply of services (professional power); (2) control over association membership (associational control); and (3) the appearance of benefitting consumers through the monopoly position gained by the association (sustaining ideology). The following discussion explores notions of power, control and ideology that are associated with these conditions.

Professional power

The first condition, professional power, is informed by Weber's definitions of power and authority (Weber, 1978). In general terms, he defined power as the probability of persons or groups carrying out their will even when opposed by others. He saw power as being an integral part of social relationships, while recognising that the differential distribution of power in such relationships leads to situations where life-chances are unequally distributed (in terms of the ability to obtain economic, social and political resources). He argued that power could arise from the possession of scarce economic resources, or from social status. Weber argued that those with power (ruling groups) attempted to legitimate their possession and use of it on three bases: tradition, rational-legal authority and charisma. Of the three modes of legitimating power, "rational-legal" authority was the most robust because it is based on the governance and legal processes of the state; thus, power takes on the authority of the state, and is thereby legitimated. Occupational groups which possess and exercise power with the (explicit, implicit or complicit) support of the "state" can claim that it is legitimated because it is based upon governance processes accepted by society at large.

Lukes provides an alternative view. He defines power by saying that "A exercises power over B when A affects B in a manner contrary to B's interests" (1974, p.34). In other words Lukes argues that power is exercised over those who could be harmed by its use, whether they are aware of it or not. Lukes posits three arenas for the exercise of power. First, power in decision making, where the focus is on behaviour in making decisions on issues over which there is an observable conflict of interest expressed as different policy preferences (p. 15). For example, if a government followed the policies advocated by trade unions, this would be symbolic of the power of the unions. second, power in non-decision making, when power is used to prevent certain issues being discussed or certain decisions being taken. Here individuals or groups exercise power by preventing those taking decisions from considering all the possible alternative sources of action, or by limiting the range of decisions that can be taken (p.20). Third, power can be exercised by manipulating the wishes and desires of those affected. Thus, a social group may be persuaded to accept, or even desire, a situation which is harmful to them (p.23).

Following Weber, Bacharach and Lawler (1980) distinguish between formal power - as authority which is formally legitimated by a means acceptable to those subject to it; and informal power - influence that is effectively exercised otherwise. Etzioni ( 1969) identifies coercion, remuneration and norms as means of enforcing power. Mintzberg (1979) and Bacharach and Lawler (1980) see possession of knowledge as a source of power (in addition to possession of economic resources or social status).

Birkett (1984, p.271) introduces the notion of hegemony to reference totalised forms of power in relation to professional associations. Hegemony extends the notion of legitimated power to encompass the complete acceptance of its possession and use by those affected; moreover, a value consensus lies across the spheres of legitimation and acceptance, binding the whole into a totality (Gramsci, 1971, p.263). Hegemony connotes the elimination of other sources of power in a domain (hence the notion of "totalisation"), and the support of legitimating authorities (the state) and the society at large (those affected by the exercise of power) bolstered by an ideological consensus that overlays the use of power, legitimating authorities and society at large (hence the notion of "wholeness"). In theorising power, Booth and Cocks (1990) equate hegemony with the achievement of domination as a totalising but subtle form of power. Of course, hegemony "exists" only as an "ideal type"; it is "never in principle either uncontested or absolute, but is only ever an unstable equilibrium, ultimately open to contestation by alternative social forces" (Milner, 1993, p.55).

Professional power refers to a particular form of hegemony in society, by occupational associations over both the production and supply of services to consumers in a particular domain or jurisdiction (Johnson, 1972; Birkett, 1984; Freidson, 1994). Professional power encompasses: the power to determine who shall be producers in the occupation's domain (that is, in the labour market); the power to determine the conditions under which services are supplied by producers to consumers in the occupation's domain (that is, in the market for services); legitimation by the state for the exercise of such powers; support for the exercise of such powers in society at large; (social) identification of the occupation with the occupational association; and the existence of ideologies which bind the practical exercise of such powers, through occupational associations, to legitimation by the state and societal acceptability. Professional power, like all hegemonic representations, serves as an idealisation, to be approached rather than realised -and always leaving open counter-hegemonic confluences in the occupational domain.

Professional power is distinguishable as a social phenomenon, with varying rationales being supplied for its existence. Following Johnson (1972, pp.42-3), it can be argued that professional power developed historically to resolve the social tensions arising in markets for services where there was high social distance between consumers and producers and consumer dependency on services was high. Professional power was deployed to ensure the quality of services provided and that they met the needs of consumers - thus reducing social tension in the market for services. Social tension would be reduced further because of the legitimacy and societal acceptability associated with the exercise of such power by occupational associations.

Once professional power became distinguishable as a social phenomenon, it would be pursued by occupations, via occupational associations, because of the monopoly advantages associated with it, not only in relation to the supply of services to consumers but also in relation to alternative producers in the occupational domain (Larson, 1977; Abbott, 1988, pp. 134-42). Professional power expresses an "authority" that is independent of the state, and thus is seen as a necessary condition of professionalism (Rueschemeyer, 1983, p.41; Freidson, 1994, p. 174; Macdonald, 1995, pp.4-6).

Threats to professional power can arise when: social distance between producer and consumer decrease, and consumer dependency decreases; there is a loss of support by government and other agencies of the state for the existence or exercise of professional power; there is a similar loss of support by society at large; an occupational association loses its identification with an occupation; there is difficulty in aligning the practical exercise of professional power with the ideologies of professionalism; and there is difficulty in sustaining an accord between the ideologies of professionalism and ideologies which sustain the state and society at large.

A further threat to professional power was identified by Roberts and Coutts (1992). They argued that "the feminization of professions is perceived as a possible threat to patriarchal power structures" (p.393) because it gives access to professional rewards which are at odds with women's lower status in society as a whole. Because of this threat, they propose that complex exclusion strategies have been introduced to reduce the threat to the professionalisation of accounting.

Kirkham (1992) warned against the exclusion of gender in the analysis of professional power in relation to the constitution of accounting knowledge and skills. Witz (1992) identified professionalisation as market power and the construction of a formal knowledge base where men mobilise gendered-based power resources to secure power and privilege knowledge. Loft (1992) reviewed a growing gender literature in accountancy in relation to who supplies accounting services and the conditions under which those services are supplied. She argued that it was important to consider the role of the gendering of the accountancy function.

Finally, Freidson (1994) argued that there has been a general tendency for professional power to decline in society and that professions were losing their cultural authority due to public skepticism, consumer activism and sophistication, and decreasing public respect. Such erosion is due to a shift of power to the consumer in the relationship between producer and consumer. Social distance is decreased as consumers become more sophisticated and are less dependent on the producer. Thus, both the need for professional power and the strength of professional power are becoming weakened; governments and society have less incentive to sustain it.

Associational control

The second condition of professionalism - control over association membership -will refer to all producers within an occupation, when an association has gained and is able to exercise professional power. Johnson (1972, pp.45, 51-2) saw control over producers in an occupation being exercised through the institutional frameworks of occupational associations. These institutional frameworks included capacities to act as a registering body for producers, and apply effective sanctions for inappropriate behaviour by them. They control: how producers engage with consumers in the market for services (Collins, 1990, pp.24-43); entry to practice (Burrage, Jarausch & Siegrist, 1990, pp.203-25); the knowledge base of the occupation, and the production of producers (Larson, 1977); relations between producers collectively and the state (Krause, 1996); the nature and structure of the occupation's work (Abbott, 1988; Macdonald, 1995); and the credentialling of producers (Freidson, 1986).

Control over membership is necessary for the exercise of professional power because it underpins the "regulative bargain" struck between an occupational association and the state and society (Larson, 1977). Such control is the practical mechanism for assuring that professional power will not be abused. If occupational associations are not in a position to control occupational membership, then they will be unable to warrant who is competent to practice and that practice will be directed to the interests of consumers; they will be unable to justify and buttress the monopoly advantages gained through the acquisition of professional power. Larson (p.71) saw supervision of the "production of producers" as a necessary condition for gaining access to the monopoly powers associated with professionalism. Freidson (1994, p. 10) saw a profession as "an occupation that controls its own work" - even though such control was a "right" that had to be negotiated and secured (Freidson, 1970, p.71).

Effectively, control of association membership involves control over the work of an occupation by professionals (Johnson, 1972; Freidson, 1994) - rather than consumers or the state. Threats to such control may arise from the state and the "capitalist power" (Krause, 1996) of consumers collectively, inter-occupational competition (Abbott, 1988), or the commodification (Elliott, 1972), routinisation (Johnson, 1972), or degradation of occupational work itself (Abbott, 1988).

Birkett (1984, p.271) saw control by an occupational association over its members being pursued by institutional frameworks ("rules, practices and conventions") directed to four ends - "homogeneity of membership", "homogeneity of service", the "social cohesion of members", and the "social identification of members with the collectivity" (pp.271-2):

Homogeneity of membership is secured by the development of rules governing recruitment, education and training, and by rules and conventions which prohibit or discourage specialisation and which do not formally acknowledge superior competence. Homogeneity of service is secured by the establishment of minimum levels of competence for practice (and the direction of educational and training endeavours to achieving this), by basing admission to membership on tests of such competence, and by establishing and enforcing standards of practice in different spheres of an occupation's work. The social cohesion of members is secured through socialisation processes which seek to inculcate norms associated with professionalism, and by the development of explicit codes of practice and behaviour which are supported by disciplinary procedures and sanctions for transgression. The identification of members with the collectivity is secured by the rules and conventions which govern membership, by the motivational effect of the advantages that accrue from professionalism itself or the possession of professional status, by organisational practices which are directed to this end or which have this effect (such as discussion groups, branch activities, social occasions, the use of journals and other modes of communication), and by practices and ideologies which support the notion of a professional career and personal identification with work.

Homogeneity is pursued to avoid differentiation and possible fragmentation of the occupation - so that competition cannot arise from within. Social cohesion and identification are pursued to attain effective collectivisation of the occupation, so that fragmentation and rupture of the occupation are put beyond contemplation.

Control of association members, and hence control of occupational work, provides a practical capacity to direct the exercise of professional power in ways that will be acceptable to the state and society at large. The competence and character of producers can be "controlled", so that the monopoly advantages accrued by access to professional power are not misused. These two conditions of professionalism, however, need to be explained, rationalised, and sustained by a "particular ideology of expertise and service" (Freidson, 1994, p. 10). Practice needs to be clothed ideologically, just as ideology needs to be given practical substance.

Sustaining ideology

Plamenatz (1970) defines ideology as a set of closely related beliefs or ideas, or even attitudes, characteristic of a group or community. Eagleton (1983, p. 14) aligns such beliefs with power structures: "By 'ideology' I mean, roughly, the ways in which what we say and believe connects with the power structure and powerrelations of the society we live in". Therborn (1980, p.2) emphasises the discursive nature of ideologies and their institutionalisation: "ideologies are social phenomena of a discursive kind, including both everyday notions and 'experience', and elaborate intellectual doctrines; both the 'consciousness' of social actors and the institutionalized thought-systems and discourses of a given society". Ideologies can take an overtly discursive form, or they can lie hidden and be taken-for-granted in social institutions.

Johnson claims that "elements of the ideology are most forcibly and clearly expressed by those occupational groups 'making claims for professional status' and engaged in an ideological struggle. Such occupations lay great stress on the need for occupational and individual independence as a precondition of fulfilling obligations to consumers" (Johnson, 1972, pp.57-8). Attributes such as "vocation", "trust relations", "ethical standards", "public-spiritedness", "altruism" and "disinterestedness" are associated with the ideological pronouncements or positions of occupational associations seeking or claiming professional status (Collins, 1990, pp.24-43). Velayutham and Perera (1995) included ideas of "public interest", "rationality" in the development of a body of knowledge, "universalism" in application, "functional specificity" and "autonomy" in practice, in their study of the development of traditional professional ideology. Willmott (1990, p.327) noted the importance of notions of "in the public interest" in insulating the UK accountancy profession from public criticism and enquiry.

The maintenance of sustaining ideologies is the third condition of professionalism. These ideologies deal particularly with the ways in which producers and consumers in the market for occupational services are expected to behave in relation to each other (Birkett, 1984, p.272):

The professional is expected to be guided by a motivation to provide service to the client, with competence and with integrity ... . In return, clients are expected to treat the power of the professional as legitimate authority and on this basis cede autonomy to the professional - in determining the nature of professional-client relations, in being free from direction or interference by others in the conduct of professional work, and in vesting inquiry, discipline and sanction in the professional association alone.

The ideology associated with professionalism offers service, competence and integrity - by producers to consumers. Moreover, professional authority is promoted as the mechanism by which the "structure of uncertainty" experienced by consumers, as a result of occupational monopoly, is managed and alleviated. Substance is given to this ideology by the way in which professional power is used, and occupational control is secured (Birkett, 1984, p.272):

Competence is assured by a conjunction of expertise and the control provided by a professional association. Integrity is also ensured by processes of occupational control - by the socialised norms governing individual behaviour and relations with clients, by codes of practice and associated disciplinary and sanctioning procedures, and by organisational processes which produce individual identification with the association as a collectivity and identification of the association with professionalism as a generalised social ideology.

For practitioners, the ideology of the profession is converted into "maxims of everyday life" (Burrage, Jarausch & Siegrist, 1990), through which they make sense of their work experiences and express their beliefs (Elliott, 1972, p. 132). On a larger scale, the ideology of the professions expresses a traditional ideal of service (Larson, 1977), inducing continued patronage by the society being served. Beyond this, the ideology of the professions makes sense of professionalism as a social institution, by indicating how professional power and associational control of members can be used by monopolised occupations to confer advantage on consumers and society at large. For the reasons which the ideology expresses, the agents of power in society ("the state") will confer authority on professional associations - so long as the ideology has sufficient substance.

In constructing the theoretical model for organising and understanding histories of professionalising activities of occupational associations of accountants, these conditions are proposed as having to be met in order to attain professionalism.

The end-state - professionalism

Professionalism6 refers to a set of conditions maintained by occupational associations that are sufficient to accord them authority independent of the state, and gain them support from government and consumers. Professionalism is achieved when the three conditions described above "exist" - when professional power is supported by associational control and apposite ideologies close the circle discursively by clarifying how occupational hegemony is put to good use and associational control is used to give substance to such claims. However, most writers on professionalism recognise that these conditions are more likely to be approached than realised, so that they constitute an "ideal type".

Freidson (1994, p.32) described his model of professions as an "ideal type". The features of the model included: total power to control work; organisation by associations that are independent both of the state and of capital; and organisation and administration of an unambiguously demarcated body of knowledge and skill or jurisdiction which members monopolise. Freidson argued that occupational associations which had achieved the conditions specified in the model would be seen as ultimate authorities on personal, social, economic, cultural, and political affairs within their domain of expertise. Larson (1977, p. 10) also saw professionalism as a special set of attributes that constituted an "ideal type". As attributes she included: a body of knowledge and techniques applied to work; training necessary to master such knowledge and skills; a service ideal; and distinctive ethics which justify self-regulation, autonomy, and prestige.

As an "ideal type", professionalism expresses an aspiration (for many), rather than a reality (for all). It represents a destination for occupational associations on the path of professionalisation, and a point of departure for those observing progress in this regard.7

The notion of an ideal type has been represented in terms of an "occupational shelter". Freedman's (1976) term "labour market shelter" connotes a level of strength in the labour market, where an occupational association has gained significant control over the supply of specialised labour in services markets and over the substance of demand for such labour (Freidson, 1994). An occupational association thus creates a monopolistic "shelter" for its members, by restricting other forms of supply and directing demand for services to its members; members of the association are "protected" by the "shelter" - they can look forward to positive discrimination by consumers, and a stable "place" where their skills and qualifications are recognised and rewarded. While Freedman used the term "labour market shelter" to characterise professionalism as an ideal type, Parkin uses the notion of "exclusionary social closure" (Parkin, 1979, pp.44-73) which produces distinctive occupational identities with the effect that occupations are set apart from (and in opposition to) other occupations (Freidson, 1994, pp.16-17).

The Weberian concept of "social closure" elaborates the notion of labour market shelter somewhat. Weber regarded society as being composed of individuals who pursued their own interests; this activity generated conscious groups, who were the bearers of ideas that legitimated the pursuits of these interests. In pursuit of their interests, social groups will seek to restrict membership of the group. Moreover, they will respond defensively to attempts by other groups to secure an advantage at their expense. Thus, they are said to be pursuing "closure" (for themselves) in a "social" domain.

In developing Weber's notion, Parkin (1979) and Murphy (1988) identified four types of social closure. First, exclusionary closure where the exercise of power by an occupational group is in a "downwards" direction and is primarily concerned with the definition of membership so as to exclude "ineligibles" (Parkin, 1979, p.450) or "outsiders" (Weber, 1978, p.342); definitions and delineation of membership are seen as critical parts of the "professional project" of occupational associations. second, demarcationary closure, an extension of exclusion whereby boundaries are defined to separate an occupation from "subordinate occupations"; Abbott (1988) discussed this notion in terms of jurisdictional disputes. Third usurpationary closure over the actions of those who wish to be eligible for membership, but are prevented from attaining it by the lack of key attributes, such as education; those excluded may, in response, devise ways to acquire the necessary attributes or force changes that make them eligible for membership. Finally, dual closure - the strategies of groups or occupations which have been excluded by others; they create their own occupational field, and establish their own exclusionary practices without any intention of amalgamating with the occupational group that excluded them; they create their own, competing exclusiveness.

Whether "professionalism" is characterised as an occupational or labour market shelter, or as a domain of social closure - it still stands as an ideal type, as a condition that might be achieved by occupational associations undertaking a process of professionalisation. But what key "dependencies" have to be maintained by occupational associations (of accountants) seeking this ideal "end-state"?

Key dependencies

Key dependencies, which occupational associations on the path of professionalisation have to manage, have been identified as: the domain of work, which the occupational association represents (Freidson, 1994); consumers in the market for services of the occupation (Larson, 1977; Streeck & Schmitter, 1985; Burrage, Jarausch & Siegrist, 1990; Krause, 1996); and the state, as a source of countervailing power (Skocpol, 1985; Streeck & Schmitter, 1985; Burrage, Jarausch & Siegrist, 1990; Krause, 1996).

Effectively, professionalising occupational associations operate in a network of power relations. They seek monopoly power (social closure). But they need to both navigate and negotiate the power that arises from the work they represent, the power of the consumers of that work, and the power of the state, representing society at large. If the power arising from the complexity and indeterminacy of occupational work diminishes, then progress towards professionalism will be made more difficult. Similarly, if the dependency and social distance of consumers diminish, then the power of the occupational association will diminish - inhibiting progress towards professionalism. And if the state is unwilling to accept the monopoly power of an occupational association, or accord it, then the path to professionalism becomes tenuous.

Work

Shifts in the nature and domain of work of an occupation are critical to its capacity to gain and use professional power. To secure the advantages arising from the use of professional power, an occupational association is dependent on task complexity in the work domain remaining high (or appearing to do so) and the set of technologies associated with these tasks retaining a high degree of indeterminacy (Johnson, 1972, p.41). An occupation's potential to access professional power will be reduced by contractions in task complexity or in the indeterminacy of taskrelated technologies (p.42).

Competition in the labour market (supply side competition) poses a threat to associational control. Other producers can compete for the work domain of an occupation, or existing producers can realign themselves to fracture the occupation - "stable boundaries between occupational roles" (Freidson, 1994, p.56) will then cease to exist, and an occupational association will lose its authority over producers and its capacity to control them. Consequently, the association will be unable to fulfill its (implicit) bargain with consumers in terms of controlling the competency and quality of service provision (Rueschemeyer, 1983, p.41) - prejudicing its capacity to deliver monopoly advantages to its members through the use of professional power (Freidson, 1994, pp.80-1).

Exogenous change of various types (technological, social, political and cultural) may intrude on an occupational domain, altering the set of tasks and their complexity. The set of tasks may become routinised or even may become irrelevant to consumer needs; new types of producer may become privileged as a result. Such changes can diminish the potency of an occupational association, reducing its access to professional power or its capacity for associational control.

Market

Professional power is exercised in markets for services (Freidson, 1986). Consumers of these services may be widely dispersed or concentrated, more or less organised or represented, and more or less knowledgeable about the quality of services they are receiving. Consumers of services may range, for example, from large corporations or public sector bureaucracies, to small firms and individuals.

Professional power may be confronted by shifts in consumer power. The structure of uncertainty facing (some) consumers (at least) may be reduced, attendant on reductions in information asymmetry (between producers and consumers) and reductions in social distance. Moreover, the dependency of consumers on a professional service may reduce, as its necessity is reduced or substitutes become available. Competition is likely to be a potent force in the market for services, as well as in the labour market. Bureaucratic or corporate control over service provision may compete or be co-incidental with associational control (particularly in the case of large-scale consumers of service); and, at the extreme, a type of service may be socially institutionalised, eluding associational control altogether (Armstrong, 1985).

Arguably, consumers in the market for (professional) services are becoming more sophisticated and knowledgeable generally, whilst many professional services are becoming more complex. Both these variables can erode professional power. The professional ideology of client interest, service, competence and integrity may be brought into question. Indeed, it may be replaced by a lack of trust on the part of consumers, particularly when there appear to be evident failures of associational control. This undermines the sustaining ideology underpinning professional power, exposing the latter to close scrutiny, severe questioning and possible rejection.

Exogenous changes affecting consumers in the market for professional services may alter the "structure of uncertainty" and "social tension" that they face. Globalisation, technological innovation, social need for a service, competition, and consumer organisation may all affect the potency and necessity for professional power in the market for services.

State

According to Mann (1993, p.55), "The state is a differentiated set of institutions and personnel embodying centrality, in the sense that political relations radiate to and from a centre, to cover a territorially demarcated area over which it exercises some degree of authoritative, binding rule-making, backed up by some degree of organised physical force". Government is one of the institutions within the state.

The state can either support or encroach upon the existence and use of professional power (Johnson, 1972); the stronger the state, the more pressure it can apply in either direction (Krause, 1996). Given these possibilities, state support (or recognition) is critical for occupational associations seeking to buttress their positions in labour and services markets with the authority of professionalism; the power of the state buttresses professional power either by recognising it or by allowing it to exist unchallenged (Larson, 1977). Larson (1990) saw that occupational associations with active "professionalisation projects" strove to obtain the backing of the state for their "exclusionary shelters in the market"; different associations in an occupation may compete for such backing. It is noteworthy that, in addition to being a mediator and an ally to professional associations, the state can become a "competitor" - by using its power to regulate supply and demand in markets directly (Elliott, 1972, p. 147), or through its imprint on the activities of occupational (professional) associations (Burrage, Jarausch & Siegrist, 1990).

Occupational associations can seek "strong" or "weak" forms of "alliance" with the state. They may seek or gain exclusivity in this alliance, or they may have to "share" in the alliance with competing associations. They can achieve licensure or registration (Parkin, 1979; Ramsey, 1988), which provides monopoly power. They can achieve a form of co-regulation with the slate, which may or may not have the same effect. Or they can achieve the capacity for self-regulation, in labour and services markets - drawing benign support from lack of state intervention, and accepting that this situation can only be provisional. Without some form of support from the state along these lines, it would be impossible for occupational associations to achieve the level of social closure associated with professionalism (Freidson, 1986, pp. 187-9).

Ramsey (1988) recognised that associational control over an occupation was as much a political phenomenon as an economic or social phenomenon; it could depend on the fortunes of politics more than any other factor. Hence, occupational associations have to negotiate strategies to "keep the state at bay" (Macdonald, 1995, p.119) through striking "regulative bargains" (Cooper et al., 1988 in Macdonald, 1995, p.116). According to Johnson (1972) state intervention or mediation in an occupation has the effect of creating divergent interests and orientations, and these divisions threaten the maintenance or inhibit the emergence of the "complete community" of professionalism.

Generally, state intervention in labour or services markets is justified by reference to the "public interest". While the "public interest" often is hard to define (Birkett, 1984, pp.286-92), it can work both ways: non-intervention as well as intervention can be justified by the "public interest". Professionalism, for example, may serve the public interest by eliminating deleterious effects of market imperfections or providing externality benefits to society beyond particular market encounters. On the other hand, it may be seen as inimical to competition in markets and as not serving the public interest in this regard. Occupational associations seeking professional status thus need to negotiate contending positions relating to the public interest, in seeking state support without state intervention in their domains of practice.

The "public interest" is used not only to reference particular modes of situated practice, but also a more generalised ideological proposition. As an ideology, it stands in contrast to other ideological positions - market or corporate efficiency and professionalism. Hence, occupational associations need to not only align their practices with the public interest (to gain state support) but also their ideological expressions of professionalism - so that professionalism and the public interest coincide, promoting the hegemony of the occupational association (in its domain of practice) within society at large.

Exogenous changes impacting the state or governments may impact their posture in relation to professional associations. Reassessments of priorities, budgetary limits, changes of governments or the ideological positions of governments in relation to market intervention - may all affect the "regulatory bargain" that occupational associations, singly or collectively, are able to negotiate with the state.

In constructing the theoretical model for organising and understanding histories of professionalising activities of occupational associations of accountants, these dependencies are proposed as having to be maintained in order to secure professionalism.

Strategies of professionalisation

The path to professionalism, as an end-state, traverses territories of conditions (professional power, control over association membership, and a set of ideologies which support them) and dependencies (work, market and state). Moreover, occupational associations need to manage the relationship between the conditions and dependencies in the process of professionalisation, because the attainment of the former is hostage to the latter. Realisation of the conditions of professionalism is dependent on factors operative in the domains of work, markets for services, and the state.

Within the accounting history literature which considers the professionalisation of accounting, strategies have been identified which bear on the nexus between these conditions and dependencies. Carnegie and Edwards (2001, p.304) recognised the formation of an organisational body (associational control) as a key strategy used in the pursuit of state recognised social closure - with the consequent granting of occupational privileges through "recognition" by the state and the attainment of monopoly powers bestowed by legislation. Edwards (2001, p.678) saw an occupational association as providing an "institutional mechanism for pursuing more effectively the ambition of professional status" (associational control).

Walker (1995) studied the reasons why Scottish accountants in Edinburgh and Glasgow in 1853 sought professional formation (associational control), and concluded that it was a collective response to the activities of a powerful group of London merchants whose proposals for law reform (founded on the dominant economic philosophy of mid-Victorian Britain) threatened the interests of accountants in Scotland (p.287). Further, Walker (2004) identified concern over inter and intra-professional demarcation of work and the protection of markets (professional power), rather than "the altruistic intent of protecting the public from the unscrupulous" (p. 151) as factors in the organisation of accountants in Liverpool, London, Manchester and Sheffield during the 1870s. In a study which examined the influence of the British Empire on the establishment of an accounting profession in Australia in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Carnegie and Parker (1999, p.78) nominated membership policy (associational control) as a specific professionalisation strategy.

Fleischman and Tyson (1999) investigated the pursuit of professional status (professional power) by the cost-accounting branch of the profession in the United States after the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) of 1933. This pursuit of status was directed at aligning cost accountants with public accountants who were seen to already have achieved such a standing (p.52). Sriram and Vollmers (1997), when studying the American Institute of Accountants from 1912 to 1940, recognised the development of codes of conduct (sustaining ideology), the establishment of educational standards and the creation of a national organisation with power to self-regulate (associational control) as strategies used to convince those in power within the state that the occupational association was worthy of the status represented by professionalism. Richardson (1997) theorised that achieving the status of professionalism required an occupation to successfully implement four strategies; market enhancement (professional power), which is achieved by developing a set of marketable skills; market closure (professional power), where work is limited to a particular set of practitioners; professional closure (occupational control), where the occupation controls recruitment to the group which has privileged access to market opportunities; and professional power which gives the occupational group control over work technologies and influence over clients (p.638).

Willmott, Cooper and Puxty (1993) argued that a Royal Charter conferred status and differentiated members within the market for accounting services (professional power). They further argued that it placed members in a strong position to gain a state-endorsed monopoly over areas of accounting practice. The pursuit (and attainment) of a Royal Charter is a strategy that has been identified with professionalisation (Walker, 1991; Poullaos, 1994). Walker found that, from 1854 to 1880, Scottish chartered accountants were able to gain a monopolistic position in the market for accountancy services on the basis of the sole possession of Royal Charters of Incorporation (sustaining ideology). Poullaos traced the attempts to obtain a Royal Charter by Australian accounting associations between 1904 and 1928, seeing such attempts being linked to attainments of the status of "professional", as much as to monopoly advantage.

In reviewing UK and US histories of the professionalisation of accountants, Lee (1995) identified the following as strategies: attaining legitimacy through gaining royal charters (sustaining ideology); instituting entry, education and training requirements (occupational control); attaining statutory registration of the title "professional accountant" (sustaining ideology); use of a journal to publicly signal the knowledge base of accountancy (sustaining ideology); developing accounting and auditing standards (professional power); and developing a conceptual framework as an intellectual basis for practice (professional power).

Allen (1991, pp.53-4) identified eight major strategies with the professionalisation of accountants. These strategies all have a bearing on the attainment of the conditions of professionalism: a code of ethics as evidence of a desire to serve the public interest (sustaining ideology); an exclusive expert knowledge base (associational control); control of education and entry where education is based in the university and monitored by the occupational association (associational control); definitions of competence levels with differing classes of membership (associational control); self-regulation predicated on expertise (professional power); promotion of a "professional image" (sustaining ideology); unification of disparate accounting associations, thus controlling all producers in the market (professional power); and state support of professional autonomy (professional power). Alien used these strategies to characterise the "development" of the Australian accounting "profession" between 1953 and 1985.

Some of the strategies used by Alien were identified by Carnegie and Edwards (2001, p.303) as "signals of movement" in the process of professionalisation: creation of a specialist knowledge base (associational control); appearance of an identifiable occupational group (associational control); and provision of specialist services requiring expertise (professional power). They argued that, after the formation of the occupational association, other "signals of movement" (p.304) involved: development of roles for a "professional body"; examination systems for membership; legislation to recognise expertise in service provision; and sponsorship of professorial posts and research activities at university.

In examining competition between colonial and imperial associations, Chua and Poullaos (1998) suggested that more than one strategy of professionalisation always was operative. They argued that market domination by an association is never complete nor continual (associational control), and that no one closure strategy is always effective; hence a range of strategies is used. They analysed the activities of the Incorporated Institute of Accountants (VIC) in its attempt to be recognised as the leading producer of accountants in Victoria between 1886 and 1903, and concluded that "closure" neither implied nor involved the total exclusion of competitors or the achievement of a "monopoly" position; instead a degree of closure was achieved - such as, "market dominance and legitimacy within the constraints and opportunities offered by (an) institutional milieu" (p. 182). They saw this as a more realistic objective of professionalisation strategies; diverse strategies were needed to negotiate market power because the membership "loopholes" constrained exclusionary policies, and "third parties" presented as much of an obstacle as "class" competitors.

The harnessing of state support is seen to be an important professionalisation strategy used by associations of accountants. Walker and Shackleton (1995, p.500) found that accounting associations in England and Wales and Scotland negotiated the situation in the 1940s and 1950s where "the state effectively conferred licensing powers on the profession in the realm of public company audits" (they failed, however, to attain the "registration" of public accountants). Walker and Shackleton (1998) also studied the British accountancy profession's attempts to negotiate bargains with the state between 1957 and 1970 in relation to the integration of different occupational associations into one profession - thus attaining "closure" (associational control). They concluded that success in the profession-ifate bargaining process was dependent on relationships between "organisational elites" and "departmental mandarins" (p.66), who managed agendas and information flows (p.67), so as to thwart integration for various "self-interested" reasons. Chua and Poullaos (1993; 2002) posited that a detailed mapping of the "state-profession axis" was crucial to understanding the professionalisation of accounting (2002, p.410).

Macdonald (1985) examined attempts at registration by accountants in the United Kingdom. Instead of gaining a legal monopoly, the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW) established a series of partial monopolies, aided and abetted by the state (p.553). Certain duties were specified to be carried out by "professional accountants" under various Acts and the specification was restricted to members of the ICAEW (professional power).

It is evident that the management of the process of professionalisation by professional accounting associations over time is likely to be context dependent, dynamic and piecemeal, in turn opportunistic and intentional. In its detail it is likely to involve (Birkett, 1984, p.297):

The negotiation of shifts in, and challenges to particular and general ideologies in situations of ambiguity; an interplay of strategy and posture; a confrontation of will and symbol; the manipulation of tenuous compromises; conflict and confluence of interests; the creation of patterns of structuration that produce regulatory frameworks in which the ebb and flow of policy processes produce substantive commitments and constraints; and a dialectic in which conflict, meaning and power are brought into some form of temporary accord through individual, organisational and inter-organisational accommodation.

Nevertheless, over time it will be seen to be directional (that is, towards professionalism) and patterns of progression (or otherwise) are likely to become apparent.

In the midst of such flux, it is convenient to identify three overarching strategies8 that occupational associations of accountants are likely to engage in the process of professionalisation. These strategies do not imply intention (much less a constancy of intention), but they will be apparent in patterns of emergence. They provide a vehicle for organising and understanding the detail of professionalisation, and exposing its underlying "rationality" in terms of the quest for professionalism. Each of these three strategies involves the patterning of a key dependency so that it favours or supports the conditions of professionalism as they relate to an occupational association. The three strategies can be expressed as follows:

* Strategy One: secure favourable alignments in the domain of work with the three conditions of professionalism - professional power, associational control, and sustaining ideologies. This strategy will focus on: task arrays and complexity, work-technology indeterminacy, competition in the supply of services, and exogenous change affecting the work domain - as these factors affect the conditions of professionalism.

* Strategy Two: secure favourable alignments in the market for occupational services with the three conditions of professionalism - professional power, associational control and sustaining ideologies. This strategy will focus on: structures of uncertainty, dependency, and the social tension of consumers; consumer power and trust; competition in the market for services; and exogenous changes affecting the consumption of occupational services - all in terms of their effects on the conditions of professionalism.

* Strategy Three: secure favourable alignments with the state in relation to the three conditions of professionalism - professional power, associational control and sustaining ideologies. This strategy will focus on various arms of the state, in relation to: alternative modes of state recognition, support and forbearance; competing claims for state recognition or support; alternative expressions of the public interest; and exogenous changes affecting modes of interaction between the state and professionalism.

It should be emphasised that: the relative emphasis given to these strategies may vary over time; not all need to be in "play" at the same time; each strategy may be served by varying arrays of activities; and that particular sets of activities may serve all strategies. Furthermore, the identification of these strategies here does not imply their "conscious" use, or even their "recognition" in these terms. They serve instead as an analytical device, for "bracketing" aspects of the activities of occupational associations of accountants over time that are significant in moving them towards professionalism.

Conclusion

This paper has developed a conceptual model which aligns processes of professionalisation with professionalism as an outcome. The model is built around three key notions: conditions of professionalism, dependencies to be negotiated on the path to professionalism and strategies which are used by professionalising associations to negotiate the dependencies so as to secure the conditions of professionalism. There are other models of professionalisation in the literature, but they have a fairly specific focus. For example, Freidson (1970, 1986, 1988) explores professional power whilst Abbott focuses on control of work "that brings the professions into conflict with each other" (1988, p. 19). The holistic model of professionalisation and professionalism developed in the paper is not found elsewhere in the literature and the significance of its contribution is that it draws on a whole range of variables in professionalisation.

There is a growing literature which considers the professionalisation of accounting drawing on the sociology of professions literature which remains, in many instances, fragmented and disordered. This holistic model is significant for the following reasons. First, as an organising principle for writing histories of professionalising activities of occupational associations of accountants. Thus far, studies of these professionalising activities have nominated key strategies in relation dependencies or conditions without identifying the nexus between them. This model can guide the writing of histories by offering an holistic framework which connects strategies of professionalisation to dependent relationships and supporting conditions for occupational associations of accountants attempting to secure professionalism as an end-state.

second, as a means by which understanding of those histories is heightened by finding complementary and mutually supporting stories as well as identifying contradictions that need resolution. In particular, the identification of strategies provides a vehicle for understanding the detail of professionalisation thus exposing irrationalities in the quest for professionalism. Third, as a means by which areas requiring further research are identified where the model provides a framework for facilitating such research. The general issue of strategies for in relation to the professionalising activities of occupational associations of accountants is underdeveloped in the literature.

The overall value of the model is not in its claim to superiority over other models. That claim can only be substantiated from empirical studies of how the model is more insightful in a given context or how this perspective has contributed more to an understanding of the history of professionalising activities of occupational associations of accountants. The contribution of the model lies in its capacity to create some order out of the chaos which is the literature on the sociology of professions dealing with professionalisation and professionalism: a literature which is used extensively in explaining the professionalisation of accounting.